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Abstract	
The health of migrants has attracted increasing attention in the international policy 
dialogue in recent years. Thailand is one of many countries where migrant health is a 
major political issue. This is because the country is situated at the centre of the 
Indochinese Peninsula and its economy is fast-growing relative to its neighbouring 
countries, particularly Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. As a result, Thailand has, for 
decades, attracted a large number of low-skilled cross-border migrants. The majority of 
these immigrants have passed the border without any valid travel document. However, 
most of the time, past governments did not impose strict deportation measures on these 
undocumented/illegal immigrants since they were considered a key contributor to the 
Thai economy. Measures often used by recent governments included granting them 
leniency for temporary residence, issuing work permits for certain jobs, and insuring 
them through public-oriented health insurance, namely, the 'Health Insurance Card 
Scheme' (HICS). 
The primary aim of this thesis is to evaluate (i) the enrolment of cross-border migrants 
in a public health insurance scheme, namely, the HICS, in Thailand through the 
viewpoints of various stakeholders, and (ii) the effects of insurance on use of services. 
Ranong province was selected as the study site since it had the largest proportion of 
migrants compared to other provinces. The main objectives are: (1) to explore how the 
HICS evolved over time in light of changes in surrounding policies, (2) to investigate 
the responses of local officers and relevant stakeholders towards the HICS and to 
examine how the policy affects migrants' health-seeking behaviour in practice, (3) to 
evaluate the outcomes of HICS in terms of utilisation numbers and financial 
implications for its insurees, and (4) to provide policy recommendations. A multi-
methods approach was employed. In-depth interviews, document review and facility-
based data analysis were undertaken. Policy makers, local healthcare providers, and 
migrants were interviewed. Thematic and analyses were applied. 
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The findings revealed conflicting ministerial objectives and gaps in both inter- and intra-
ministerial policies. In addition, policy objectives were not clear from the outset. While 
the health sector aimed to insure ‘all’ migrants, this was constrained by the security and 
economic authorities where the focus was mainly only on migrant workers who 
registered with the government. Besides, in reality, the boundary between ‘legal’ and 
‘illegal’ migrants was very fluid.  
Though the current government attempted to address policy gaps by overhauling the 
HICS and instigating a new measure, namely, 'One Stop Service', it is difficult to claim 
that the deep-rooted implementation problems were resolved. This situation was even 
more complicated at the local level as some frontline health officers adapted the policy 
in various ways, and occasionally made the policy diverge from its initial objectives.  
For users, the cost of registration was a significant barrier in obtaining the insurance 
card, and a reliance on private intermediaries (both legal and illegal) to help them obtain 
the insurance card was not uncommon. Besides, there were migrants who were neither 
insured, nor able to return to their home country.  
However, the HICS still had some merits in reducing out-of-pocket payment, and 
helping increase utilisation of services amongst insurees. It was noteworthy that the 
most important factor determining the number of visits was history of experiencing 
catastrophic illness, not insurance status, and this influence was even more apparent in 
Thai patients than in migrants. Evidence suggested that there might be insured migrants 
with catastrophic illness who still experienced difficulties in accessing services, let alone 
uninsured migrants.  
Unless policies to protect the health of this population are put in place, poor access to 
health services for the uninsured will continue being a serious public health problem, not 
only to migrant communities but also to Thai society as a whole. Both macro- and micro 
policy recommendations are provided, for example, integrating the different authorities’ 
information systems on migrants, amending some outdated laws and regulations, and 
strengthening the capacity of the insurance governing body. 	
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Section	1:	Background	
This section serves as the thesis' starting point and is composed of four chapters. The 
first chapter provides the outline of the whole thesis. It also describes the migrant health 
situation in a broader context: how it has evolved, current trends in international 
migration, and the importance of global and regional health policy discourses. Chapter 2 
presents findings from the literature review on issues related to migrant health. All of 
these points are linked in Chapter 3, where the story is narrowed down to the Thai 
context and gaps in knowledge are identified. The last chapter is Chapter 4, where the 
research objectives and the methodological outline are discussed.   
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Chapter 1: Background 
Chapter 1 considers why migrant health is a critical concern at the present time. The 
chapter commences with an overview of current migration trends (subsection 1), and 
summarises how migrant health is related to political, economic and human rights issues 
(subsection 2). Following this point, the attempt to include migrant health protection as 
part of the global momentum towards Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 
growing effort to achieve Universal Health Coverage (UHC), particularly in the 
Southeast Asia region, are described (subsection 3). At the end of the chapter, the 
document outline (subsection 4) and the expected academic contribution of this thesis 
(subsection 5) are displayed. 
1.1 Current trend and scope of international migration 
It is believed that more than 214 million people (constituting over 3.1% of the global 
population) are residing outside their country of origin. The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) (2010) estimated that if international migration continued at the 
same pace as in the last two decades, the number of international migrants worldwide 
would reach 405 million by 2050. The growth of people's mobility was due to a variety 
of reasons, such as economic pressures, low transportation costs, changes in 
demographic trends, environmental degradation, political conflict, domestic violence, 
and even human trafficking.  
Traditionally, most migration reports and policy discourses emphasised the movement 
from low and middle income countries (LMICs) to high income countries (HICs), so-
called, 'South-North' migration. However, it is now believed that the 'North-South' 
distinction does not accurately reflect the actual migration trend. Recent evidence 
showed that 'South-South' migration was rising sharply, from less than 20 million in 
1990 to almost 60 million in 2010, while 'South-North' migration remained stable at 45 
million during the same period (International Organization for Migration, 2013). This 
phenomenon is likely explained by many factors, for instance, an increasing demand for 
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labour in response to fast economic growth in the developing nations, plus political and 
domestic violence in some regions. 
So far there has been no universally accepted definition for the term 'migrant' in 
international policy discourses. In practice, this term was mainly applied to persons and 
family members moving to another country with the aim of obtaining better material and 
social conditions and of improving their and their family’s job prospects (International 
Organization for Migration, 2004). As used in this thesis, the term migrant followed the 
above definition but was limited to cross-border low-skilled migrants from the countries 
neighbouring Thailand. Other types of migrants, for instance, refugees, foreign 
professionals, and tourists, were beyond the scope of this study.    
Note that the term migrant often overlapped with the term 'alien'. The term 'alien' has 
been used in the nationality laws of many countries, including Thailand (United Nations, 
1948, Thai Immigration Bureau, 2004), and originated from the maxim of using 
'nationality' to define a 'nation-state' (UNESCO, 2015). The nationality principle often 
used 'nationality' as a 'tool' in deciding who the members of the nation-state are. This 
point was affirmed by the Hague Convention (1930).   
In theory, nationality laws should function in line with immigration laws. Using 
nationality as a measure, populations in a country are categorised into two main groups: 
(1) persons with nationality of the nation-state (nationals), and (2) persons without 
nationality of the nation-state (aliens). In addition, 'aliens' could be broken down into 
two subgroups: (1) people migrating from another country, and (2) people residing in 
the present country since birth. Concerning human mobility, in the receiving country, 
the nationals of another country were often treated as 'foreigners', while the 'non-
nationals' were often labelled 'stateless migrants'. A group of aliens residing in the 
nation-state since birth but not entitled to the present country’s nationality was called 
'in-situ stateless people' (Napaumporn, 2012), see Figure 1. An elaboration on the 
complexity (and even confusion) of these terms is presented again in Chapter 5.       
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Figure 1 Simplified diagram of various subgroups of 'aliens' 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Napaumporn (2012) 
1.2 Health of migrants through the international lens—
Why is it important? 
It is undeniable that citizens' health is a precondition for the sustainable development of 
all countries. A country with healthy citizens can expect economic prosperity since 
healthy citizens lead to an increase in a country's productivity, which in turn contributes 
to the expansion of government fiscal space and the increase in health and education 
investment (Webster and Sanderson, 2013). However, in the real world, this issue is not 
straightforward as almost all countries are constituted of both 'national' and 'non-
national' populations. This point leads to a critical question, that is, to what extent the 
health of cross-border migrants should be protected by the state of residence.  
Historically, the main concern was related to a contagion brought by migrants. An 
example was found in the US. The yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia in the 1790s 
was attributed to the arrival of the Caribbean people in the US (the disease was later 
called 'Barbados distemper') (Powell, 1949). Also, the cholera epidemic in the early 
1830s was linked to the influx of immigrants from Ireland (Rosenberg, 1987). 
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Loue (2012) opined that the prohibiting laws on migrants were promulgated according 
to three main presumptions: (1) fear that citizens of the host country would come into 
contact with germs/diseases carried by immigrants, (2) concern that the 'stock' of native 
population would be diminished in quality if it was combined with an 'inferior' migrant 
race, and (3) alarm that the host country's economy would face the expense of caring for 
immigrants.    
In the 20th century, the emergence of globalisation caused a paradigm shift to a modern 
economy that attempted to reap benefits from the circulation of human capital. A sharp 
increase in labour/economic migration has led to calls for better protection of the health 
and welfare of migrants as 'healthy migrants' represent a better economic contribution to 
the host country. Evidence showed that the purchasing power of migrants living in 
Australia was as large as €20 billion, and in the UK, in 2006 alone, migrants contributed 
up to £6 billion to the British economy (International Organization for Migration, 2013).  
Of note is that the idea of protecting health of migrants included not only legal migrant 
workers, but also illegal immigrants (the term, 'illegal', was often used interchangeably 
with  'undocumented', 'irregular', and 'clandestine', referring to anybody entering a 
country in violation of the immigration laws of that territory) (Loue, 2012). This was 
evidenced by the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1991), which expanded the definition 
of 'migrant worker' to 'anybody' who is engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of 
which he/she is not a national. 
The promotion of migrant health therefore expanded from economic protection to 
include a human rights aspect. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) has been considered the supreme maxim of the human rights issue (United 
Nations, 1948). The scope of human rights encompassed not only an individual's 
physical health but also his/her quality of life and social determinants as reaffirmed by 
several international covenants and conventions on human rights, such as Article 24 (3) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7 (1) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 12 of the International Covenant 
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on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 5 (d) (iii) of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) and Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (Napaumporn, 2012). The World Health 
Organization (WHO) (2002) also suggested that health and human rights were 
inextricably linked in three facets: (1) violations of human rights can lead to serious 
health outcomes; (2) health policies and programmes can promote human rights in their 
design or implementation; and (3) vulnerability to ill health can be addressed by taking 
steps to fulfill human rights, see Figure 2.  
Figure 2 Linkage between health and human rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: adapted from WHO (2002) 
The global momentum to protect the health of migrants was observed in a number of 
high-level dialogues, such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in 
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AIDS (UNAIDS) Board meeting in 2009. The WHO also called for migrant-sensitive 
health policies and practices through the World Health Assembly Resolutions (WHRs), 
including the WHR60.26 (2007) and the WHR61.17 (2008). Recently, the concept of 
UHC has been more emphasised. This was evidenced by the post-2015 SDGs, where 
UHC is one of the indicators (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2015b).  
Despite a marked progress towards better health and social protection for migrants, there 
are still a number of challenges when translating this concept into action. To achieve 
this goal, multisectoral and multidimensional policy interventions are required with 
adequate support from both domestic and international politics.   
1.3 Migration issues in ASEAN 
Southeast Asia is one of the world's most dynamic regions, with a substantial volume of 
migrant workers moving within the region, as well as between the region and the rest of 
the world (Guinto et al., 2015). In recent years, migrant health in Southest Asia has 
gained much attention in regional policy dialogue as the region has attracted large scale 
overseas investment due to its high economic potential and a sheer number of low-wage 
workers (Kantayaporn and Mallik, 2013). This situation was more pronounced 
especially after the ten member statesi of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
(ASEAN) agreed to work towards full economic integration, so-called, the ASEAN 
Community (AC), by 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007). With this situation, a further 
rise in migration can be expected. Destination countries were those with declining birth 
rates and with high demand for industrial sector labour, such as Brunei, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Note that some countries also exported a large number of 
workers to countries outside the region, for instance, Thai workers to Japan and Taiwan; 
or overseas Filipinos to the US (Kantayaporn and Mallik, 2013), see Table 1. 
                                                 
i Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, The Philippines,  and 
Vietnam 
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Table 1 Volume of cross-border migration amongst the ASEAN countries  
Origin 
Destination 
Brunei 
Cambodia 
Indonesia 
Lao PDR 
Malaysia 
Myanmar 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Total 
 Brunei NA 
  
-                  -   
  
-   
  
7,905                -   
  
1,003 
  
-   
  
-                  -   
  
8,908 
Cambodia 
   
-   
  
NA                  -   
  
909 
  
-                  -   
  
232 
  
-   
  
124,761                -   
  
125,902 
Indonesia 
   
6,727  
  
505 
  
NA   
  
-   
  
1,397,684                -   
  
5,865 
  
102,323 
  
586                -   
  
1,513,690 
Lao PDR 
   
-   
  
1,235                -   
  
NA   
  
-                  -   
  
-   
  
-   
  
110,854                -   
  
112,089 
Malaysia 
   
81,576  
  
816                -   
  
-   
  
NA                -   
  
394 
  
1,060,628 
  
2,251                -   
  
1,145,665 
Myanmar 
   
-   
  
247                -   
  
143 
  
17,034 
   
NA   
  
415 
  
-   
  
1,078,767                -   
  
1,096,606 
Philippines 
   
15,861  
  
728                -   
  
-   
  
277,444                -   
  
NA   
  
-   
  
6,778                -   
  
300,811 
Singapore 
   
3,033  
  
581                -   
  
-   
  
103,318                -   
  
288 
  
NA   
  
1,617                -   
  
108,837 
Thailand 
   
3,855  
  
50 
  
506 
  
734 
  
3,880 
   
226  
  
145 
  
13,919 
  
NA   
  
536 
  
23,851 
Vietnam 
   
-   
  
173,694                -   
  
8,167 
  
-                  -   
  
748 
  
-   
  
301 
  
NA   
  
182,910 
Total 111,052 177,856 506 9,953 1,807,264 226 9,091 1,176879 1,325,915 536 4,619277 
Source: Kantayaporn and Mallik (2013) 
Note: Limited to only documented workers where data available 
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While much attention has been devoted to the economic benefits of within-region labour 
migration, the health and well-being of migrants and their dependants still remain under-
explored. Though the ASEAN member states have agreed in principle to protect the 
rights of migrants (as evidenced by the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights of Migrant workers and by one of the strategic objectives under the ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Comunity Blueprint), the policy discourse on health and migration still 
focused on general issues regarding the spread of infectious diseases and border control 
measures, rather than considering broader health system changes to promote the holistic 
quality of life of migrants (Guinto et al., 2015).  
At the country level, Thailand is one of the important migrant-receiving countries in the 
region. Therefore it is benefical to draw lessons from how the country addresses migrant 
health issues through the operation of its existing public health insurance scheme for 
cross-border migrants and how this attempt is linked to the UHC concept.  
As stated earlier, the scope of this study focused on low-skilled cross-border migrants 
who were the primary target of the migrant insurance scheme managed by the Thai 
Ministry of Pubic Health (MOPH). However, deeper exploration revealed that the 
boundary between 'legal' and 'illegal' migrants was unclear, and this inevitably affected 
the population scope of the insurance policy. This point is discussed later in Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6, and Chapter 8. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
From now on, this thesis is structured into three sections. In Section 1, the introduction 
chapter (Chapter 1) sets the scene for this study, detailing why migrant health is of 
importance. Chapter 2 shows results from the literature review from several angles, such 
as theoretical concepts/theories concerning migrants' health and how health insurance 
policies for cross-border migrants are arranged in selected countries. Chapter 3 narrows 
this issue to the Thai context and presents gaps in knowledge, which in turn serve as a 
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basis for constructing research questions, research aim and objectives, and relevant 
methodology in Chapter 4.        
Section 2 (Chapter 5-7) displays the key findings of each objective. Chapter 5 elaborates 
on the evolution of migrant health insurance policy in Thailand as well as its interaction 
with other ministerial policies. Chapter 6 delves into the perceptions and challenges 
relevant to implementing migrant health insurance policy through the lens of local 
implementers and service users. Chapter 7 presents the quantitative outcomes of the 
policy.  
In Section 3 the key results from previous chapters are discussed in more detail to 
construct emerging knowledge/themes for this thesis (Chapter 8). Key policy 
recommendations and recommendations for future research priorities are presented in 
Chapter 9. Additional information, which is not the core of the thesis, is shown in 
Appendixes. 
1.5 Expected academic contribution 
It is expected that this thesis will contribute to knowledge on the issue of migrant health 
in various ways. This study can be regarded as multi-methods research. It also serves as 
an example of how health policy and systems research (HPSR) questions can be 
scientifically addressed in real-world settings.  
At the local level, this study helps identify the advantages and drawbacks of existing 
Thai health insurance policy arrangement for migrants. More than a decade since its 
implementation, there have been very few studies that assessed outcomes of the policy 
in a systematic fashion. Furthermore, there is little evidence of the views of frontline 
implementers in non-health sectors (such as employers of migrants or officials in non-
MOPH ministries) on migrant health issues.  
At the international level, since migrant health is now immensely related to the global 
momentum towards UHC, lessons from the Thai case study might be useful to both 
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developing and developed countries. This is because, though Thailand is a developing 
nation, it has a relatively strong healthcare system and has already achieved UHC like 
many developed countries.  
In addition, while most existing literature has discussed the constraints to managing 
insurance for migrants from the angle of individual attributes (such as language 
difficulty and cultural difference), this study attempts to explore this issue throughout 
the whole policy process. Also, the academic contribution of this study goes beyond the 
health sector, as it sheds light on the challenges of diverging interests and policies 
between authorities. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
This chapter presents the key findings from the literature review, which then served as a 
basis for constructing the research design and for identifying knowledge gaps. The 
chapter is divided into five subsections: (1) general theories and concepts about health 
and migrant heath seeking-behaviour, (2) international experience of health insurance 
management for undocumented/illegal migrants, (3) providers’ perspectives on 
challenges in the provision of care for migrants, (4) methodological concerns about 
policy evaluation research, and (5) conclusion. Subsections 1, 2, and 3 focus on issues 
related to migrant health, while subsection 4 is more focused on policy evaluation 
concept. 
A narrative review was undertaken in subsection 1, 2 and 4, as it is a useful approach for 
examining theories or concepts, while a systematic review was applied in subsection 3.  
Reason for conducting a systematic review in subsection 3 rather than a narrative review 
was because, while exploring relevant literature, the author discovered that though there 
existed some reviews of literature on challenges to care from the viewpoint of migrants, 
literature that explored this issue from providers' perspectives was quite limited.  
2.1 General theories and concepts about health and 
heath seeking-behaviour of migrants 
Most of the literature in this subsection was garnered from textbooks and research 
reports in the field of migrant health and migrant healthcare policy, for instance, 
'Immigrant Medicine' by Walker and Barnett (2007), 'Encyclopaedia of Immigrant 
Health' by Loue and Sajatovic (2012), and 'World Migration Report' by the IOM (2013). 
Additional information was sourced from electronic journals in Medline. This 
subsection consists of two parts: (1) Migrant health, and (2) Health seeking-behaviour of 
migrants—What are the challenges?. 
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I. Migrant health 
Migrant health is highly dynamic and affected by several factors. Zimmerman et al 
(2011) suggested that the migration process comprised five stages, namely, pre-
departure, travel, destination, interception, and return. Studies from different regions 
reported that migrants usually had lower public health utilisation than native people, as 
supported by Norrendum (2010) in European countries, Gonzalez-Block and de la 
Sierra-de la Vega (2011) in Mexico, and  Hesketh et al  (2008) in China.  
The low utilisation rate of migrants was more evident for some specific conditions, such 
as life-limiting illnesses (de Graaff and Francke, 2009, Shanmugasundaram and 
O'Connor, 2009) and mental diseases (Tarricone et al., 2012, Jackson et al., 2007); but 
less apparent in emergency care and inpatient admissions (Srithamrongsawat et al., 
2009, Norredam et al., 2010). Such findings suggested that migrants tended to seek 
formal care when they were critically ill. 
Some articles ascribed the low utilisation of migrants to the 'healthy migrant effect' 
(Thomson et al., 2013, Fennelly, 2007, Hesketh et al., 2008). This concept proposed that 
individuals who migrated to recipient countries tended to have favourable health status. 
David and Collins (1997) highlighted that in the US, Mexican, Caribbean and African 
mothers usually enjoyed a significant birth-weight advantage compared with US-born 
citizens. Wu et al also (2005) pointed out that migrants in Canada had 12% lower 
prevalence of unmet needs than Canadian-born residents.  
However, other articles explained this phenomenon differently. Razum and Rohrmann 
(2002) suggested that migrants’ low utilisation of health services was derived from 
intrinsic international differences in mortality patterns. Domnich (2012) reported that 
the healthy migrant effect was apparent in the US and Canada but less evident in Europe 
and in certain types of migrants, for instance, refugees.  
Furthermore, Ingleby et al (2005) explained that long-term residence in a host country 
tended to lead to immigrants’ health deterioration as a consequence of poor living 
36 
 
conditions and an inability to culturally integrate him/herself into the receiving society. 
Bollini and Siem (1995) called this phenomenon the 'exhausted migrant effect', while 
similar findings from the US and Canada referred to this as the 'immigrant paradox', 
suggesting that migrant individuals with a shorter stay in destination countries tended to 
have more favourable health outcomes than those with a longer stay. Bacio et al (2013) 
and Delavari et al (2013) ascribed this phenomenon to an erosion of protective cultural 
factors and an accumulative exposure to risky behaviours commonly found in a host 
country, such as smoking and substance abuse. Berry (2006) proposed that migrants 
displayed several approaches for acculturating to a host country, that is, 'assimilation', 
'separation', 'integration' and 'marginalisation'; so-called, 'bidirectional model of 
acculturation'. The model summarises acculturation as a degree to which migrants 
become submerged in a new cultural environment and how migrants maintain their 
cultural identity. According to the bidirectional model, 'marginalisation' was considered 
the most deleterious approach amongst the four strategies (Marks and Conn, 2012). 
Yoon et al (2013) and Schluter et al (2011) asserted that 'integration' was the most 
preferable acculturation strategy. Given this evidence, it can be concluded that cultural 
acculturation is an important factor that determines health of migrants, see Table 2. 
Table 2 Bidirectional model of acculturation 
Acculturation approach Maintain original culture, attitudes and behaviours
Discard/avoid original cultures, 
attitudes and behaviours
Adopt/apply new cultures, 
attitudes and behaviours Integration Assimilation 
Discard/avoid new cultures, 
attitudes and behaviours Separation Marginalisation 
Source: adapted from Berry (2006) and Schluter et al (2011) 
II. Health-seeking behaviour of migrants—What are the 
challenges? 
As stated earlier, migrants often had lower health-service utilisation than the host 
country's citizens. It is therefore of interest to explore the contributing factors to this 
phenomenon, and to this end a literature review for additional references was conducted. 
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The following search term, (("Transients and Migrants"[Mesh]) AND (("Information 
Seeking Behavior"[Mesh]) OR ("Illness Behavior"[Mesh]) OR ("Health 
Behavior"[Mesh]) OR ("Health Services Accessibility"[Mesh]) OR ("Culture"[Mesh]) 
OR (health seeking behavio*)) AND (hasabstract[text] AND ("2000/01/01"[PDat] : 
"2014/12/31"[PDat]) AND Humans[Mesh] AND English[lang]))) was applied in 
Medline. The selected abstracts were limited to literature published in English after 1 
January 2000. A total of 504 articles were recruited. Of these 504 articles, 75 employed 
a qualitative approach as the main method, whereas the remaining 429 articles were 
excluded since they employed quantitative methods with a primary focus on disease 
epidemiology or biomedical research. After excluding articles where full texts were not 
available and those focusing only on domestic migrants, 28 were left for the final 
review. See Appendix 1 for more detail. 
Almost all articles were published in developed countries (26/28), while there were two 
articles from developing countries (Huffman et al (2012) from Kazakhstan and 
Munyewende et al (2011) from South Africa). Most selected literature explored health-
seeking behaviour of migrants for general illnesses, except for some articles that focused 
on severe illnesses, such as Aranda-Naranjo (2000), Navaza et al (2012) and Weine et al 
(2013). The key challenges of migrants' access to care can be grouped into five 
categories as follows. 
1) Communication barrier: This barrier presented in a variety of diseases, from non-
severe illnesses, such as skin problems in Latino farmworker migrants in the US (Arcury 
et al., 2006) and dental problems in Iraqi and Lebanese migrants in Australia (Riggs et 
al., 2014), to life-threatening conditions like HIV/AIDS amongst African migrants in 
Spain (Navaza et al., 2012). Blignaut et al (2008) suggested that Chinese-born patients 
in Australia were reluctant to utilise public mental health services due to communication 
difficulties.  
2) Cultural difference and dissimilarity of views on Western medicine: Cultural 
differences shaped the attitudes and views of migrants towards Western medicine, and 
this led to ineffectiveness when conveying health messages to migrants. While 
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healthcare workers in Australia recommended putting a baby in his/her own cot to 
prevent sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), such health messages were often resisted 
by the Indian families as Indian migrant women regarded co-sleeping between a mother 
and her baby as a way to promote child security (Aslam et al., 2009). However, cultural 
dissimilarity did not always lead to negative consequences. For example, Islamic beliefs 
in Turkish communities in the Netherlands encouraged migrants with hepatitis B to 
receive treatment as soon as possible, to purify themselves before returning to god after 
death (van der Veen et al., 2009, Van Cleemput et al., 2007).    
3) Precarious legal status: Biswas et al (2011) showed that undocumented/illegal 
Asian migrants in Denmark feared being reported to the police if they visited health 
facilities. To cope with the citizenship status problem, some undocumented/illegal 
migrants applied alternative strategies to help them access health services, such as 
borrowing health insurance cards from their peers, and seeking help from charitable 
agencies (Biswas et al., 2011, Heyman et al., 2009). 
4) Poor housing and working conditions, and economic constraints: Cross-border 
migrants often worked in risky settings. Financial hardship also had a detrimental 
impact on the health of migrants. Walter et al (2002) found that the prevalence of 
occupational injuries was quite high in Mexican and Central American workers in the 
US, due to dangerous work environments, lack of training, and inadequate safety 
equipment. Since some migrants were engaged in low social-status occupations and/or 
illegal situations, they were likely to be treated differently to native citizens, and this 
might lead to more severe consequences, such as discrimination and harassment by the 
authorities (Munyewende et al., 2011, Huffman et al., 2012, Bollini et al., 2007) 
5) Mobile behaviour: Seasonal farm workers from Mexico in the US were more likely 
to be exposed to HIV/AIDS infection due to unsafe sexual practices (Aranda-Naranjo et 
al., 2000). Frequent mobility of Burmese migrants in London made registration with, 
and access to, general practitioners (GPs) more difficult. Huffman et al (2012) raised 
concerns over drug resistance in Uzbek patients with tuberculosis in Kazakhstan since 
their frequent mobility caused treatment delay and interruption. 
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2.2 International experience on the management of 
health insurance for undocumented/illegal migrants 
As shown in the earlier subsection, precarious legal status is one of the most important 
factors hampering access to care of migrants. It is imperative to investigate how 
receiving countries manage health insurance for undocumented/illegal migrants. 
It should be noted that a legal migrant may become an illegal one if he/she over-stays in 
a host country, while an illegal immigrant may become a legitimate resident if he/she 
undertakes the legalisation process.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are several terms defining illegal migrants, which are 
often mixed with the terms, 'refugees' and 'asylum seekers'. The operational definition of 
several subtypes of ‘illegal migrants’ for this review is displayed in Table 3 below.  
Table 3 Operational definition of undocumented/illegal migrants 
Type Definition
Irregular migrants Irregular migrants are those whose migration paths did not conform 
to legal provisions of entry and residence.
Undocumented 
migrants 
Undocumented migrants are third-country nationals without a valid 
residence permit or visa permitting them to live in the country of 
destination.
Involuntary migrants Any foreign-born people who have migrated to a country because 
they have been displaced from their home country, have an 
established or well-founded fear of persecution, or have been moved 
by deception or coercion.
Asylum seekers Asylees are persons applying for asylum under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention on the Status of Refugees on the grounds that they had a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
political belief and nationality if they returned to the country of 
origin.  
Refugees Refugees are asylum seekers whose application has been successful. 
Source: adapted from Biswas et al (2011) 
Literature was sourced from the database of the 'Platform for International Cooperation 
on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)', which explored health insurance policies for 
undocumented/illegal migrants in the European Union (EU) member states. Additional 
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literature outside the EU was explored, such as the Asia Pacific Journal and official 
websites of the authorities accounting for healthcare management for 
undocumented/illegal migrants in certain countries (Parikh, 2010, Department of Health, 
2015a).    
Gray and van Ginneken (2012) categorised EU countries into three levels according to 
the degree of care the state provided to undocumented/illegal migrants: (1) emergency 
services (limited rights), (2) primary care and emergency services (minimum rights), 
and (3) (almost) full range of care (full rights).  
The author further divided the reviewed countries into six groups according to the 
financing system of the main insurance scheme and the degree of care in the host 
country (see Table 4). This distinction was based on the assumption that different 
financing mechanisms might affect how migrants would be eligible for the insurance. 
For example, countries with payroll tax financing might require migrants to pay 
contributions, and this requirement might contradict the fact that most 
undocumented/illegal migrants were not allowed to have legitimate work in the host 
country. Thus it is imperative for the review to take into account the difference in 
financing systems.  
Table 4 Level of rights to healthcare for undocumented/illegal migrants in 27 EU 
countries 
Level of 
rights 
General tax 
financing  Premium or payroll tax financing  
Limited  
rights 
Finland, Ireland, 
Malta, Sweden 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Romania 
Minimum 
rights 
Cyprus, Denmark, 
The UK 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
(almost) Full 
rights 
Italy, Spain, 
Portugal France, The Netherlands 
Source: adapted from Gray and van Ginneken (2012) 
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Health insurance for undocumented/illegal migrants in Thailand provides (almost) the 
full range of benefits (including HIV/AIDS treatment), thus it might be justifiable to 
claim that, at least in theory, Thailand can be categorised at least in the 'minimum-rights' 
or even the 'full-rights' tier. Therefore, the review from this point onwards focuses on 
countries where at least basic primary care is provided. 
To attain maximal variability in terms of level of rights and financing management, this 
review focuses on four European countries, namely, the UK (basic rights, general tax), 
Germany (basic rights, premium), Italy (full rights, general tax) and France (full rights, 
premium). Moreover, country examples outside Europe were included. In this case, 
Japan and the US were selected because they are amongst the most popular destinations 
for migrants in Asia and America. 
Note that the review experienced challenges in acquiring up-to-date and accurate data of 
the number of undocumented/illegal migrants. The figures of undocumented/illegal 
migrants shown below were always approximate numbers. In addition, since the policy 
towards migrants in each country is dynamic, the data on undocumented/illegal migrants 
below might not reflect the situation at the present time.  
Moreover, it was difficult to set a clear line between 'legal' and 'illegal', or between 
'documented' and 'undocumented' migrants. This is because for countries where health 
care policies were open to all types of migrants, it did not mean that anybody could 
enjoy services without showing his/her identity. In practice, the laws in each country 
almost always required an undocumented/illegal migrant to undertake certain kinds of 
registration, however it did not mean that those registered migrants were fully legalised. 
The nuanced differences in citizenship status also reflected the complexity in population 
management policies, not just in the reviewed countries but also in Thailand (see 
Chapter 5).   
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I. United Kingdom 
As of 2010, the number of undocumented/illegal migrants was approximately 618,000 
to 1.1 million (Migration Watch UK, 2010). The main authority responsible for insuring 
the health of the UK residents is the National Health Service (NHS). The eligible 
beneficiaries of the NHS are 'ordinary residents' as specified in the 1989 Statutory 
Instrument No 336. Generally, a person residing more than 3 years in the UK is defined 
as ordinary resident, and this term normally includes legal immigrants. Ordinary 
residents are allowed to enjoy free NHS services in all range of care.  
For undocumented/illegal migrants, only certain services are provided free of charge, 
which include (but are not limited to), outpatient emergency care, compulsory treatment 
under court order, psychosis treatment, treatment for potential public threats (such as 
cholera, tuberculosis (TB), encephalitis, HIV/AIDS [in England and Scotland, but not in 
Wales], and influenza), family planning, and treatment for victims of violence.ii Note 
that maternity care is regarded as secondary care where undocumented/illegal migrants 
are liable to pay the treatment expense. Doctors are not allowed to delay treatment for 
patients with urgent needs who are unable to pay the treatment cost, but the incurred 
debts will be pursued later (Citizens Advice, 2015). In practice, there was still confusion 
in the NHS guidelines and regulations for dealing with undocumented/illegal migrants. 
Some NHS staff were unaware of the rights of these migrants (Piacenti, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the NHS attempted to resolve confusions by establishing a hotline service 
where healthcare staff can check the rights of each patient. Some Primary Care Trusts 
collaborated with non-profit clinics or charitable agencies in order to help 
undocumented/illegal migrants have better healthcare access (Cuadra, 2010b). 
II. Germany 
There were about 8.2 non-German nationals in Germany (~10% of its population). It is 
estimated that the number of undocumented/illegal migrants might be as large as 1.5 
                                                 
ii There are slight differences in migrant insurance policies amongst countries within the UK; most 
information in this review is from the English experience.  
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million. The refugee crisis of European region in recent years might have expanded the 
volume of migrants who applied for asylum by 330,000 (Berens et al., 2008, BBC, 
2015). 
The main public insurance system in Germany follows the Bismarck concept where 
social health insurance plays a dominant role. Standard insurance is funded by a 
combination of employee contributions, employer contributions and government 
subsidies on a scale determined by income level. Germany has a universal multi-payer 
system where private insurance companies under state regulation are the main insurer 
(pluralistic system). Contributions are waived in certain beneficiary groups, such as 
children and pregnant women. The benefit package is comprehensive. Legal migrants 
are required to make insurance contributions, similarly to German nationals. In 
summary, the German health insurance system is tightly linked to work and residence 
status (Gray and van Ginneken, 2012). 
Undocumented/illegal migrants’ rights to care are limited to certain services, such as 
post-natal care and infectious disease treatment (including HIV/AIDS, TB, and sexually 
transmitted diseases [STDs]). For such services, no charge is incurred by a patient if 
he/she applies for the Health Card (Krankenschein) with the Welfare Office. The state 
will issue a Toleration Certificate (Duldung), which guarantees the patient’s right to care 
while he/she is under a temporary suspension of expulsion. In some local regulations, 
the coverage of the Duldung also covers delivery and postpartum care. Germany also 
endorsed the Law of Infectious Diseases, which allows an undocumented/illegal migrant 
to participate in anonymous disease screening and counselling free of charge without 
showing his/her legal identity. Undocumented/illegal migrants without the Duldung are 
still allowed to enjoy emergency care without any charge. Healthcare providers can 
apply to have the cost of emergency treatment reimbursed by the Social Welfare Office 
upon the condition that the providers report the residence status of these migrants 
according to the law (Section 87 AufenthG). This practice indirectly creates barriers to 
care for some undocumented/illegal migrants who are afraid of being reported to 
immigration officials (Gray and van Ginneken, 2012). 
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III. Italy 
Of the 60 million residents in Italy, 3.5 million (~5.8%) are foreign-born (Cuadra, 
2010a). The estimated volume of undocumented/illegal migrants was one million. The 
main insurance system is the Italian Health Service, financed by general taxation. 
Insurees are required to register with the local authorities to obtain a Health Card 
(Tessera Sanitaria). The Health Card holder is eligible to enjoy comprehensive health 
services, including specialised care/treatment, but there is co-payment at point of care, 
varying by the beneficiary's income. Certain populations are exempted from co-
payment, such as those aged above 65, low-income, prisoners, persons suffering from 
chronic diseases, and pregnant women. Legal migrants are under the same regulations as 
Italian nationals (Gray and van Ginneken, 2012).  
Undocumented/illegal migrants are eligible to acquire a 'Temporary Residing Foreigner 
Code', with a 6-month validity. This serves as a guarantee to enjoy a variety of essential 
services. In general, the benefit includes treatment for infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS, 
TB, occupational injuries and maternal and child care (Cuadra, 2010a). However, there 
are subtle differences in the interpretation of scope of ‘essential service’ between 
regions. Healthcare providers are not obliged to inform immigration control or the 
police about the presentation of undocumented/illegal migrants, except where they 
suspect that the patients are involved with criminal activity (Brindicci et al., 2015). 
IV. France 
France is composed of 64.7 million residents. About 3.6 million of them are foreign-
born (~5.8%). The volume of undocumented/illegal migrants is approximately 300,000-
500,000 (~0.7%) (Gray and van Ginneken, 2012). French public health insurance is 
operated under the Universal Coverage Act. Employees and employers must pay 
contributions to the Social Health Insurance, controlled by the Ministry of Social 
Security. The contributions are exempted in some populations, such as pregnant women 
and children, and persons with a yearly wage less than €6,600.The benefit package is 
comprehensive. For outpatient care, a patient must pay for the treatment first but up to 
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70% of the total expense can be later reimbursed from the scheme (Gray and van 
Ginneken, 2012).  
The benefit package comprises primary care, secondary care, maternity and child care, 
emergency care, vaccination, family planning, public health threat treatment (including 
HIV/AIDS and TB), but migrants need to apply for the State Medical Assistance 
Certificate first (Aide Médicale d'Etat: AME). Evidence required for the AME 
application consists of birth certificate, expired passport and proof of residence and 
monthly income. The French healthcare system classifies the benefit for 
undocumented/illegal migrants into three tiers according to length of stay in the country. 
For the first three months of residence, the patients can access only emergency care free 
of charge. After three months, the benefit package is expanded to cover secondary care 
and high-cost items, with some exceptions, such as prostheses and corrective lenses. If 
the patient has been residing in France for at least three years, they can be eligible for 
'home medical assistance' (Assistance Médicale à Domicile), and other services, which 
are almost similar to French nationals.  
In 2004, the French government established a special fund for indemnifying unpaid 
debts of health facilities incurred from providing emergency care to uninsured patients 
(including undocumented/illegal migrants). The Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie 
(CNAM) is the governing body of the fund. Requests for reimbursement are considered 
on a case-by-case basis. Facilities must provide evidence to the CNAM to show that that 
the patient is uninsured and the treatment is really related to an emergency condition 
(Gray and van Ginneken, 2012, Hasuwannakit, 2012a). 
V. Japan 
Japan is one of the top destination countries for migrants in East Asia, with about 2.2 
million immigrants according to the IOM report (2010). However, the volume of 
undocumented/illegal migrants in Japan is much smaller than in other developed 
countries in the western world. Fujimoto (2013) suggested that the size of 
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undocumented/illegal migrants in Japan was around 67,000, and most of them were 
Chinese and Korean.     
The Japanese health insurance system is based on the Bismarck model, where employers 
and employees are required to pay contributions. There are four main sub-schemes, that 
is, (1) Social Health Insurance for large companies/enterprises, contributed by 
employers and employees, (2) Social Health Insurance for small-scale 
companies/enterprises, financed by tripartite contribution (employers, employees, and 
the government), (3) Citizens’ Health Insurance for the self-employed population, 
financed by an individual contribution plus the government's subsidy, and (4) Long-term 
Care Insurance for those aged over 75, subsidised by the central government with part of 
the budget cross-funded from the above three main schemes. The benefit package of all 
schemes is comprehensive but there is a co-payment at point of care of around 30% of 
the total expense (except for the elderly where exemption is applied) (Ikegami et al., 
2011). Legal migrant workers are required to pay contributions to the Social Health 
Insurance like Japanese citizens.  
The insurance system for undocumented/illegal migrants is not well established. 
However, there were some attempts to endorse laws that provide a safety net for these 
migrants, for instance, the Infectious Diseases Law ratifying the rights to TB treatment 
for everybody in Japan (this does not include HIV/AIDS), or the Tertiary-Level 
Emergency Care Unpaid Bill Reimbursement scheme, which aims to subsidise unpaid 
debts to the health facilities that provide complicated treatment for uninsured patients. 
Nonetheless, requests for reimbursement are considered on a case-by-case basis, and the 
system is effective only in some regions (such as Kanto region) (Calain-Watanabe and 
Lee, 2012, Parikh, 2010). The Mother and Child Health Law also provides pregnant 
women and their newborns rights to maternity care regardless of their immigration 
status, with the benefits including antenatal care, postnatal care and vaccination. 
However, some officials in welfare centres opposed the idea of providing care to 
undocumented/illegal migrants, and this situation created inconsistency in the provision 
of care across provinces (Calain-Watanabe and Lee, 2012, Parikh, 2010). 
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VI. United States 
The US is the nation with the most ethnically diverse population, with an approximate 
number of undocumented/illegal migrants of about 11.3 million in 2014 (Krogstad and 
Passel, 2015). The health insurance system varies across states. Normally, each state 
applies a pluralistic system, which is a combination of private and public insurance. The 
main insurance arrangements are (1) public insurance for the vulnerable groups, that is, 
Medicaid for low-income populations and Medicare for the elderly, and (2) voluntary 
private insurance. Some states provide state-sponsored insurance for individuals who are 
medically uninsurable through private insurance.  
Those who are not entitled to any scheme above are liable to out-of-pocket payment at 
point of care. In 2010, the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) was enacted. The Act 
made it illegal for insurers to refuse to insure an individual due to pre-existing 
conditions. It also increased coverage by expanding Medicaid to cover individuals and 
households near the poverty line, and by subsidising private insurance for middle-
income people (Hall and Lord, 2014). Legal immigrants and foreign-born residents have 
the same rights as US citizens.  
This review found an example from California, where the policy for 
undocumented/illegal migrants is quite relaxed. The local government established the 
state's insurance project for undocumented/illegal migrants, namely, restricted Medi-
Cal. To be entitled to the scheme, the applicants must provide a proof of residence to the 
officials, such as an expired visa or the residence card (California Department of Health 
Care Services, 2015, Hispanas Organized for Political Equality (HOPE), 2015). The 
basic benefit package includes: (1) emergency treatment, (2) acute, ongoing, and 
maintenance renal dialysis services, and (3) maternity and childcare (family planning, 
antenatal care, delivery care, and postpartum care up to 60 days).  
Beneficiaries can utilise such services free of charge. Aside from these services, patients 
are liable to have co-payment. However, disadvantaged or poor beneficiaries can apply 
under the Ability-to-Pay Plan, which is the programme that helps reduce treatment 
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expenses for a patient. The Plan subsidises cost of care in accordance with the patient's 
income. There is no charge for individuals in applying for the Plan if, after deductions 
(current taxes, medical insurance, child care and support payments), their monthly 
income is still less than 138% of the poverty line (around US$ 1,343 for a single 
applicant). If, after deductions, the applicants' monthly income is still above that 
threshold, they have to pay the monthly premium, varying between US$ 60-500 to be 
eligible for outpatient care. Yet the individual is still obliged to pay for inpatient care. 
The Plan also helps patients negotiate with a health facility in order to pay the treatment 
cost in instalments rather than a lump sum (Maternal and Child Health Access, 2014).  
In conclusion, the review found that each country has managed its health insurance for 
undocumented/illegal migrants differently, according to its health system context. Even 
where there are laws and regulations that ratify migrants' rights to care, these do not 
guarantee that migrants can enjoy their rights without constraints. Some common 
barriers include ignorance of healthcare providers about migrants' eligibility for health 
benefits, and variation in legal interpretation across regions. On the other hand, in a 
country where migrants’ rights to care are restricted, there may exist some extra-
mechanisms/channels, such as charitable organizations, that help migrants access 
essential care.  
2.3 Challenges in the provision of healthcare services 
for migrants: a systematic review from the providers' 
perspective 
In addition to the earlier review, which presented a macro-picture of international 
insurance designs for cross-border migrants, it is beneficial to explore this element in 
more depth. This subsection explores the evidence or real-life challenges encountered by 
healthcare providers when seeking to provide care for migrants.  
At the time of writing, there was little systematic review of this issue from providers' 
perspectives. Therefore, the author conducted a new systematic review on this matter.  
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The review question was: 'What are the perceptions and practices of healthcare 
providers in managing care for migrants, as well as the challenges and barriers that they 
often faced in the actual setting?'. 
I. Review methods 
Review framework 
The review defined 'healthcare providers/workers' as people engaging in service 
delivery (in the public or private sector) in structured facilities such as hospitals and 
primary care units. Note that family carers at home and health volunteers were excluded.  
The review framework was adapted from Ferlie and Shortell (2001), suggesting that 
challenges faced by a provider were shaped not only by individual attitudes towards a 
patient, but also by surrounding environment in which the provider was operating.  
The environment was divided into three levels, namely: (1) patient factors, (2) 
workplace factors, and (3) societal factors (specifically laws and regulations that 
stipulated the rights to care for migrants), see Figure 3. 
Figure 3 Review framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Ferlie and Shortell (2001) 
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Search strategy 
Since this review sought a broad description of the attitudes and perceptions of 
healthcare staff rather than aiming to assess this topic quantitatively, articles which 
utilised qualitative methods were considered more suitable for the review than 
quantitative articles. Accordingly, the search was limited to qualitative research articles.  
Potential articles were recruited from two main strands: (1) systematic search, and (2) 
purposive search. In the systematic search, the key search engines, namely, Medline, 
Embase and Scopus, were explored.  
In Medline, both 'Medical Subject Headings (MESH)' search, and text search were 
performed. In Embase and Scopus, where MESH terms are not available, an exploding 
search strategy was applied to encompass relevant texts as though the MESH terms were 
used.  
Publication date was limited to the time of writing, between 1 January 2000 and 30 June 
2015. Due to limited capacity for language translation, studies published in any 
language other than English were excluded. Table 5 indicates the search terms employed 
in the three aforementioned databases. Truncation and wildcards were carefully checked 
in all search engines. 
Table 5 Search terms used in Medline, Embase, and Scopus for the systematic review 
Search engine Search terms
Medline ((((("mixed method*")) OR (("qualitative study")) OR (("qualitative 
research")) OR (("Qualitative Research"[Mesh])))) AND (((("Transients 
and Migrants"[Mesh])) OR (("Emigrants and Immigrants"[Mesh])) OR 
(("migrants")) OR (("refugees*")) OR (("asylum seekers*"))) AND 
((("Health Services"[Mesh])) OR (("Professional Practice"[Mesh])) OR 
(("Attitude of Health Personnel"[Mesh]))) AND (("Health 
Personnel"[Mesh]))))
Embase (((exp migrant/) OR (exp refugee/) OR (exp asylum seeker)) AND (exp 
health care personnel/) AND ((exp health personnel attitude/) OR (exp 
professional practice/) OR (exp health service/)) AND ((exp qualitative 
research/) AND ("mixed method".mp.))) 
Scopus ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "qualitative research"  OR  "qualitative study"  
OR  "mixed method" )  AND  PUBYEAR  >  1999  AND  PUBYEAR  
<  2016 )  AND  ( ( ( ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "asylum seekers" )  AND  
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Search engine Search terms
PUBYEAR  >  1999  AND  PUBYEAR  <  2016 )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-
KEY ( refugee )  AND  PUBYEAR  >  1999  AND  PUBYEAR  <  
2016 )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( immigrant )  AND  PUBYEAR  > 
1999  AND  PUBYEAR  <  2016 )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( migrant )  
AND  PUBYEAR  >  1999  AND  PUBYEAR  <  2016 ) )  AND  ( ( 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "health personnel" )  AND  PUBYEAR  >  1999  
AND  PUBYEAR  <  2016 ) ) )  AND  ( ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "health 
service" )  AND  PUBYEAR  >  1999  AND  PUBYEAR  <  2016 )  OR  
( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "attitude" )  AND  PUBYEAR  >  1999  AND  
PUBYEAR  <  2016 )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "practice" )  AND  
PUBYEAR  >  1999  AND  PUBYEAR  <  2016 ) ) ) ) )  AND  ( 
LIMIT-TO ( LANGUAGE ,  "English" ) ) 
 
For the purposive search, articles and publications were retrieved from the WHO 
websiteiii and from the online grey literature database organised by the New York 
Academy of Medicine Libraryiv. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria and data extraction  
Abstracts of initially selected articles were screened by the researcher and a research 
assistant. Any disagreement in the decision on abstracts was resolved by discussion. 
Apart from the abstract screening, all other steps of the systematic review were 
performed solely by the researcher. Articles which passed the screening process were 
retrieved for the full text. Eligible studies were included if they met all the following 
criteria: (1) providing information about perceptions, attitudes or practices of providers, 
(2) presenting evidence relevant to cross-country migrants, (3) involving health services 
that were commonly performed in routine clinical settings, and (4) being primary 
research with sufficient scientific details of the methods used. 
Articles were excluded if they met any one of the following criteria: (1) failing to 
provide sufficient information about providers' perceptions, attitudes and practices; (2) 
engaging with domestic migrants rather than cross-country migrants, (3) not employing 
a rigorously scientific approach (that is, a selected article must pass the first two 
                                                 
iii http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/health_of_migrants/en/  
iv http://www.greylit.org/ 
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questions of the quality assessment checklist; see 'Quality assessment and data analysis' 
below) or purely representing an author's opinion (letters to the editor or commentary 
articles were left out), (4) not relevant to widely practiced modern medicine (health 
services which were specific to some cultures, such as Aruyaveda or Chinese herbal 
medicine, were excluded), and (5) being restricted to experimental or biomedical pilot 
programmes.  
Potential articles were then checked for duplication and the full text was screened. 
Studies were stored and tracked in a manageable computerised format by EndNote 
software Version X4. 
Quality assessment and data analysis 
The main results of each selected article were extracted and collected in the data 
extraction table. A quality assessment tool was applied from Spencer et al (2003) and 
the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklist (2013). The checklist is 
composed of 10 questions, each of which would be given an answer, 'Yes', or 'No', or 
'Cannot tell'. Passing the first two screening questions meant that an article’s research 
question matched the review objective, and the methods used were appropriate for 
addressing the research question. In this case, the article's full text would then be 
perused in greater detail.  
Articles which failed to meet the above screening criteria were not included in the data 
extraction table. Note that the assessment of quality in this regard did not apply a 
specific cut-off point to discard articles of seemingly poor quality. Instead it was used to 
remind audiences of any potential bias of the study. Framework analysis as suggested by 
Barnett-Page and Thomas (2009) was applied, that is, the key message of each article 
was summarised and charted against the above framework. A summary of the article 
selection process is presented in Figure 4 on the following page. 
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Figure 4 Article selection process 
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II. Results 
A total of 203 articles were obtained from the systematic search (41 from Medline, 59 
from Embase and 103 from Scopus). After discarding 43 duplicate articles, there were 
160 remaining articles. After combining with 17 articles from the WHO website and 7 
articles from the grey literature database, there were 184 articles left for abstract 
screening. Of the 184 articles, 37 passed the screening process and then the full text was 
explored for key messages. The quality assessment result of each article is shown in 
Appendix 2, and the key messages of each article are exhibited in Appendix 3. 
Of the 37 articles, three showed data from multi-country surveys (Dauvrin et al., 2012, 
Straßmayr et al., 2012, Sandhu et al., 2013), the remaining thirty-four are standalone 
study projects. About 68% of the reviewed studies (25/37) were carried out in Europe, 
followed by 24% (9/37) in America, and the rest in Australia and Africa. Only two 
studies were conducted in developing nations, that is, Costa Rica and Morocco (Goldade 
and Okuyemi, 2012, van den Ameele et al., 2013).  
The quality appraisal table in Appendix 2 reveals that the quality of the selected articles 
varied considerably. The most common concern regarding article quality was a failure to 
critically examine the extent of potential bias resulting from the role and experience of 
the researchers (reflexivity). Examples of articles which had a clear reflexivity issue 
were Abbot and Riga (2007), Akhavan (2012) and Byrskog et al (2015). 
Interaction with patient factors 
Almost all the selected articles (35/37) highlighted that language and cultural 
differences, and  lack of knowledge of a host country's health system, are perceived by 
providers to be common challenges (Abbott and Riga, 2007, Otero-Garcia et al., 2013, 
Hakonsen et al., 2014, Pergert et al., 2008, Terraza-Núñez et al., 2011, Suurmond et al., 
2013, Samarasinghe et al., 2010, van den Ameele et al., 2013). These difficulties 
significantly impeded effective communication between migrants and providers. The 
barriers interweaved with unfamiliarity with specific cultural beliefs of migrants, such as 
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patriarchal norms in Muslim culture, making it difficult for providers to address 
migrants’ illnesses in a holistic fashion. In light of this barrier, primary care physicians, 
were reluctant to delve into details beyond physical illness, and consequently shaped 
their practice to be more 'superficial' and 'straight forward'. This problem was 
highlighted by Rosenberg et al (2006) and Hultsjo and Hjelm (2005), reporting that 
language barriers made nurses in psychiatric emergency wards adapt the way they took 
patients’ medical histories, making the accounts less complex to avoid delving into the 
traumatic experiences of migrants. Dauvrin et al (2012) reported that providers in 
accident and emergency (A&E) departments, where treatment was more direct, were far 
less affected by language and cultural divergence than those in mental health and 
primary healthcare clinics. 
Furthermore, cultural beliefs, specifically gender preference, also played an important 
role. As expounded by Lyberg et al (2012), most male interpreters did not understand 
the demands of immigrant women receiving maternity care. Since it was difficult to 
deliver health services effectively, there arose a feeling of mistrust, meaning providers 
feared accusations of racism if they unintentionally made cultural mistakes 
(Manirankunda et al., 2012, Worth et al., 2009).  The mistrust problem was further 
complicated when it was combined with the fact that most migrant patients were 
unfamiliar with the health system of the country of residence (Sandhu et al., 2013, 
Englund and Rydström, 2012, O'Mahony and Donnelly, 2007).  
Interaction with workplace factors  
Respondents commonly cited in-house constraints resulting from huge work burdens 
and inadequate human resources and institutional capacity as common barriers (found in 
21 of 37 articles). As discussed by Straβmayr et al (2012), such challenges were more 
apparent when providers with highly specific expertise were in demand, for example, a 
shortage of skilled psychotherapists in mental care. 
To resolve communication barriers, interpreting services were set up as part of 'migrant-
friendly services'. Yet the availability of interpreting assistance neither guaranteed the 
quality of care nor ensured the interpreting service would be utilised in practice. 
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Akhavan (2012) and Farley et al (2014) highlighted that using interpreters was 
somewhat time consuming. Eklof et al (2015) and Lindsay et al (2012) emphasised that 
using phone interpreters increased the workload of nursing staff, especially in situations 
requiring urgent care. In addition, Lyberg et al (2012) found that an interpreting service 
was of little use in some circumstances, such as during delivery and maternity care. 
Nicholas et al (2014) suggested interpretation problems might be eased by using 
healthcare staff of the same ethnic background to the patients to serve as a bridge 
between migrants and healthcare providers. 
The respondents in some studies (7/37) mentioned contradictions between service 
provision guidelines of the workplace and beliefs of migrant patients (Foley, 2005, 
Fowler et al., 2005, Munro et al., 2013, Worth et al., 2009, Høye and Severinsson, 2008, 
Vangen et al., 2004, Wachtler et al., 2006). Foley (2005) raised an example where 
nurses in an HIV clinic in the US changed their routine practice by delivering medicine 
for HIV-positive migrants at places outside the patients' homes in order to avoid 
disclosing the HIV status of female migrants to their male partners. Hoye and 
Severinsson (2008) and Wachtler et al (2006) underscored that the mismatch between 
routine clinical service guidelines and migrant patients' beliefs increased feelings of 
stress amongst healthcare providers. An instance of intensive care wards in Norway was 
raised to support this notion, since the wards were often crowded by a large number of 
family members of immigrant patients, and this hampered care procedures of the 
nursing staff (Høye and Severinsson, 2008).  
Interaction with societal factors  
Societal challenges were reported in 25 of 37 articles. Different belief systems of 
providers and service users was an important challenge. For example, patriarchal values 
in Muslim migrants made female providers feel that they were not fully trusted by 
patients (Høye and Severinsson, 2008, Englund and Rydström, 2012). Nicholas et al 
(2014) mentioned that neonatal intensive care staff in Canada reported negative feelings 
towards the birthing rites of some immigrant families. The difference in belief systems 
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had some overlapping features with language and cultural barriers as explained above 
(interaction with patient factors).   
Aside from cultural differences, a discrepancy between immigrant laws and professional 
norms was observed. Professional norms more strongly shaped the behaviours and 
attitudes of healthcare providers than laws that prohibited migrant rights to care. In cities 
where policy regarding universal healthcare access was open for 'everybody', clinical 
practice was more relaxed. Nonetheless, the relaxation of laws that allowed 
undocumented/illegal migrants to enjoy services (for free or with little expense) did not 
guarantee that migrants would be able to access health facilities without constraints. In 
contrast, in countries where the rights of migrants were restricted, most health 
practitioners did not feel obligated by this mandate. Informing the police or government 
authorities about the presence of undocumented/illegal migrants was an uncommon 
practice, even though they were requested to do so (Dauvrin et al., 2012, van den 
Ameele et al., 2013, Kurth et al., 2010). Common excuses used by the providers were 
grounded on philanthropic concepts, recognising migrants as a vulnerable group and 
taking into account the potential threat to the public of leaving sick migrants untreated 
(Goldade and Okuyemi, 2012). 
Besides, administrative and financial burdens usually played an important role in 
limiting the migrants’ rights to care (Foley, 2005, Munro et al., 2013, Eklof et al., 2015, 
Donnelly and McKellin, 2007). Donnelly and McKellin (2007) exemplified a case in 
Canada where a breast cancer screening service for immigrants faced a huge funding 
cutback. Because of administrative delay, refugees and refugee claimants in Quebec 
found themselves uninsured despite having the right to participate in the Interim Federal 
Health Programme (Munro et al., 2013).  
Similar challenges also appeared in the US. To be insured at the city health centres in 
Philadelphia, an immigrant must first provide proof of residence to the accountable 
authority. Yet some African women had no documentation in their own name since they 
lived with male partners or relatives (Foley, 2005). Goldabe and Okuyemi (2012) 
reported healthcare providers’ opinions that allowing migrants to access emergency 
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services was reasonable, since it had advantage in preventing the country from 
experiencing public health threats (however, respondents reported that the benefit 
should not include treatment for occupational injuries because the profit of the treatment 
went to individual companies rather than the wider national population).  
Though this review aimed to identify 'challenges' encountered by healthcare providers in 
managing care for migrants, some 'enabling factors' could be identified. The 
introduction of an interpreting service as expounded in the earlier subheading 
(Interaction with workplace factors) could be regarded as a mechanism that facilitated 
healthcare access for migrants. Another obvious example was a collaboration between 
public healthcare providers and informal networks, such as charitable groups or non-
government organisations (NGOs). A reliance on informal networks/channels could help 
providers in the public sector overcome administrative and legal constraints since most 
NGOs or philanthropic agencies were less bound by rules and procedures than 
government authorities (Straßmayr et al., 2012, Health Protection Agency, 2010). A 
concrete example was in England where some health staff described confusion in the 
NHS regulations that limited some benefits (such as housing aid) for certain types of 
migrants. Therefore, some health professionals resorted to non-statutory organisations or 
civil networks to help fill this service gap (Health Protection Agency, 2010). 
III. Limitations of the review 
Despite a rigorous search design, this systematic review experienced some limitations. 
Firstly, the search did not encompass non-English-language articles, due to limited 
interpreting capacity of the researcher. Secondly, the majority of articles were retrieved 
from online databases and the selection was mainly based on the MESH terms. 
Literature from university-based reports, unpublished articles and domestic textbooks, 
were not thoroughly explored. Lastly, the review was limited to qualitative research 
articles only. The reason for confining the search in this fashion was that this review 
aimed to capture a broad understanding of the perceptions and practices of healthcare 
staff in providing care for migrants, rather than assessing this topic in a quantitative 
sense.  
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2.4 Methodological issues in policy evaluation research 
While subsections 1, 2, and 3 are about the 'content' of migrant health and migrants’ 
access to care, subsection 4 is more about 'methods' and 'viewpoints' towards policy 
evaluation research. There are two subheadings under this topic: (1) 
Challenges/conflicts between policy objectives and policy implementation, and (2) 
Trends in modern-day evaluation research. 
I. Challenges/conflicts between policy objectives and policy 
implementation 
Though this research focuses primarily on policy implementation, it is worth mentioning 
the whole policy process, from agenda setting and policy formulation to policy 
implementation and outcome evaluation (Walt, 1994). 
Ideally, in formulating a policy, policy makers should be 'rational'. The goals and 
consequences of all policy options should be carefully considered (Walt, 1994). 
Lindblom (1979) argued that, in the real world, policy makers often use the 
'incrementalist model'. The model suggested that policy makers usually explore only a 
small number of alternatives in dealing with problems and tend to select options that 
differ trivially from existing policies. That is, in practice a good decision is defined as 
agreement between policy makers.  
A critic of incrementalism is Dror (1989), who criticised incrementalists for being too 
conservative. With such a conservative approach, policies were likely to reinforce 
inertia and the status quo. Dror (1989) also argued that incrementalism was a sound 
approach in countries with high social stability but not in a situation where significant 
social changes were required.  
In policy implementation, experiences from many countries attest that, oftentimes, 
actual practice might deviate from a policy’s initial goals. The situation in the UK can 
exemplify this notion. Recently, the UK government endorsed the 'migrant health levy' 
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policy, which put an additional financial burden on the non-British service NHS users. 
However, some GPs in the UK expressed discomfort with this policy as it made them 
act like a 'border patrol’ officer rather than a clinician. As a result, some GPs found a 
compromise solution by removing (illegal) migrant patients from their patient list when 
contacted by the UK Border Agency (UKBA), then reinstating them later (Migrants' 
rights network, 2011). 
In general, there are two analytical approaches/frameworks to investigate how a policy 
is implemented, that is, 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches (Nilsen et al., 2013). 
Though this study focuses mainly on a bottom-up perspective, it is worth mentioning 
briefly the top-down approach. Besides, the more the study was conducted, the more the 
researcher found that parts of the phenomenon in the field could not be explained solely 
by the bottom-up perspective as parts of the implementation problems originated from 
the policy formulation process at the central level, which could be better explained by 
the top-down approach (see Chapter 5).  
Top-down investigators often ascribe implementation failure to problems deriving from 
central government policy makers, such as insufficient provision of resources and 
unclear or flawed policy messages (Schofield, 2001). Hogwood and Gunn (1984) 
defended the top-down approach by proposing some recommendations for policy 
makers to improve policy implementation, such as minimising the dependency 
relationship in a command line, making a job description as clear as possible, and 
getting rid of external circumstances that might impose crippling constraints on the 
implementing agencies.  
By contrast, bottom-uppers often criticise the top-down perspective for considering 
implementation as a purely administrative process (Nilsen et al., 2013). The bottom-up 
approach therefore pays more attention to variables in the field and views policy 
implementation as a complex process of translating policy intentions to action. One of 
the renowned theories which is recognised as a classic example for bottom-up policy 
analysis is the 'Street-Level Bureaucracy' (SLB), proposed by Lipsky (1980). The theory 
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suggests that what policy makers expect to happen may not always align with 
perceptions or preferences of local implementers, or 'street-level bureaucrats'.  
Lipsky (1980) defined street-level bureaucrats as those 'who interact with citizens in the 
course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work'. 
In this sense, health workers can be viewed as street-level bureaucrats. The theory also 
emphasised that the decisions of street-level bureaucrats and any mechanisms they 
invented to deal with work pressures and uncertainty might shape the reality of public 
policies.  
Some common adaptive behaviours of frontline officers are (1) rationing services (that 
is, prioritising their clients, in terms of who should receive benefits first), (2) controlling 
clients and reducing the consequences of uncertainty (routinisation of any request/appeal 
made by clients in a passive manner), (3) husbanding worker resources (developing 
work patterns to conserve the resources available), and (4) managing the consequences 
of routine practices (avoiding tackling complicated cases directly by referring them to 
other agencies, in order to protect their routine work).  
Moreover, Leichter (1979) proposed that the implementation of policy was influenced 
by several exogenous elements: (1) situation factors—referring to the transient and 
idiosyncratic atmosphere surrounding a policy, for example, violent events or a radical 
change in politics; (2) structural factors—the relatively unchanging elements of society; 
(3) cultural factors—value commitments within a community; and (4) international 
factors—events or values outside the boundaries of a political sphere, such as bilateral 
trade agreements and pressures from external donors.  
II. Trends in modern-day evaluation research 
In recent years, evaluation research has been moving away from a 'black-box' towards 
an 'open-box' approach. 'Black-box' evaluation focuses on the magnitude of programme 
effects, whereas the 'open-box' approach aims at expounding 'how' and 'why' such 
effects come about (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010, Pawson and Tilley, 2004). Having 
reviewed the literature concerning migrant health insurance in Thailand (presented in 
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Chapter 3), most literature rarely pointed out 'why' the insurance can (or cannot) boost 
service utilisation amongst the beneficiaries, 'what' the barriers in the policy 
implementation are, and 'how' health personnel overcome such barriers. These questions 
could not be answered by using only the 'black-box' approach. 
A qualitative approach is considered beneficial in providing a better understanding on 
'how' and 'why' a policy/programme turns out as it does in practice. A remarkable 
example on 'open-box' study was drawn up by Ssengoba et al (2012), explaining why 
performance-based contracting (PBC) policy failed in Uganda. The study highlighted 
that inadequate design and hasty selection of service targets meant healthcare providers 
were 'locked-in' to the poor choices. Such explanations complemented the findings of an 
earlier study by Basinga et al (2011), which pointed to a lack of improvement in child 
immunisation completeness after the introduction of PBC.  
From a quantitative angle, apart from 'how' and 'why' questions, the question of whether 
or not the success/failure of a policy is due to the policy per se is of equal importance. 
This point is related to the 'counterfactual' problem. Khandker et al (2010) defined the 
idea of tackling the counterfactual argument as an 'impact evaluation'.  
The impact evaluation is a quantitative assessment of what might happen in the absence 
of the policy/programme. Thus, the quantitative analysis, which adjusts for potential 
confounders, is important in addressing possible statistical bias in evaluating programme 
impacts.  
Therefore, applying the quantitative 'impact evaluation' concept alongside the qualitative 
'open-box' concept (through a multi-methods approach) might be helpful in obtaining a 
comprehensive view of a programme’s achievement, and this was the rationale for 
constructing the methodology for this thesis. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the following issues: (1) general conceptions of migrant 
health and health-seeking behaviour, (2) international examples of health insurance 
arrangements for undocumented/illegal migrants, (3) providers' perspectives on 
challenges and barriers to care for migrants, and (4) methodological concerns over the 
current trend of policy evaluation research.  
The review suggested that migrants normally had lower utilisation rates than the native 
populations. However, there was evidence arguing that the low utilisation rate of 
migrants was not necessarily due to favourable health status of migrants. The situation 
might be attributable to the fact that some migrants faced a number of barriers to care, 
including language difficulty, unfamiliarity with the host country's health system, 
economic constraints, and precarious legal status.  
The second topic considered experiences of insurance management for 
undocumented/illegal migrants in the six countries. The review reported that health 
insurance design for undocumented/illegal migrants varied across countries. Yet there 
are some common features in the insurance design: (1) emergency care and treatment 
for maternal and child health and communicable diseases were relatively open to all 
types of migrants, (2) though there were laws and regulations affirming the rights to care 
of migrants, these did not guarantee that migrants were able to enjoy services in reality 
since there were varying legal interpretations, and (3) in a country that tended to limit 
the rights to care of migrants, health practitioners occasionally requested support from 
non-government authorities to fill the service gaps.  
In the third topic, the systematic review found that perceptions, attitudes and practices of 
individual practitioners were markedly influenced by several factors. Diverse cultural 
beliefs and language differences created difficulties for providers to manage care for 
migrants, and these difficulties could not be addressed simply by establishing 
interpreting assistance. Limited institutional capacity, such as human resources resource 
and financial shortfall, could undermine the achievement of migrant-friendly services.  
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The fourth topic reviewed potential gaps between policy objectives and policy 
implementation. Though, ideally, policy makers were supposed to be 'rational' in 
formulating a policy, this might not occur in practice. At the implementation level, 
frontline officers might adapt their practice of the policy to manage day-to-day problems 
and this situation might create gaps between policy objectives and policy 
implementation. 
In terms of methods for evaluating the policy, there is now an increasing tendency to use 
an 'open-box' approach to better explain the real-world phenomenon rather than a sole 
reliance on 'black-box' approach. Besides, the concept of 'impact evaluation' is of 
important in policy evaluation research. 
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Chapter 3: Overview of migrant related policies 
in Thailand and identification of knowledge gaps 
Chapter 3 supplements the literature review in Chapter 2 by focusing on the Thai 
situation. The chapter is divided into four subsections: (1) an overview of the Thai 
healthcare system and a brief description of the main public health insurance system in 
Thailand, (2) an introduction to how Thailand defines its 'non-Thai' populations, (3) a 
literature review for identifying gaps in knowledge for this thesis, and (4) chapter 
conclusion. 
3.1 Overview of the Thai healthcare system 
I. Thailand at a glance 
Thailand is one of the founding members of the ASEAN in 1967. The geographical 
location that connects the India Ocean (through the Andaman Sea) with the Pacific 
Ocean (through the Gulf of Thailand) makes the country the centre of logistics and 
transportation in the Indochinese Peninsula. The country shares over 5,000 kilometres of 
land border with Cambodia (758 km), Lao PDR (1,750 km), Malaysia (576 km), and 
Myanmar (2,202 km). As of 2013, there were 89 official border crossing points, set up 
to accommodate the orderly transportation of goods and people, see Table 6.    
Table 6 Border crossing sites between Thailand and its neighbouring countries 
Thailand Length of the 
shared border 
(km) 
International border crossings 
Permanent Temporary Special 
permitted 
areas  
Total
Myanmar 2,202 4 14 4 22
Lao PDR 1,750 13 26 1 40
Cambodia 758 6 8 4 18
Malaysia 576 9 - - 9
Total 89
Source: Than Online (2015) 
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The majority of the population (96%) is of Thai ethnicity. The country's official 
language is Thai and Buddhism is the main religion (93%). The population rose from 
34.4 million in 1970 to 63.8 million in 2010. However, the population growth rate 
declined rapidly in the last three decades due to effective family planning. The total 
fertility rate fell from over 3 births per woman in 1980 to 1.6 in 2010.  
Demographically, there were slightly more females than males (51% v 49%). The ratio 
of children aged 0-14 to the total population shrank from 45.1% in 1970 to 19.6% in 
2010, and the percentage of people aged 65 or over almost tripled, from 3.1% to 8.9% 
during the same period. The adult literacy rate in 2010 was about 93.5%, see Table 7. 
Table 7 Demographic transition of Thailand between 1970 and 2010 
Demographics 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total population (million) 34.4 44.8 54.5 60.9 63.8
Population, female (% of total) 50.1 50.2 50.4 50.7 51.2
Fertility rate (total births per woman) 5.6 3.4 2.1 1.7 1.6
Population aged 0-14 (% of total) 45.1 38.3 29.2 24.4 19.6
Population aged 65 or over (% of total) 3.1 3.6 4.7 6.3 8.9
Adult literacy rate (% of total) 78.6 87.2 92.7 90.8 93.5
Source: adapted from Jongudomsuk et al (2015) 
Thailand is one of the countries in the region with a fast growing economy, especially 
during 1985-1996, when the country planned to establish itself as a newly industrialised 
nation. However, the country experienced major negative economic growth after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, and Thailand took almost 10 years to recover from the crisis. 
By 2006, the gross national income (GNI) per capita recovered to the same level as 
before the 1997 financial crisis.  
The fiscal space, measured by tax burden, was about 16–17% of the gross domestic 
product (GDP). Though it was relatively small, compared to the average for 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, it was 
slightly higher than most middle-income countries (Jongudomsuk et al., 2015). 
According to the World Bank criteria, Thailand is now recognised as one of the upper 
middle income nations as its GNI per capita has gone beyond US$ 4,125 since 2010 
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(World Bank, 2015). Though the labour force in the agriculture sector is quite large, it 
has been decreasing continuously. The contribution to GDP made by the agricultural 
sector was around 12% in 2010, almost half of the contribution in 1980. Despite marked 
economic growth, income distribution has not improved notably. The country's Gini 
index has never gone below 0.4, see Table 8. 
Table 8 Macroeconomic indicators of Thailand between 1980 and 2010 
Indicators 1980 1990 2000 2010
GNI per capita (US$) 710 1,480 1,930 4,150
GNI per capita, Power purchasing parity (US$) 1,050 2,800 4,800 8,120
Tax burden (% of GDP) - - - 16.0
Value added in industry (% of GDP) 28.7 37.2 42.0 44.7
Value added in agriculture (% of GDP) 23.2 12.5 10.3 12.4
Value added in service (% of GDP) 48.1 50.3 49.0 43.0
Gini coefficient  0.44 0.45 0.43 0.40
Source: adapted from World Bank (2015) and Jongudomsuk et al (2015) 
II. Thailand's healthcare system and its path towards UHC 
Thailand has extensive experiences in the development of its healthcare system. In 1942 
the Thai MOPH was founded. The MOPH has helped fuel the development of modern 
medicine for the entire nation, leading to a shift in health-seeking behaviour of the Thai 
population, from self-medication to facility-based treatment (Prakongsai, 2008).    
Before 1960, not all districts in the country had a district hospital. At that time, only 
certain large districts had well-established health facilities. Between 1960 and 1975, 
according to the National Health Development Plan, the government agenda was geared 
towards speedy development of health and education (Prakongsai, 2008). Accordingly, 
the district health system development project was launched in 1977 to provide all 
districts with full geographical coverage of district hospitals and health centres. By the 
late 1990s, the targeted coverage was achieved, resulting in the foundation of over 95 
provincial hospitals (tertiary care), 725 district hospitals (secondary care) and almost 
9,800 health centres (primary care) throughout the country (Tangcharoensathien et al., 
2013). The infrastructure improvements were followed by the engagement of a larger 
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health workforce. The number of physicians grew tremendously, from 8,000 in 1985 to 
over 40,000 in 2013—a fivefold increase in almost three decades, and more than a 
threefold increase in nurses was observed during the same period. The establishment of 
medical and nursing schools, particularly those outside Bangkok, contributed to a 
considerable rise in the country’s capacity to produce physicians and nurses. With the 
long term investment in healthcare infrastructure and human resources, Thailand 
achieved UHC in 2002 through the introduction of the Universal Coverage Scheme 
(UCS) (Evans et al., 2012).  
In terms of financing, since the early 1970s, previous governments had devised a 
piecemeal approach to expand health insurance coverage to all populations in Thailand 
(Towse et al., 2004). The 'Workmen's Compensation Fund' and the 'Free Medical Care 
for the Poor' were the first two public health insurance schemes introduced during the 
mid-1970s. These were followed by a variety of insurance schemes for Thai citizens, for 
instance, the 'Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme' (CSMBS), 'Traffic Accident 
Victim Insurance' (TAVI), the 'Low Income Card Scheme' (LICS), the 'Voluntary 
Health Card Scheme' (VHCS), the 'Social Security Scheme' (SSS), and finally the UCS.  
The policy for protecting the poor was first initiated in 1975, through the 'Free Medical 
Care for the Poor' policy, which gradually evolved into the LICS 1981. The LICS 
enabled the poor (with a yearly income below the national poverty line) to obtain 
government health services free of charge. The process of identifying eligible persons 
was means testing, and community leaders were involved in selecting the eligible 
beneficiaries. Evidence suggested the LICS experienced many operational problems, 
such as local prejudice and nepotism from community leaders, inadequate financial 
resources from the government, and relatively poorer quality of service compared to 
other schemes (Kongsawat et al., 2000, Pannarunothai, 2002). It should be noted that the 
LICS did not impose a nationality condition on its beneficiaries. Migrants or foreign 
populations, who were identified as 'being poor', were still eligible to buy the card. 
The SSS is a tripartite contributory scheme, in which employers, employees, and the 
government, all pay equal contributions to the Social Security Fund. The contribution is 
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5% of an employee's monthly salary. SSS beneficiaries are covered for both health and 
non-health benefits, such as sickness, death, invalidity, child assistance, and 
unemployment benefits. The Social Security Office (SSO) is in charge of purchasing 
health services from public and private providers by using a capitation contracting 
model.  
After three decades of a piecemeal approach of targeted health insurance schemes, the 
health insurance system in Thailand seemed to be composed of fragmented insurance 
schemes, each of which had diverse characteristics in terms of targeted population, 
benefit package, and provider payment method, see Table 9. 
Table 9 Chronological events of the development of various health insurance schemes 
for Thai citizens 
Year 
 
Events Insurance Characteristics 
Social 
welfare 
Fringe 
benefit 
Compulsor
y insurance 
Voluntary 
insurance 
1954 First Social Security Act     
1974 Workmen's Compensation Fund     
1975 Free Medical Care for the Poor     
1978 First private health insurance 
company    
 
1980 Royal Decree for Civil Servant 
Medical Benefit Scheme 
(CSMBS) 
    
1981 Low Income Card Scheme 
(LICS) 
    
1983 Maternal and Child Health 
Fund    

1984 Voluntary Health Card Scheme 
(VHCS)    
 
1990 Social Security Act covering 
enterprises with 20 or more 
employees 
    
1992 Free medical care for the 
elderly 
    
1993 Traffic Accident Victim 
Insurance    
  
1994 Social Security Act extending 
to cover enterprises with 10 or 
more employees 
    
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Year 
 
Events Insurance Characteristics 
Social 
welfare 
Fringe 
benefit 
Compulsor
y insurance 
Voluntary 
insurance 
1994 VHCS extending to cover 
community leaders and health 
volunteers  
    
1994 LICS expanding to the elderly, 
the disabled, and children aged 
< 12 years 
    
2000 Social Security Scheme (SSS) 
under the Social Security Act 
expanding to cover old age 
pension and child benefits
    
2001 Implementing the Universal 
Coverage Scheme (UCS)
    
2002 Social Security Act extending 
to cover enterprises with at least 
one employee 
    
Source: adapted from Prakongsai (2008) and Tangcharoensathien (2009) 
The fragmentation and the ineffectiveness of health insurance arrangements were one of 
many factors contributing to the establishment of the UCS. With strong political support 
from the newly elected government, and technical support from health reformists, policy 
analysts, and movements from many civic groups, the UCS was successfully 
implemented in late 2001.  
Since then, the country has seen three major public insurance schemes covering almost 
99% of the 67-million population. The first scheme is the CSMBS for government 
employees (~9% of the population), funded by general taxation and managed by the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). The second scheme is the SSS for private employees in the 
formal sector (~15% of the population), financed by payroll taxes equally paid by 
employers, employees, and the government. The SSS is regulated by the Ministry of 
Labour (MOL). The last scheme is the UCS, covering the rest of the population (~75% 
of the total population), including 18 million people who were previously uninsured and 
former beneficiaries of the LICS and the VHCS.  
The most remarkable change after the UCS was the establishment of the National Health 
Security Office (NHSO) to act as the sole purchaser on behalf of all UCS beneficiaries. 
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Though the NHSO is an independent public agency, the NHSO Board is chaired by the 
Public Health Minister. The 2002 National Health Security Act serves as the legal basis 
for the foundation of the NHSO. Moreover, the Act clearly indicates that every 'Thai' 
citizen has entitlement to medical care under the state's protection (National Health 
Security Office, 2002). Table 10 summarises key characteristics of the main three public 
health insurance schemes in Thailand. 
Table 10 Key characteristics of the main three insurance schemes in Thailand at present 
Insurance 
scheme 
Population 
coverage 
Source of revenue Mode of provider 
payment
Access to service
Civil 
Servant 
Medical 
Benefit 
Scheme 
(CSMBS) 
~9%, 
government 
employees plus 
dependants 
(parents, 
spouse, and up 
to 2 children) 
General tax, 
noncontributory 
scheme 
Fee for service, 
direct disbursement 
to mostly public 
providers and 
Diagnostic Related 
Groups (DRG) for 
inpatient treatment  
Free choice of 
public providers 
Social 
Security 
Scheme 
(SSS) 
~16%, private 
sector 
employees, 
excluding 
dependants  
Tripartite 
contribution, 
equally shared by 
employer, 
employee and the 
government 
Inclusive capitation 
for both outpatient 
and inpatient plus 
additional adjusted 
payments for 
accident and 
emergency and 
high-cost care
Registered public 
and private 
contractors 
Universal 
Coverage 
Scheme 
(UCS) 
~75%,the rest 
of the 'Thai' 
population not 
covered by the 
SSS and the 
CSMBS 
General tax Capitation for 
outpatients and 
global budget plus 
DRG for inpatients 
Registered 
contractors, 
notably the 
network of public 
hospitals 
(Contracting Unit 
for Primary Care)
Source:  Tangcharoensathien (2009) and National Health Security Office (2002) 
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3.2 Introduction to non-Thai populations and 
insurance management for non-Thai populations 
I. Who are non-Thais? 
The Thai Immigration Act (1979) uses the term, 'alien' ('tang dao' in Thai) to refer to 
any ordinary person who does not have Thai nationality. This definition is extremely 
broad, encompassing foreign workers, tourists, ethnic minorities, displaced persons, 
refugees, and stateless populations. However, Thai society often uses the term 'tang dao' 
to refer to migrants and their dependants travelling from countries with low economic 
status, whereas better-off groups, such as tourists and foreign professionals, are usually 
called 'foreigners' ('tang chad' in Thai language) (Thai Immigration Bureau, 2004, 
Taotawin, 2010). 
Confirming the actual number of non-Thais residing in the country is always irksome 
for policy makers. Different government agencies use different recording systems for 
tracking non-Thai populations. To date, there are three main official authorities 
responsible for collecting information on non-Thai populations, namely, the MOL, the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI), and the Ministry of Information and Communication 
Technology (MICT) with details as follows. 
1. The Department of Employment (DOE) of the MOL: The recording system of 
the MOL focuses on cross-border 'migrant workers'. A migrant worker is required to 
apply for a work permit. The DOE normally posts records of work permit holders on its 
website, which is updated on a monthly basis. By the end of 2015, there were more than 
1.5 million cross-border migrant workers in Thailand (Office of Foreign Workers 
Administration, 2015). Note that this figure excluded self-employed migrants and 
dependants of migrants; therefore it is very likely that the reported number was 
underestimated. The DOE classifies migrant workers into two main categories: (1) 
legal/regular migrant workers, and (2) illegal/irregular migrant workers. 
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I. Legal/regular migrant workers: There are five subcategories under this group: 
'Lifetime', 'General', 'Board of Investment (BOI)', 'Memorandum of understanding 
(MOU)', and 'Nationality Verification (NV)'.  
a) Lifetime: Lifetime migrant workers are those authorised for permanent 
residence and holding the Foreigner Identification Card for an indefinite period. These 
migrants are approved to work in Thailand indefinitely according to the Revolutionary 
Party Announcement No.332 in 1972, stating that 'a work permit granted to an alien 
who had resided in the Kingdom under Immigration Law and had worked before 13 
December 1972, is valid for the lifetime of that person except where he/she changes 
his/her occupation'. In 1980, there were about 27,000 foreigners who were granted 
permanent residence status and acquired the Lifetime work permit. Currently, the MOL 
no longer issues this type of work permit. Accordingly, the number of Lifetime migrant 
workers rapidly declined to 983 in 2014, and has remained constant since that time 
(Sciortino and Punpuing, 2009). 
b) General: This category includes foreigners who have obtained temporary 
permission to work in Thailand in a high-level position at a company/firm. Some were 
sent from the company headquarters outside Thailand. The minimum business income 
threshold to be approved for hiring migrant workers in this category is two million Baht 
(US$ 60,606). 'General' migrants are allowed to work in Thailand for up to two years. 
Most of them are Japanese, British, and Chinese. Each year, the number of these 
migrants varied between 70,000 and 100,000 (Office of Foreign Workers 
Administration, 2015). 
c) Board of Investment (BOI): Migrant workers in this category are quite 
similar to the 'General' group. The difference is the 'BOI' migrant workers are permitted 
to work in Thailand under special laws that aim to boost the Thai economy, such as the 
Investment Promotion Act  (1977) and the Act on Industrial Estate Authority of 
Thailand (1979). The majority of these migrants are posted in high-level positions, such 
as managers and advisors to large manufacturers. The stock of these migrants steadily 
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increased from about 24,000 in 2007 to over 37,000 in 2014 (Office of Foreign Workers 
Administration, 2015). 
d) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): 'MOU' migrants are workers 
engaged in low-skilled occupations. The majority of them are wage labour and domestic 
servants who are given permission to work in the country for two years, with a 
possibility of a two-year extension (not exceeding four years in total). Employers of 
these migrants can be either physical or juristic persons. These migrants are recruited 
through bilateral agreement between Thailand and neighbouring countries. The volume 
of MOU migrants in Thailand expanded from 14,150 in 2007 to more than 200,000 in 
2014 (Swaschukaew, 2014).  
e) Nationality verification (NV): NV migrants refer to formerly illegal 
migrant workers from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar who have already been in the 
country for a while and are in the process of converting their immigration status from 
'illegal' to 'legal' through the nationality verification process. The NV measure has been 
operated in parallel with the MOU policy, with the aim that the stock of NV migrants 
will gradually decline and will be substituted by the arrival of MOU migrants. NV 
migrants are low-skilled workers and this group constitutes the largest category of all 
types of all migrant workers in Thailand. By 2015, the volume of NV migrants was over 
1,000,000, and became larger after the instigation of a special policy, called the One 
Stop Service, during the junta era (more detail in Chapter 5) (Office of Foreign Workers 
Administration, 2015). 
II. Illegal or irregular migrant workers: Since in theory, the DOE cannot issue 
work permits to illegal migrants, there is no record of this migrant group in the DOE 
system. Nonetheless, the existence of a huge number of illegal migrants in Thailand is 
undeniable. Therefore, the MOL has in the past attempted to create systems to track this 
population by means of issuing work permit for 'illegal migrants who participated in the 
registration process'. The DOE classified this population into two subgroups.   
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a) Ethnic minorities awaiting Thai nationality verification: This group 
consists of migrants who have been living in Thailand for an extended period. The 
majority of them are tribal populations residing along the northern border. However, 
they were labelled as 'aliens' according to the Regulation of Resolution No.337 in 1972, 
the era of military government, which revoked Thai nationality for ethnic minorities 
during the Cold War. Some of them are native people who failed to register with the 
MOI as Thai nationals. Part of this population overlaps with 'stateless people' (this point 
is detailed later). The number of migrants in this category fell from over 50,000 in 2007 
to about 20,000 in 2014, as a result of the nationality verification measure (Paitoonpong 
and Chalamwong, 2011). 
b) Three-nations migrants: This category is a group of illegal migrant 
workers from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, or CLM nations, who were 
registered with the government under the amnesty law (Section 13 the Working of Alien 
Act (2008).  This stipulates that an illegal migrant can be issued a work permit, 
conditional upon Cabinet Resolution, while awaiting deportation. In other words, the 
government allowed illegal migrants to work for a certain period but these migrants 
must be registered with the MOL and the MOI to undertake the NV. The term 'three-
nations' is somewhat confusing, since in fact, these migrants are a stock of 'registered' 
migrants from CLM nations who were awaiting the NV or have recently undertaken the 
NV but the NV process has not been completed. Once the NV is finished, they will 
become NV migrants as mentioned above (in principle, this category should be called 
'pre-NV' migrants rather than 'three-nations' migrants; however, the MOL always used 
the term, 'three-nations', to refer to this population in its official documents) 
(Kantayaporn and Mallik, 2013). The first registration effort for illegal migrant workers 
started in 1992, then re-opened on a year-by-year basis until 2013. This migrant group 
expanded rapidly from approximately 100,000 in 2000, reached its peak at 1,300,000 in 
2009, and subsequently fluctuated around 900,000-1,000,000 after 2010 (Paitoonpong 
and Chalamwong, 2011). In 2013 the Thai government discontinued the leniency policy 
that allowed illegal migrants to temporarily stay and work in Thailand since this policy 
was replaced by 'the National Strategy on Comprehensive Management of the Illegal 
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Cross-border Migrants Problems (2012b)'. The Strategy emphasised that all illegal 
migrants who did not participate in the NV process must be deported. As a result, the 
MOL stopped recording numbers of migrant workers in this category in 2013. However, 
the fact is, after 2013 there were still a large number of migrants who neither joined the 
NV nor returned to their home country. This is one of the key reasons that, in 2014, the 
government launched a special measure, the One Stop Service, to clear up all existing 
illegal migrants (more details in Chapter 5).  
According to the above classification, the target population of the health insurance card 
policy for cross-border migrants (which is the focus of this thesis) comprises (1) 'MOU 
migrants' in the informal sector, (2) 'NV migrants', and (3) 'Three-nation migrants' (who 
then became the target group of the One Stop Service). A summary of the volume of 
various types of cross-border migrant workers in Thailand is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 Numbers of several types of foreign migrant workers in Thailand 
 
Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration, the MOL (2015) 
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2. The Department of Provincial Administration (DOPA) of the MOI: While the 
MOL assembles data on non-Thai workers in order to issue a work permit, the MOI 
(through the DOPA) is responsible for registering anybody with permanent or temporary 
residence in Thailand through the household registry. There are two types of household 
registration (Ministry of Interior, 2001).  
I. Tor Ror 14: Tor Ror 14 is a household registry for either, (1) a Thai national, or 
(2) non-Thai national who is granted a permanent legitimate residence. The latter group 
is mostly composed of ethnic minorities who were surveyed by the MOI during the mass 
registration policy for all residents in Thailand about fifty years ago.  
II. Tor Ror 13: Tor Ror 13 is a household registry for a non-Thai national who is 
granted temporary legitimate residence. The non-Thai nationals in this category can be 
divided into two subgroups: (1) those passing the border legally and showing a definite 
period of residence in Thailand, such as foreign business workers, foreign 
wives/husbands, and expatriates, and (2) formerly illegal migrants who had passed the 
NV or, in other words, NV migrants.   
In addition, there are other two special forms of the household registry. Strictly 
speaking, these are a 'profile record' rather than a household registry, which can be 
classified into two subtypes:  
I. Tor Ror 38/1: Tor Ror 38/1 is issued for illegal migrant workers and 
dependants who are registered with the authority. The difference between Tor Ror 38/1 
and Tor Ror 13 is that Tor Ror 38/1 is for migrant workers whose NV process has not 
been completed. Tor Ror 38/1 comes together with the national identification number 
(ID), or 13-digit number, beginning with '00', and this ID serves as the official identifier 
for illegal migrants while the NV is on the way. Of note is that a Thai national acquires 
a national ID at birth but the number appearing on the ID card starts with non-zero 
integers (such as 1XXXXXXXXXXXX). The relationship between Tor Ror 38/1 and 
the health insurance policy for migrants is described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
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II. Tor Ror 38kor: Tor Ror 38kor is for people with citizenship problems, who are 
often called 'stateless people'. Similar to Tor Ror 38/1, by being issued of Tor Ror 
38kor, a stateless person will acquire a 13-digit ID, but the difference is the ID for 
stateless people commences with '0'. Stateless people are persons who failed to register 
for a birth certificate for various reasons (such as geographical barriers or ignorance of 
the Thai civil registry system). Though most of them are ethnic minorities, the stateless 
population also includes children of (both Thai and foreign) parents, who have not 
joined the civil registration in any country, and foreign migrant workers who cannot 
return to their country of origin (or in other words, the country of origin refused to ratify 
their nationality). The size of the stateless population in Thailand is about 500,000-
700,000. Note that some civil groups and academics regard the term 'stateless' as 
misleading because these people are in essence 'nationalityless' rather than 'stateless'. 
Yet the term 'stateless' is still used in many official documents, even on the official 
website of the MOPH (Paisanpanichkul, 2008, Srithamrongsawat et al., 2009).     
It should be noted that the household registration of the MOI is a passive system. It is 
the responsibility of migrants (or employers of migrant workers) to contact the local 
branch of the DOPA to have their name enlisted in the registry. An example is that an 
ex-illegal migrant with Tor Ror 38/1 who has completed the NV is not obliged to 
contact the DOPA local office to change Tor Ror 38/1 to Tor Ror 13. Besides, the 
registry is subject to double counting. Migrants leaving for their home country are not 
withdrawn from the registry unless the MOI is informed of their departure, and the 
registration of illegal migrants with the MOI depends on the 'openness' of migrant policy 
at a particular period (Kantayaporn et al., 2013, Archavanitkul, 2012).    
3. The National Statistical Office (NSO) of the MICT: The NSO has conducted a 
nationwide census every 10 years since 1960. The recent 2010 census estimated that the 
number of non-Thai nationals in Thailand was about 3.2 million (~4.9% of the country 
total population). Though the census is theoretically the best way to collect detailed 
information on 'all' people, the data accuracy is questionable as surveyors often face 
problems when communicating with non-Thai respondents or people with precarious 
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citizenship status, who might not be willing to be exposed by the surveyors 
(Kantayaporn et al., 2013). 
Aside from the three organisations above, there are other authorities that gather records 
of specific groups of non-Thai populations. These organisations include, but are not 
limited to, (1) the Immigration Bureau of the Royal Thai Police, which collects records 
of circular migrants and tourists, and (2) the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), responsible for collecting data on refugees or displaced persons in 
UNHCR camps/sheltered areas.  
The Immigration Bureau gathers data on non-Thais who enter and leave the country 
legally. This group comprises (1) tourists, (2) transit visitors en route to a third country, 
and (3) those granted temporary permission to stay in Thailand for a variety of reasons 
such as study, business, diplomatic service, and living with family members. Part of this 
group are work permit holders. Therefore, some of them overlap with foreign workers 
stated above. Table 11 below displays the size of entries and exits to Thailand and 
balance remaining in each year. 
Table 11 Number of entries and exits to Thailand and balance remaining (excluding 
Thai nationals) 
Year Entry Exit Balance remaining
2011 20,468,020 20,023,951 444,069 
2012 24,072,940 23,343,873 729,067 
2013 28,661,493 28,137,665 523,828 
2014 27,296,540 27,005,405 291,135 
Source: Immigration Bureau, Royal Thai Police (2015) 
The UNHCR is the principal international agency that deals with international refugees 
and asylum seekers. Most refugees are ethnic minorities from Myanmar, fleeing 
political conflict to the western border of Thailand nearly 30 years ago. The Thai 
government has run the refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border in cooperation 
with the UNHCR. The camp inhabitants receive essential food, medicine, shelters and 
schooling, provided by NGOs. The reorientation of Myanmar politics in recent years has 
caused a decrease in the size of the camps, and as of mid-2014, the total population of 
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the camps was about 120,000 (The Border Consortium, 2015). Note that Thailand does 
not have a formal process of accepting refugees and asylum seekers like European 
countries as Thailand is not a party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.  
II. Health Insurance for non-Thais 
Though private insurance is available for non-Thai populations, the discussion on this 
topic is confined to public insurance schemes. Registered foreign migrant workers, who 
enter the country legally (such as the BOI and Lifetime migrants) are, by law, insured by 
the SSS, similarly to Thai workers. Migrants whose spouse and parents are Thai civil 
servants are covered by the CSMBS. However, those insured by the SSS and the 
CSMBS are very small in number.    
Households and individuals falling below the poverty line, regardless of their 
nationality, were eligible to be insured by the LICS until the year 2002, when the LICS 
was replaced by the UCS. The UCS covers all Thai nationals, but not non-Thais, due to 
the verdict of the Office of the Council of State, stipulating that the term 'Thai' in 
Section 5 of the 2002 National Health Act refers to 'Thai nationals'. Such interpretation 
limited the function of the NHSO towards migrants. Many migrant workers and their 
dependants, as well as stateless populations, who were previously covered by the LICS, 
were thus excluded from the UCS (Hasuwannakit, 2012b). The MOPH therefore took 
over the responsibility for protecting the health of the non-Thais. To date, there are two 
main MOPH public insurance schemes for non-Thai populations, namely, (1) 'Health 
Insurance for People with Citizenship Problems' (HI-PCP), and (2) the 'Health Insurance 
Card Scheme' (HICS) for cross-border migrants. 
The HI-PCP: The HI-PCP or 'Stateless Insurance' covers the stateless population, 
numbering about 500,000 beneficiaries. The scheme was initiated in 2010. The Health 
Insurance Group (HIG) of the MOPH is the governing body of the scheme. Hospitals 
are paid by capitation. The benefit package is comprehensive and quite similar to that of 
the UCS, including outpatient and inpatient services, health promotion and disease 
prevention, and high-cost care. There is no co-payment at point of care, similar to the 
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UCS. The purchasing mechanisms are copied from the UCS (Hasuwannakit, 2012b, 
Suphanchaimat et al., 2015). Though the HI-PCP is not the focus of this study, there are 
some discussions on the instigation of the HI-PCP in Chapter 5 as part of it is related to 
the evolution of migrant policies.  
The HICS: The HICS is the prime focus of this thesis. It was endorsed by the Cabinet 
Resolution in 2004. Strictly speaking, the HICS existed before 2004 but at that time it 
operated only in certain provinces. In 2004 the HICS expanded to cover all provinces. 
At present, the HICS covers cross-border migrant workers in the informal sector and 
their dependants, conditional upon registration with the One Stop Service. Beneficiaries 
need to buy the insurance card, and this must be renewed every year. The benefit 
package includes outpatient care, inpatient care, and some high-cost treatments such as 
chemotherapy and antiretroviral therapy (ART) for HIV/AIDS. Yet it still exempts some 
conditions, such as psychotic or substance-abuse conditions and renal replacement 
therapy for chronic renal failure (Health Insurance Group, 2013).  
It should be noted that, in 2013, the Public Health Minister at that time (Dr Pradit 
Sintavanarong) announced to the public that the MOPH was in the process of improving 
its health service system to ensure effectiveness and promoting Thailand to be a medical 
tourism and wellness hub in ASEAN as a preparation for the advent of the ASEAN 
Community by 2015. Though the message did not clearly detail how the MOPH would 
provide insurance coverage to all non-Thai populations, there was an idea that the 
MOPH would target three groups of foreign nationals: (1) people from countries sharing 
border with Thailand who sought treatment in Thailand, (2) foreign workers, migrants, 
and expatriates and their families who were not covered by the SSS, and (3) foreign 
tourists or visitors (Bangkok Post, 2013).  
For the first group, the MOPH would plan to set charges for those entering Thailand to 
seek medical treatment, and in the meantime, help the neighbouring countries to develop 
insurance systems in an attempt to encourage patients to receive care in their own 
countries. Some measures were piloted, such as signing a memorandum of 
understanding between some Thai hospitals and border hospitals in Myanmar and 
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Cambodia to boost health care collaboration, especially in terms of sharing disease alerts 
and referring emergency or severe cases (Wangkiat, 2013). For the second group, the 
ministry would open the health card scheme (which was in fact the existing insurance 
scheme for CLM migrants) for all foreign workers and expatriates (Bangkok Post, 
2013). For the third group, the government would find measures to promote medical 
tourism in Thailand. Some measures were proposed, such as exempting the visa 
requirement for people from six Gulf states who come to Thailand for treatment 
purposes under the condition that the patients (or tourists) must show an appointment 
letter issued by a Thai hospital (Ngamsangchaikit, 2013).    
It seems that this policy was just in an early development phase and necessitated much 
more work to translate this intention into action. Besides, this idea sparked public 
debates. Some doctor groups called for a removal of the minister from the position, 
accusing him of weakening the public system through the medical hub policy and 
through supporting the growth of the private sector (Sarnsamak, 2013). Note that the 
medical hub policy was not the only reason for the protest, but it was combined with 
other contentious issues, such as removal of a hardship allowance for rural doctors, and 
intervening in the functioning of independent health agencies, including the NHSO 
(Sarnsamak, 2013). Dr Sintuvarong was in the position for only around one and a half 
years, and was removed from the position after the coup in May 2014. So far, to the 
researcher's knowledge, there have not been any concrete measures/interventions from 
the current government to materialise or seriously advance this hub policy.      
3.3 Literature review for identifying gaps in knowledge 
This section explores whether the HICS has ever been evaluated in a systematic manner 
and to what extent such evaluation met the state of the art in healthcare evaluation 
research (as presented in the literature review in Chapter 2). To this end, a scoping 
review was conducted. Tricco et al (2015) suggested that a scoping review is a useful 
method to identify knowledge gaps and to set research agendas. It differs from a 
systematic review in several ways, for instance, a scoping review is more of hypothesis-
generating exercise, while a systematic review can be seen as hypothesis-testing. The 
83 
 
literature search was conducted in Medline through the following search term, 
(("Transients and Migrants"[Mesh]) OR ("Emigrants and Immigrants"[Mesh])) AND 
(Thailand)).  
A total of 163 articles were retrieved. The search was limited to between 1 January 1980 
and 31 March 2015. Only articles published in Thai or English were recruited. 
Additional references from other journal-based databases, such as Embase and Scopus, 
were also explored.  
The findings revealed that, since 2005, the issue of migrant health in Thailand has 
received increasing attention, as reflected in the rising number of published articles in 
Medline, see Figure 6. 
Figure 6 Number of articles published in Medline concerning health of migrants in 
Thailand 
 
Source: Author's synthesis from Medline 
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Of the 163 articles, about one third (63) explore migrant health from either an 
epidemiological or clinical point of view (such as drug trial and quantitative survey on 
migrants' health risk behaviour), without adequately examining this issue through a 
health system angle. Around two thirds (93) were about overseas Thais and/or health 
professional migration (this might be because the MeSH term, "Emigrants and 
Immigrants"[Mesh], encompasses a diversity of migrants). Only seven articles were 
found to have some components related to migrant health service, with details as follows 
(Sirilak et al., 2013, Sullivan et al., 2004, Hu, 2010, Webber et al., 2012, Canavati et al., 
2011, Crozier et al., 2013, Saether et al., 2007). 
Sullivan et al (2004) investigated how Mae Tao Clinic, an NGO clinic in Tak province, 
implemented a 'migrant-friendly service' programme, and how the programme suffered 
from shortage of healthcare staff and poor evaluation systems. Sirilak et at (2013) 
highlighted the pivotal role of migrant health volunteers, which helped bridge cultural 
and linguistic gaps between migrant patients and health personnel.  
Three articles investigated some migrant disease specific services, namely HIV/AIDS 
care (Saether et al., 2007, Crozier et al., 2013), and child immunisation (Canavati et al., 
2011). A common finding of these three articles was that, although HIV screening 
service and child immunisation were available to all patients, some irregular migrants 
with mobile behaviour seemed to benefit from those services less than Thai citizens.  
The most relevant articles were studies by Hu (2010) and Webber et al (2012). Hu 
(2010) surveyed migrant and Thai populations living in the outskirts of Kanchanaburi 
province in 2000 and in 2004. The surveys found that about half of migrants did not 
have health insurance, while about 90% of the Thai residents were insured. 
Approximately 54% of the surveyed migrants ever utilised services. This figure was 
much lower than the 87% figure of the Thai participants. However, the study did not 
perform multivariate analysis. 
Webber et al (2012) assessed influencing factors and barriers to care amongst migrant 
beer promoters in Bangkok. Almost all informants (97%) were insured. The study also 
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reported that the regulation of the insurance that required migrants to access services 
only at registered hospitals was perceived as hindrance to care since it contradicted the 
mobile behaviour of migrants. Yet the study did not detail or analyse the effects of 
migrant health insurance from the perspectives of other stakeholders, such as health staff 
and employers of migrants.  
In addition to the journal search, grey literature and research reports from the MOPH 
and other network institutes (for example, the Health Insurance System Research Office 
(HISRO) and the Health Systems Research Institute [HSRI]) were investigated. There 
were three studies, conducted by Prasitsiripol et al (2013), Srithamrongsawat et al 
(2009), and Suphanchaimat et al (2013), which have study objectives close to the focus 
of this thesis. A summary of those studies is as follows. 
Srithamrongsawat et al (2009) evaluated the impact of the HICS in Thai provincial 
hospitals. The study revealed that migrants insured with the HICS had much a lower 
crude utilisation rate than the UCS and the SSS beneficiaries. The financial impact of 
the HICS on health facilities varied considerably. The HICS was an 'income generator' 
for hospitals in Bangkok and its vicinity, whereas smaller hospitals at the border did not 
financially benefit from the policy. Yet, the study assessed only crude use rates of the 
patients.  
Prasitsiripol et al (2013) employed actuarial methods in calculating the HICS premium 
if the card was to cover HIV/AIDS (before 2013, the card's benefit package did not 
include HIV/AIDS—see Chapter 5). The study estimated that if 'all' migrants were 
forced to be insured, the stock of insured migrants would be increased in size by almost 
one million, and the appropriate card premium should be raised by 300 Baht (US$ 9) per 
annum. In the scenario that only 300,000 migrants bought the insurance, the annual 
premium should be increased by approximately 900 Baht (US$ 27). Though the study 
had a qualitative component by interviewing healthcare providers, the result was not 
counterbalanced with opinions of migrant service users.                  
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Suphanchaimat et al (2013) applied a 'Difference-in-Difference' (DID) technique in 
analysing the impact of the HI-PCP (the insurance policy for stateless people) in terms 
of utilisation volumes and out-of-pocket payments of its insurees. The study reported 
that the HI-PCP policy did not bring about significant changes in service utilisation 
patterns of stateless patients, compared to before the policy was implemented. 
Moreover, the study found that the legal status of stateless people and migrants was 
quite fluid. This problem more or less affected the accuracy of the quantitative analysis. 
Though policy makers and providers were interviewed, opinions from service users 
were not explored. 
According to the above review, the following critical knowledge gaps were identified. 
Firstly, though there is a body of literature describing how migrants perceived 
difficulties in accessing care, or how health staff faced barriers in managing care for 
migrants, views from both sides were explored in separate studies.  
Secondly, little is known about the perception of migrant health insurance from other 
stakeholders apart from those in the health sector. Having comprehensive views from all 
key stakeholders might be more beneficial in illuminating how the policy is actually 
functioning in the field.  
Thirdly, most identified studies used a single methodological approach. Those relying 
solely on quantitative methods, could neither tackle the question of 'why' and 'how' the 
policy came out as appeared, nor take into account the counterfactual argument.  
Fourthly, in terms of Thailand, since the introduction of the HICS in 2004, there have 
been very few studies that systematically evaluated the achievement of the policy and its 
constraints at the operational level. The most recent evaluation was conducted by 
Srithamrongsawat et al (2009), which was about six years ago. Since migrant policy is 
very dynamic and is always influenced by various factors, it is imperative to re-evaluate 
the performance of the policy through a more rigorous scientific approach. 
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As mentioned earlier, the benefit of a scoping review is that the review findings can 
serve as key ingredients for formulating research hypotheses. In this regard, the 
following hypotheses were generated, and used as grounds for constructing the research 
objectives in the next chapter. Firstly, challenges and barriers in the implementation of 
migrant insurance policy in Thailand might be explained by, amongst other things, a 
difference (or even conflict) of views and/or directions between various stakeholders 
involved in the policy (such as healthcare staff, non-MOPH officials, migrants, and 
employers of migrants). Secondly, local staff were likely to adapt the policy to match 
their routines, and this adaptive behaviour might not necessarily be in line with the 
original policy intentions. Thirdly, insurance status alone was not sufficient in 
determining the number of services used. Other factors, such as baseline characteristics 
of the insurees or disease conditions might have significant impact on service utilisation, 
and the impact from these covariates might modify the insurance effect to some extent.          
3.4 Conclusion 
Thailand is an upper middle income country with a well-established healthcare system. 
The country achieved UHC in 2002. The main public insurance schemes are the SSS for 
workers in the formal sector, the CSMBS for civil servants and their dependants, and the 
UCS for the rest of Thai citizens. However, non-Thai populations are not covered by 
these insurance schemes, except for high-skilled migrant workers insured by the SSS. 
The majority of non-Thai populations are low-skilled migrant workers and their 
dependants. Most of them are undocumented/illegal immigrants from CLM nations, who 
were later registered with the government to join the nationality verification process. To 
provide health protection for these migrants, the government launched a specific 
insurance scheme, namely the HICS, in 2004. After more than a decade of its 
implementation, little is known about the outcomes of the scheme, either in terms of the 
responses of all stakeholders involved in the policy, or the impact of the policy on its 
insurees at point of care.   
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Chapter 4: Aim, objectives, and research 
methodology 
Chapter 4 comprises five subsections, namely, (1) research aim and objectives, (2) 
research framework and relevance to theory, (3) methodology, (4) ethical 
considerations, and (5) conclusion.  
4.1 Aim and objectives 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to evaluate (i) the enrolment of cross-border 
migrants in Thailand in a public health insurance scheme, namely, the Health Insurance 
Card Scheme (HICS), through perspectives of various stakeholders, and (ii) the effects 
of the insurance on use of health services. It is hoped that the evidence generated in this 
thesis will ultimately help inform policy makers and academics for further improvement 
of the migrant health insurance policy in Thailand. The main research questions are as 
follows.  
1. How was the HICS policy established and how has it interacted with other 
migrant policies in Thailand?  
2. How do health providers and relevant officers at the implementation level, as 
well as migrant service users, respond to the policy, and why do they respond 
accordingly? 
3. What is(are) the outcome(s) of the policy on service utilisation and out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payment of migrants receiving care at health facilities, relative to Thai UCS 
beneficiaries and uninsured migrants?  
With the research questions above, the following objectives were constructed: 
1. To investigate how the HICS was established in the context of surrounding 
migrant policies in Thailand from the policy makers' perspectives 
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2. To explore and analyse the response of local healthcare providers to the HICS 
policy, and how the policy affects migrant health-seeking behaviour. 
3. To assess the outcome of the policy on service utilisation and out-of-pocket 
expenditure of insured migrants in comparison to the Thai UCS beneficiaries and the 
uninsured migrants. 
4. To provide recommendations for further improvement of the HICS. 
4.2 Research framework and relevance to theory 
The above objectives were developed based on the following hypotheses/theories. 
Firstly, success in policy implementation does not depend only on the readiness of 
health facilities. As proposed by Leichter (1979), the implementation success is 
influenced by several external factors, namely, situation factor, international factor, 
cultural factor, and structural factor. These points are captured in objective 1. The 
preliminary results of objective 1 helped shape the interview guides used in objective 2, 
and shed light on the 'gaps' of understanding between policy makers and local 
implementers.  
Secondly, with reference to 'Street-Level Bureaucracy' (SLB) theory, the adaptation of 
policy may derive from the fact that local healthcare providers consider that guidelines 
or rules relayed from central authorities do not suit their day-to-day problems and that 
what they adjust/adapt are more practical for the real-world practice. Thus it is 
imperative to explore whether, and to what extent, any of these behaviours appeared in 
the implementation of the HICS in the Thai context, and why such adaptive practices 
happened. Findings from interviews with providers are of more value if complemented 
by insights from migrants. It is possible that, despite the policy encouraging 
undocumented/illegal migrants to buy the insurance card, some migrants may consider 
that the policy does not effectively meet their needs. The interviews with migrants in 
objective 2 help address this point.  
The quantitative analysis of volume of use and out-of-pocket expenditure of migrants in 
objective 3 helps justify/confirm the findings in objective 2, while findings in objective 
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2 can help explain results in objective 3. Both objectives were exercised in parallel and 
were explored through an iterative process. All findings from objective 1-3 are analysed 
and synthesised in objective 4 through an inductive approach, in order to identify policy 
recommendations. All above accounts were drawn together to develop the following 
research framework, see Figure 7.  
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Figure 7 Research framework of the study and linkage between objectives 
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4.3 Methodology 
This thesis applied a multi-methods approach. Qualitative methods demanding primary 
data collection, and quantitative methods with secondary data analysis were undertaken. 
The following section explains methods used in each objective. 
I. To investigate how the HICS policy was established in light 
of surrounding migrant policies in Thailand from the 
perspectives of policy makers (objective 1) 
Methods: Qualitative approach 
Data collection: The key data collection techniques for this objective were in-depth 
interviews with policy makers, and document review. The key informants were 
purposively selected, taking into account their role and responsibility within the policy. 
Additional informants were recruited through snowball sampling. The interviews were 
conducted at informants' workplaces. The researcher served as the principal interviewer, 
accompanied by a research assistantv as a note taker. Each interview lasted about 45 
minutes, and was audiotaped upon consent from interviewees. In practice, informants 
were firstly asked to explain their role and responsibilities, and their general perceptions 
of the HICS. Then, the researcher gradually probed into details by adapting the 
interview questions while the dialogue went along. The interviewees' characteristics are 
exhibited in Chapter 5. The following question guides served as a starting point for the 
interview, though not reflecting exact words used. Hard brackets contain suggested 
prompts or memos, which were used to remind the interviewer during the interviews.  
                                                 
v As this fieldwork involved only one research assistant, the researcher did not set up a formal 
training/workshop to train her. However, before embarking on fieldwork, the researcher arranged a 
debriefing session between himself and the research assistant. This process allowed the research team to 
rehearse and practise a mock interview, and prepare the team not only in academic content, but also in 
other issues, such as how to dress properly, how to communicate with local officers and migrant patients, 
and how to protect confidentiality of the interviewees. The researcher and the research assistant also 
attended the qualitative research training workshop held by Prof Luechai Sringoenyuang, Mahidol 
University, Thailand. Though the workshop was not directly related to migrant issue, it markedly helped 
the research team gain better insight on qualitative research prior to starting fieldwork.     
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 Please tell me about your position [How long have you been in this position?, 
What about your past experience in this work?, What are the role and responsibility of 
your job re migrant healthcare policies?, etc]; 
 Please briefly explain how you have been involved in the development of HICS 
policy [How was it developed?, Who was involved?, What was the original 
intention/goal of the HICS?, etc]; 
 Now that the HICS was introduced, what are your opinions on the policy [Was it 
implemented in the way you expected? (If so, or if not, how and why?), Have you 
received any feedbacks from the local implementers?, What is the feedback?, etc]; 
 Please tell me about the positive sides and the negative sides of the HICS policy 
in your opinion [What are the key challenges?, How can those challenges be overcome?,  
etc]; 
 Please suggest ways to improve the HICS policy and also other migrant-related 
policies in Thailand. 
The researcher also reviewed relevant policy documents, such as (1) minutes of the 
MOPH and NHSO meetings about migrant policies, (2) existing laws and measures 
stipulated by current and recent governments, and (3) official letters and announcements 
from the central authorities to local health facilities. Besides, the researcher observed 
and participated in the meetings, in which migrant healthcare policies were discussed, 
for instance, the Prince Mahidol Award Conference Side Meeting (January 2015, 
Bangkok) and the Regional Workshop on Migrants' Health, jointly arranged by the IOM 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Thailand (August 2015, Bangkok).  
Data analysis: The interview data were imported into the NVIVO v10 software and 
were coded manually. Thematic analysis was applied. The researcher thoroughly 
checked the cleanliness of the transcript by listening to the tape. Transcribers were asked 
to record everything appearing on the tape, including interrupting noise and laugh. The 
researcher then identified condensed meaning units of a paragraph with the same 
content. The preliminary codes across similar meaning units were identified. Similar 
codes were grouped in order to formulate emerging categories. Finally, a higher 
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construct/theme that presents across categories was identified. This analytical process 
was also exercised in objective 2. The interview data were triangulated against findings 
from the document review, field notes and memos.  
II. To explore and analyse the response of local healthcare 
providers to the HICS policy, and how the policy affects 
migrant health-seeking behaviour (objective 2) 
Methods: Qualitative approach 
Study area: The selection criteria for the study site stem from a presumption that an 
area with a large number of migrants is likely to face significant workload in addition to 
routine practice, and this situation causes local health units to adapt themselves or 
increase their capacity to deal with the emerging consequences of the policy. Ranong 
province was selected as it has the largest proportion of registered migrants to Thai 
citizens, compared to other provinces in Thailand, see Figure 8 and 9.   
Figure 8 Proportion (%) of insured migrants to Thai citizens in all provinces in Thailand 
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Figure 9 Top-10 provinces with the largest proportion (%) of insured migrants to Thai 
citizens 
 
Source:  
1. Health Insurance Group, Office of the Permanent Secretary, the MOPH (2013) 
2. National Statistical Office of Thailand (2008) 
 
Within Ranong province, the two districts with the largest number of migrants were 
selected, namely, Muang (headquarter) district and Kraburi district. A summary of 
Ranong province's characteristics is displayed in the introduction part of Chapter 6. 
Data collection: Individual in-depth interviews were conducted in two strands: (1) 
interviews with local healthcare providers, local staff working in non-health agencies, 
and NGO representatives, and (2) interviews with migrant service users and employers 
of migrants. 
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Strand 1—Interviews with healthcare providers, officers from non-health agencies, 
and NGO representatives  
 Sampling strategy: The researcher purposively selected local health officers, 
who are responsible for managing the HICS in Ranong province. The researcher 
approached the provincial chief medical officer (PCMO) at the Ranong Provincial 
Public Health Office (PPHO) and hospital directors of Ranong provincial hospital and 
Kraburi district hospital, then used a snowball technique. The key informants also 
included NGOs and officers of the local branches of non-health authorities (the MOI 
and the MOL). The total number of participants was 14, with some participants 
participated in the interviews more than once. A list of the interviewees is displayed in 
Chapter 6. 
 Interview procedure: The interview procedure and the interview team were 
arranged in the same fashion as objective 1. Most interviews were conducted at the 
participants' workplace. Debriefing sessions between the research team members were 
arranged before and after each interview. The interviews were audiotaped upon approval 
from the interviewees. Each interview lasted approximately 45-60 minutes. Additional 
interviews via telephone or further contacts by email were performed after the 
researcher listened to the interview record and had further inquiries. Data from the 
informal conversations were not audiotaped, but the researcher still jotted down that 
information in field notes.  
 Question guides: The interviews were performed in a relaxed manner, starting 
with open questions and an introductory discussion of the research. The question guides 
were mostly constructed with reference to the SLB concept (Lipsky, 1980). Respondents 
were asked to explain how they coped with operational constraints in carrying out the 
policy. This approach enabled the researcher to identify 'de jure' policy design and 'de 
facto' practices of providers. The respondents were also asked to provide suggestions for 
the improvement of the policy. An example of question guides used in the real interview 
is displayed in Appendix 4. 
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Strand 2—Interviews with migrants and employers 
 Sampling strategy: Two subdistrict health centres were selected. They are 
located in subdistricts where migrant dwellers are mostly concentrated. Therefore 'health 
centre A' in Muang district and 'health centre B' in Kraburi district were chosen (the real 
names of these health centres were anonymised to protect confidentiality). The 
researcher approached employers of migrants through purposive sampling. For migrant 
interviewees, the selection process was more complicated. Households with member(s) 
having severe or chronic diseases were selected as index cases. By investigating these 
index cases, it was possible to assess whether and to what extent the policy really 
addressed their need for services. Ten households were selected (four in Kraburi district 
and six in Muang district), taking into account a variety of household characteristics and 
the insurance status of family members (for some households, only some or none of the 
members were insured). Thick description of the selected households is presented in 
Chapter 6 and Appendix 11. Since some migrants have precarious legal status, a 
sampling strategy through a formal approach might lead to selection bias. The 
researcher therefore used the following approaches to access potential interviewees. 
(1) Approaching NGOs or civil society groups—Volunteers from NGOs 
and charitable groups are key implementers of many healthcare programmes for 
migrants and other vulnerable populations in Thailand. Some local health facilities in 
Ranong province received support from NGOs to hire 'migrant health volunteer 
(MHVs)' and 'migrant health workers (MHWs)', with the aim of assisting local health 
staff to reach the hard-to-reach patients and interpret for local health staff. Most MHVs 
or MHWs are migrants who have been living in Thailand for years and become familiar 
with the Thai healthcare system. More details about the role/responsibility of MHVs and 
MHWs are presented in Chapter 5. The research team contacted MHVs and/or MHWs 
and accompanied them when visiting hard-to-reach migrants as part of their work. Some 
MHVs and/or MHWs also served as the key informants 
(2) Exploring family folders—Family folders stored at subdistrict health 
centres are useful resources as they contain information on household characteristics and 
brief comments on the health status of household members (regardless of their 
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nationality), see Figure 10. The researcher used this information as a starting point for 
gaining better insights into migrant communities before presenting himself to the field.  
Figure 10 Example of family folders stored at subdistrict health center  
 
Note: Green folders are for migrant households whereas black folders (with pink strip) 
are for Thai households.  
(3) Discussion with ground-level health staff—Frontline health staff at 
subdistrict health centres, such as nurse practitioners and public health officers, are 
likely to be more acquainted with migrant community than hospital-level staff. 
Moreover, subdistrict health centre staff usually have long working experience in the 
field, and this allowed the researcher to obtain information about how the policy has 
evolved over time.             
 Interview procedure: The interviews were performed at migrants' households. 
The researcher conducted 2-3 rounds of interviews per household. The first visit was to 
introduce the research team and build rapport. The following visits were for in-depth 
interviews and for following up any emerging themes/topics. The interview language 
was chosen according to the respondents' preference (some migrants are fluent in Thai). 
The principal investigator served as the main interviewer, accompanied by a research 
assistant as a note taker, and a local coordinator (selected from MHVs or MHWs) as an 
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interpreter. The number of the interview team was kept as small as possible to minimise 
any pressure on participants. Each interview took around 30-45 minutes. The 
information was audiotaped and transcribed verbatim upon verbal consent from 
interviewees. The transcriber was instructed to include notes about tone of voice and 
laughter. Note that some interviews are considered group interviews rather than 
individual interviews. This is because most interviews took place at migrants' 
households, and this made it difficult to exclude migrants' family members from taking 
part. One may argue that such situation might lead to respondent bias as the interviewers 
might avoid divulging sensitive information in front of other people. This argument 
might not be true in case of migrants with precarious legal status (like in this setting) as 
they might feel more secure in a situation where they were surrounded by their family 
members and peers. The methodological discussion about advantages and disadvantages 
of such an interview setting are presented in Chapter 8. Nonetheless, in practice, before 
starting an interview, the researcher always asked the key informants whether they were 
comfortable to join the interview in such a setting. 
 Translation issue: Translation was made through the following steps. Firstly, 
the interviewer asked the question in Thai. Secondly, the translator asked the participant 
in Burmese. Thirdly, the participant answered the question in Burmese, and fourthly, the 
translator repeated the answer in Thai. The translator was given instructions to translate 
contextual meaning (including phrases, emphases, idioms, etc) rather than simply 
verbatim. Note that, though MHVs or MHWs can serve as interpreters and local 
coordinators, they are not professional interpreters, and this situation may affect data 
accuracy (see Chapter 6 for more discussion on this point). To ensure rigour and 
trustworthiness of the translation, the following measures were executed; (1) using the 
same interpreter throughout the fieldwork, (2) cross-validating the interview findings 
with information from informal discussion and observation, and (3) having an 
independent professional interpreter check parts of the audio records and the transcripts.  
 Question guides: The question guides were developed based on the background 
knowledge that health-seeking behaviour of migrants is influenced considerably by 
factors such as cost of services, and support from peers and family members. Migrants 
were asked to tell their life story about how they journeyed to Thailand, and the reasons 
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behind their migration. Then, the researcher asked the interviewees about their 
experience in receiving care and their involvement with the HICS, and other related 
migrant policies. Appendix 5 demonstrates an example of question guides used in the 
actual interview.    
Data analysis: Data were coded manually. Thematic analysis was applied in similar 
fashion with objective 1. Additional information from informal 
discussions/conversations recorded in field notes and memos was added to the interview 
data.  
III. To assess the outcome of the policy on service utilisation 
and out-of-pocket expenditure of insured migrants in 
comparison to the Thai UCS beneficiaries and the uninsured 
migrants (objective 3) 
Method: Facility-based quantitative analysis 
Data sources: This objective aimed to investigate the extent to which the policy 
affected the utilisation volume and OOP of migrants at point of care. Inpatient (IP) and 
outpatient (OP) visits in the latest five fiscal years were analysedvi.The IP data are 
routine admission records of Ranong provincial hospital and Kraburi district hospital. 
The OP data are routine OP utilisation records, including disease prevention activities 
performed at health facilities. The OP data used in this research were retrieved from the 
PPHO since it is the only authority that assembles OP records of all health facilities in 
the province (from subdistrict health centresvii to district and provincial hospitals). It 
should be noted that data on newborns admitted right after delivery were excluded to 
avoid double counting with delivery admissions. 
                                                 
vi Fiscal year X started from the first of October of the year before, for example, fiscal year 2014 starts 
from 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2014. 
vii Subdistrict health centre is also known as 'Tambon health promoting hospital'. 
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Rationale of the analysis: As the HICS policy has been gradually developed over time, 
it is difficult to set a specific cut-off point for 'before-after' comparison. A more feasible 
approach is 'treatment-control' comparison, which addresses the counterfactual argument 
by taking into account within individual variation over time.   
Using data stored at local health facilities is superior to using the data stored at the 
NHSO or at the MOPH. This is because local health facilities are not obliged to submit 
immigrant patient records to the MOPH for healthcare cost reimbursement (except for 
high-cost treatment) as the HICS budget is independently managed by individual 
facilities (the HICS budget management is detailed in Chapter 5).  
Lack of incentive to submit data to the MOPH might affect the completeness of 
information stored at the MOPH. Another data source is the NHSO, where Thai UCS 
beneficiary data are complete but non-UCS data are filtered out.  
Therefore, the facility-based data have advantage in enabling the researcher to access 
information on all beneficiary groups, namely, (1) insured migrants, (2) uninsured 
migrants, and (3) Thai UCS patients.  
Nevertheless, using routine facility-based data has some disadvantages, one of which is 
data uncleanliness. Accordingly, much effort is required for data cleaning. While this 
point is deemed as a handicap, it also reflects how local administrative staff deal with 
migrant data (for more discussion on this point, see Chapter 8). 
Health facilities in Thailand are structured in the form of a coordinating network, 
namely, 'contracted unit for primary care' (CUP), comprising one provincial hospital 
and/or one district hospital and contracted health centres. Hence, this study tracked OP 
data from health centre level to provincial/district hospital level in CUPs where migrants 
are concentrated. In this case, health centre A (under Muang CUP) and health centre B 
(under Kraburi CUP) were selected to match the selection in objective 2.  
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After exploring the cleanliness of data, the researcher found that the IP data of Ranong 
hospital were not feasible for OOP expenditure analysis due to data incompleteness. 
Table 12 summarises the availability of data from each health facility. 
Table 12 Overview of the data in each health facility used for the analysis in objective 3 
District 
Muang Kraburi 
Ranong 
hospital Heath centre A 
Kraburi 
hospital Health centre B
IP data: utilisation  Not applicable  Not applicable
OP data: utilisation     
IP data: out-of-
pocket payment  
Not available    
OP data: out-of-
pocket payment
    
 
Statistical analysis and variable setting: The analysis in this objective mainly uses 
econometric techniques to identify causal relationships between the variables of interest. 
According to Samuelson et al (1954), econometrics is defined as the quantitative 
analysis of actual economic phenomena, including the development of theories and 
concepts in terms of which observable phenomena can be described, classified, and 
related. Most econometric studies in the past were concerned with economic 
implications, for example the study by Angirst (1990), which estimated the effect of 
voluntary military service on earnings in later life of the US veterans during the cold 
war.  
Recently, econometrics applications have gained more attention from researchers in the 
area of health policy and systems research (HPSR) because, in most HPSR, it is almost 
impossible to assess the impact of a health policy/intervention in a controlled 
environment in the same way as for clinical research. Some examples of use of 
econometrics in HPSR are the multi-country study by Basu et al (2013), which explored 
the relationship between sugar intake and prevalence of diabetes, and the study by 
Limwattananon et al (2011), which investigated the incidence of household 
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impoverishment from healthcare payment pre- and post-UCS (1996, 1998, 2000, and 
2002) in Thailand.  
Regression analysis appears to be the most common statistical technique used to identify 
causal inference in most econometric studies. However, this is not just a matter of 
regressing the outcome variable on independent variable(s). An HPSR researcher needs 
to be wary of the fact that, in the real world, it is very difficult to avoid selection bias 
(also called omitted variable bias). Including covariates into the regression equation is 
one of the most common but effective approaches to address selection bias (in 
econometric language, fulfilling the 'conditional independence assumption'). Khandker 
et al (2010) summarises several methods, which can help address such a problem in 
econometric studies, such as Difference-in-Difference (DID) and Instrumental variable 
(IV) techniques.  
Note that 'regression analysis' is a broad term, comprising various mathematical 
techniques (such as Poisson regression, Logit regression, and Ordinary Least Square 
[OLS]). To select the most appropriate method(s), several issues should be carefully 
assessed, including how well a proposed technique fits to the dataset, characteristics of 
the variable(s), efficiency (how large is the standard error) and consistency (how large is 
the bias given the sample size grows close to the true population) of the estimates. All of 
these points are considered again in Chapter 7 
The analysis of this objective was founded on an assumption that HICS insurees are 
considered 'treatment', while the UCS insured population and uninsured migrants are 
'control 1' and 'control 2' respectively. This assumption implied that the analysis treated 
the HICS as having some features of ‘natural experiment’. 
The calculation is composed of 2 main parts: (1) utilisation analysis, and (2) OOP 
analysis. In each part, the analysis is divided into two tiers, namely, (1) general 
assessment using descriptive statistics, and (2) determining relationship between the 
policy and outcomes of interest by econometric techniques. 
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 Part 1—Utilisation analysis: The analysis in part 1 was executed on migrants 
(regardless of insurance status) and UCS patients. Since most variables were analysed 
for an individual patient but the routine dataset is stored as 'per visit', linking different 
visits for a unique individual must be done prior to the analysis. This means that 
selecting an appropriate 'unique identifier'viii is very important.  
For Thai citizens, the national 13-digit identification number (ID) is the unique 
identifier. However, this approach is not suitable for migrant data as not all migrants 
obtained the 13-digit ID (to obtain the 13-digit ID, a migrant must first register 
him/herself with the MOI). Moreover, accessing the national ID of an individual is very 
sensitive even if the analysis is done anonymously.  
A more feasible alternative is using hospital numbers (HN) as unique identifiers since 
each patient has his/her own HN which is unique and remains constant over time for 
each hospital. The key independent variable is insurance status, while the outcome 
variables are the number of visits per year. Detailed information about the variables 
(dependent variable, independent variable, and confounders) used in the analysis is 
presented in Appendix 6. 
Since this study attempts to identify the policy impact over time and across insurance 
entitlements, an appropriate technique should be able to account for timing effects and 
influences from unobserved characteristics (such as culture, beliefs, and health need). 
Given this, the OLS or the Poisson regression with robust variance adjusted for 
individual variability over time is suggested.  
The author also explored other possible techniques, such as Random-effects (RE) model 
and Fixed-effect (FE) model, but found that the Poisson regression with robust standard 
error sufficed (see Chapter 7). STATA XII software was used. Goodness of fit and 
model specification were tested by Likelihood Ratio test and Hausman test.  
                                                 
viii The identifier that is unique per each individual and constant over time.  
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Subgroup analysis was then carried out on migrant patients only. This step can be 
considered a sensitivity analysis as well since the researcher assumed that there was 
'endogeneity effect' in the HICS utilisation. The effect is succinctly explained as a 
problem of reverse causality, and if it exists in the data, the conventional OLS may 
produce misleading estimates.  
For a more concrete explanation, one might ponder that a possibility of obtaining the 
card may be influenced by some characteristics of migrants. For example, migrants in 
specific occupations (such as those working in the formal sector) may have better 
opportunities to acquire the card. In this account, the 'card' is recognised as 'endogenous' 
variable since migrants with the card are likely to utilise more services and, on the other 
hand, those who tend to utilise services more often are more likely to take out the card to 
accommodate their needs.  
Since the Thai citizens are not potential beneficiaries of the card, Thai patients' records 
were excluded for this step. The Probit-2-Staged-Least-Square (Probit-2SLS), which is 
one of the techniques under the IV family, was used in lieu of the conventional OLS  or 
Poisson regression (Khandker et al., 2010, Cerulli, 2011). 
The researcher also conducted another round of subgroup analysis but this time limited 
the calculation to all patients with non-delivery conditions. This is because the 
descriptive statistics saw a large volume of delivery-related visits by the HICS and the 
uninsured patients (more details in Chapter 7). Hence it is beneficial to assess whether 
the impact of HICS on utilisation volume might change if delivery-related conditions 
were excluded. Nevertheless, the researcher found that there was just a trivial difference 
between the full and the subsample analyses. Thus, to make the thesis more concise, the 
results of this subgroup analysis are not displayed in the main results chapter, but appear 
in Appendix 14 instead. 
 Part 2—OOP analysis: The analysis in part 2 is limited to insured and 
uninsured migrants because theoretically the UCS patients need not pay for their 
treatment. In OOP analysis, it is well recognised that health expenditure data often have 
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unique characteristics, which may affect the accuracy of the estimates. These include a 
substantial positive skewness, excess zeros and heavy right tails.   
A traditional approach in handling non-normally distributed data in medical statistics is 
using a non-parametric test, however, this approach is less accepted by policy makers 
than the estimate of mean cost (Arrow and Lind, 1970). Methods based on a normal 
distribution assumption, such as Student’s t test, are subject to biases if facing extreme 
values given the underlying normal distribution is not met, especially with a small-to-
moderate sample size (Mihaylova et al., 2011). 
In this regard, alternative method, based on a mixture of parametric distributions, is 
proposed (Mihaylova et al., 2011), that is, the Two part model (TPM). The model 
generates a separate probability function (first part) and positive outcome (second part).   
The first part is to estimate the probability of having any expense by Logit or Probit 
regression, whereas the second part focuses on positive values of count data or 
continuous data using Generalised linear model (GLM). Estimations of the expected 
cost are the multiplication of the probability of incurring cost and conditional cost being 
incurred. An instance of the application of the TPM in healthcare expenditure is a study 
by Clarke et al (2003), which estimated the healthcare cost for complicated diabetes 
patients in the UK Prospective Diabetes Study in 1996-1997.  
Details of the FE model, the RE model, the IV method, and the TPM are exhibited in 
Appendix 7. 
IV. To provide recommendations for further improvement of 
the Thai migrant healthcare policy (objective 4) 
Findings from the above objectives were brought together and analysed by the thematic 
analysis. Various policy recommendations are proposed, such as ways to improve 
operational management, how to make communication between central authorities and 
local health units more coherent, and ways to facilitate registration for the card and 
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increase healthcare access for migrants. A summary of the research questions, research 
objectives and corresponding methods is displayed in Table 13 below. 
Table 13 Linkage between research questions, research objectives and corresponding 
methods 
Research question (RQ) Objective Main methods Analytical 
tool
RQ 1: How was the HICS policy 
established and how has it 
interacted with surrounding 
migrant policies in Thailand?  
Objective 1: to 
investigate how the 
HICS policy was 
established through the 
lens of policy makers  
In-depth 
interviews and 
document review 
Thematic 
analysis 
RQ 2: How do health providers 
and relevant officers at the 
implementation level, as well as 
migrant service users respond to 
the policy, and why do they 
respond accordingly? 
Objective 2 (strand 1): 
to explore the response 
of local implementers 
towards the card policy 
In-depth 
interviews, group 
interviews, and 
document review 
Thematic 
analysis 
 
Objective 2 (strand 2): 
to explore how the 
policy affects migrants 
and employers   
RQ 3: What is(are) the 
outcome(s) of the policy on 
service utilisation and OOP of 
migrants from receiving care at 
health facilities relative to the 
UCS and the uninsured patients? 
Objective 3: to assess 
the influence of the 
policy on service 
utilisation and out-of-
pocket expenditure of 
insured migrants 
Quantitative 
analysis of 
facility-based 
data 
Econometric 
techniques 
Objective 4: To provide policy recommendations for future policy improvement
 
4.4 Ethical considerations 
I. Ethics approval 
This study was carried out according to the London School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine (LSHTM)'s Guidelines on Good Research Practice. It was approved by the 
School’s Ethics Committee (ID: 8776) and the Institute for Development of Human 
Research Protection in Thailandix.  
                                                 
ix  IHRP letter head: 166/2558 
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All data are kept anonymous. Dissemination of data can be done only for academic 
interest and individual information cannot be identified. Facility-based data were 
obtained upon the consent from respective hospital directors. For the interview process, 
the participants were informed about the study's objectives and were assured that 
confidentiality would be strictly kept. The research team always informed participants 
that it was perfectly acceptable for them to withdraw from the study at any time or to 
refuse to answer any question if they felt uncomfortable.  
Though written consent is considered the gold standard, it may make migrants 
uncomfortable to participate in the interview as some migrants have precarious legal 
status. Thus, migrant respondents were asked for verbal consent instead and the 
interviewer would record this. Non-migrant interviewees (healthcare providers, 
employers or migrants, local officers, and NGOs) received a stipend of about 500-1,000 
Baht (US$ 15-30) each for their time spent after the interview was finished, while the 
migrant respondents received a souvenir (cost about 250-500 Baht or US$ 8-15 each) as 
a thank you gift for their participation. 
II. Confidentiality & anonymity of participants 
The confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees were preserved in transcripts, 
data entry and publications. Participants were asked for their consent to be quoted 
anonymously in published materials, for which their personal information would be 
adequately altered to ensure that the readers could not identify them. Audio-recordings 
were made upon consent from the interviewees. Audio files and transcripts were 
password protected in the researcher's personal computer. Electronic facility-based 
records were retrieved upon written approval from the facility directors. The researcher 
also asked health staff of the facilities to redact some digits of the patients' ID to protect 
the patients’ confidentiality. The participant information sheet and consent form (in 
English, Thai and Burmese) are displayed in Appendix 8.   
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4.5 Conclusion 
This research sought to evaluate providers' and migrants' responses to the current 
migrant health insurance policy in Thailand. Qualitative and quantitative methods were 
employed in parallel. A wide range of data collection and analysis techniques were used, 
including primary data collection through in-depth interview and document review, and 
secondary data analysis using facility-based data. Perspectives of all relevant 
stakeholders involved in the policy, such as policy makers, healthcare providers, and 
migrant service users, were investigated. Impact evaluation via econometric analysis  
was performed to assess the outcome of the insurance policy on its insurees in terms of 
utilisation volume and out-of-pocket payment. Results from all objectives were 
synthesised to provide policy recommendations. 
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Section	3:	Results	
This section is composed of 3 chapters (Chapters 5-7). Chapter 5 presents the findings 
from objective 1, which centres on how migrant policy in Thailand has evolved over 
time. Chapter 6 (objective 2) describes how local health staff, and other relevant 
stakeholders, responded to the health insurance policy for migrants in the real world. 
Chapter 7 (objective 3) elaborates the quantitative results. Each chapter starts with a 
brief introduction (subsection 1) and a summary of the methods used (subsection 2). 
Key results from the fieldwork (subsection 3) are displayed after the methods 
subsection. Each chapter is recapitulated with a short discussion (subsection 4), and a 
conclusion (subsection 5).   
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Chapter 5: Evolution of the HICS policy and 
relevant migrant policies in the Thai context 
5.1 Introduction 
The main focus of this thesis is to explore the outcomes of the health insurance for 
cross-border migrants in Thailand (the HICS). Though the main focus is the downstream 
policy process, some understanding of the upstream process, that is, how the policy was 
formulated, is also important. 
As briefly explained in earlier chapters, the HICS is not a standalone policy. In fact, it is 
an interministerial agenda. This chapter therefore explored not only the health aspect of 
the HICS, but also its surrounding elements, such as concerns over state security or 
economic necessity.   
In addition, the design of the HICS did not necessarily come out according to a rational 
policy decision making process, since oftentimes it was affected by various factors 
including internal and external politics, and the legacy of previous laws/regulations. 
Hence it is imperative to investigate the historical and contextual environment of the 
HICS not merely its current formulation.  
5.2 Methods 
The main data collection techniques were in-depth interview and document review. For 
in-depth interview, seven key informants who were, or have been involved in the 
formulation of the HICS, were identified. Initially, the researcher could identify only 
five interviewees working closely with the MOPH (namely, PM01, PM02, PM03, 
PM04, and ADM_CO1), then the two additional interviewees outside the MOPH (PM05 
and PM06) were recruited through snowball sample selection. More details about the 
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interview process were given in Chapter 4. The interviewees' characteristics are 
presented in Table 14 below.  
Table 14 Key characteristics of the interviewees  
Code Age Sex Current workplace Role and responsibility regarding the 
HICS 
PM01 58 Male Office of the Permanent 
Secretary, the MOPH 
Involved in the HICS formulation 
PM02 76 Male Independent academic 
institute 
Involved in the policy discourse 
whether the NHSO responsibility 
covered non-Thai populations
PM03 55 Male Office of the Permanent 
Secretary, the MOPH 
Involved in the HICS formulation
PM04 59 Male Office of the Permanent 
Secretary, the MOPH 
Involved in the HICS formulation
PM05 58 Male Office of the Permanent 
Secretary, the MOL 
Involved in the MOU migrant 
recruitment policy 
PM06 57 Female Faculty of law in one of 
the public universities 
Member of the National Reform 
Council during the junta 
ADM_CO1 55 Female Office of the Permanent 
Secretary, the MOPH 
Supervising the reimbursement for 
contracted hospitals under the HICS  
 
For document review, the researcher explored the Thai laws/regulations concerning 
migrant issues, tracing back to the early 1950s. These included the Thai Constitution, 
the Nationality Acts, the Immigration Acts, and the Working of Alien Acts. Subordinate 
laws, such as ministerial announcements, were perused.  
Relevant minutes and proceedings from official meetings and conferences, where 
migrant health issues were discussed, were investigated. For instance, the Regional 
Workshop on Migrants' Health, convened by the MOFA and the MOPH in August 
2015; the Consultative Meeting in Developing Strategy for Addressing the Rights to 
Health Services of Stateless/nationalityless People held by the MOPH in March 2015; 
and the Roadmap in Managing Services for Migrant Workers in Thailand, arranged by 
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the WHO Thailand Country Office in July 2015. The researcher presented at the above 
conferences as an observer and used that opportunity to identify potential respondents 
for further interview. Additional references were sought from Medline and the MOPH's 
archive.  
Data analysis was done through both deductive and inductive thematic approaches. In 
the deductive approach, from the review in Chapter 2, it is clear the migrant health is not 
just a matter of health, as it often interplays with political and economic elements. The 
researcher thus grouped the interview findings into three domains, namely, (1) National 
security, (2) Employment, and (3) Health insurance. In addition, during the time of 
fieldwork, Thailand introduced a special measure, the One Stop Service (OSS), with the 
aim of overhauling existing migrant policies. The researcher thus added the OSS as a 
new domain, making four domains/themes in total. These domains were used as the 
interview guides. The findings were coded and charted against these domains. The 
coding was performed manually. NVIVO v10 software was used to store the interview 
data.  
Then the inductive thematic analysis was conducted. The researcher identified 
crosscutting content from each deductive domain/theme as described above and grouped 
them into common themes. Two crosscutting themes were identified, namely, (1) 
Instability of Thailand's migrant policies, and (2) De facto powerlessness of the health 
sector. These themes are presented in the discussion subsection.  
The original quotes in Thai are displayed in Appendix 9 to allow the (Thai-speaking) 
readers to check translating accuracy.  
5.3 Results 
The evolution of the HICS immensely interacted with the following aspects: (1) national 
security, (2) employment, (3) health insurance, and (4) the very specific measure 
launched after the 2014 coup d'état, namely, the OSS. 
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I. National security 
Foundation of national security and immigration laws 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, the Immigration Act (1979) defines an 'alien' as any 
ordinary person without Thai nationality (Thai Immigration Bureau, 2004). In the Act, 
'alien', is written in Thai as 'tang dao'. However, in lay language, there are two specific 
Thai words, 'tang chad', which is commonly assigned to 'foreigners', and 'farang', which 
is usually assigned to Caucasian (white) foreigners. Thus the term 'tang dao' is 
theoretically much broader than 'tang chad' and 'farang'.  
However, in the common perception of Thai people, the word 'tang dao' is set aside for 
'cross-border migrants' travelling from less developed countries. This perception 
deviated from what is written in the Act, and at times these words were used 
interchangeably; not only in the lay language, but also in official documents.  
The Office of Foreign Workers Administration (OFWA) of the MOL, is an apparent 
example of this confusion. The OFWA uses the term, 'tang dao' (alien), in its Thai 
heading, which contradicts its English heading, where the word, 'foreign', is used. One 
of the interviewees also highlighted this point. 
"The bottom line of migrant health problems in Thailand is many people, particularly 
Thai NGOs, are overly afraid of using the term 'aliens' and try to replace it with more 
beautiful words like 'foreigners' or 'migrants'. This made us forget the non-nationals 
who cannot identify their country of origin. It is like hiding a problem; using a hand to 
cover the sun. Can we hide it?" [PM06] 
The concept of defining 'alien' stemmed from the nation-state maxim. In the late 1800s, 
Thailand began to define its boundary with neighbouring countries in light of the 
expansion of British and French colonial empires. The state administration was 
reformed towards more centralised enforcement power in the same fashion as more 
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developed countries. Accordingly, in 1909, the first registration law was endorsed (the 
Census of People in the Kingdom Act).  
In 1913 the first written Nationality Act came into force and was considered the first 
concrete tool in selecting the citizens of the country. At that time, the only criteria for 
authorising 'Thai nationality' was based on a person’s place of birth, regardless of 
his/her parents' nationality (jus soli enjoyment). Similar reform processes took place 
later in neighbouring countries, after the declaration of independence from the British 
and French empires. Nationality laws were enacted for the first time in 1948 for 
Myanmar, in 1990 for Lao PDR, and in 1996 for Cambodia. The length of time in the 
introduction of nationality laws between countries is one of many factors that explains 
the incompleteness of population management in the region (Teerawekin, 2009, 
Napaumporn, 2012, Soitong, 2012). 
The evolution of nationality laws in Thailand was very sensitive to both internal and 
external politics. One of the most important milestones in the history of nationality laws 
was the Regulation of Revolution Party No.337 (Por Wor 337), proclaimed in 1972 
(Saisoonthorn, 2006). The most striking features of Por Wor 337 are: 
 'Revoking the Thai nationality of persons who were born in Thailand before 14 
December 1972 of an alien father with non-permanent residence, or an alien mother 
with non-permanent residence, in circumstances where the lawful father is absent;' and  
 'Refusing to grant Thai nationality to any person born since 14 December 1972 of 
an alien father with non-permanent residence, or an alien mother with non-permanent 
residence, in circumstances where the lawful father is absent.'  
Por Wor 337 was introduced due to a fear of communism in Southeast Asia. The 
purpose of this regulation was to prevent children of people from communist countries 
obtaining Thai nationality but it also had spill-over effects on people from non-
communist countries (Saisoonthorn, 2006).  
In 1992, the Regulation was repealed by the Nationality Act (second revision), but the 
concept of jus soli restriction remains in force today as presented in the Section 7bis of 
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the current 2008 Nationality Act (fourth revision), see Appendix 10 (Saisoonthorn, 
2006, Rijken et al., 2015).  
Despite the stipulation in the 1979 Immigration Act that illegal immigrants must be 
deported, Thailand’s economy is hugely reliant on these migrant workers. Martin (2009) 
reported that cross-border migrants contributed over 6% of the country's GDP. For this 
reason, most previous governments exercised the power specified in Section17 of the 
1979 Immigration Act, which indicates that 'In certain special cases, the Minister, with 
Cabinet approval, may permit any alien or any group of aliens to stay in the Kingdom 
under certain conditions, or may consider exemption from being conformity with this 
Act', by permitting undocumented/illegal migrants from CLM nations to have legitimate 
residence for a given period (normally between 6-24 months) (Thai Immigration 
Bureau, 2004).  
Between 1992 and 2012, there were more than twenty Cabinet Resolutions on this 
matter. These lenient measures have common characteristics in terms of demanding that 
Thai employers take their illegal migrant workers to register with the government and 
obtain work permits from the MOL. Nevertheless, there were subtle differences between 
the Resolutions of different periods. For instance, in 1996 the Resolution granted 
amnesty only to illegal migrants in 8 industries in 43 provinces, while the 2002 
Resolution cancelled the area restriction but still restricted business types (Paitoonpong 
and Chalamwong, 2011).  
Another example was the Resolution promulgated on 26 May 2009, requiring illegal 
migrants and dependants aged below 15 to register with the MOI within a couple of 
months. However, due to administrative procrastination, many migrants, especially in 
the fishery business, did not undertake the registration. As a result, the government 
extended the registration period to 30 September 2009. Yet, the new extension was 
made only for migrant workers in the fishery industries without including dependants of 
migrants. The Lawyers Council of Thailand (2011) reported that these 'confusing' and 
'unsystematic' measures were more likely to create labour exploitation troubles than 
solve them. 
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"When you talk about migrant policy in Thailand, that's wrong. Because, there has 
never been a migrant policy in this country…Policy makers in this country never saw 
farther than the end of their noses, and never thought of addressing structural 
problems." [PM02] 
Current national strategies for managing the citizenship status of non-
Thais 
To date, there are three important national strands in the government's attempt to 
register all 'non-Thais' in the country.  
1. The non-Thai ID card introduced by the Bureau of Registration 
Administration (BORA) under the MOI in 2004 
Before 2004, there were seventeen different ID cards for non-Thai nationals. Different 
ethnic groups were assigned different colours on the card. The colour system was 
replaced by a single colour (pink) ID card for all non-Thai nationals. The new card for 
non-Thais looks similar to that of Thai nationals, except for the numbering code. For 
illegal migrants from CLM nations, the number on the card starts with '00' (while for 
Thai nationals, the number starts with non-zero integers). Once registered, these illegal 
migrants would acquire Tor Ror 38/1 along with the ID card. It should be noted that the 
'00' card only served as temporary identification evidence while the nationality 
verification, so-called, the 'NV', was underway, see Figure 11.   
Thus, the issuance of '00' card was considered a 'semi-legalisation' system (Chamchan 
and Apipornchaisakul, 2012). Once the NV was finished, their illegal status would be 
legalised, and they would acquire a temporary passport and would have the right to put 
their name in a household registry (Tor Ror 13), similar to regular foreigners.  
Note that the passport of NV migrants is called a 'temporary passport'. In other words, it 
is a passport recognised in Thailand and CLM countries only; the temporary passport 
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holders cannot use this to travel abroad to any countries but Thailand and their country 
of origin.  
Figure 11 Example of the '00' card for illegal CLM migrants  
 Source: Real picture taken from one of the interviewees 
 
2. The National Strategy to Address Rights and Citizenship Problems of a Person, 
endorsed by the National Security Council (NSC) in 2005  
This Strategy was often called the Stateless Strategy. Its highlights were (1) 
comprehensively registering all persons with citizenship status who have permanent 
residence in Thailand, and (2) affirming the basic human rights of a person while the 
resolution of citizenship status is underway (Ngamurulert et al., 2009). It has some 
components overlapping with cross-border migrants as some migrants are unable to 
return to their country of origin, and de facto become permanent residents in Thailand.  
Yet, in practice, those who really benefit from the Strategy are only in-situ stateless 
persons, while cross-border migrants are left untouched. Napaumporn (2012) reported 
that as of 2011, more than 880 migrant workers from CLM nations were rejected for 
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their nationalities under the NV process and the exact figure of migrant workers failing 
the NV is still in question. 
The most significant impacts of the 2005 Strategy are as follows. 
 The MOI launched measures for registering in-situ stateless persons in Thailand 
and providing them with an ID card, where the code starts with '0' (not '00').  
 The Ministry of Education (MOE) launched its internal policy through the 
Cabinet Resolution in 2005, ratifying the right to free basic education (grade 1-9) for all 
non-Thai nationals. 
 The MOPH endorsed the 'HI-PCP' or the 'Stateless Insurance' for registered 
stateless persons. 
There are some points to note in the 2005 Strategy. Firstly, the '0' card is just a 
recognition that the state recognises the citizenship status of a person. It does not mean 
that he/she is a Thai national. Should there be sufficient evidence that confirms his/her 
Burmese nationality, he/she should return to Myanmar or enter the legalisation process 
for CLM migrants as stated above.  
Secondly, though the Strategy was endorsed in 2005, the actual survey on people with 
citizenship problems was physically conducted only between 2007 and 2009.  
Thirdly, if a '0' ID card holder does not have evidence that proves they are a national of 
another country, and has been living in Thailand for a certain period (usually more than 
five years), he/she is eligible to apply for Thai nationality. However, in practice, the 
application process always takes time. Thus very few people were successful in 
changing their (problematic) citizen status to Thai nationals. This is reflected by the fact 
that number of '0' card holders remained relatively stable since the massive survey in 
2005 (Suphanchaimat et al., 2013, Hasuwannakit, 2012b).  
Lastly, while both the MOE and the MOPH used this Strategy as grounds to launch their 
internal policies, the MOE was more responsive to this political opportunity by 
submitting its proposal to the Cabinet for affirming rights to education to 'all' non-Thai 
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children. The MOE policy is that if a child does not hold an ID card, or if he/she holds 
any types of non-Thai ID card (that is, the '00' card or the '0' card), the MOE can issue a 
special ID for him/her. The MOE's ID is recognised only in MOE schools. The ID is 
generally known as the 'G-series' ID (GXXXXXXXXXXXXX). The most distinct 
features of the 'G-series' policy are (1) a 'G-series' child is eligible to enjoy free essential 
education, and (2) a school with 'G-series' students is eligible to receive an additional 
capitation budget (about US$ 12-15 per head) from the MOE. Recently, in March 2015, 
there was an attempt to expand HI-PCP coverage to all 'G-series' children by launching 
this proposal to the Cabinet, however, it has not been approved by the existing 
government (Chotprueksawan, 2013, Bureau of Budget, 2015). One of the interviewees 
(PM06) mentioned that the MOE was more responsive when 'windows of opportunity' 
were open, whereas the MOPH moved much more slowly. 
"I was involved in the drafting of the 2005 Strategy. At that time, the spearhead of the 
Strategy was Mr XXX, who then held a high position in the Ministry of Education soon 
after the 2005 Strategy was introduced." [PM06] 
3. The National Strategy on Comprehensive Management of Illegal Cross-border 
Migrants Problems, endorsed by the NSC in 2012 
In 2012 the number of illegal CLM migrants with a '00' ID card soared to over a million 
and seemed unlikely to decline (Office of Foreign Workers Administration, 2015) (see 
the growing number of migrant workers in the 'Three-nations' category in Figure 5). 
External pressures also played an important role. In 2010 Thailand was listed in the Tier 
2 Watchlist of the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, the second worst amongst all 
reporting levels. Countries in the Tier 2 Watchlist would be auto downgraded to Tier 3 
in two years unless they made exhaustive efforts to combat trafficking problems (US 
Department of State, 2012). An apprehension about country demotion, combined with 
pressure from the business sector and civil society, provoked the government to show 
significant efforts in dealing with problems of illegal migrants (Thai Civil Rights and 
Investigative Journalism, 2012). Therefore, the NSC proposed a new strategy in 2012, 
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namely, 'the National Strategy on Comprehensive Management of Illegal Cross-border 
Migrants Problems'.  
The 2012 Strategy did not provide new measures to tackle the illegality problems of 
migrants. It reiterated measures from the earlier Strategies and gave a strong message 
that those failing to register with the authorities would be subject to deportation. Hence, 
after the 2012 strategy, the amnesty laws ratified by the Cabinet Resolutions were 
cancelled as the government expected that 'all' illegal migrants would enter the NV 
process or be subject to deportation. One of the respondents expressed that the 2012 
Strategy gave inadequate attention in affirming rights to health of migrants.                 
"The 2012 Strategy belongs to the right-wing hawk. Unlike the 2005 Strategy, which 
ensures human rights of a person, the 2012 Strategy rarely touches this (humanitarian) 
issue. In the XXX international meeting, the Strategy was shamefully criticised." 
[PM06]         
A summary of policies for tacking citizenship problems of an alien and/or a migrant in 
Thailand is displayed in Figure 12 below. 
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Figure 12 Summary of national security policies in dealing with illegal migrants and 
aliens in Thailandx 
 
Source: adapted from the Office of National Security Council (2012a) 
 
                                                 
x The Strategy encompasses measures to deal with several migrant groups, including refugees and asylum 
seekers as shown in the lower right box of the diagram, but these groups are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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II. Employment 
History of the employment policy for migrants 
The Office of Foreign Workers Administration (OFWA) under the MOL is the main 
organisation responsible for processing work permit applications for migrant workers, 
and assisting Thai employers to recruit cross-border migrant workers (Paitoonpong and 
Chalamwong, 2011). The history of the work permit issuance for migrants started in 
1978, when the first 'Working of Alien Act' was promulgated. The Act indicates that an 
alien who wishes to work in Thailand must apply for a work permit, valid for one year, 
which can be renewed every year.  
The distinct requirements for a work permit applicant are: (1) not being insane, mentally 
ill, or with a history of substance dependence, (2) not being sick of serious public threat 
infectious diseasesxi, (3) not being an illegal immigrant, and (4) not applying for work in 
any of the 39 reserved occupations. The 39 reserved occupations are indicated in the 
Royal Decree (1979), so-called the 'negative list'.  
In principle, occupations in this list is reserved for Thai nationals only because they are 
occupations that are seemingly linked with Thai tradition and culture, for instance, wood 
carving, manual cloth weaving, and tour guiding. The list also includes 'manual labour', 
forestry and fishery and various kinds of labour works, such as shop-front sellers and 
bricklayers. 
In the early 1990s, Thailand made considerable progress in its economy by moving from 
an agricultural-based to industrial-based economy. The fast economic growth resulted in 
labour shortages, particularly in sectors such as construction and fishery, which are often 
engaged in dirty, difficult, and dangerous work ('3Ds' jobs) (Napaumporn, 2012, 
Pholphirul and Rukumnuyakit, 2008). Thus low-skilled migrant workers from CLM 
countries became an attractive option for Thai entrepreneurs. Besides, wage rates in 
Thailand were generally more attractive than in neighbouring countries, creating a 
massive inbound migration of illegal workers from CLM nations, but the 1978 Working 
                                                 
xi leprosy, elephantitis, stage 3 syphilis, drug addiction, and active tuberculosis  
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of Alien Act means that illegal migrants cannot apply for a legitimate work permit 
(Chantavanich and Vungsiriphisal, 2012). This situation forced the government to find a 
solution that enabled these (illegal) migrants to work lawfully in the country.   
Similar to the MOI, the MOL has devised legal instruments to 'legalise' the illegal status 
of migrant workers. One of the key tools is the Ministry of Labour Decree of 2004 (the 
same period when the '00' ID card was introduced), which allows an alien, who 'is 
allowed to temporarily stay in the Kingdom while awaiting deportation', to be engaged 
with 27 occupations specified in the Decree (Thai Immigration Bureau, 2008). This 
approach was like a way out for migrant workers from the negative list.   
Examples of the 27 occupations in the list are laundry workers, waiters in restaurants, 
and herdsmen. In essence, these 27 occupations can be categorised into two groups (1) 
manual labour and (2) domestic servants. Of note is that this regulation is enforced only 
for CLM migrants (Archavanitkul and Wachanasara, 2008).  
In the early 1990s permission to work for irregular/illegal migrants was confined to 
certain provinces with heavy industries. Then, in the early 2000s, the permission for 
illegal migrants to work became a nationwide policy.  
Before 2010, migrant workers from Myanmar made up the greatest proportion of CLM 
irregular migrants. However, the recent political reform towards democracy in Myanmar 
made many migrants return to their home land (Thet and Pholphirul, 2015). As a result, 
the number of illegal migrant workers from Myanmar gradually declined, and figures in 
2015 show that the stock of Cambodian workers slightly outnumbers migrants from the 
other two nations, see Figure 13. 
125 
 
Figure 13 Numbers of migrant workers (with work permit) from CLM nations in 
Thailand 
 
Source: The National News Bureau of Thailand (2015) and the OFWA (2015) 
Current challenges in the recruitment of migrant workers  
The NV policy and the amnesty laws are temporary measures for dealing with CLM 
migrants who have already crossed the border. There is another measure, the MOU that 
aims to deal with the problems of illegal migrants more proactively. The MOU was 
made between Thailand and CLM nations (Thailand signed with Cambodia and Lao 
PDR in 2002, and with Myanmar in 2003). However, the implementation of the MOUs 
was belated because of cooperation challenges between countries and limited capacity 
of relevant authorities to manage the process outlined in the MOUs. The deployment of 
migrant workers did not commence in Cambodia and Lao PDR until 2006, and was 
deferred in Myanmar until 2009 (Vasuprasat, 2008).  
The rough framework of the MOU included: (1) proper procedures for employing 
migrant workers, (2) effective repatriation of workers who have completed the 
terms/conditions of employment, (3) protecting the rights and welfare of workers, and 
(4) effective action against illegal border crossing and human trafficking. Though the 
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MOU policy implied an active role by government authorities in aiding legal migration, 
private recruitment agencies were able to step in and fill this role instead because there 
were several formal and informal steps to deploy a worker through MOU procedure 
(Chantavanich and Vungsiriphisal, 2012), see Figure 14.  
Figure 14 Example of the processes for recruiting Myanmar migrants via the MOU 
policy 
 
Source: Adapted from Swaschukaew (2014) 
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It was estimated that the minimum time from sending a request to the Thai Department 
of Employment (DOE) to the arrival of a worker was around 60-90 days. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) (2015) reported that huge administrative 
burdens and lengthy approval processes that were quite opaque and difficult to 
understand indirectly made employers and workers turn to private intermediaries. This 
was supported by one of the key informants below.  
"I just knew that there was a quota (for migrant recruitment), but I had no idea how it 
(the MOL) allocated this quota. If I request 5 housemaids, I am not sure whether it (the 
MOL) will check this request." [PM02] 
MOU migrants and NV migrants shared similar characteristics in terms of permitted 
length of stay in Thailand and acquired documents. For time permitted, migrants in both 
groups were allowed to have temporary residence for two years plus a two-year 
extension (four-year maximum). After that, they must return to the country of origin for 
three years before applying to return to Thailand again (Hall, 2012).  
For documents acquired (see Figure 15), both groups would acquire a temporary 
passport and work permit. With a temporary passport, they were allowed to travel to any 
province in Thailand as regular migrants. However, they were not allowed to change an 
employer without informing the DOE first (with a fee incurred). Before the temporary 
passport was issued, they were allowed to live only within a certain area/province as 
stipulated in Tor Ror 38/1. 
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Figure 15 Work permit and temporary passport for NV and MOU migrants 
 
Source: Real pictures from the author's interviewees 
The expense for obtaining work permit varied according to type of work and length of 
stay, normally between 1,000 and 4,000 Baht (US$30-121). Hall (2012) suggested that 
the entire price of the MOU process, including the cost of broker services, might be up 
to US$ 1,100 per person. According to the ILO Convention on Private Employment 
Agencies, the entire cost of recruitment should be borne by an employer. Yet some 
employers avoided defraying this cost by paying the work permit expense in advance 
then deducting this from their employees' salary (Archavanitkul and Wachanasara, 
2008). 
III. Health Insurance 
History of the HICS 
Before exploring the HICS, it is worth mentioning a little about its relationship with the 
SSS. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, MOU and NV migrants were mostly engaged 
in low-skilled work either in the formal sector or the informal sector. In this regard, 
MOU and NV migrants in the informal sector, despite being fully legalised, were not 
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entitled to SSS coverage because the SSS covered only legal workers in the formal 
sector. In summary, migrants who were not entitled to the SSS included (1) 
undocumented/illegal migrant workers in both formal and informal sectors, (2) legal 
migrants working in the informal sector, and (3) dependants of migrant workers. To fill 
this policy gap, the MOPH promulgated the 'Health Insurance Card Scheme', or the 
'HICS'. 
One of the key informants (PM05) opined that all work permit holders in the formal 
sector should be insured by the SSS regardless of the completion of the NV (the SSS 
does not cover workers whose NV is not completed because those persons are still 
considered not fully legalised). However, it was very difficult to implement this idea in 
practice because there was always a lag time that the DOE needed for investigating the 
profile of applicants before issuing a work permit. This situation implied an 
implementation gap between the SSO (accounting for insuring migrant workers) and the 
DOE (accounting for issuing a work permit).   
"There was an idea that once a work permit was obtained, and to avoid duplicate 
payment of premiums, the SSO should register this person (regardless of the 
completeness of the NV). But in practice, during the first two weeks, it (the DOE) needs 
to check information on that migrant, including his/her criminal background and so on. 
So that migrant is not fully eligible for the SSS. Accordingly, that migrant cannot be 
insured by the SSS during that time. This is a constraint in practice." [PM05] 
"Even within the MOL, both parties (the SSO and the DOE) rarely talk to each other. 
Those responsible in insuring migrants work in the SSO. Those finding jobs for migrants 
work in the DOE. Those responsible for issuing work permit just do their job. They do 
not care if migrants will be insured for their health. It is not my business! Because it is 
not written in the law (that migrants with work permit must be insured)." [PM03] 
The first health insurance launched by the MOPH for migrants was a 500 Baht (US$ 15) 
health card (the same premium as the LICS at that time), which was endorsed in certain 
provinces. The premium then expanded to 1,000 Baht (US$ 30) in 1999 and 1,200 Baht 
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(US$ 36) in 2001, plus an annual health screening cost of 300 Baht (US$ 9) 
(Srithamrongsawat et al., 2009).  
The most remarkable change took place in 2004, the same period where the '00' card 
policy was established. The HICS was officially set up as a nationwide policy at that 
point. This implies that the policy is 'compulsory' because employers of migrants are 
required to take their migrant employees to visit a health facility for medical check-up 
and buy the insurance card as part of the entire registration process. However, the 
MOPH does not have specific legal instruments that can force migrants to buy the 
insurance and to punish their employers who refuse to buy the card for their employees. 
In other words, the policy is not 'compulsory' as intended. 
"(Interviewer: What factors that you consider a bottleneck for operating the migrant 
insurance at this moment?) We must make the insurance system supported by a legal 
instrument. Without legal grounds supporting the system, it is not possible to set up an 
authority to work on this issue in the long run." [PM04] 
Characteristics of the HICS 
Before the OSS era, the HICS primarily targeted migrant workers; but for dependants of 
migrants, it was applied on a voluntary basis. The HICS covers a wide range of services, 
including health promotion. This is in contrast to the SSS, where health promotion 
activities were not included in the benefit package because the SSS had an agreement 
with the UCS, indicating the UCS is the main agency responsible for health promotion 
and disease prevention for all Thai citizens (Sakunphanit, 2010). Key attributes of the 
HICS are as follows. 
Governing body 
The Health Insurance Group (HIG) is the main governing body of the HICS. It is under 
the Office of the Permanent Secretary (OPS) of the MOPH. The organisation was set up 
in 1993 to deal with MOPH financing. Due to its background in health financing, the 
organisation was assigned by the OPS to manage the HICS in 2004.  
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Though the HIG has its own director, the organisation does not have true discretionary 
power. All official letters and announcements to local health facilities, regarding any 
changes in the HICS, must be signed by the Deputy Permanent Secretary, not by the 
HIG director. 
Tangcharoensathien (2015) mentioned that the MOPH bureaucratic structure was 
obsolete and unresponsive to health system dynamics, in addition to its transparency 
issue. This factor also led to discontinuity in policy implementation since the Deputy 
Permanent Secretary was subject to change when there was a change in the government. 
Besides, one of the interviewees working in the HIG expressed her concern over a 
shortage of staff in the organisation and a shakiness of the government policies on 
migrant issues. 
"There are only 10 staff members in the office. Two of them have just resigned. 
Seriously, I wish to resign too…The big-picture policy (on migrants) is always shaky. 
This consumes much of our time since we need to change our work according to a new 
policy. If the new policy was developed based on what we have done, this would lead to 
progress. But nowadays it is always volatile." [ADM_CO1]    
Apart from the HIG, there are some authorities under the MOPH which have some 
functions related to the HICS. Examples of these authorities are the Bureau of Policy 
and Strategy (BPS) and the Bureau of Health Administration (BHA).  
The BPS is responsible for collecting individual (both Thai and non-Thai) patient 
records from health facilities. However, the collection of records is just routine 
monitoring and not related to reimbursement. The BPS is also commissioned to feed 
draft strategies to policy makers upon request.  
One of the MOPH strategies linked to the HICS is the 2012-2016 Border Health Plan. 
The Plan clearly stated that health facilities in areas where migrants were concentrated 
should develop 'migrant-friendly services', such as having migrant health volunteers, or 
establishing health education leaflets in non-Thai language. However, the Plan was 
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merely a guidance. The implementation of activities proposed in the Plan was subject to 
willingness/readiness of individual facilities (Bureau of Policy and Strategy, 2012).  
The BHA’s main duties are to support administrative works of the MOPH (such as 
launching guidelines or crafting ministerial announcements). In terms of the HICS, the 
BHA is responsible for launching health screening guidelines, contacting non-MOPH 
ministries on behalf of the MOPH, and monitoring quality of service.  
Note that BHA is under control of another Deputy Permanent Secretary, who is not in 
charge of the HIG. One of the respondents mentioned that this overlapping function 
between authorities usually caused confusion in HICS implementation.  
"They (the BHA) launched health examination regulations and other miscellaneous 
measures. But when local providers faced problems with the insurance, the BHA didn't 
solve the problems of local providers. So they (local providers) always speak to us (the 
HIG) instead." [ADM_CO1] 
Financing mechanism  
Healthcare financing refers to the means by which a health service is funded. This topic 
can be explored through the three basic functions: (1) revenue collection, (2) risk 
pooling, and (3) purchasing of health services.  
For revenue collection and purchasing, the HICS receives remittances from the card 
premium. It does not matter if an employer purchases the card for his/her employees, or 
migrants buy it by themselves. The card price was 1,300 Baht (US$ 39) since the 
inception of the policy in 2004 until 2013, when it rose to 2,200 Baht (US$ 67). Year 
2013 was also the time when the '365-Baht card' (US$ 11) for a migrant child was 
launched. The rationale behind the instigation of the '365-Baht' card is described at the 
end of this subsection. 
In 2014 the card price for an adult was reduced to 1,600 Baht (US$ 48) to persuade 
more migrants to register with the OSS policy, but the card price for a child remained 
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constant. In addition to the card premium, there was an annual 600 Baht (US$ 18) health 
examination cost, which a buyer must pay before being insured. The health examination 
cost was reduced to 500 Baht (US$ 15) in mid-2014 during the OSS era (Health 
Insurance Group, 2013). Note that migrant dependants under 7 are not obliged to pay for 
the health check. This means, in total, an adult must pay 2,100 Baht (US$ 64) for 
obtaining the insurance (1,600-Baht premium plus 500-Baht health check).  
Risk pooling is a means to distribute financial risks. The HICS pool is divided into three 
pots: (1) registering hospital, (2) the PPHO, and (3) the MOPH.  
The largest pot (~57%) is pooled at a hospital to cover the cost of services (both OP and 
IP treatments) provided to the card holders.  
Another pot (~20%) is pooled at the PPHO to support all administration expenses and to 
encourage health facilities to undertake health promotion activities for outreach 
populations. A health facility is able to ask the PPHO for funding from this pot to 
support its health promoting projects, or the PPHO can use this money to launch its own 
health promoting initiatives. 
Lastly, the rest of the card revenue (~23%) is pooled at the MOPH. This budget is used 
for subsidising (1) expense of high-cost care incurred by contracted facilitiesxii, and (2) 
emergency treatment in case a patient visits a hospital located outside his or her 
registered province. 
The interviewee, PM01, mentioned that he was involved in designing the HICS 
financing from the beginning. He also stated that it was the intention of policy makers at 
that time to have the largest portion of the card revenue pooled at local facilities rather 
than at the MOPH because this would enable the facilities to make best use of the 
income from selling the card to match their own needs.       
                                                 
xii A treatment is considered 'high-cost' if the IP's adjusted Relative Weight (adjRW) is equal to or larger 
than 4. AdjRW is the indicator reflecting disease severity and health resource used for IP care. Admission 
with higher adjRW number means the disease of that episode is more severe (and requires more resources 
for treatment) than that of a lower adjRW number.  
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"We intended to have reverse financing design to the UCS. Since each province has its 
own specific context. So the money should be pooled only where needed but distributed 
as much as possible." [PM01] 
If a patient bypasses his/her registered hospital to attend another hospital within the 
same province in an emergency condition, the receiving hospital must be liable to take 
care of treatment expense first, then be reimbursed from the registered hospital. For a 
bypass of an emergency condition to another province, the receiving hospital can be 
reimbursed the treatment cost directly from the MOPH. For a bypass of a non-
emergency condition, the treatment charge is incurred by a patient (Health Insurance 
Group, 2013).  
A summary of the financing mechanism of the HICS is presented in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Financing mechanism of the HICS in different periods 
 
Source: adapted from the HIG (2013) 
136 
 
The reimbursement for 'high-cost' care is like a reinsurance system. A contracted 
hospital must absorb high-cost treatments for migrants as well as ART for HIV/AIDS 
cases first, then be reimbursed this from the MOPHxiii. Before 2013, the money pooled 
at the MOPH was the smallest in size amongst the three pots but, after 2013, the MOPH 
pool has become much enlarged due to additional earmarked fund for HIV/AIDS 
treatment. Note that there is no additional budget for ART in the 365-Baht card but the 
card still covers treatment for HIV/AIDS in children. Two interviewees (PM03 and 
ADM_CO1) mentioned that they experienced some hospitals that refused to transfer 
part of the card revenue to the MOPH and wished to take the financial risk on their own.      
"Some hospitals are bluffing by not sending (high-cost) money to us (the MOPH). They 
may think that they have already sold a large number of cards so they don’t want to 
pool the high cost with us." [ADM_CO1] 
Health screening 
Before buying the card and obtaining a work permit, a migrant applicant must pass the 
health checkxiv, which includes several measures including chest X-ray, blood 
examination for syphilis, and leprosy screening (Health Insurance Group, 2013). Results 
of the health check are divided into 3 tiers.  
 Tier 1: An applicant, who is fit enough, and does not have any serious 
communicable diseases, will be issued a work permit and be eligible to buy the 
insurance card. 
 Tier 2: An applicant who is infected by either TB, leprosy, syphilis, or parasites, 
will be obliged to have further treatment before being issued a work permit and buying 
the insurance card. 
                                                 
xiii The MOPH subsidises this expense based on DRG with global budget (normally about 10,500 Baht or 
US$ 318  per adjRW) 
xiv The full measures are (1) chest X-ray (followed by sputum examination in tuberculosis suspected case), 
(2) blood examination to investigate microfilaria and syphilis infection, (3) urine analysis for checking 
narcotic drug use and amphetamine plus pregnancy test for woman, (4) leprosy screening, (5) provision of 
a single dose of Diethycarbamazine (300 mg of DEC) and a single dose Albendazole (400 mg) for treating 
parasites, and (5) other health screening where doctors deem appropriate 
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 Tier 3: An applicant, who is infected with any of the following conditions: active 
tuberculosis, obvious leprosy or filariasis that causes 'social disgust', stage-3 syphilis, 
narcotic drug addiction, alcoholism, and psychosis, or suffers any sickness that may 
hamper his/her job based on an individual doctor's opinion, will be reported to the 
Immigration Bureau for deportation.  
This guideline has been used and remains unchanged since 2004. The conditions 
specified in Tier 3 were adopted from the Decree No.14 (1992) which gave details of 
conditions for banning suspicious immigrants from entering the country.  
Recent data from the MOPH showed that the proportion of migrants falling into Tier 3 
was about 0.9% of all registered migrants. However, the accuracy of this figure was in 
question, especially the reporting of TB cases (Bureau of Health Administration, 2015). 
This was because the term 'active tuberculosis' in clinical sense was somewhat different 
from the interpretation specified in the ministerial announcement. In clinical practice, 
'active tuberculosis' referred to a patient with abnormal chest X-ray and positive sputum 
examination, while the health check in the field performed a chest X-ray only but not 
sputum test because the HICS guideline indicated that a further sputum exam would be 
undertaken only if an abnormal chest film was found. The whole process for acquiring 
sputum results usually took time, but the report to the MOPH was normally based on 
chest X-ray only. One of the interviewees (PM03) opined that the health checks and 
dividing the findings to different tiers were not useful compared to insuring 'all' migrants 
at the first place, and, in his view, the classification of Tier 2 and Tier 3 was very 
subjective. 
"I am the one that is not convinced that we should force migrants to have health 
screening. Even though it sounds good… But I am an epidemiologist. I know that a 
yearly health check does not benefit you that much. But if you take all of them to the 
insurance, this is the best disease surveillance system. It is a win-win situation. Now it is 
like you need to know whether a migrant is having diseases and you ask him/her to pay 
you to get this answer. But if you insure all of them, it means that I promise to protect 
138 
 
your health all year long. That migrant will benefit from the treatment and you will be 
able to know his/her health status." [PM03] 
Benefit package 
Registered migrant workers and dependants are eligible to obtain health benefits at the 
hospital where they had health screening. However, in some provinces, such as Ranong 
province, the PPHO introduced its own measure by allowing a beneficiary to access 
health services at all public facilities within the province (see Chapter 6 for more detail). 
The HICS benefit package includes OP and IP treatments, emergency care, health 
promotion, and disease prevention. Nonetheless, some treatment items are not included, 
such as treatment of psychosis and drug dependence, and renal replacement therapy for 
chronic renal failure. 
Another important feature of the HICS is that the benefit package remained unchanged 
since its inception in 2004, until the year 2013. Potential explanations for this change are 
explained in the later subsection.  
Contracted health facilities 
All public hospitals under the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the MOPH, 
including district hospitals and provincial hospitals as well as network health centres, 
are contracted facilities. The only exception is in Bangkok where hospitals under the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and hospitals under the Department of Medical 
Services of the MOPH serve as contracted facilities.  
The insurees need to visit the hospital where they first registered. This is a gate-keeping 
mechanism similar to the UCS. In cases where the designated hospital is unable to 
provide suitable treatment for severe diseases, the patient can be referred to a higher-
level contracted hospital within a province first, then to a higher-level hospital outside 
the province. 
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Key reasons for the changes in the HICS and remaining challenges 
One of the most important changes in the HICS took place in 2013, when the 
government launched the Cabinet Resolution on 15 January 2013 to officially allow 'all' 
migrants and dependants to buy the insurance. There were three major changes indicated 
in the Resolution: (1) the expansion of the benefit package to cover HIV/AIDS 
treatment alongside an increase in the card premium, from 1,300 Baht (US$ 39) to 2,200 
Baht (US$ 67), (2) the introduction of insurance for migrant children aged under 7 with 
an annual price of 365 Baht (US$ 11), and (3) the announcement that the MOPH at that 
time was independent from the MOI and the MOL.  
The target population of the 2013 HICS is 'all non-Thais' who are not covered by the 
SSS. A remarkable point is that the term 'workers' does not appear in the Resolution. It 
implied that in 2013 migrants without a work permit or any identification document 
were eligible to buy the insurance card (Ministry of public Health of Thailand, 2013).  
A key informant (PM01) mentioned that key reasons behind the 2013 HICS changes 
were (1) a possibility that the Global Fund programme would no longer support ART for 
illegal migrants in Thailand, and (2) external pressure that forced the country to show 
more effort in combating trafficking problems.  
For the first reason, the Global Fund support contributed to about 41% of budget used 
for HIV prevention activities. It also served as the main supporter for ART for uninsured 
migrants in Thailand. With reference to the 23rd Global Fund Board Meeting in 2011, a 
new 'Eligibility' policy was adopted. It indicates that an upper middle income country 
will no longer be eligible to submit a new proposal to the Global Fund. Therefore, the 
inclusion of ART into the benefit package of the HICS in 2013 was considered a 
solution for tackling this problem (Patcharanarumol et al., 2013).  
Secondly, during that period, there was external pressure in the risk that Thailand would 
be downgraded to the Tier 3 Trafficking Report (and finally, in 2014, Thailand was 
labelled as a Tier 3 trafficking country). The US government reported that more than 
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23,000 Cambodian trafficking victims departed Thailand in each year and the Thai 
government did not show 'adequate' efforts to combat the trafficking crisis (Embassy of 
the United States in Thailand, 2013).  
Thus the change of the HICS in 2013 was regarded as a means of bringing 'underground' 
migrants into the open. Note that the '365-Baht' price was not calculated from the actual 
cost of treatment. On the contrary, it was set up as a 'campaign' (as the total card price 
was equal to one Baht per day) or the country's 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR), 
to show efforts in taking care of vulnerable populations, especially, migrant children.  
The Public Health Minister at that time even announced that this was the cheapest 
insurance in the world (Thairath Online, 2013). Yet, one of the interviewees (PM02) 
opined that the 365-Baht card, in essence, reflected a fuzzy management of illegal 
migrants in Thailand rather than a CSR.    
"Children and women are potential victims of human trafficking. I am also a member of 
the White Ribbon (a campaign against violence on women and children) [The 
interviewee showed the White Ribbon badge to the researcher while 
interviewing]…That is why we made the 15-January-2013 insurance policy to enable us 
to insure all migrants in Thailand.…and the '365-Baht' card is the country's CSR. …And 
if we take care of them well, once they return home, they will definitely wish to come 
back to us." [PM01] 
"This (the 365-Baht card) shows how the government has brain but no wisdom. How 
can they say that this is a charitable gift?…If the problem is so huge, it should not be 
CSR…Concerning structural problems, if the problem is so big, it means we must do 
something (systematically). We should know how 'strict' we are going to be in dealing 
with these illegal migrant children." [PM02] 
Though the 2013 HICS policy was relatively open to illegal migrants, the number of the 
card holders was quite low. As of December 2013, around 12 months after the Cabinet 
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Resolution came out, there were only 66,000 card holders, far from its target of 1 
million (ASTV Manager Online, 2013).  
Moreover, there was a problem with the interpretation of the eligibility of the card 
buyers because the 2013 MOPH announcement did not indicate the nationality of a 
buyer. This led to a problem as in some areas, particularly in the northeastern region, 
there were European pensioners, who have settled in Thailand, and even some 
foreigners living in Lao PDR, attempting to buy the insurance card. Some hospitals in 
the northeastern region complained to the MOPH that the HICS made them risk running 
a deficit since most European pensioners had chronic non-communicable diseases 
(NCD), such as diabetes mellitus (DM) and hypertension (HT).  
Before 2013, these patients were liable to pay out-of-pocket. However, after 2013, 
because of the card, they were able to enjoy services free of charge. The bottom line for 
this point is because the annual treatment expense for these foreign patients was 
substantial, and even much higher than the card price.  
Note that the card used the term, 'foreigner', on its English title but used the term, 'tang 
dao', in its Thai title (see Figure 17). To resolve this confusion, the MOPH sent an 
official letter to all facilities in July 2014, asking health facilities to 'temporarily stop' 
selling the card to 'farang' (which is a lay Thai term referring to Caucasian or white 
foreigners, and this term really appeared on the MOPH letter to the local facilities) and 
to await further announcements. Yet, so far there has not been any official message from 
the MOPH informing the health facilities what should be done next for this matter 
(Ministry of Public Health of Thailand, 2014a). 
One of the interviewees (PM03) highlighted that the reason why the MOPH asked all 
hospitals to pause the selling of the card to western foreigners was not only the 
confusion in the texts, but more importantly, because the policy was designed for 
vulnerable migrants, not for those the interviewee considered as better-off groups, like 
European pensioners.  
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Figure 17 Picture of the health insurance card in 2013 
 
Source: adapted from the HIG (2013) 
"The problem of this policy (the Cabinet Resolution on 15 January 2013) is 'who is the 
target population?'. When policy makers talk to the public, they said 'everybody'. Then, 
it created problem. Can a foreign husband of a Thai wife in Udonthani (one of the 
provinces in the Northeast) come to buy the card? Healthy foreigners will not buy the 
card for sure. Those who bought the card are sick foreigners, who used to pay the 
hospital over 60,000-70,000 Baht a year. Now they just pay 2,200 Baht. Of course, they 
will be happy. So, we launched a letter telling the hospitals to stop selling the card (to 
western foreigners)." [PM03] 
"[Laughing] Oh!, they use the term, 'farang' (referring to Caucasian foreigners). The 
MOPH must answer whether these foreigners are aliens in legal terms." [PM06] 
IV. One Stop Service policy 
The OSS is the most recently launched measure. Failure to convince migrants to buy the 
card in 2013 is just one of the key factors resulting in the instigation of the OSS policy. 
Other important reasons are domestic political unrest and turbulent relation between 
Thailand and Cambodia during 2013-2014.  
Political instability occurred in 2013, triggered by the People's Democratic Reform 
Committee (PDRC), protesting over the elected government. The protesters viewed the 
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government as a puppet of the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was 
accused of corruption and damaging the country's democracy (Nguyen et al., 2014). The 
turmoil led to the coup d'état and the establishment of a junta, so-called, the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in July 2014. The NCPO claimed that 
overthrowing the government was a measure to prevent a potential clash between the 
PDRC and the pro-Shinawatra supporters (Red Shirt group).  
During the crisis, there were reports that some Red Shirt leaders hired Cambodian 
migrants to join the group (Thearith, 2014). This claim coincided with a report by the 
Cambodian government that the Cambodian prime minister appointed the controversial 
ex-prime minister of Thailand to be an 'adviser of economics' to Cambodia. Some Red 
Shirt supporters were exiled to Cambodia and vowed to resist the junta from outside 
Thailand (Thearith, 2014, Cartalucci, 2013). A month after the coup d'état, the coup 
leader broadcast that the military would strictly regulate the migrant workforce in 
Thailand (Keck, 2014). Days after the speech, Cambodian newspapers began reporting a 
large number of illegal migrant workers journeying back home. The Phanom Penh Post 
(2014) also reported that undocumented/illegal migrant workers were at risk of being 
killed, not just arrested and deported. These rumours spread rapidly all over the country, 
resulting in a massive voluntary exodus of 170,000-220,000 Cambodian migrants. Such 
a huge number of Cambodian migrants returning home produced negative effects on 
both the Thai and Cambodian economies, causing a loss of more than US$ 1 million per 
day in cash flow between both countries (Thearith, 2014). One respondent commented 
that this phenomenon reflected a mismanagement of migrant policies of the government.  
"I am more than happy to see more than 100,000 Cambodian migrants fleeing out of the 
country. It makes the government realise that they (migrants) are not voiceless [Bang 
the table!]. I wish Thai people would petition the government too." [PM02] 
To restore the country's reputation, the NCPO officially announced a series of measures 
to resolve this conflict. Accordingly, the NCPO Order No.67/2557 (2014a) was 
broadcast on Thai media on 16 June 2015, stating that: 'The NCPO is considering an 
amendment of laws and regulations in addressing illegal migrant problems in a 
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sustainable manner…Meanwhile, the country is accused by many humanitarian NGOs 
and civil groups of violating human rights…These claims are not based on fact at all.' A 
couple of weeks later, the NCPO formed a special committee, so-called, 'the National 
Policy Committee to Address Issues of Migrant workers and Human Trafficking', 
chaired by the Deputy Chief of the junta. About half of the committee members were 
from representatives of the armed forces, while the rest were Permanent Secretaries 
from various ministries, including the MOPH.  
The Committee promptly instigated the 'OSS' policy in four provinces along the Thai-
Cambodian border. The Order No.70/2557 (2014b) stipulated that Cambodian migrant 
workers who wished to work in Thailand, either the newcomers or returnees, must be 
registered for Tor Ror 38/1, having a health check and obtaining a work permit at 
designated places under the OSS. The OSS was shortly expanded across the country 
with an aim to register 'all' illegal migrant workers and dependants (plus legal migrants 
whose work permits had expired) within a given period (25 June 2014 to 21 August 
2014). Then, the NCPO found that there were many more migrants than expected, 
making it impossible to register all of them in a few months. Thus, the OSS deadline 
was extended to 31 October 2014 with an intention to complete the NV process by 31 
March 2015 (National Council for Peace and Order, 2014c).  
"Initially, this (the OSS) was a measure to pull Cambodian migrant workers back to 
Thailand. And finally, there was a policy to cover all irregular migrants. But our data 
are of bad quality. I asked in the meeting how many Cambodian migrants who were in 
this exodus came back to us? Nobody can answer this. At that time, many constructions 
in Thailand, let's say roads, express ways, and so on, were badly affected." [PM03] 
Some key attributes of the OSS are as follows. Firstly, it required the MOI, the MOL, 
and the MOPH to work together in designated places within a province to facilitate the 
registration process. 
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Secondly, the NCPO explicitly declared that there would not be any further extension of 
the OSS after 31 October 2014. Illegal migrants and dependants failing to register with 
the OSS by 31 October 2014 would be deported.  
Thirdly, the OSS targeted only 'migrant workers' and 'dependants' from CLM nations. 
However, it did not specify a definition of 'dependants', to whom this measure applied. 
Fourthly, the essence of the OSS is similar to the pre-OSS policies, that is, an illegal 
migrant must (1) register for the '00' card, (2) be issued with a work permit and (3) pay 
for health insurance. The new '00' card specifies the name of the employer and 
registered hospital on the back of the card, see Figure 18. Note that other essential 
documents, namely, the work permit document and the health insurance card, are still 
issued as usual.    
Figure 18 Picture of the '00' card issued during the One Stop Service 
 
Source: Real picture taken from one of the interviewees 
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Fifthly, the OSS initially aimed that the NV process would be completed by 31 March 
2015. However, it appears that the process was belated, meaning a number of registered 
migrant workers and dependants did not obtain a valid passport. The government 
therefore opened the second round of OSS between 1 April 2015 and 30 June 2015 to 
renew the '00' card only for those who had registered in the first round of OSS but 
whose NV process had not been completed. 
Sixthly, each province has discretion in designing the detailed function of the OSS. For 
example, in Ranong province, all migrant workers were required to have their health 
check carried out only by Ranong provincial hospital, despite registering for health 
insurance with other district hospitals within the province. 
Seventhly, the MOPH reduced the price of the health check from 600 Baht (US$ 18) to 
500 Baht (US$ 15), and health insurance card from 2,200 Baht (US$ 67) to 1,600 Baht 
(US$ 49). Moreover, it introduced subsets of the 1600-Baht card, namely, the 500-Baht 
(US$ 15) card for 3-month insurance and the 900-Baht (US$ 27) card for 6-month 
insurance. The main reason for setting up these cards was that newly-registered migrants 
working in the formal sector were required to have their salary deducted for at least 3 
months before being fully eligible for the SSS. The 3-month and 6-month cards hence 
served as an interim insurance for migrants in the formal sector who were awaiting the 
SSS entitlement.  
Lastly, the NCPO did not clearly specify whether the 2013 HICS policy was functioning 
as there was no text indicating that the 2013 HICS policy was replaced by the OSS, let 
alone explaining the difference in the terms used between both announcements, and this 
resulted in confusion in policy implementation, which is detailed in Chapter 6.     
It is obvious that the OSS aimed at perfect coordination between ministries. However, 
some problems still existed. A conspicuous example of imperfect coordination was 
reflected by a discrepancy in the number of registered migrants between authorities. By 
the end of 2014, the MOI claimed that the stock of registered migrants and dependants 
was as large as 1,626,235, whereas the MOPH reported a smaller figure at 1,470,778; 
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about 10% difference. This difference became larger in mid-2015, where the MOI 
reported the figure of 1,103,728, around 30% higher than the 757,284 figure of the 
MOPH (Bureau of Health Administration, 2015).  
"Speaking in lay language, once an illegal migrant passes the OSS door, he will become 
a legal migrant…The government used to say that they would be able to clear all illegal 
migrants within two months, which I told them that was impossible...See, then they 
extended…The MOL also negotiated with us to reduce the insurance price to reduce 
barriers. Then the negotiation began and the price was set to 1,600 Baht…But there 
exist problems, you can recall Burmese guys that were accused of killing a British girl 
[During the interview period, there was news reporting that two British backpackers 
were murdered in Thailand by Burmese migrant], they still have not yet joined the 
OSS…Like dependants issue, to what extent we will cover? Only one wife? Parents of 
migrants? What is the cut-off age of dependants? These questions need lots of further 
negotiations. And I believe that even you ask the government, they cannot answer…" 
[PM03] 
In conclusion, several subtypes of the insurance card for migrants, which were still in 
effect at the time of writing (including the 2013 HICS policy), are displayed in Table 15 
on the following page. 
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Table 15 Characteristics of several subtypes of the insurance card for migrants 
Card Premium Length 
of 
coverage
Beneficiary Beginning from Benefit package Legal basis
Health 
Insurance 
Card for 
'migrant' 
2,200 Baht 
+ 500 Baht 
for health 
check  
1 Year
 
All non-Thai 
populations, except 
for tourists, and 
Caucasian foreigners
15 January 2013 
 
Outpatient,  inpatient, and 
health promotion, disease 
prevention services (including  
HIV/AIDS treatment, and 
other high-cost care; 
excluding renal replacement 
therapy for chronic renal 
failure and treatment for 
psychosis and drug 
dependence)
Cabinet 
Resolution 
on 15 
January 2013
Health 
Insurance 
Card for 
'migrant child' 
365 Baht 1 Year
 
Migrant child aged 
less than 7 
15 January 2013 
 
Health 
Insurance 
Card for 
'migrant 
worker' 
1,600 Baht 
+ 500 Baht 
for health 
check 
1 Year Migrants who 
registered with the 
One Stop Service by 
31 October 2014 
7 July 2014 Outpatient,  inpatient, and 
health promotion, disease 
prevention services (including  
HIV/AIDS treatment, and 
other high-cost care; 
excluding renal replacement 
therapy for chronic renal 
failure and treatment for 
psychosis and drug 
dependence) 
NCPO Order 
No 118/2557 
900 Baht + 
500 Baht 
for health 
check 
6 months
500 Baht + 
500 Baht 
for health 
check 
3 months
Health 
Insurance 
Card for 'a 
child of 
migrant 
workers' 
365 Baht 1 Year Child of migrant 
workers, aged less 
than 7, registered with 
the One Stop Service 
by 31 October 2014 
7 July 2014 
Source: adapted from the HIG (2013) 
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A summary of the complete registration process that a migrant is supposed to undertake 
is presented in Figure 19 below.        
Figure 19 Entire registration process of all ministries in which a cross-border migrant in 
Thailand is supposed to participate 
 
Note 
1. Green = MOL policies, Red = MOI policies, and Purple = MOPH policies 
2. The 2013 HICS policy is indicated by a dashed arrow as it was not clear if the 
policy was still in effect after the OSS. 
Source: Author's synthesis 
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5.4 Discussion 
This subsection extracts key themes from the results subsection. Part of this is discussed 
again in Chapter 8. With the use of thematic analysis, two important themes were 
extracted, namely, (1) Instability of Thailand's migrant policies, and (2) De facto 
powerlessness of the health sector. 
I. Instability of Thailand's migrant policies 
It is obvious that the entirety of migrant policy in Thailand is considerably dynamic. The 
constant shift in policies reflects how the country coped with the changes in its 
contextual environment and political dynamics over time. As proposed by Leichter 
(1979) exogenous factors, namely: (1) situation factors, (2) structural factors, (3) 
cultural factors and (4) international factors, always play a vital role in policy 
formulation and implementation. The evolution of migrant policies in Thailand is 
conspicuous proof of Leichter's proposal. Going beyond that, the researcher discovered 
that some exogenous factors were not always 'exogenous'. In contrast, they might 
become embedded in, and part of, Thai politics. For instance, the first Nationality Act 
employed the jus soli principle (birth-right citizenship), but due to a fear of communism 
during the cold war, the subsequent Nationality Acts were amended in a way that 
opposed this principle. 
Based on the researcher's own synthesis, migrant policies in Thailand can be divided 
into four phases/eras. The first era place took place from the early 1900s to the 1990s, as 
the sense of nationalism grew in response to the entrance of colonialism in Southeast 
Asia, and became more pronounced in 1970s in the light of fear of the communist 
regime. This point is mirrored by the special law (Por Wor 337), which revoked the Thai 
nationality of a person born to non-Thai parents. Nationalism was prioritised over health 
rights and economic prosperity. In other words, the international factor became part of 
the cultural values and the structure of migrant policies in Thailand.  
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The second phase began in the early 1990s. The country was aiming to industrialise its 
economy but the shortage of low-skilled labour was intense. A huge influx of (illegal) 
Burmese migrants, fleeing from political violence in Myanmar, was on one hand 
perceived as a security threat, but on the other hand, was a solution to the country's 
labour shortage. In this regard, 'economics' was used as a legitimate reason to turn a 
blind eye to the illegal status of migrants, and has been exercised by all governments.    
The third phase commenced after 2004, where the '00' card was an important milestone. 
The health insurance scheme and the system for health screening for migrants were set 
up nationwide. A period between 2004 and 2013 was the time when the health security 
concept permeated national migrant policies, as evidenced by the introduction of the 
365-Baht card for a migrant child, and the expansion of the benefit package to cover 
ART. One may claim that the openness of the card policy in 2013 reflected an effort of 
the Thai government to provide health protection to all people in Thailand, and this 
point was supported by the fact that the ex-minister at that time raised the idea of 
providing health protection to 'all' populations in Thailand, including foreign expatriates 
and tourists (see Chapter 3). However, evidence to support this claim was merely 
suggestive as none of the interviewees explicitly mentioned this. Moreover, it is difficult 
to claim that this change was due to a genuine intention of policy makers to promote 
humanitarian values. As a matter of fact, pressure from civil society and international 
actors, particularly the allegation of human trafficking in Thailand, strongly pushed the 
country in this direction. In other words, health protection for migrants was used as a 
tool to avoid this accusation.  
The fourth era, which continues to the present time, began in mid-2014 immediately 
after the coup against the elected government. The nationalist perspective has reclaimed 
its dominant position again. Upholding the 'nation' is currently a core value of Thai 
citizens, as declared by the junta (Areerat, 2014). Summary of the evolution of migrant 
policies is presented in Figure 20 below. 
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Figure 20 Evolution of migrant policies in Thailand (synthesised by the author) 
 
Source: Author's synthesis 
Note: The ovals next to the central arrow refer to the external environment at a 
particular time. 
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The introduction of the OSS, from one angle, is the attempt of the government to 'sweep 
and clean' problems of illegal migrants. Yet, from another angle, whether it is true or not 
that migrants are engaged in the political movement, it is noticeable that migrant issues 
are dragged into Thai politics. Immigration has been framed as a vital policy topic, 
which can easily grasp public interest.  
This has happened not only in Thailand, but also in other regions. An immigration crisis 
in Europe in 2015 caused a series of public debates between both political wings 
(Sanandaji, 2015). In 2015 the Conservative Party in the UK made a commitment during 
the election campaign that it would cap net migration in the UK and restrict migrant 
rights in order to protect the benefits of UK taxpayers. The party gained strong support 
from the public despite sparse evidence to support the claim that migrants undermine the 
benefits of the UK citizens (Partos, 2015).  
Interestingly, none of the recent changes in the Thai policy have tackled the problem of 
migrants at the structural level. Key changes in the past were about amendments to the 
card price and a re-opening of the registration period. The OSS is an attempt to overhaul 
the whole sphere of migrant policies by requiring all relevant authorities to work 
'simultaneously' in the 'same' venue, and this tactic seemed to be successful (at least 
superficially). By the end of October 2014, the number of registered migrants reached 
its highest point (about 1.7 million) in the history of Thailand's migrant policies (one 
might argue that this success is not due to the OSS per se but because of the fear of the 
military government). However, it is difficult to claim that the policies of different 
ministries are truly integrated.  
Furthermore, the root cause of irregular migration starting at the border has not been 
addressed. The only measure that seems to be an innovation in preventing further illegal 
crossing is the MOU policy, which still demands much further work in operational 
details. Without this effort, the MOU measure cannot work effectively, as evidenced by 
the fact that the number of (regular/legal) migrant workers recruited through the MOU 
increased very slowly compared to other types of illegal migrants (Office of Foreign 
Workers Administration, 2015). 
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Besides, policy makers at times act like street-level bureaucrats in the way that they 
adapt or change policies within their discretion without tackling the root cause of the 
problems. One instance is the restriction of permitted jobs for migrants. In spite of 
amending laws and regulations on job restrictions and imposing a long term recruitment 
plan, previous governments always used Cabinet Resolutions as a quick measure to 
tackle this matter.  Resolutions were much easier to achieve than an amendment to the 
Act, but do not tackle the root of migrant problems.  
The policy making process in Thailand is congruent with what Lindblom (1979) referred 
to as the 'incrementalist model', that is, policy makers often explore a small number of 
alternatives in dealing with problems and tend to select options that differ minimally 
from existing policies. Once migrant insurance was assigned to the MOPH, it became 
politically difficult to overhaul this system or think of alternatives, such as delegating 
responsibility to the NHSO or to the SSS, let alone deal with challenges in harmonising 
the three major insurance schemes (the UCS, the SSS, and the CSMBS) for Thai citizens 
(Evans et al., 2012).  
This situation made the management of health insurance for migrants in Thailand 
different from other developed countries. In the literature review (Chapter 2), it is clear 
that, in many countries, once undocumented/illegal migrants are registered by the state 
authority, they will be enrolled into the mainstream public insurance scheme(s) of the 
host country. In contrast, in Thailand, after registration, undocumented/illegal migrants 
cannot be insured by the UCS like Thai nationals. This creates a huge burden on the 
MOPH, whose capacity is quite limited, as discussed subsequently. 
II. De facto powerlessness of the health sector 
The findings above showed that health authorities appeared to have limited power in 
formulating migrant policy, relative to the MOI and the MOL. Health authorities in this 
regard are not only the MOPH, but also the NHSO and the SSO. The SSO seems to have 
identified a comfort zone in dealing with only formal-sector fully-legalised migrants, a 
far smaller number than irregular migrants in the informal sector. Likewise, the NHSO 
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has limited discretion, covering only Thai citizens as stipulated in the judgement of the 
Office of the Council of State on the National Health Act (2002). Though the NHSO has 
recently launched its new strategy, attempting to expand its function to 'all' residents in 
Thailand as indicated in its vision (National Health Security Office, 2014), the MOPH is 
still in effect the only authority which has a physical role in liaising with other ministries 
on national migrant policies. This situation more or less reflects the competition/conflict 
between the MOPH and the NHSO. 
The decision-making role of the MOPH is subordinate to other ministries. Particularly 
during the OSS epoch, the basic requirement before being a HICS beneficiary is being 
registered with the MOI. This implies that the MOI is at the forefront of all steps in 
migrant registration. In this regard, it is very likely that the system may miss some 
migrants who fear being exposed to the MOI officers. This situation also happens in 
some European countries. For example, although the Spanish insurance system is open 
to all migrants, a number of undocumented/illegal migrants were still missing from the 
system due to fear of being deported if they presented at the municipality (Gray and van 
Ginneken, 2012). 
The only progressive change in MOPH policies came in 2013, when the HICS was 
opened to all migrants. Yet the 2013 HICS is regarded as voluntary insurance, which is 
at risk of adverse selection problems (as mentioned in the interview that European 
foreigners with chronic diseases opted to buy the card). This implies a lack of power of 
the MOPH in controlling and measuring the implementation of the policy at the ground 
level.  
Internal bureaucratic inefficiency and outdated public administration also make this 
situation more complex. As expressed in the interview, the HIG lacked skilled staff, 
infrastructure and know-how to deal with a vast number of migrants. The vertical 
structure of the MOPH was not responsive to rapid changes in migrant policy. The 
criticism regarding obsolete bureaucracy applied to all state agencies, not only the 
MOPH.  
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However, lessons from the past show that there were some MOPH successes in 
propelling some innovative policies, and all of which were driven in the period where 
'windows of opportunities' opened. The UCS was a good example of this. It was 
promoted by reformist groups in the health sector combined with strong support from 
civil society, right after the landslide victory of the new political party in the late 1990s 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2007). Another example was the compulsory licensing (CL) 
of ART and antiplatelet drugs for ischemic heart diseases soon after the former coup 
d'état in 2006. Chotesungnoen (2007) suggested the strongest determining factor of CL 
success was the autonomy of the working panel, which expanded its work beyond the 
MOPH bureaucracy by working closely with civil society. 
Nevertheless, in terms of migrant health, the MOPH was not able (or was not willing) to 
grasp the 'windows of opportunities' well enough. The Stateless Insurance is one 
example of this. In 2005, when the NSC launched the national strategy to deal with 
citizenship problems of permanent residents in Thailand, the MOE was successful in 
ratifying the right to education of non-Thai children through the G-series system. In 
contrast, the MOPH was not responsive enough to this opportunity and took about five 
years after the MOE in delivering the Stateless Insurance. One might even contend that 
the instigation of the HI-PCP did not originate from the MOPH bureaucracy per se, but 
arose from media pressure from NGOs and border hospitals, which complaint to the 
Cabinet about the hospitals' financial catastrophe (Hfocus, 2015). 
5.5 Conclusion 
The evolution of migrant policies reflects high-level politics and power play between 
state authorities: (1) the MOI, which upholds security interests, (2) the MOL, which 
aims at protecting economic interests, and (3) the MOPH, which accounts for health 
protection. The HICS is part of the entire nexus of migrant policies, where the MOPH 
appears to have a less dominant position in the policy decision making. All migrant 
policies in Thailand are dynamic and sensitive to both internal factors, such as changes 
in the government and pressures from the civil society, and to external factors. Ideally, 
the HICS is supposed to function seamlessly with other migrant policies, particularly the 
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process of obtaining work permit and the nationality verification, but, in practice, there 
are a number of constraints, including bureaucratic inefficiency, poor law enforcement, 
and lack of intersectoral integration. In 2014 the OSS was endorsed by the junta in order 
to fill the gaps between different authorities’ migrant policies, and to respond to the 
exodus of migrant workers, resulting from the political unrest in Thailand. Though the 
OSS was successful in registering a large number of undocumented/illegal migrants, the 
information systems between ministries have not been really integrated and other 
supporting mechanisms to resolve the rights and legal status problems of migrants have 
not been in place. 
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Chapter 6: Responses of local healthcare 
providers, relevant stakeholders and migrants 
towards the HICS 
6.1 Introduction 
While Chapter 5 elaborated on how the HICS was formulated and how the policy was 
perceived by policy makers, this chapter sheds light on how the HICS functioned in 
reality and how frontline officers, NGOs, and service users interacted with the HICS. 
This chapter also serves as a link between Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 as it complements 
Chapter 5 in terms of to what extent the policy was implemented as intended and why it 
appeared this way in practice, as well as explaining the quantitative outcomes of the 
policy in Chapter 7. 
The introductory subsection describes (1) the context of Ranong province and (2) lives 
of migrants in the province, to help the readers gain better insight into the study site's 
context. The results subsection is divided into two parts: (1) perceptions of local policy 
implementers, and (2) perceptions of migrants and employers. The discussion subsection 
presents key themes synthesised from the interview findings through thematic analysis 
approach, and these are discussed again in Chapter 8 together with emerging themes 
from other chapters.   
I. Summary of Ranong province's characteristics 
Ranong province is the northernmost province in the southern region of Thailand. Its 
total population (in the civil registry) is about 170,000. It is the least populated province 
in the country. However, the province has the largest ratio of migrants to Thai 
population, relative to other provinces. The volume of the HICS beneficiaries in the 
entire province is approximately 40,000. This is commensurable to one fifth of the total 
population in the civil registry (Ranong hospital, 2014b).  
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Ranong province comprises a large diversity of ethnic groups, including Thai citizens, 
migrant workers and dependants (mostly from Myanmar), foreign tourists, and stateless 
people (Ranong Provincial Public Health Office, 2014).  
In terms of geography, it is located on the Kra Isthmus, a slim land strip connecting 
Thailand with the Malay Peninsula. The long coast facing the Andaman sea makes the 
province one of the wettest places in Thailand, and this biosphere makes it suitable for 
rubber and palm planting as well as fishing (Srivirojana et al., 2014). 
The province is composed of five districts. Muang (headquarter) district and Kraburi 
district are the study sites for this research since they are the two districts with the 
largest number of migrants. Muang district is the centre of transportation and city 
business. Its economy mostly depends on the service sector and fishing industries. 
Kraburi district is about 60 kilometres north of Muang district. It is more rural and less 
populated. Most of the residents in Kraburi district are in the agricultural sector, 
particularly rubber plating (Srivirojana et al., 2014). 
Migration from Myanmar to Ranong province has taken place for years. Muang district 
is connected to Kawthaung district, the southernmost area of Myanmar (also known as 
'Victoria Point' during the British empire). It is now one of the busiest border trade cities 
in the South of Myanmar.  
Moreover, aside from Kawthaung district, migrants from diverse areas in Myanmar 
(such as Myeik and Dawei) often travel to Ranong province. Commuting between 
Muang district (through official border control) and Kawthaung district normally takes 
about half an hour by local ferries.  
In each month there are more than 40,000 people travelling between the two districts. 
Note that this figure counts only those passing the permanent border checkpoints 
(Department of Disease Control (branch no.11), 2014). The figure might be much higher 
if it were to include the number of travellers to and from temporary (natural) 
checkpoints. 
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Figure 21 Geographical location of Ranong province 
Source: Ranong PPHO (2014) 
Though this study focuses on the migrant population from Myanmar, another population 
of interest is displaced Thais. Displaced Thais are people believed to have Thai ethnicity 
but not registered as Thai nationals. Their history lies in the fact that in the past, there 
was no clear cut boundary between Siam (the name for Thailand at that time) and 
Myanmar until 1868, when Myanmar was governed by the British government. 
Thailand reached consensus with the British government to establish a clear 
demarcation line dividing the country from Myanmar, using the Kraburi river as a 
natural landmark (Suphanchaimat et al., 2015).  
Although the demarcation process led to the establishment of the modern Thai state, it 
resulted in negative consequences for population management, since many of the Thai-
ethnic population on the western bank were left behind and were labelled as non-Thai 
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citizens. During the 1980s and 1990s, many displaced Thais travelled back to Ranong 
and nearby provinces to flee from political upheaval in Myanmar, and then claimed Thai 
nationality from the government. Offspring of this population also suffered from this 
complication as they were not recognised as Thai nationals. It is estimated that there are 
about 28,000 displaced Thais residing in Thailand, and this problem led to the recent 
revision of the Nationality Act in 2012. The key change in the Act was that some 
displaced Thais, who have strong links to Thai-national ancestors, are eligible to apply 
for Thai nationality through DNA testing or interviews with witnesses of their birth. 
However, the process of nationality verification is slow. So far about 2,000 displaced 
Thais have successfully claimed Thai nationality (Chumchonthai Foundation, 2012). 
This implies that, currently, some displaced Thais are still recognised as people with 
citizenship problems or stateless persons; some of them are even regarded as Burmese 
migrants. Some displaced Thais have created families with Burmese migrants, making it 
more difficult to manage this issue effectively. This situation inevitably affected how 
healthcare providers dealt with the HICS in the real world as presented in the story of a 
displaced Thai, Kan, in the household of one of the interviewees (MK4) in the results 
subsection. 
II. General background of lives of migrants in Ranong 
province 
The growing economy in Ranong province has attracted many migrants from Myanmar 
for years. Burmese migrant workers have been deeply embedded in the province's 
economic structure, and some of them finally set up their lives in Thailand. Some 
migrants used Ranong province as a starting point to migrate to other provinces where 
economic opportunities are more promising (Srivirojana et al., 2014).  
In one migrant household, there are about 4-5 family members on average. It appeared 
that the system for house leasing was not clear. Some migrants had not signed a contract 
with landlords, and some did not even have their name on the official documents, such 
as Tor Ror 38/1 or Tor Ror 13 (Suphanchaimat, 2015).  
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Migrant communities in Ranong province comprise not only migrant households, but 
also Burmese schools and temples, most of which are run by NGOs. Buddhist Burmese 
migrants are the majority of non-Thai populations in the province (Ranong Provincial 
Public Health Office, 2014). Due to high population density, community hygiene is an 
important public health concern. Srivirojana et al (2014) reported that the case fatality 
rate due to cholera amongst Burmese communities in Ranong province was around 15 
cases per 100 migrants in 2011, about sevenfold the rate in Thai citizens (see Figure 22). 
Figure 22 Picture of shelters for migrants in one of the migrant populated areas in 
Muang district 
 
Source: Real picture from the fieldwork  
Where migrants work in fishing, normally a boat has a crew of 17-18 workers, including 
a pilot, an engineer, and a cook. In most boats, the pilot and the engineer are Thais while 
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the rest of the crew are Burmese migrants. A boat goes offshore for about 30 days and 
comes back to a dock for about 3-5 days. The income of workers on trawling boats 
depends on the amount of fish caught, varying between 9,500 and 12,000 Baht (US$ 
288-364) per month (Departmentof Labour Protection and Welfare, 2015). Then, the 
fish and shrimps are passed to fish docks and distributed to migrant workers for peeling 
and processing. For small-scale fish docks, this process is done in private migrant 
houses rather than in well-established factories (see the story of the interviewee, Za, in 
Appendix 11 as an example).  
The lives of migrants in Kraburi district are somewhat different. Most migrant workers 
in Kraburi district are involved in rubber planting. Kraburi's migrant communities are 
less populated compared to Muang district. This is because, normally, a Thai 
landlord/employer divides his/her whole land into sub-areas (~6 acres/sub-area), and 
assigns each sub-area to a household of migrant employees. Each household is 
responsible for rubber tapping in the area assigned and earns revenue from rubber 
selling according to the amount of tapped latex. The revenue is shared between the 
landlord and the employees. The share is agreed in advance and is subject to the market 
price. Normally, no contract is needed for the share agreement; verbal agreement 
suffices.  
The most suitable period for rubber tapping is in the late rainy season and the winter 
season (October to February). Accordingly, during the summer time, some migrant 
workers travel to other districts to seek jobs while some travel back to Myanmar, then 
come back again in the winter time (Ranong Provincial Public Health Office, 2014). 
Thus it seems that Kraburi migrants behave more like 'circular migrants'xv than those in 
Muang district (see the story of the interviewee, MK6, in Appendix 11 as an example). 
                                                 
xv With reference to the IOM definition in 2011, circular migrants are 'people travelling between countries 
either in temporary or long-term movement, which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring 
voluntarily and linked to the labour needs'.  
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6.2 Methods 
The author used in-depth interviews and document review as the main data collection 
tools. For document review, the data were mainly retrieved from minutes, proceedings, 
and official letters sent by the MOPH and relevant authorities to local facilities. Most in-
depth interviews were conducted at the respondents' workplaces or at migrants' 
households.  
For the interviews with migrants, some interviews were regarded as group interviews 
rather than in-depth interviews since some migrant informants preferred to have their 
family members take part in the interview. Some interviews, particularly those with 
migrant informants, were conducted more than once. Local health staff and NGOs 
introduced the researcher into migrant communities. The first interview normally started 
with informal discussion to build up rapport. Once migrants became more familiar with 
the researcher, the following interviews were exercised in a more structured fashion 
(that is, with tape recording, consent approval, and photographing), see Chapter 4 for 
more detail of the interview process.  
The respondents are divided into: (1) implementer group, and (2) service user group, 
numbering 28 interviewees in total. The implementer group is composed of ten health 
staff members, two non-MOPH officials, and two NGO representatives. The service 
user group consists of four Thai employers and ten migrants (see Table 16 and 17).  
Data analysis was done through an inductive thematic approach. The interview and the 
document review data were coded manually with the use of NVIVO v10 software as a 
filing storage. The original quotes in Thai are displayed in Appendix 9. The emerging 
themes (first-order themes) in each interviewee group are displayed in the results 
subsection. The crosscutting contents of the first-order themes were identified to 
develop higher constructs (second-order themes), which are discussed in the discussion 
subsection.  
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Table 16 Key characteristics of the interviewees (group 1: local implementers) 
Code Age Sex Current workplace Role and responsibility 
regarding the HICS
RN_PHO1 ~40 Male Ranong Provincial Public Health 
Office
Administrative staff 
RN_PHO2 ~50 Male Ranong Provincial Public Health 
Office
Executive staff 
RN_RNH1† ~50 Male Ranong hospital Executive staff
RN_RNH2† ~42 Female Ranong hospital Insurance staff 
RN_RNH3 ~29 Female Ranong hospital General practitioner
RN_KH1 ~50 Female Kraburi hospital Insurance staff 
RN_KH2 ~55 Female Kraburi hospital Executive staff
RN_NGO1 ~50 Male Foundation A NGO 
RN_NGO2 ~40 Male Foundation B NGO 
RN_HC1 ~42 Female Health centre A in Kraburi district Executive staff
RN_HC2* ~45 Female Health centre B in Muang district Executive staff
RN_HP1 ~60 Female Health centre B in Muang district Village health volunteer
RN_MOI1* 40 Male Ranong Department of Provincial 
Administration,  the MOI
Executive staff
RN_WP1 ~55 Male Ranong Provincial Employment 
Office, the MOL 
Executive staff
Note:  * Telephone interview 
 † The interviewee, RN_RNH1, was also present in the interview with 
RN_RNH2 as she helped provide some information for the interview to RN_RNH2. 
Nevertheless, the researcher conducted another round of in-depth interview only with 
RN_RNH2 to mitigate respondent bias.  
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Table 17 Key characteristics of the interviewees (group 2: service users) 
Code Age Sex District Role/responsibility Workplace 
/occupation 
Years in 
Thailand 
Tor 
Ror 
38/1* 
Work 
permit 
Insurance 
card 
Health 
status 
RN_E1 ~62 Male Muang  Employer  Construction 
enterprise owner 
NA NA NA NA NA 
RN_E2 ~42 Female Kraburi  Employer  Rubber field 
owner 
NA NA NA NA NA 
RN_E3 ~65 Male Muang  Employer  Fishery 
company owner 
NA NA NA NA NA 
RN_B1† ? Male Muang Employer/broker Fishery 
company owner 
NA NA NA NA NA 
MM1‡ 41 Male  Muang Migrant Unemployed   15   -  - (expired) HIV  
MM2 42  Male  Muang  Migrant Karaoke shop 
owner  
20     TB lungs  
MM3 34  Female  Muang  Migrant Translator at 
health centre  
17     Healthy  
MM4§ 47  Female  Muang  Migrant Unemployed  20+     DM and  
HT  
MM5§ 50  Female  Muang  Migrant Street vendor  20+  -?  -  - (expired) Healthy  
MM6 58  Female  Muang  Migrant Shrimp peeling 
employee  
10+     Dyspepsia 
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Code Age Sex District Role/responsibility Workplace 
/occupation 
Years in 
Thailand 
Tor 
Ror 
38/1* 
Work 
permit 
Insurance 
card 
Health 
status 
MK1 64  Male  Kraburi  Migrant Unemployed  20+ -?  -  -  COPD  
MK2 32  Female  Kraburi  Migrant Rubber field 
worker  
6     Pregnant  
MK3 53  Female  Kraburi  Migrant Rubber field 
worker 
23     DM and  
HT  
MK4# 34  Female  Kraburi Migrant Housemaid 10+     HT  
Note:  *Tor Ror 38/1 is personal profile containing 13-digit ID, which is equivalent to the legitimate residence permit. 
 †Telephone interview 
 ‡Group interview: The interviewee's wife also joined the interview to help the interpreter translate the interviewee's 
words. 
 § Group interview: MK4 and MK5 are siblings and neighbours. Both of them took part in the interview at the same 
time.  
 # Group interview: The interviewee's (Thai) husband also joined the interview to help the interpreter translate the 
interviewee's words.
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6.3 Results 
I. Perceptions of local implementers 
There were five emerging themes from the interviews with the local implementers, that 
is, (1) Migrants overly taking advantage of the Thai healthcare system—Concern of 
healthcare providers, (2) Adaptation of policies—Positive or negative?, (3) Unclear 
policy message—Devil is in the detail, (4) Lack of inter- and intra-sectoral coordination, 
and (5) Relaxation of law enforcement.    
Migrants overly taking advantage of the Thai healthcare system—
Concern of healthcare providers 
Four from ten interviewees (RN_RNH1, RN_RNH2, RN_RNH3, and RN_HC2) 
mentioned that the HICS provided 'too-many' rights for migrants. A remarkable example 
was the HICS child birth benefit. Essentially, HICS mimicked the UCS in terms of 
benefit package (and offered less than the UCS in some high-cost items, such as 
haemodialysis for end-stage renal diseases [ESRD] patients and psychotic diseases 
treatment), but the HICS was superior to the UCS in terms of child delivery. The UCS 
allowed beneficiaries to have free delivery up to two births, while the HICS did not limit 
the number of deliveries (National Health Security Office, 2014). The use of this 
delivery benefit was more evident in hospital-level facilities, where over one fifth of 
migrant inpatients were admitted due to obstetric condition (see more detail about the 
disease pattern of migrant patients in Chapter 7). 
"I think the health card gives right to a migrant patient equal to or even more than a 
Thai patient, especially in case of pregnancy. Thais can enjoy two pregnancies at most 
but the Burmese are allowed to have free deliveries with unlimited number…pregnant 
again and again…Now, in Ranong, there are more Burmese residents than Thais. In my 
opinion, we will face problems in the future, particularly problems with these Burmese 
children, who will be brought up in Thailand." [RN_HC2] 
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One of the interviewees (RN_RNH1) stated that the right to be 'insured' by the HICS 
should be restricted to 'healthy' migrants only. This view was derived from the fact that 
though migrant health cards were a 'revenue generator' for a health facility (especially 
one with a large number of insured migrants), the facility could not derive maximum 
benefit from the revenue. This was because part of the revenue was used to subsidise the 
unpaid debts of uninsured patients. An example of this was the unpaid debt absorbed by 
Ranong hospital, equivalent to approximately 2-3 million Baht (US$ 66,000-99,000) per 
year.  However, the card revenue was somewhat unpredictable as it was subject to the 
number of card holders, which varied year by year due to the fluctuations in registration 
policies, see Figure 23.   
Figure 23 Number of the HICS beneficiaries registered with Ranong and Kraburi 
hospitals between 2011 and 2015 
 
Source: Ranong hospital (2014b) 
Note: The figure was the cumulative number of registered migrants at the start of a 
given fiscal year. For instance, the figure, '11,917', refers to the number of card holders 
registered with Kraburi hospital at the beginning of fiscal year 2015.  
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Although the number of registered migrants soared at the beginning of 2015, there was a 
question over the credibility of this figure, regarding whether there was double counting. 
The healthcare providers of Ranong hospital also noticed that about 26,000 of the 
45,000 registrations in the latest year were done within just 3 months (July 2014-
October 2014) because of the stringent enforcement of the OSS. This matter implied that 
had the OSS not occurred, the registration numbers might have been much smaller than 
this. Nonetheless, the increase in registration volumes at Ranong hospital contributed to 
an enlargement of its net revenue by about 11.9 million Baht (US$ 360,000) (see Table 
18).     
"Last year (2013), we got profit from the card…But we need to use this money to cover 
the uninsured as well. See!, We are generous. Last year (2013), we shouldered the 
unpaid debt by 2.5 million Baht, so, 11.9 million Baht left. But this is the money that we 
will use to care for all migrants throughout the whole coming year. Certainly, this 
(money) won't be adequate." [RN_RNH1] 
Table 18 Revenue from selling migrant health insurance cards and the related expense 
from treating migrant patients at Ranong hospital at the end of fiscal year 2014 
Items Baht US$
Re
ven
ue (1) Revenue from the health card (adults) 32,130,428    973,649(2) Revenue from the health card (children) 932,890     28,269 
(3) Revenue from health check 24,286,600   735,958 
(4) Total revenue ((1)+(2)+(3)) 57,349,918 1,737,876 
Ex
pen
se 
(5) Cost of treating insured migrant outpatients  13,602,750    412,205 
(6) Cost of treating insured migrant inpatients  19,049,339    577,253 
(7) Cost of health check  10,255,700    310,779 
(8) Unpaid debt from treating uninsured migrant outpatients  38,553 1,168 
(9) Unpaid debt from treating uninsured migrant inpatients  2,486,248    75,341 
(10) Total expense ((5)+(6)+(7)+(8)+(9)) 45,532,590 1,379,775 
Total revenue – total expense ((4)-(10)) 11,917,328    361,131 
Source: Finance and accounting unit of Ranong hospital (2014) 
Note: Financial sheet of Ranong hospital in earlier years and financial sheet of Kraburi 
hospital were not available. 
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Besides, the above perspective was linked to the problem of adverse selection, as 
experienced by some frontline staff. Three health provider interviewees (RN_RNH1, 
RN_RNH2, and RN_RNH3) opined that the policy was 'overly' open, and this created 
room for 'counterfeit employers' as well as 'non-worker migrants' to unfairly take 
advantage of the Thai healthcare system. The term, 'brokers', was commonly used as a 
jargon amongst hospital staff to refer to 'counterfeit employers', though in reality there 
existed both real and counterfeit brokers.    
"There are people who are hired to act as an employer and even attorney. There was a 
woman with stage-3 breast cancer came to the hospital to buy the card. She was over 
80. The employer said that she was his household maid. The attorney emphasised that if 
we didn't sell the card, he would sue us. The attorney might receive 5,000 Baht and the 
employer might receive 3,000 Baht from that migrant. Certainly, she cannot work at 
such an advanced age." [RN_RNH1] 
Adaptation of policies—Positive or negative? 
All health provider interviewees were aware of the adaptation of the HICS in the field. 
Three health provider interviewees (RN_PHO2, RN_RNH1, and RN_KH2), who were 
executive staff of the PPHO and the hospitals, detailed how the HICS policy was 
adapted and why such adaptation was necessary.  
Some adaptive practices originated from the PPHO while some were the internal policy 
of a facility. Some were a genuine policy, while some were a different interpretation of 
the MOPH's message. 
The researcher categorised these adaptations into two groups: (1) positive and (2) 
negative. Note that the term, 'positive' in this respect refers to the adaptation of policy 
that (seemingly) facilitates access to care or expands rights to care of migrants; whereas 
the term, 'negative', means the opposite. The 'positive adaptation' does not necessarily 
lead to positive health outcome or to an increase in the satisfaction of healthcare 
providers towards their work. The key innovative/adaptive policies found in the 
fieldwork are as follows. 
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Positive adaptation 
1. Fee schedule for treatment with externality benefit 
Since there is no private hospital in the province (there are some private clinics without 
admission beds), public facilities are the main choice of care; and in practice it is 
difficult for healthcare providers in the public sector to inhibit non-Thai populations 
from receiving services. The PPHO hence initiated a fee-schedule policy to incentivise 
local staff to provide certain services to 'all' patients regardless of the patients' 
nationality/immigration status.  
The services specified in the fee schedule were those with externality benefits, namely, 
child vaccination, antenatal care and family planning. The PPHO agreed to pay the 
health facilities 10 Baht/case (US$ 0.3) for vaccination, 70 Baht/case (US$ 2) for a 
provision of contraceptive pills, and 1,000 Baht/case (US$ 30) for contraceptive 
implants.  
This initiative was applied to insured and non-insured migrants, as well as stateless 
patients. The budget used in this policy was accumulated from part of the card premium 
(326 Baht per card; see detail of the card remittance arrangement in Chapter 5), 
earmarked at the PPHO. This is a within-province reinsurance system. Note that the 
UCS also had a comparable system for its Thai beneficiaries. The NHSO normally paid 
a health facility based on a fee schedule for particular treatments that needed a rapid 
scale-up at the country level; for example, metabolic disease screening and PAP smear 
for cervical cancer screening (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2015a). 
One of the interviewees (RN_HC2) opined that this system really helped migrants have 
better access to care, especially for the vaccination programme. 
"I think now there are more Burmese children than Thai children for the EPI (Extended 
programme on immunisation)…The PPHO gives us some money per head for the 
service (EPI) provided. But we need to submit this info (to the PPHO) on a monthly 
basis." [RN_HC2] 
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2. Withdrawal of gate-keeping regulation within the province  
Normally, an insuree (of all insurance schemes but the CSMBS) was required to visit a 
primary care facility (a health centre or a district hospital) first. In other words, the 
district hospital served as a gatekeeper for a patient. Should a patient bypass a gate-
keeping hospital without a referral document, an out-of-pocket payment would be 
incurred, except for emergency conditions. However, this system was difficult to apply 
in a small area like Ranong province, where the residents were highly mobile. Hence an 
internal policy that abrogated the gate-keeping regulation was introduced by the PPHO. 
This measure has been applied to the HICS and the HI-PCP since 2010. Soon after, Thai 
UCS patients complained that they had less privilege than non-Thai patients as UCS 
patients were still required to conform to the gate-keeping regulation (Suphanchaimat et 
al., 2015). As a result, the PPHO expanded this policy to all public insurance schemes, 
including the UCS.  
The PPHO served as the 'internal clearing house' for verifying the utilisation records of 
patients across health facilities. If a patient in Kraburi district bypassed Kraburi hospital 
to go to Ranong hospital, he/she would not be obliged to pay out-of-pocket. The PPHO, 
after verifying the patients' data, asked Kraburi hospital to pay Ranong hospital for the 
treatment cost. The payment rate was 700 Baht (US$ 21) per each OP visit, and was 
about 10,000 Baht (US$ 303) per adjRW of each IP visit. Note that the payment rate 
varied year by year and there was a debate over the benefit of this policy, as voiced by 
one of the interviewees (RN_RNH1). Higher-level hospitals claimed that the fixed 
payment rate did not reflect its actual treatment cost and this system created room for 
smaller hospitals to be inert in providing services and to take advantage of a bigger 
hospital. 
"If a patient from hospital X comes to us, he will not need to pay for the service. We will 
send the bill to the PPHO to be reimbursed for 700 Baht per case. But there is now a 
debate. Because sometimes the medicine cost is about 3,000 Baht but we earn only 700 
Baht. If the PPHO insists on applying this system, next time we will prescribe medicine 
at the cost of not more than 700 Baht." [RN_RNH1] 
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3. Migrant health workers and migrant health volunteers—Key players for 
promoting migrant-friendly service  
Ranong province was one of the earliest areas in the country to introduce 'migrant-
friendly service' initiatives. Note that 'migrant-friendly service' is a broad term, 
encompassing a wide range of activities. Initially, the initiative focused on HIV/AIDS 
prevention and education, and shortly later, the programme was expanded to general 
health services, including the establishment of bilingual leaflets (Thai-Myanmar), 
provision of condoms, and NCD screening (Sirilak et al., 2013).  
The most well-known activity under this initiative was hiring migrants as health 
workers. Around five years ago, the PPHO, in collaboration with the Fishery 
Association, employed a Burmese physician and two Burmese nurses to provide 
outpatient care to Burmese patients only at Parkklong health centre, one of the health 
centres situated near the ferry port. The monthly salary was 30,000 Baht (US$ 909) for 
the Burmese physician and 15,000 Baht (US$ 455) for the Burmese nurse. 
Suchartsunthorn (2015) reported that the initiative was beneficial in reducing the 
number of referral cases to Ranong hospital, and migrants seemed to be more 
comfortable in utilising services performed by physician with the same ethnicity.  
This initiative was abrogated in 2014 due to budget constraints. Although the MOPH 
also recognised this initiative, promoting this policy as a nationwide programme was 
controversial. This is because the regulation of the Thai Medical Council (TMC) 
stipulates that, in order to practice lawfully in Thailand, a foreign doctor must sit the 
license exam as a new Thai graduate though he/she has already passed the license exam 
in the country of origin (Thai Medical Council, 2015). Thus the employment of the 
Burmese health professionals in this case was not authorised by the TMC. 
The activity that was still in effect was the hiring of 'migrant health workers' (MHWs) to 
work at health centres. In addition, low-skilled migrants were recruited to work as 
'migrant health volunteers' (MHVs). The MHV initiative was comparable to the 
recruitment of local Thai residents to work as 'village health volunteers' (VHVs). The 
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monthly salary of MHWs was about 5,000-5,500 Baht (US$ 152-167). The PPHO was 
responsible for arranging a training workshop once a year when recruiting MHVs and 
managing refresher courses for MHWs. Note that there was no salary for MHVs. The 
function of MHVs was providing health education to communities and relaying 
messages from the health centres for any important events, such as disease outbreaks.  
Most MHWs and MHVs were former illegal migrant workers who had completed the 
NV process. Being MHWs and MHVs was not limited to only the Burmese migrants. A 
Thai national was able to serve as an MHW as well if he/she was fluent in Burmese and 
had ever participated in the training workshops held by the PPHO. At the time of 
writing, there were 34 MHWs and 350 MHVs in Ranong province. Sirilak et al (2013) 
suggested that MHVs tended to have positive attitudes to providing care and their work 
was beneficial in bridging language and cultural gaps between migrant patients and 
health professionals.  
Six out of fourteen interviewees (RN_PHO1, RN_PHO2, RN_HC1, RN_HC2, 
RN_HP1, and RN_NGO1) emphasised that MHWs and MHVs were key health workers 
in the province, since a sole reliance on 'formal' health workers might not be sufficient 
to address the health problems of 'hidden populations', including illegal migrants and 
stateless people.  
This matter was confirmed by the fact that doctor-to-population ratio of Ranong 
province fell below the national average if the population count included non-Thai 
citizens. Note that the shortage of dentists and nurses (relative to the national average) 
was lesser than that of doctors, see Table 19.  
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Table 19 Population to health workforce ratio in Ranong province 
Health workers in Ranong 
province 
Population to health worker ratio (XXX:1)
Type Number National 
average
Bangkok Southern 
region
Ranong 
province* 
Ranong 
province†
Physicians 61 2,538 895 3,125 2,845 4,476
Dentists 28 8,740 5,515 13,100 6,199 9,752
Pharmacists 46 6,200 4,143 7,551 3,773  5,936
Professional nurses 468 550 332 558 371  584
Assistant nurses 11 NA NA NA 15,779  24,822
Public health workers 81 NA NA NA 2,143  3,371
Village health 
volunteers 
2,964 NA NA NA 59 93
Migrant health workers 34 NA NA NA NA 2,926
Migrant health 
volunteers 
350 NA NA NA NA 284
Note: * Only Thai citizens, † Thai citizens plus registered migrants and stateless 
people  
Source: Data on population to health workforce ratios at national and regional level 
were  retrieved from the Health Information System Development Office (HISO) in 
2012 for doctors and in 2008 (the most recent year with complete data) for other health 
workforce cadres (HISO, 2012). Data on the health workforce in Ranong province were 
gathered from the PPHO (2014). 
 
Though hiring MHWs was widely accepted as an effective means to promote better 
health access in migrant patients, its programme sustainability was still in question. This 
problem was derived from the fact that the majority of MHWs were ex-illegal Burmese 
workers who successfully passed the NV. By the MOL law, illegal immigrants taking 
part in the NV process were allowed to work only in 'low-skilled' jobs (see Chapter 5).  
The above regulation created conflict between the MOPH and the MOL since health 
assistants or translators were considered 'high-skilled' workers. In addition, MHWs 
could not be hired as a 'government officer' in the normal civil post system (where civil 
177 
 
servant salaries are directly disbursed by the MOF) because a person posted in a civil 
service position must hold Thai nationality.  
MHWs were thus always employed as temporary (unofficial) staff. Since the salary of 
temporary staff could not be reimbursed from the MOF like salaries for Thai official 
staff, the budget for employing MHWs was mobilised from various sources.  
Before 2012, this budget was financed by local NGOs. However, after the NGO project 
was curbed due to financial constraints, the PPHO inevitably absorbed the cost itself; 
and this situation created a concern over the sustainability of the MHW employment 
programme, as expressed by the respondents below. 
"We employ 34 MHWs. Before 2012, all money (used for hiring the MHWs) was from 
NGOs. In 2012 the NGOs quit. So we needed to shoulder this cost. Frankly, we don't 
have enough money. But we still had some savings in our purse, about 10 million Baht. I 
may be able to extend this project (hiring MHWs) just for the next 2-3 years." 
[RN_PHO2] 
"We (as an NGO) mobilised money from many sources, such as the Australian Embassy, 
AusAID, and recently from Global Fund; but now Global Fund is about to fade 
away….So we try to reduce our work size, from 9 provinces to 4 provinces." 
[RN_NGO1] 
"The PPHO may not support the hiring of MHWs for this year. They (the PPHO) said 
they have no money. Our MHW earns only 5,000 Baht for her salary. That is low, 
compared to if they work in a factory." [RN_HC2] 
4. Campaigning the health insurance card in Myanmar 
Though the HICS was designed to ensure the health security of migrant workers and 
dependants, who are residing 'in Thailand', the PPHO also promoted this policy in 
Kawthaung district in Myanmar with an aim to recruit more 'clients'.  
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The card was marketed in leaflets, or cut-out boards written in Burmese. The campaign 
was formally initiated in 2013 as at that time the policy was relatively open and any 
migrant was able to buy the card regardless of whether or not he/she had Tor Ror 38/1 
and/or work permit.  
From the perspective of the PPHO, this measure benefited the province in its entirety, as 
in 2013, the province earned more than 70 million Baht (US$ 2 million) from selling the 
card.  
"We tried to tell the hospital to sell the card to as many people as possible. Some 
hospitals said they wouldn’t sell the card to children because of a fear of running 
deficit. They said they wouldn’t sell the card to sick people. I told them we should not 
think like that. We must sell the card to them and ask them to persuade other migrants to 
buy the card. Finally, the province earned more than 70 million Baht (from selling the 
card). I even promoted this by making a huge cutout written in both Thai and Burmese. I 
even travelled to Kawthaung district to seek more clients. The reason for doing this was 
because the hospitals were very inert." [RN_PHO2] 
Three interviewees (RN_RNH1, RN_RNH2, and RN_RNH3) opined that the campaign 
in Kawthaung district contributed to an increase of the number of 'sick' buyers, and this 
might undermine the financial benefit of the facility. In practice, it was difficult to check 
whether the buyer was really residing in Kawthaung district, and selling the card to 
those residing in Myanmar was subject to the 'strictness' of frontline staff of each 
facility.  
"There was a time when the PPHO went to Kawthaung district to campaign for the card 
but the hospital did not agree with such campaign. It happened before the advent of the 
One Stop Service. The bottom line is if we can make mass sales, this will be financially 
worthy. But it is not like that because we found the majority of the buyers are sick or 
pregnant migrants. We used to face a case with thyroid disease and renal disease. We 
asked his history and he could not answer naturally. Finally, he confessed that he was 
from Kawthaung district" [RN_RNH3]  
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5. Seeking support from NGOs to fill the gaps of service 
The local health facilities at times sought support from NGOs or civil groups to help 
implement some initiatives that faced a bureaucratic constraint. For example, NGOs 
stepped in during the process of hiring MHWs by acting as employers of migrants. On 
paper, the NGOs indicated that they hired migrants as housemaids or labour workers in 
the NGO offices, but, in practice, these migrants worked as MHWs at the health centres.  
Another initiative founded by the NGOs was a foundation of primary healthcare centres, 
so-called, 'health posts', in communities with high density of migrants. The health post 
in this account was different from the 'health centre', which is the lowest basic official 
health facility under the MOPH. In practice, the health post was a community 
dispensary operated by trained Thai VHVs. Some VHVs used their own house as the 
health post.  
All residents in the communities (both Thais and non-Thais) were able to buy basic 
medicine (such as antipyretic drugs, wound dressing set, and oral dehydration salts) at 
the health posts. The VHVs were trained once a month by the PPHO. The by-product of 
this programme was to imbue a sense of ownership and saving awareness in migrants. 
This was because health posts were set up as a co-operative. Both Thai and non-Thai 
residents were eligible to apply for membership of the co-operative.  
A respondent (RN_HP1), working in Muang district, reported that about a quarter of the 
co-operative's members were migrants. Normally, the medicine sold in the health post 
was supplied by Ranong hospital at low cost. The profit from selling medicine is 
distributed to all shareholders at the end of a year. The cost of joining the co-operative 
was about 50 Baht (US$ 2) per share unit.  
However, the programme had not been thoroughly evaluated, either in terms of its 
effectiveness or the health outcomes of the residents. Moreover, an interviewee 
observed that this initiative received inadequate monitoring.  
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"I used to speak in the meeting (between the VHVs and the inspectors from health 
centres) as well but they (the inspectors) had never visited the community. I told them 
that we need the officials to come and check whether many small-sized grocery stores 
here sell medicine because I found that those drug sellers have never attended the 
training." [RN_HP1]           
Negative adaptation      
1. Imposing special conditions in obtaining and using the card 
Ranong hospital created its own regulations restricting the rights of migrants to purchase 
and use the card. The first measure is barring 'sick' migrants from buying the card, and 
the second measure is imposing a one-month lag time after the card was purchased 
(Ranong hospital, 2014a). All of these measures were derived from the practices in the 
private insurance arrangement.  
For the first measure, the 'sick' condition here was not a list of diseases as in Tier 3 of 
the regulation. It relied on an individual physician's judgment as to whether an applicant 
was 'healthy' enough to work.  Note that pregnancy was not a restriction in acquiring the 
card. Three interviewees (RN_RNH1, RN_RNH2, and RN_RNH3) mentioned that such 
measures were essential in preventing counterfeit brokers and in protecting the hospital's 
financial benefit. They also highlighted that this practice was not against the HICS 
regulation as the text in the MOPH announcement indicates that 'An applicant, who is 
infected by either of the following conditions...or is having any sickness that may 
hamper his/her job based on individual doctor's consideration, will be reported to the 
Immigration Bureau for deportation.' 
In other words, even if a migrant had already acquired all essential documents (such as 
the work permit, and the '00' card) as per the OSS regulation, this could not be a 
guarantee that an applicant would be able to buy the card as the final judgement was 
based on the discretion of a health practitioner. 
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"I used to meet a chubby woman with heart failure. She said she was working as a maid. 
It seemed that she was still able to work (therefore this case was able to buy the card). 
From my experience, most of the buyers passed the health check. There were only 2-3% 
not passing the health check. Let's say if we face a cancer patient, we will not let them 
pass the health check since cancer requires high-cost care" [RN_RNH3] 
"All of these measures (such as forbidding unhealthy migrants from being insured) were 
initiated by us. These measures put us at risk of being sued. To insure a patient, the 
MOPH should give us the right to say yes or no…May I ask you something? When you 
buy a health insurance from a private company, does it accept every case? If you take a 
guy, who is going to die soon, to the company, will it accept?" [RN_RNH1] 
In contrast, one of the interviewees suggested that this measure might create 
unfavourable consequences in terms of limiting the insurance pooling size for the entire 
province.    
"Some hospitals said they won't sell card to pregnant and sick migrants. So who is 
smarter than whom? Do you think migrants are not smart? They all know. If you are 
fair enough, you should sell the card to pregnant (and sick) cases. Of course, it might 
run a deficit. But these migrants will persuade more people to buy the card, this will 
make us earn more in the end." [RN_PHO2] 
The researcher also checked with the HIG as to whether it was possible to interpret the 
HICS policy in such fashion. The HIG officer, who was also the interviewee in Chapter 
5 (ADM_CO1) expressed that the text appearing in the announcement should be 
interpreted in the way that 'not fit for work' meant an applicant was developing serious 
infectious diseases specified in the Tier 3 diseases list (namely, active TB, elephantitis, 
filariasis, etc). Therefore, in her opinion, the interpretation that solely relied on 
individual health practitioner's discretion, whether an applicant was 'healthy' enough, 
was invalid.  
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"We have used such text for several years. It means that only patients with such diseases 
(active TB, filariasis, elephantitis, etc) can't buy the card. It is the problem of that 
hospital. If this case is voiced to us, we will be on patient side." [ADM_CO1] 
Besides, Kraburi hospital and Ranong hospital also introduced a parallel policy, 
indicating that migrant mothers must buy the 365-Baht card for her baby right after 
delivery. In practice, the health staff at postnatal ward strongly encouraged migrant 
mothers to buy the card for their babies. However, if a migrant mother refused to buy 
the card for her baby right after delivery, but later on, her (uninsured) baby was sick 
after being discharged from the hospital, the mother had to pay out-of-pocket for the 
treatment and she was allowed to buy the card for her baby again only if the treatment 
for that episode was finished.  
The second internal policy of Ranong hospital was imposing a one-month lag time 
between purchasing the card and using the card. A card holder had to wait at least one 
month in order to be able to enjoy services free of charge.  
If a beneficiary utilised services within one month after purchasing the card, the patient 
was to pay out-of-pocket. This mechanism served as the second gate for preventing 
migrants from ‘overly’ taking advantage of the system.   
"To enjoy the right, the system should not allow an immediate effect. There should be a 
one-month lag time like private insurance company. We used to see a patient. He did not 
buy the card, then he got an accident, and had fracture of femur. He was admitted in the 
orthopaedic unit. He didn't have money. Then, our staff advised him to be discharged 
from the hospital first. Then, he bought the card. And he could buy it since at that time 
our staff were confused about the policy. One day later, he was admitted again (to enjoy 
the treatment free of charge)." [RN_RNH1] 
One of the interviewees (RN_RNH2) accepted that the above restricting policies might 
not be effectively implemented in practice. This was because the unhealthy migrants 
were still able to buy the card at hospitals where the internal policy was more relaxed. 
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Moreover, due to the repeal of gate-keeping mechanisms in the province, after an 
unhealthy migrant bought the card from a more relaxed hospital, he/she was still able to 
come back to the more stringent hospital where he had been refused permission to buy 
the card. 
"(Interviewer: So what will you do when facing unhealthy migrants who really wish to 
buy the card?)...I will tell them to buy it at another hospital. Since then they can use 
service anywhere in the province." [RN_RNH2]    
2. Inhibiting the selling of the 2,200 Baht card to non-worker migrants after the 
OSS policy 
The OSS policy did not stipulate whether the 2,200-Baht card (according to the Cabinet 
Resolution on 15 January 2013) was still in effect. Healthcare providers in the province 
perceived that, after the finish of the OSS re-registration by 31 October 2014, illegal 
migrants were not allowed to buy the insurance card. This interpretation was in 
accordance with the political atmosphere at that time as the junta repeatedly informed 
the media that illegal migrants who failed to register with the OSS would be arrested.  
As a result, all health provider interviewees opined that the 2,200-Baht card no longer 
had any role for migrants after the OSS. From the provider perspective, a migrant 
worker or a dependant of migrant worker, who wished to buy the current insurance card 
(1,600 Baht) must have already registered with the OSS and acquired the 00 card (13-
digits ID) and work permit first.   
However, providers in Ranong province interpreted that the 2,200-Baht card was still 
valid for stateless populations who failed to register with the HI-PCP; and most of this 
population is a group of 'displaced Thais'. The interviewee, RN_RNH2, reasoned that 
the uninsured displaced Thais were not required to take part in the OSS and thus they 
were not permitted to buy the 1,600-Baht card. As a result, the only channel left for the 
uninsured stateless population was the 2,200-Baht card.  
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This interpretation of policy did not explicitly appear in the MOPH announcement, but it 
emerged from the day-to-day problems faced by local health staff as there were some 
displaced Thais who bought the card in 2013 asking to renew the card (Ministry of 
Public Health of Thailand, 2014b). 
"During the One Stop Service, the MOPH said the target population was migrant 
workers. So we perceive that a buyer must have work permit (in order to be eligible to 
buy the 1,600-Baht card). And what about those without work permit? Yes, they are still 
eligible. But the card price is 2,200 Baht and he/she must be a displaced Thai." 
[RN_RNH2] 
Unclear policy message—Devil is in the detail 
As briefly shown in Chapter 5, there were conflicts and discordance both between and 
within migrant ministerial policies. This subsection emphasises the aforementioned 
point by showing how an unclear policy direction leads to confusion at the 
implementation level. There were two key examples regarding this matter: (1) the 
difference between how the MOPH and the MOI defined the term, 'dependants', and (2) 
whether or not an illegal CLM migrant was still able to buy the card if he/she failed to 
register with the OSS.  
Since the junta did not define 'dependants', this rendered a variety of interpretations by 
related authorities. According to Section 44 of the Labour Protection Act (1998), it was 
illegal to employ a child under fifteen years of age. This meant a child aged less than 15 
could not be issued with a work permit. However, the HICS policy defined the cut-off 
age for 'dependant' at 7. The problem arose when the OSS policy was introduced, as the 
OSS tied obtaining insurance with a possession of a work permit.  
Literally, a migrant child aged less than 7 was eligible to buy the card at the cost of 365 
Baht, while a child aged between 8 and 15 was required to buy the card at the same 
price as an adult. This served as a barrier to attaining the insurance as most migrants 
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considered that the adult price was too expensive for a child (see 'Perceptions of service 
users' in the subsequent section).  
Two interviewees (RN_RNH2 and RN_RNH3) at Ranong hospital mentioned that a 
migrant aged between 8 and 15 was eligible to buy the card only if he/she held a work 
permit (which is impossible by law). As a result, the hospital stopped selling the card to 
children aged between 8 and 15 and was awaiting clarification from the central 
government.   
"The term, 'dependant', for the MOPH is different from the MOI. Now we are selling the 
card to only those below 7. For those between 8 and 15, we have not opened (the card 
selling policy) yet. Because the term, 'dependent', for the MOI uses the cut-off at 15. 
(Interviewer: So far, is there any consensus for this difference?) No!, we have stopped 
selling the card (for children aged 8-15) at this moment" [RN_RNH3] 
The second example was a confusion about whether or not the HICS insurance card 
endorsed before the OSS was still valid, as briefly described under the 'negative 
adaptation' topic. The unclear message led to different interpretations between facilities. 
The staff in Ranong hospital understood that the facility was allowed to sell the 2,200-
Baht card only to displaced Thais, who failed to register with the HI-PCP. The 
healthcare staff in Kraburi hospital mentioned that the 2,200-Baht card could be sold 
only to a migrant patient who already had Tor Ror 38/1 but had failed to register with 
the OSS. Additional references by Patomsirilak et al (2016) suggested that some health 
facilities (in Bangkok, for instance) interpreted that the 2,200-Baht card was no longer 
valid at all, because if they sold the 2,200-Baht card, it might appear that they were 
supporting illegal immigrants.   
One of the respondents (RN_PHO1) shared his experience in voicing this issue to the 
MOPH. However, he stated that the answer from the MOPH was unclear and the MOPH 
even informed the ground-level providers to decide what they deemed appropriate. 
186 
 
"(Interviewer: If I were Burmese, and I somehow did not join the One Stop Service, 
what would you do to me?) We dare not sell the card. Suppose we sell, there might be a 
question whether we are against the national policy. (Interviewer: Have you ever raised 
this issue to the MOPH?) I did. Dr XXX (policy maker in the MOPH) told me that 'Yes!, 
you may sell them the card but do this covertly. ' I then replied that 'Sir!, if you said so, 
no local facility will dare sell the card.' Because nobody will protect our action if that 
migrant is caught and charged by the police." [RN_PHO1] 
In early 2015, the HIG launched a HICS instruction handbook to all PPHOs. The 
handbook indicated that the electronic registration programme of the 2,200-Baht card 
was still in effect and local health staff were still able to sell the card to 'anybody' (even 
without the 13-digit ID). Then, the HIG electronic system would generate the 'artificial' 
13-digit ID to a card buyer, starting with '00H' (ie 00Hxxxxxxxxxx) (Health Insurance 
Group, 2015). This ID generating system was called the 'H-series'. It was imitated from 
the G-series system of the MOE.  
However the H-series could not be used for securing budget from the government like 
the G-series because the G-series system was endorsed by the Cabinet Resolution in 
2005 while the 'H-series' was just an internal programme of the MOPH or, strictly 
speaking, it was the internal programme of the HIG and was not recognised by other 
departments of the MOPH (The Thai Cabinet, 2005).  
Follow-up interviews with the local providers in Ranong province found that they were 
aware of this recent change in the MOPH policy. However, it was difficult to ensure that 
this awareness led to concrete actions. A recent report from the HSRI (2015) suggested 
that the H-series message from the MOPH did not properly reach the healthcare staff in 
many provinces (such as Krabi province and Pitsanulok province) despite the fact that 
the guideline paper was distributed to all PPHOs. 
The researcher also checked this point with one of the interviewees (ADM_CO1) 
working at the HIG. The interviewee reiterated that, in her view, the MOPH message 
was 'clear enough'; that is, all migrants are always eligible to buy the card regardless of 
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nationality status and regardless of whether they had ever registered with the OSS. 
However, the reason why the HIG could not explicitly announce to the wider public that 
the HICS policy was 'always open' (rather than just sending the handbook to the PPHOs) 
was that, as a 'bureaucrat', it was difficult to send a strong message that was against the 
overarching national policy, particularly during the junta era. As a result, what the 
MOPH could do best was create room for everybody to be insured, even though such 
room was implicit.  
Aside from the two major contentious issues presented above, there was a minor 
concern about whether or not the 30-Baht fee was still applied to an insured migrant. 
The HICS policy was first adopted in 2004 and mimicked the UCS system which at that 
time imposed a 30-Baht fee per visit on a patient as a 'symbolic' charge. In 2007, the 30-
Baht fee policy was revoked by the NHSO, however, there had not been a clear message 
from the MOPH as to whether migrant patients still needed to pay the 30-Baht fee. All 
healthcare provider interviewees still understood that as long as the MOPH did not 
explicitly terminate the 30-Baht fee for the HICS, it was justifiable to collect the this fee 
from a migrant user, but the interviewee at the HIG (ADM_CO1) suggested that the 
local providers should interpret the HICS in the same way as the UCS, that is, the 30-
Baht fee collection from a migrant patient should be cancelled (Patcharanarumol et al., 
2011, Srithamrongsawat et al., 2009).   
Lack of inter- and intra-sectoral coordination 
Not only was there confusion about policy content, how the policy was communicated 
was also a critical problem as raised by six of fourteen interviewees (four healthcare 
providers and two non-MOPH officials). The interviewee from the MOI, RN_MOI1, 
exemplified this point through the situation during the OSS implementation. Since the 
OSS was quickly endorsed and authorities were not informed how to operate this 
measure in detail, many constraints arose, including a debate about who should absorb 
the cost of setting up the OSS.  
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"There were some legal and administrative constraints re the reimbursement of extra 
stipend for staff or the problem about human shortage. Because when you summoned 
lots of staff in a short time to work in a special venue, you needed to ask for help from 
many authorities. The government might say that it is your duty. But it is difficult for us 
(the MOI), as the host (of the venue) to ask for support from others. Because if we 
cannot give them an extra stipend, they might ask why they have to participate in this 
event (the OSS). I wish to stay at my workplace so that I can save my travel cost." 
[RN_MOI1] 
The finding from the MOI staff was congruent with the perceptions of MOPH staff. 
Two interviewees (RN_RNH1 and RN_RNH2) from the health sector reported that they 
felt that the health sector was 'voiceless', and the feedback mechanism from the ground 
level to the central authorities was also lacking. 
"(Interviewer: Could you please tell me about the coordination between you and non-
MOPH authorities?) Frankly, we are voiceless. The two parties (the MOI and the MOL) 
will inform us after they had already talked to, and agreed with each after." 
[RN_RNH2] 
Conflict between ministries was derived from not only a lack of cooperation but also a 
misunderstanding of roles/responsibilities between authorities. An instance was drawn 
from the argument between the MOPH and the MOI. Though the MOPH intended to 
have all registered migrants buy the insurance card, the MOPH did not have any legal 
power to 'penalise' migrants or employers of migrants, who refused to buy the card. This 
was because, literally, the HICS was just a ministerial announcement. Such a situation 
created difficulty for the MOI staff when dealing with the MOPH staff during the OSS, 
as reflected by the interviewee below. 
"To be honest with you, I think we at times have difficulties when working with the 
MOPH. I may not understand the culture and the way of thought of the health sector. 
For example, the MOPH always told us to force everybody to buy the insurance. But if 
they could not afford the price, can we force them (to buy the card)? To my knowledge, 
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it is just a ministerial announcement. The MOPH told us to speak in the same language 
(that all migrants are obliged to buy the card). That makes us feel uncomfortable (to say 
so)." [RN_MOI1] 
As well as conflict between ministries, there were also within-ministry communication 
problems. These took place not only in the MOPH, but also in the MOL, as suggested 
by five of fourteen interviewees (RN_PHO1, RN_PHO2, RN_RNH1, RN_RNH2, and 
RN_WP1). An obvious instance was raised by RN_PHO2, suggesting that the three 
main organisations under the MOPH which were responsible for the migrant health 
issue, namely, the BHA, the BPS, and the HIG, were not always working in harmony 
(see functions of these three agencies in Chapter 5). This situation led to confusion in 
policy implementation as local providers were overloaded by a large quantity of 
disparate information. Another example of within-ministry conflict was discussed by 
RN_WP1. After the Department of Employment (DOE), issued the work permit to 
migrants, the DOE did not always check if those migrants were later insured with the 
SSS.      
"There are three main agencies at the central level that deal with migrant health, 
namely the BPS, the BHA, and the HIG. I used to be invited to attend the meetings about 
migrant health in the MOPH. In the morning, there was a meeting by the HIG, and then 
in the afternoon, there was a meeting by the BPS. And the meeting agendas (between 
authorities) were the same. So, who is insane? If you cannot talk amongst your teams at 
the central level, you should not invite the local level like us. We are frontline staff. The 
order must be clear, then we can act according to the order. If the order is blurred, 
that's pointless." [RN_PHO2] 
"The work permit is issued by me as the registration officer. But, in case there are 
employers who refuse to pay monthly contribution for their employees, the SSO should 
be the plaintiff, not the DOE...I have power to check only whether you are working in 
the site according to what it is shown in your work permit." [RN_WP1] 
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Relaxation of law enforcement 
Three respondents (RN_MOI1, RN_WP1, and RN_NGO2) divulged that not all 
migrants-related laws/measures were strictly enforced. From a different angle, this 
practice might be regarded as an adaptation of policies that happened in non-MOPH 
sectors. Though other interviewees did not comment directly about this issue, they all 
admitted that they were aware of this relaxation and this practice was not something 
strange in the province. Two conspicuous instances were raised, (1) the zoning policy, 
and (2) the relaxation of the measure that required migrants to travel back to their 
country of origin after their residence permit expired.    
The 'zoning policy' originated from the idea that it was almost impossible to prevent the 
influx of illegal migrants from Myanmar, particularly in an area with a very long border 
like Ranong province. Moreover, it was widely accepted that there were a vast number 
of illegal migrant workers in the fishery industries in the province. The respondent, 
RN_MOI1, mentioned that based on his experience, if the deportation law was strictly 
exercised, this might lead to conflicts between the prosecutors and local entrepreneurs. 
To solve this problem, the 'zoning' system was instigated. The system implied that the 
prosecutors were more 'relaxed' around the fish docks where migrant communities were 
concentrated; but the prosecutors tended to be less 'relaxed' around the city centre. This 
practice was like turning a blind eye to the illegality problems and serving as a 
compromise between economic necessity and security concerns. 
"In our area, we tried to block the influx of migrants. But we admit that we still face 
some limitations. In many work sectors, if we always caught illegal migrants, there 
might not be enough workers left. Then, we might have problems with the entrepreneurs. 
So we need to use other measures aside from law enforcement. For example, we tried to 
create the zoning area that we will be somewhat strict in the inner city and will be more 
relaxed in the outer zone." [RN_MOI1] 
The second example was the relaxation of the measure of the MOL that required a 
temporary pause on NV and MOU migrants who reached the 4-year maximum stay in 
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Thailand. In principle, these migrants needed to return to their home country and were 
not permitted to re-enter Thailand for another three years. However, in practice, this rule 
was not strictly enforced. Some migrants went to the border control and had their visa 
stamped as if they had left the country and then came back to Thailand right away. 
Paithoonpong and Chalamwong (2011) reported that this practice was not uncommon, 
and it was found not only in cross-border migrants but also in foreign tourists. Foreign 
immigrants possessing tourist visas were not permitted to work in Thailand and had a 
permitted length of stay for a maximum of three months. However, many tourists 
avoided this rule by taking on paid jobs and making quarterly 'visa runs' to nearby 
countries' cities, such as Vientiane and Penang, then returning to Thailand to resume 
their paid employment.  
"(Interviewer: Normally, how long is a migrant required to pause before coming back to 
Thailand again?) In fact, they came back immediately, just get their passport stamped 
and then re-enter the country. But, in theory, they should pause. I knew this from my 
own experience. I knew one of the immigrants who did this." [RN_NGO2] 
In addition, the interviewee (RN_NGO2) opined that while the wider public perceived 
that the OSS was a 'stringent' measure in clearing the illegal/undocumented immigrants, 
in practice, it was quite relaxed in examining the immigration history of the participating 
migrants. Some legalised migrants (who had passed the NV before the OSS), whose 
passport and work permit were about to expire, abandoned their passport and work 
permit and acted as illegal migrants in order to re-register with the OSS (instead of 
returning back to their country of origin country to legally apply for a working visa).  
"During the OSS, there was a transition period where the visa of some legalised 
migrants was about to expire and they needed to journey back to their home country. As 
a result, they turned themselves into illegal migrants again in order to enter the OSS 
instead of legally extending their visa and passport ...Because it was cheaper, faster, 
and more convenient, then re-entered the NV again. Thus, the increase of the 
registration volume (during the OSS) might be false. I think the figure was too high." 
[RN_NGO2] 
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II. Perceptions of service users 
This subsection describes the key themes from the interviews with service users. Six 
common themes were identified, namely, (1) Difficulties in managing the insurance for 
migrant employees, (2) Diverse reasons for seeking the insurance card, (3) Ambiguity of 
employment status, (4) Support from family and employers, (5) Satisfaction with the 
health service and the card policy in general, and (6) Uncertain future of the vulnerable. 
The first theme was mainly raised by the employer respondents, while the other five 
themes were described by migrant interviewees. Note that, to protect confidentiality of 
the respondents, names of respondents below have been changed. 
Difficulties in managing the insurance for migrant employees 
All four employers (RN_E1, RN_E2, RN_E3, and RN_B1) articulated that the HICS 
created difficulties for employers. From their outlook, the HICS should not be a 
compulsory measure. The rationale behind this idea was that most migrant workers, 
especially those working in offshore fishing boats, were very mobile. Besides, most 
seafarers spent much of the time offshore. Thus the employers mentioned that it was not 
worth paying for the insurance for their employees as they had fewer chances to enjoy 
services.  
This problem was coupled with the registration of migrant workers. Legalised migrants 
(those who passed the NV) were able to travel throughout the country. From the 
perspective of employers, this regulation created the risk of losing their employees. In 
contrast, (illegal) migrants, who had not completed the NV, were not allowed to move 
outside the registered province. As a result, it was more likely that illegal migrants 
would not leave their employers. 
The situation of migrant sea workers in Thailand became more complex following EU 
sanctions in 2015. The EU attempted to crack down on illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing with the threat of import restrictions. In April 2015 Thailand 
acquired a warning, so-called, the 'yellow card', from the EU due to an allegation of IUU 
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fishing as well as slave labour and trafficking on fishing vessels. Such a situation caused 
the country's fishery industry to fall into disarray and prompted the government to issue 
a new Royal Decree on Fishery to respond to this pressure (The Nation, 2015). The new 
Decree imposed 'stricter' supervision and a 'more severe' punishment on those who 
breached the law. This created massive strikes from many domestic fishing 
entrepreneurs since they deemed that this new regulation was 'unfair' and 'impractical' 
(for example, downsizing the permitted fishing areas of local fisheries), and those likely 
to benefit most from the Decree, were large-scale enterprises (Isranews Agency, 2015). 
Kwan-on (2015) suggested the stringent supervision created fear of being arrested in 
many migrant sea workers because some migrants worked offshore over months and at 
times exceeded the permitted length of stay/work in the country. Accordingly, some 
migrants might leave their employers before the boat embarked on a journey, or right 
after the boat landed.  
"I always opposed the HICS. If that is for land migrants or those at the fish docks, I will 
be OK with it. But for seafarers, I totally disagree because they don't have a chance to 
use the insurance. They are always aboard. I lost over a million for the insurance. Some 
migrants stayed with me for just a couple of months, then they left their work. And who 
paid for their insurance? It is the employer! I didn't even have a chance to deduct their 
salary to recover my expense. The policy makers did not understand this setting. Do you 
think this policy is successfully implemented? I think it was just 30% successful." 
[RN_E3] 
Another problem raised by the interviewees was the red tape in the registration. Two 
employers (RN_B1 and RN_E2) pointed out that the registration process was 
burdensome. As a result, a reliance on private intermediaries or brokers was considered 
an effective means to overcome this difficulty despite causing additional expense. The 
Thai Chamber of Commerce (2014) also reported that there were a number of 
unregulated employment intermediaries or 'ghost' brokers in Thailand.  
"Now there emerges a new job that helps complete the registration for migrants on 
behalf of the employers…It is more convenient but I had to pay more (laugh!). It 
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charged me 500 Baht per head of migrant. But the registration takes numerous steps, 
and is very tiresome, and there are so many people. That's why I don't want to get 
involved. So I am OK with hiring them (brokers)." [RN_E2]  
Diverse reasons for seeking the insurance card 
Of the ten migrant interviewees, seven were insured. For the insured respondents, there 
were diverse reasons in obtaining the card: from health benefit, security benefit, and 
even having no specific idea about the card (since the employer initiated it).    
Almost all respondents (except MM3, who was a translator at the health facility) stated 
that they did not have clear knowledge about the card benefit. Two respondents (MK2 
and MK4) stated that they did not have a specific intention when buying the card. They 
viewed the health card as part of the 'package' when they registered with the authorities 
(through the assistance of employers or brokers).  
Two respondents (MM4 and MM5) had a misconception that the card did not cover 
treatment of traffic accidents (in fact, the card covered traffic accident treatment in the 
same way as the UCS). One of the interviewees (MM6) shared her experience that the 
card benefit went beyond health issue by protecting her from the officials, who 
threatened her with deportation. She also expressed that, recently, just after the junta 
came into power, there was news that the military might arrest the uninsured migrants. 
As a result, she decided to join the OSS.  
While some health providers expressed that the insurance was spoiled by sick migrants, 
the interview with migrants found that only two of the seven card holders bought the 
card after they felt ill (MM2, and MM4), and one of the uninsured (MM1) sought the 
card when he was first diagnosed with HIV/AIDS (but at the time of writing, the card 
had already expired and had not been renewed). The story of MM2 (case study 1) shown 
in Appendix 11 was an example of this account. 
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Ambiguity of employment status 
The seminal intention of the OSS was to 'sweep and clean' all illegal migrants in the 
country. A migrant granted a legitimate residence permit in Thailand must be a 'worker', 
with a clear job description and employer details. However, in the real world, especially 
in places like Ranong province, where most migrants were engaged in low-skilled jobs 
and transportation across the border could be done very easily, the employment status of 
migrants was not always clear. The above story of Monn (MM2) showed that there was 
a disparity between 'job written in the work permit' and the 'real job', in which a migrant 
was being engaged.  
For this issue, there were three respondents whose life story could reflect the complexity 
of employment status. The first case was Tho (MM2), a 42-year-old illegal immigrant, 
who had been residing in Thailand for over 20 years. He joined the registration process 
during the OSS. Tho was running his karaoke shop in Muang district. Strictly speaking, 
registered migrants in Thailand were allowed to work in certain jobs only (see Chapter 
5), but 'shop owner' is not in the list of permitted jobs. However, his work permit 
indicated that he was a labour employee. The real shop owner was his Thai employer, 
allowing Tho to run the shop freely as though it was Tho's asset. Tho needed to pay a 
monthly rent (about 5,000 Baht (US$ 152)) to his employer.  
At the other end of the spectrum was the case of a 'migrant worker' without 'work 
permit'. Aye-Mo (MM5)'s story matches this scenario. She was a 50-year-old migrant 
who had been living in Thailand for more than 20 years. She had never been registered 
with the MOI. Thus she did not hold Tor Ror 38/1, and this explicitly meant that she 
could not apply for a work permit. Yet it was difficult to claim that she was an 'illegal 
resident' as she always held a 'border pass'.  
The border pass was a document, authorised by the mutual agreement between the two 
nations, that allowed Thai and Burmese residents to commute between the border towns 
(in this case, crossing from Ranong province to Kawthaung district, and vice versa), 
with a maximum stay of not more than two weeks. The border crossing by the border 
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pass was valid for visiting the border town only. Onward travel to other places still 
needed visa and passport. In other words, the border pass was like a lenient border 
control that facilitated the travelling of inhabitants for short-stay tourism or business 
purposes, see Figure 24. 
Figure 24 Appearance of the border pass 
 
Source: Real picture taken from the interviewee 
Aye-Mo always had her border pass stamped at the border biweekly as if she travelled 
from Myanmar. She always bought goods from the border and earned a living by selling 
them to her neighbours. Her overall health was still good; therefore buying the health 
card was not of interest at this moment. She mentioned that the card was too costly. If 
she wished to buy the insurance card, she would need to seek assistance from a broker to 
help her acquire a passport and a work permit first.  
The last example was more complex. It was the story of Za's family (MM6), an illegal 
immigrant family from Myanmar, see her life story in Appendix 11 (case 2) for more 
detail. Za had been dwelling in Muang district for over ten years. Za peeled shrimps for 
197 
 
a living and had already acquired a work permit. However, the employer specified in the 
work permit was not the employer that hired her to peel shrimps. All of her documents 
(work permit, health card, and Tor Ror 38/1) were managed by a broker, and Za stated 
that she had no idea about her 'de facto' employer.  
Support from family and employers 
In general, migrants in Kraburi district appeared to have better living conditions than 
those in Muang district. Of the four migrant interviewees from Kraburi district, three 
were already insured and had completed the NV (MK2, MK3, and MK4). The 
interviewees from Kraburi district had higher income, lived in more spacious houses, 
and received better support from peers and family members. 
A potential explanation of this phenomenon, as expressed by one of the employer 
interviewees, (RN_E2), was that most rubber field owners tended to treat their migrants 
nicely. The 'nice' treatment included provision of better shelters, fringe benefits, higher 
wages, and helping migrants to undertake the registration process. The interviewer 
opined that the likely explanations for this phenomenon were: (1) most migrants in 
Kraburi district were indeed 'not-poor' (some even owned their business on the other 
bank of Kraburi river) and (2) the rubber market price in Thailand had declined over 
recent years; therefore without proper treatment, migrant rubber field workers might 
leave for other provinces to seek more promising jobs. 
"The current migrants are those who expect that the rubber price may go up. But there 
are fewer new workers now. Some of our migrants even have their own rubber field on 
the other bank (of the river). It is like they use us as their learning field (laugh!)." 
[RN_E2]  
Three of four migrant interviewees (MK2, MK3, and MK4) in Kraburi district still had 
connections with their relatives in Myanmar. In contrast, almost all migrant interviewees 
in Muang district were distanced from their relatives in Myanmar. The only case in 
Muang district that still maintained her links with peers or relatives in Myanmar was Ae 
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(MM3), who had quite a good education background and was now serving as an 
interpreter at the health centre.     
Kraburi district is separated from Myanmar by the Kraburi river. Travelling from one 
bank to the other is very cheap and convenient (about US$ 2 per head per trip by a 
speedboat). Therefore, migrant interviewees in Kraburi district stated that they travelled 
back to Myanmar quite often for various reasons (such as visiting relatives, joining 
cultural/religious festivals, or looking after their rubber fields in Myanmar). Jin (MK2) 
was an example. She lived with her husband and her one-month-old baby in a small 
house provided by the rubber field landlord. She did not pay for accommodation, except 
the utility bills. Everybody in the household was insured and had already acquired 
temporary passports through the assistance of the landlord. Her cousin from Myanmar 
also crossed the river to help her take care of her child every other day. Jin planned to 
take her son back to Myanmar to enter a school there. Another similar instance was Wei 
(MK3). The detailed story of Wei's life is presented in Appendix 11 (case 3). 
Satisfaction with the health service and the card policy in general 
All respondents who were insured by the HICS, opined that they were generally 
satisfied with the services they received. Wei (MK3) articulated that the hospital usually 
provided good quality care. Ayee (MM3) and Tho (MM2) confirmed that most doctors 
at the hospital were very kind, however frontline administrative staff and nurses tended 
to be less nice. They preferred visiting a hospital over a health centre as doctors were 
always available there (in the Thai context, services at a health centre are normally 
operated by nurses). They were happy with the card since it saved considerable 
treatment expense (compared to not having the card). 
Nevertheless, a private clinic still had an important role in health-seeking behaviour, 
particularly in non-severe illnesses and for the uninsured migrants (see the case story of 
Su [MK1] in the subsequent subsection). Over half of the interviewees (~7/12) reported 
that they visited a private clinic when they got ill. Cho (MK4) emphasised that the 
critical advantage of visiting a private clinic was the shorter waiting time, though there 
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was always a cost incurred (ranging from 200 Baht [US$ 6] to 500 Baht [US$ 15] per 
visit).  
It was worth mentioning here that Cho's family had some distinct features. She had been 
living with her Thai husband for over ten years without a marriage document. Legally 
speaking, with a long stay in Thailand and strong link to the country (through a marriage 
with a Thai national), she was eligible to apply for Thai nationality (but, in practice, she 
might need to complete the marriage document first). Cho's husband expressed that he 
had ever explored if Cho was able to obtain Thai nationality, but he finally forwent this 
idea after experiencing the red tape. As Cho was diagnosed with hypertension that 
demanded continuing treatment, her husband helped her acquire insurance by informing 
the official that he had hired Cho as a housemaid. Thus, in the work permit, Cho was 
acknowledged as a housemaid employee with her husband as a Thai employer, and this 
enabled her to be insured with the HICS.  
Though Cho was satisfied with the status quo since at least she was insured, she said 
that it would be better if the insurance coverage could expand to her family members. 
The important aspect of Cho's family was that it consisted of members of more than 
three nationalities. In the household, there were Cho (Burmese), her husband (Thai), her 
husband's son born by his ex-wife (Thai), and her husband's daughter in law, Kan 
(displaced Thai). Kan did not have a birth certificate or any identification document 
since her parents died when she was very young. She spoke Thai fluently and was 
familiar with Thai culture. People in the community always recognised her as displaced 
Thai.  
Strictly speaking, Kan would have been insured with the HI-PCP if the national survey 
for stateless people by the MOI (according to the 2005 National Strategy, see Chapter 5) 
had been done completely. Although, in fact, the HICS allowed Kan to buy the 2,200-
Baht card even though she was undocumented (see details of the H-series in ‘Unclear 
policy message—Devil is in the detail’), the health centre staff, who occasionally visited 
Kan's family, were still ignorant about this system, let alone Kan and her family. 
However, Kan was still healthy. Obtaining the card was not her primary concern at this 
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moment. In addition, the family was still satisfied with the services received at the 
public health facilities. Cho and her husband stated that they felt that the facilities 
always welcomed every patient regardless of his/her nationality and insurance status.     
All of the insured interviewees opined that the card was beneficial in reducing out-of-
pocket payments. Jin (MK2) added that the card was very useful for a child as the 
child’s card price was very small. She had bought one for her baby right after giving 
birth. Nevertheless, the interviewees still had limited knowledge of the card in several 
aspects, such as why the price was raised (from 1,300 Baht to 2,200 Baht) and whether 
the card covered traffic injury treatment. Almost all knowledge of the card was received 
from informal discussion with peers or neighbours. Ayee (MM3) shared her experience 
as MHW that the policy changed too fast and it was difficult to keep pace of all changes.    
"The advantage of the card is if we have surgery or if giving birth, we pay only 30 
Baht...But the policy changed very quickly. We went to tell the villagers (about the 
card), and then it changed again, and the villagers came to blame us (for giving wrong 
information)." [MM3] 
Besides, Ayee confirmed that most migrants preferred to be insured with the HICS over 
the SSS. Although, in theory, employers in the formal sector should have their migrant 
employees switched from the HICS to the SSS once the NV process was finished, in 
practice, very few migrants (and employers) were willing to do so. She opined that the 
payroll contribution of the SSS was much higher than the HICS premium despite the 
SSS granting more fringe benefits such as unemployment allowance and pension 
allowance. Moreover, the process of obtaining these additional benefits was 
cumbersome and even contradicted the mobile behaviour of most migrant workers. 
"The Social Security Office told that they will give us the money back when we reach 60 
years of age, and also when we die. Who will guarantee that we will receive that 
money? And they say they will give us 1,000 Baht when we leave for our home. But you 
must send notice (to the SSO) in advance…Who knows that their cousin will die by next 
month? Just 1,000 Baht!, I can collect it by myself." [MM3] 
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Uncertain future of the vulnerable 
While all of the insured respondents mentioned that they were satisfied with the services 
provided by the HICS, there existed some migrants, particularly the most vulnerable 
ones, who gained little benefit from the scheme. Coupled with their low socioeconomic 
status, these vulnerable migrants were placed in a deadlock, that is, unable to engage in 
the (formal) labour market and in the same time, unable to return to the home country, 
as mirrored by the following cases. 
The first case was Su (MK1), a 64-year-old man with chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD). Su had suffered from breathing difficulties for years. Though he was 
still able to maintain his basic living functions, the disease prevented him from being 
involved with labour intensive work. This condition was possibly due to his excessive 
smoking when he was young. Su used to live in Dawei district in Myanmar before 
(illegally) travelling to Thailand about two decades ago.  
Currently, he was dwelling with his 33-year-old daughter and his three grandchildren in 
a shelter in the palm field owned by his daughter's employer. His daughter was insured 
and had already got temporary passport and work permit through the assistance of the 
employer. The shelter was provided free of charge but the dwellers were responsible for 
other expenses. As the total expense of the household was on par with their income 
(about 10,000 Baht (US$ 303)/month), the family did not have enough savings to return 
to Myanmar and was not capable of setting up a new life in Thailand.  
Su's daughter mentioned that her employer did not mind if Su stayed with her, but as Su 
was unable to work, he refused to take Su to register with the officials. None of her 
children were insured either. As a consequence, Su did not have any documents with 
him, making him a totally undocumented person. Su claimed that he used to possess 
some official documents several years ago but those documents were lost. Su said that 
he had no idea about the card and had never heard about the OSS. When he felt chest 
discomfort, he usually asked his grandchildren to buy some unlabelled medicine from 
Myanmar as it was cheap (less than 6 Baht [US$ 0.2] per package), see Figure 25. 
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Figure 25 The interviewee (MK1)'s house and the example of unlabelled medicine 
 
The second preferred choice of care for Su was the private clinic. He had visited it 3 or 4 
times. The expense for each visit was approximately 500 Baht (US$ 15). Note that he 
had never been to the hospital. However, the MHW from the nearby health centre came 
to visit him occasionally.     
The second case (Tan, MM1) was more complicated. While Su still had family support, 
Tan faced a more difficult situation as the only financial supporter of the household was 
his wife, who was affected by HIV/AIDS like him. Moreover, his health status was 
much deteriorated by the disease, causing difficulty in his basic daily activities. Tan had 
previously had the insurance card but then his card expired and he could not renew the 
card since the hospital created a new internal policy that prohibited 'sick' migrants from 
buying the card. Tan's life narrative is displayed in Appendix 11 (case 4). 
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6.4 Discussion 
This subsection discusses the higher constructs (second-order themes) emerging from 
the above findings. Three important themes were identified: (1) Adaptive behaviour of 
all stakeholders involved in the policy, (2) Gaps and dissonance in policy objectives, 
and (3) Economic implications of being legal. Note that these themes were not mutually 
exclusive. As a matter of fact, they closely interacted with each other. The relationship 
between the first-order and the second-order themes is exhibited in Figure 26 on the 
following page. 
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Figure 26 Association between the first-order themes and the second-order themes 
 
 
 
First-order themes from 
local implementers 
Second-order themes First-order themes from 
service users 
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I. Adaptive behaviour of all stakeholders involved in the 
policy 
It is very striking that all stakeholders adapted their behaviour towards the HICS policy. 
The term, 'stakeholders', here includes not only street-level bureaucrats but also the 
clientele (service users). This phenomenon reflected the concept proposed by Lipsky 
(1980) that frontline workers of government agencies routinely interacted with the 
clients in implementing the policy and had some discretion over which service should be 
given. The local implementers were de facto not only 'implementers' as at times they 
acted like policy makers (who changed the policy in the way that might contradict the 
initial policy directives). 
At the macro-level, while the 'formal' directive of the government attempted to 'clean' 
illegal immigrants from the country, the ground-level officers changed that directive to a 
'zoning system' since it was impossible to block a massive influx of migrants into the 
province. While the MOPH intended to provide the insurance for migrant residents in 
Thailand, the PPHO adapted this policy by promoting the card to residents in Myanmar 
as the PPHO perceived that, in the Ranong setting, it was impossible to prevent the 
movement of people between the two countries.  
At the meso-level, while the PPHO encouraged its affiliated hospitals to sell the card to 
all migrants, regardless of health status, with the aim of enlarging provincial risk 
pooling, some hospitals breached this agreement by restricting the eligibility criteria 
only to healthy buyers, in order to protect their own financial balance sheets. 
At the micro-level, in a hospital that prevented unhealthy migrants from purchasing the 
card, its administrative staff also referred, or at least advised, the buyer to purchase the 
card at another hospital where the card-selling policy was more relaxed.  
When the adaptive behaviours were coupled with poor supervision from the central 
authorities (like the MOPH in this case), it seemed that the local authorities were de 
facto given a considerable degree of discretion to distort the policy implementation. 
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From the user side, most respondents considered that they were content with the services 
in general and preferred being insured with the HICS to the SSS. Some migrants got 
away from the HICS rule that requires the buyer to have a physical employer by 
engaging private intermediaries, brokers, and personal networks to look for someone 
who could assume the employer role.  
Some employers refused to have their migrant employees and dependants of migrants 
involved in the registration process to avoid the costly expense. However, since such 
treatment risked losing migrant employees, some employers found a middle way, by 
bestowing accommodation and other fringe benefits to counterbalance the benefits that 
migrants would receive if they took part in the registration. 
Interestingly, the above point has broadened the perspectives on the SLB theory, that is, 
adaptive behaviours occurred not only in government officers but also in the 
users/clientele, and appeared at all levels of policy implementation. 
Erasmus (2014) argued that street-level bureaucrats often exercised a variety of 'coping' 
practices, for instance, rule breaking, careless rule enforcement, and suspicion of 
patients. Similar coping behaviours were apparently reflected by the practices of the 
respondents of this study, such as promoting the card in Myanmar (rule breaking), 
zoning system (careless rule enforcement), and perceiving that migrants were taking 
advantage of the system unfairly (suspicion of patients). 
II. Gaps and dissonance in policy objectives 
The implementation problems of the HICS could not be analysed without taking into 
account influences from other ministries. It was apparent that the MOPH, the MOI, and 
the MOL had not worked in harmony. As long as the MOPH concerned itself purely 
with health matters and ignored citizenship status problems, measures to protect heath of 
migrants could not function sustainably and effectively (just as the employment status of 
MHWs had not been resolved, even though it was widely accepted that MHWs were key 
human resources in the health system). The MOI focused only on national security 
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through the registration process, without an effective long term plan to deal with 
unregistered migrants aside from just deporting them. The MOL limited its function 
only to migrant workers with employers, ignoring the fact that not all migrants are 
workers, and some are self-employed.  
When a policy was hastily endorsed (the OSS for instance) with different policy 
directions, it created confusion in the field. This problem was intermingled with vague 
policy messages, for example, diverse interpretations of the term 'dependants'. 
Furthermore, NGOs were dragged into this confusion as support for public authorities 
(for example, offering financial support to health facilities for hiring MHWs) but the 
involvement of NGOs was quite haphazard. A reliance on NGOs to deal with gaps in 
ministerial policies might not be successful in the long run (like when financial support 
for MHWs ended in 2014). 
Note that the conflicting policy directions were present even within the same ministry. 
An instance was the tension between the PPHO and some hospitals in the province. 
While the PPHO wished to have as many card holders as possible, in order to gain better 
risk sharing, some hospitals perceived that such idea might create a financial risk for 
them because it might aggravate adverse selection. Some facilities imposed a special 
rule that allowed only the healthy to buy the card in order to maximise their financial 
benefit from the policy, then used this money to subsidise unpaid debts from treating the 
uninsured (despite the fact that some hospitals saw overall financial gain even without 
such special rule). 
Interestingly, the researcher noticed that there was a specific pattern where respondents 
opined that migrants were exploiting the Thai healthcare system. The majority of 
respondents expressing this opinion were providers in high-level health facilities, 
particularly the provincial hospital, while health staff in the health centres did not show 
significant concerns over this. Potential explanations are as follows. Firstly, insurance 
cards were not purchased at health centres. Thus, health staff at provincial/district 
hospitals were likely to face more migrant-related work than those at health centres, 
even excluding dealing with counterfeit brokers. Secondly, the provincial hospital was 
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the last station of the referral line and the provincial in-house regulation that waived the 
gate-keeping mechanism might create room for migrants (and also Thai patients) to 
bypass the health centres. This situation might make providers in higher-level facilities 
feel that they were shouldering too much burden from treating migrants who were 
supposed to be cared for at lower-level hospitals. Though the PPHO tried to manage this 
problem by setting a fixed payment per visit that the referred hospital could be 
reimbursed from the referring hospital, this was still perceived as unfair treatment by 
staff at higher-level facilities, since the unit cost in bigger hospitals tended to be higher 
than in smaller hospitals (see the response of RN_RNH1 in 'Withdrawal of gate-keeping 
regulation within the province' subsection). 
Another important problem was a lack of feedback mechanism from local implementers 
to policy makers, which intensified the confusion in the implementation of the HICS. 
Feedback in this regard encompassed both (1) a linkage between the central authorities 
and the implementing agencies, and (2) communication means that could link the 
service users to the central authorities. This research found that though there existed 
some vestigial feedback channels that linked the local implementers to policy makers, 
such as a launch of consultative letters, or attendance at seminars or consultative 
meetings arranged by the MOPH, a feedback mechanism that could help service users 
voice their concern directly to policy makers was completely missing. This omission 
might derive from the fact that some local providers did not understand the root cause of 
migrant health problems and did not serve as a mediator that helped properly connect 
the users to the central authorities. 
III. Economic implications of being legal 
A striking finding of the fieldwork was a concern over the economic burden when 
entering the registration/legislation process. While the literature review highlighted that 
language and cultural differences were important barriers in providing services, both 
healthcare providers and migrant patients mentioned this less compared to the economic 
constraint. This phenomenon might be due to the fact that cultures and life styles of the 
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Burmese and the Thai residents in Ranong province were quite alike. Thailand and 
Myanmar are both agriculture-based countries, and the majority of the residents are 
Buddhists. Though the language difference was quite distinct, some Burmese (for 
example, the respondents, MK2 and MM3) were able to speak Thai quite fluently. This 
study also presented the case of a Thai national building up family with a Burmese 
migrant (MK4). Therefore, the economic constraint regarding registration process might 
be more worrisome than language and cultural barriers. 
Almost all migrant respondents shared experiences of getting involved with brokers 
during the registration process. Some employers expressed unwillingness to pay the 
work permit fee and the health card premium for their employees since the fees were too 
costly (even though all the employers involved in this study deducted those fees in 
monthly instalments from their employees' salary). This finding was consistent with the 
earlier study by Paithoonpong and Chalamwong (2011) suggesting that some employers 
were reluctant to enter their employees in the registration process. The Economist 
(2013) revealed that some migrants were hoodwinked by unscrupulous brokers. Some 
brokers were even engaged in trafficking syndicates, which smuggled migrant hopefuls 
with a promise of better paying jobs in Thailand. Motlagh (2012) contended that there 
were some 'good brokers', who assisted migrants and employers to pass through the 
registration process straightforwardly and lawfully, or even helped their migrant clients 
tackle corrupt officials. However, the chance of meeting 'good brokers' was somewhat 
unpredictable. It should be noted that though this research did not aim to explore the 
corruption issues in Thailand, it is difficult for the government to deny that Thai 
officialdom may be complicit in labour abuses, and that most of the time, Thai 
governments have treated the trafficking issue like the elephant in the room (Parkinson, 
2015, Environmental Justice Foundation, 2014).        
This problem became more complex when it was intermingled with instability of 
policies, which caused frequent openings and re-openings of the registration period (see 
Chapter 5). Most migrants (and employers) were confused by the frequent changes in 
policy and this situation indirectly created room for (unscrupulous) brokers or private 
intermediaries to intervene. Suphanchaimat and Napaumporn (2015) exemplified this 
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point by showing a case of a Laotian immigrant from Pitsanulok province, who joined 
the NV process at least five times (that meant this migrant possessed five passports). 
Such an example clearly contradicted the legal intention, as once an immigrant 
completes the NV, he/she will be fully legalised and there is no need to undertake the 
NV again.        
Another important observation from the fieldwork was that what migrants were really 
concerned about was not the cost of the health card alone, but the cost of the 'whole 
package of documents' (health card, work permit and passport). This implied that though 
in theory the junta expected that the reduction in the card premium and tying the health 
insurance with work permit might give workers more legal protection from ruthless 
employers and encourage employers to buy the card for their employees; in practice, it 
merely created new opportunities for graft.  
As long as the cost of being 'legalised' is too expensive, migrants are likely to engage 
with fraudulent brokers (or even with traffickers). Besides, this problem might create 
negative impacts in terms of public health threats such as a risk of untreated infectious 
diseases where some unhealthy migrants are left uninsured. Without adequate measures 
to tackle the root cause of illegality, such a vicious cycle cannot be broken, regardless of 
how many OSS policies are launched in the future. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shed light on the perceptions of healthcare providers and relevant 
stakeholders involved in the implementation of the HICS. With an unclear policy 
message and lack of effective monitoring system, an adaptation of policy was 
predictable. Some local officers adapted the policy in various ways that might optimise 
their benefits and these adaptations could bring about both 'positive' and 'negative' 
impacts on service users. Some adaptive practices, such as imposing an extra-rule that 
barred unhealthy migrants from being insured, might be regarded as a deviation from the 
public insurance concept, while some practices, for instance, a removal of fee schedule 
for some treatment items, might be considered an innovative means for promoting the 
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health of migrants. As a matter of fact, problems arose at a very early stage of the policy 
process, starting from policy formulation, as a result of the dissonance in policy 
directions between ministries and even between authorities in the same ministry. In 
addition, the implementation problem was more nuanced than just a deviation from the 
policy objectives since the policy objectives might not be clear from the outset. 
Charitable organisations played an important role in filling the gaps in public services, 
but this support might not be sustainable. It is clear that the policy adaptation could 
occur at all levels, from policy makers at the MOPH, to executive staff at the PPHO, and 
to frontline health staff at local facilities. The lack of a feedback mechanism was 
noticeable, and this intensified the complexities of implementation. The cost of 
registration was a vital concern from the viewpoint of service users. Adequate support 
from employers was the factor that determined participation in the registration process 
and the purchase of the insurance card. A reliance on brokers in passing through the 
registration process was common in both migrants and employers, but this might create 
opportunities for graft if they encountered unscrupulous brokers.  
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Chapter 7: Impact of the HICS on utilisation and 
out-of-pocket payment of the beneficiaries 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the effect of the HICS on its insurees at the point of care. The 
study aims to fill the knowledge gaps (mentioned in Chapter 3) that occur because, since 
the introduction of the HICS in 2004, very little is known about the outcomes of the 
policy. In addition, earlier research often missed the consideration of using uninsured 
migrants and the UCS as 'natural comparators'. 
This chapter commences with a brief description of methods used (for more detail, see 
Chapter 4), followed by the results subsection. Each part begins with the findings from 
descriptive statistics. Next, results from univariate and multivariate analyses, with a 
battery of econometric techniques, were employed. The chapter is completed by the 
discussion subsection where the important elements of the results are explained and 
linked with the earlier qualitative chapters.    
7.2 Methods 
This subsection contains two parts: (1) data source, and (2) statistical methods and 
variable management, with contents as follows. 
I. Data source 
The study employed facility-based data, which recorded actual IP and OP attendance of 
all patients at the facilities. Corresponding with the study areas in qualitative chapters, 
data from Ranong provincial hospital and Kraburi district hospital were explored.  
For OP use, since a patient can enjoy services at health centres, which are the smallest 
units of the public primary care network at subdistrict level, data from two health 
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centres, namely, health centre A from headquarter (Muang) district and health centre B 
from Kraburi district, were included. These health centres are situated in the subdistricts 
with a high density of migrant populations.  
The data were tracked over the last five fiscal years (FYs), that is, from 1 October 2010 
to 30 September 2015. However, data availability varied by facilities. For instance, OP 
data of the health centres were available only from FY 2012, hence the OP utilisation 
analysis was exercised only from FY 2012 onwards. Of note is that newborn admissions 
were excluded in most analyses except for the analysis by descriptive statistics. This 
practice was performed in order to (1) avoid double counting with delivery admission, 
and (2) prevent misclassification bias derived from the fact that in practice there was a 
slight delay in buying the insurance card for a newborn after birth. 
II. Statistical methods and variable management 
The main outcome variables were (1) volume of use (visits/person/year) and (2) out-of-
pocket payment or OOP (in Baht/visit). Note that OOP in this setting was an exact 
amount paid by a patient in each visit, not a cost incurred by health facilities. For IP 
OOP, there was a limitation in data availability, that is, the individual IP OOP data of 
Ranong hospital were incomplete due to a recent change in the electronic IP data 
collection software in Ranong hospital. Thus the IP OOP analysis was performed only in 
Kraburi hospital. 
For utilisation analysis, as the dataset was collected as an individual record, data 
management was needed before applying the econometric techniques. Therefore, 
multiple visits per individual in a given fiscal year needed to be linked together via the 
unique identifier, namely, the hospital number or HN. The researcher regarded HN as 
the most appropriate unique identifier in this setting, despite recognising that it was not 
flawless. Further discussion on this point is presented later in the discussion subsection 
of this chapter and in Chapter 8. 
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The key independent variable was the insurance variable, coded 0 for the uninsured, 1 
for the HICS, and 2 for the UCS. With respect to traditional epidemiological or clinical 
research, the HICS was like exposure/treatment group, while the uninsured and the UCS 
were control groups (control 1 and control 2, respectively).  
Aside from the insurance status variable, the analysis also took into account the effect of 
the key confounders/covariates, namely, sex (male/female), age (years), disease status 
(in terms of ICD10 and DRG), employment status (employed/unemployed), hospital 
level (provincial hospital/district hospital), and domicile (registered address).  
These covariates came together with the raw dataset. However, in the econometric 
analysis, some variables were slightly modified to have more explanatory power, for 
instance, age was converted to age group (0-7 years, 8-15 years, 16-30 years, 31-60 
years, and over 60 years) and domicile was converted to hospital proximity (any 
individual with address located in the same district as the facility was coded 1 
[proximity] and coded 0 [non-proximity] if otherwise). The researcher also added a 
variable that captured the change in contextual environment of the policy over time by 
including the OSS variable (post-OSS/pre-OSS). The OSS variable was coded 0 if 
utilisation occurred before FY 2015, and coded 1 if after FY 2015. Subtle detail about 
the management of variables is presented immediately before the presentation of each 
econometric technique in the results subsection. 
The most appropriate techniques in this setting were Poisson regression for IP 
utilisation, Negative binomial regression for OP utilisation and Two part model (TPM) 
for both IP OOP and OP OOP. As expounded in Chapter 4, the TPM was basically a 
concoction of techniques that captured (1) probability of making payment and (2) the 
amount paid for records with a payment (at any Baht). Before acquiring the most fitted 
technique(s), the researcher exemplified an application of some key conventional 
techniques and briefly explains why the selected techniques were more suitable in this 
setting. The demonstration of a variety of econometric techniques here is to justify why 
the analysis was performed in such a manner rather than a comparison of results 
between different techniques. 
215 
 
In order to address the endogeneity effect, subgroup analysis was performed by focusing 
on only migrant patients. This step can be considered sensitivity analysis as well since 
the researcher assumed that the endogeneity effect existed. In this regard, the 
'Instrumental variable' technique was applied, and is displayed after the full-sample 
analysis.  
Then, the researcher also conducted another round of subgroup analysis, but excluded 
delivery conditions. This was done to assess the change of multivariate analysis results 
after excluding delivery-related records, because delivery conditions were common 
causes of visits in migrant patients in the descriptive analysis. Note that the results for 
non-delivery subgroup analysis are displayed in Appendix 14 instead of the main text 
since they did not show a remarkable difference from the results from full-sample 
analysis.  
It should be noted that it is possible that an insured migrant was coded 'HICS' in the first 
visit and 'uninsured' in the second visit (where, for example, his/her insurance card had 
expired). Besides, the uninsured group comprised both Thai and non-Thai patients. 
Literally, Thai nationals cannot be coded as 'uninsured' as they are insured by either of 
the three main public insurance schemes (the UCS, the SSS, and the CSMBS). 
However, in practice a Thai patient may be willing to pay out-of-pocket for that visit.  
This can happen when a Thai patient asks for extra services (such as private ward) 
which is not directly related to his/her illness and a physician agrees to provide such 
services only if the patient accepts to pay out-of-pocket. The inconsistency in insurance 
coding as mentioned above may create misclassification bias, and this inevitably affects 
the estimate's accuracy. To avoid such a problem, any individuals that changed the 
insurance status (around 6% of the entire records) were dropped from the analysis (for 
example, changing from UCS to uninsured, or changing from HICS to uninsured, and 
vice versa). Besides, records of Thai nationals that were coded as uninsured were 
excluded. Of course, this approach reduced the power of the analysis by decreasing the 
number of observations, but such an approach enabled the researcher to avoid a problem 
of misclassification bias by sacrificing only a small amount of data.   
216 
 
7.3 Results 
This subsection is categorised into four parts: (1) inpatient utilisation, (2) outpatient 
utilisation, (3) inpatient out-of-pocket payment, and (4) outpatient out-of-pocket 
payment.  
I. Inpatient utilisation 
Overview of the data    
A total of 111,725 records between FY 2011 and FY 2015 were retrieved. About 83% of 
records were drawn from Ranong hospital (92,925 records from Ranong hospital). The 
raw dataset contained a large volume of newborn admissions (ICD10 of principal 
diagnosis coded as Z380), constituting about 20% of the entire data size, this can be 
seen in Figure 27 below, which shows a large proportion of patients with age less than 1.  
Figure 27 Percentage of IP utilisation volume by age 
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Since, in both hospitals, the top three most common insurance schemes are (1) the UCS, 
(2) the uninsured, and (3) the HICS (see Figure 28), the analysis from this point onwards 
focuses on these three entitlements. 
Figure 28 IP utilisation volume by insurance schemes 
 
Note:  
1. The term 'Stateless', appearing in the graph, refers to stateless population, which 
is insured by the HI-PCP (details in Chapter 5).  
2. The term 'Traffic' refers to traffic insurance for road accidents. 
Amongst the top three, the UCS was the most common entitlement in all years. Overall, 
admissions of UCS patients constituted around two thirds of all admissions (~67%), 
followed by the HICS (~19%), and the uninsured (~14%), see Figure 29. 
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Figure 29 IP utilisation volume by the top three most common insurance schemes by 
years 
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Overall utilisation rate 
A crude analysis of utilisation rate of UCS beneficiaries and card holders is as follows. 
The numerator was volume of use by each beneficiary type in a given fiscal year while 
the denominator was the number of registered beneficiaries in each hospital, see 
Appendix 12 for more calculation detail. Of note is that because there was no 
information about the entire unregistered migrant residents in Thailand, the utilisation 
rate of uninsured migrants could not be calculated.    
Overall, the utilisation rate of the provincial hospital was twice as large as that of the 
district hospital in both beneficiary types. The utilisation rate of registered migrants was 
lower than of UCS beneficiaries, particularly at Ranong hospital. In Kraburi hospital, 
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the IP utilisation rates of both insurance types were almost on par, except in 2013 and 
2014 (a period before the OSS era when the HICS policy was relatively open [see 
Chapter 5]), when the utilisation rate of migrants became slightly larger than the UCS.  
It is noteworthy that despite frequent changes in the HICS during the last few years, 
there was little positive effect on the utilisation of migrant card holders. On the other 
hand, in FY 2015, during the OSS era, the utilisation of the HICS beneficiaries at 
provincial hospital declined about 50% compared to the year before. This phenomenon 
might be because of a surge in the number of registered migrants (which meant a sharp 
increase in the denominator) in response to the OSS, see Figure 30. 
Figure 30 IP utilisation rate between the HICS and the UCS beneficiaries by years 
 
220 
 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Personal characteristics of the patients across insurance schemes 
Findings from descriptive statistics and univariate analysis between individual personal 
attributes and insurance status are presented in Table 20 (N = 74,722 admissions, 
excluding newborn admissions and restricting the analysis only to the three most 
common insurance schemes). ANOVA test and Chi-square statistics were applied.  
It was found that females outnumbered males in all beneficiary types. After excluding 
normal labour admissions, the proportional difference between sexes in all beneficiary 
types markedly declined but the number of admissions by females was still larger than 
males. HICS admissions were concentrated in the working age groups with a small 
portion of patients aged under 7 (~6%). In contrast, over one fifth of the admissions of 
the uninsured were from children under 7 years. The UCS group had the largest 
proportion of admissions of the over 60s, compared to other beneficiary types (~26%). 
The majority of patients were admitted to the facility close to their residence and almost 
90% of card holders were employed. HICS patients accounted for 15% and 20% off all 
admissions at district hospitals and provincial hospitals respectively. 
Table 20 Comparing total admissions by personal attributes and insurance schemes 
Variable 
 
Uninsured 
N = 10,382 
HICS 
N = 14,165 
UCS 
N = 50,175 
Test 
(P-value) 
Age—mean (SD) 26.2 (18.7) 30.9 (13.7) 39.2 (26.5) ANOVA (<0.001) 
Age group—n (%) 
 =< 7 y 
 8-15 y 
 16-30 y 
 31-60 y 
 > 60 y 
 
2,327 (22.4) 
578 (5.6) 
3,700 (35.6) 
3,215 (31.0) 
560 (5.4) 
 
841 (5.9) 
109 (0.8) 
6,830 (48.2) 
5,963 (42.1) 
422 (3.0) 
 
8,302 (16.6) 
3,468 (6.9) 
9,651 (19.2) 
15,597 (31.1) 
13,156 (26.2) 
Chi-square 
(<0.001) 
Female—n (%) 5,935 (57.7) 9,766 (68.9) 26,596 (53.0) Chi-square (<0.001) 
Female (non-delivery) —n (%)   4,478 (51.7) 6,612 (60.1) 24,466 (50.9) Chi-square (<0.001) 
Proximity to a facility—n (%)  6,376 (63.4) 11,051 (83.6) 35,648 (71.1) Chi-square (<0.001) 
Employed—n (%) 5,428 (57.6) 12,124 (90.0) 21,987 (55.3) Chi-square (<0.001) 
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Variable 
 
Uninsured 
N = 10,382 
HICS 
N = 14,165 
UCS 
N = 50,175 
Test 
(P-value) 
Facility level—n (% in row) 
 District hospital 
 Provincial hospital 
 
1,782 (11.9) 
8,600 (14.4) 
 
2,172 (14.6) 
11,993 (20.1) 
 
10,974 (73.5) 
39,201 (65.5) 
Chi-square 
(<0.001) 
Note: Missing data were small in number and were excluded from the analysis above.    
Disease status 
The top five most common principal diagnoses, for the card holders and the uninsured, 
were mostly related to normal delivery. This finding was contrast to the UCS, where the 
top five list seemed to be more diverse, including delivery-related conditions, infectious 
and chronic diseases. The diseases/diagnoses listed here are coded by ICD10, see Table 
21. 
Table 21 Top five most common principal diagnoses by insurance schemes 
Insurance Diagnosis by ICD10 Admissions—n 
(%)
Uninsured 1. O800: Normal vertex delivery 1,010 (9.8)
2. O758: Other specified complications of labour/delivery 376 (3.7)
3. O820: Delivery by elective caesarean section  282 (2.8)
4. A09: Dengue fever 252 (2.5)
5. O342: Maternal care due to previous caesarean section 219 (2.1)
HICS 1. O800: Normal vertex delivery 2,736 (19.5)
2. O758: Other specified complications of labour/delivery 574 (4.1)
3. O339: Maternal care of cephalo-pelvic disproportion 493 (3.5)
4. O342: Maternal care due to previous caesarean section 316 (2.3)
5. O700: First degree perineal tear during pregnancy 246 (1.8)
UCS 1. O800: Normal vertex delivery 1,777 (3.8)
2. A09: Diarrhoea and gastroenteritis 1,335 (2.7)
3. J209: Acute bronchitis 1,323 (2.7)
4. J441: COPD with acute exacerbation 1,301 (2.6)
5. A90: Dengue fever 1,251 (2.5)
 
To establish disease severity, length of stay and adjusted relative weight (adjRW) were 
analysed by ANOVA test and Chi-square statistics. The adjRW is a disease severity 
indicator for inpatient care; the larger the weight is, the more severe that admission 
appears to be. It appeared that the level of disease severity in the UCS patients was 
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slightly greater than for HICS and uninsured patients but with statistical significance (as 
evidenced by longer length of stay and larger ratio of patients with catastrophic illness 
with P-value <0.001), see Table 22. 
Table 22 Comparing disease severity between insurance schemes 
Disease severity by: 
 
Uninsured 
N = 10,382 
HICS 
N = 14,165 
UCS 
N = 50,175 
Test 
(P-value) 
Mean adjRW (SD) 0.9 (1.2) 0.8 (1.1) 0.9 (1.3) ANOVA 
(<0.001) 
Mean length of stay—days (SD) 3.3 (5.3) 3.2 (7.0) 4.1 (9.7) ANOVA 
(<0.001) 
No of admissions with 
catastrophic illness—n (%) 
1,411 (15.4) 1,722 (13.7) 10,392 (23.6) Chi-square  
(<0.001) 
 
As the information on length of stay and adjRW is already embedded in the DRG, in 
this step, a new binary variable, 'catastrophic illness', was created. An admission with 
DRGxvi of either XXX2, or XXX3, or XXX4, was coded 1, while an admission with 
DRG of XXX1 was coded 0. The multivariate analysis in the next step uses DRG as a 
proxy for disease severity.  
Difference of utilisation volume between insurance schemes and between pre-OSS 
and post-OSS 
For the analysis in this step and in the multivariate analysis in the next subsection, the 
dataset was converted from per visit to per person-year (by linking multiple visits via a 
patient's HN). Comparing the number of yearly admissions across beneficiary types, 
UCS patients seemed to experience the greatest number of services; followed by the 
HICS and the uninsured respectively (1.3 v 1.1 v 1.0 admissions/person/year). The 
differences across groups showed statistical significance using both the ANOVA test 
and the Kruskal-Wallis test, see Table 23. 
                                                 
xvi DRG is composed of five digits. The last digit, ranging from 1 to 5, reflects the degree of severity for 
that admission (1 = mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = severe, 4 = catastrophic). In this study, the researcher 
considered the last digit of 2-4 as 'catastrophic illness' since in practice it was difficult to distinguish 
between 'moderate', 'severe', and 'catastrophic' severity levels.   
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Table 23 Comparing mean and median numbers of yearly admissions by insurance 
schemes in all years 
Insurance Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Min Max ANOVA 
P-value 
Kruskal-
Wallis  
P-value
Uninsured 1.0 (0.2) 1 (0) 1 6
<0.001 <0.001HICS 1.1 (0.4) 1 (0) 1 11UCS 1.3 (0.8) 1 (0) 1 20
Total 1.2 (0.7) 1 (0) 1 20
 
Comparing the volume of yearly admissions within each patient group, the change in 
yearly admissions between pre- and post-OSS periods was infinitesimal, and this finding 
was supported by the insignificant P-value in both Student's t test and Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, see Table 24. 
Table 24 Comparing mean and median numbers of yearly admissions in each insurance 
group between pre-OSS and post-OSS 
Insurance Mean (SD) Median (IQR) P-valuePre-OSS Post-OSS Pre-OSS Post-OSS Student's t Rank-sum
Uninsured 1.0 (0.2) 1.0 (0.2) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0.157 0.056
HICS 1.1 (0.4) 1.1 (0.4) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0.787 0.594
UCS 1.3 (0.8) 1.3 (0.9) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0.146 0.922
Total 1.2 (0.7) 1.2 (0.8) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0.066 0.491
 
Multivariate analysis 
Multivariate analysis was performed. The dependent variable was number of admissions 
per person per year. The main independent variable of interest was beneficiary status. 
Other covariates were age group (0-7 years, 8-15 years, 16-30 years, 31-60 years, and 
over 60 years), sex (male/female), level of facility (provincial hospital/district hospital), 
history of catastrophic illness (ever had catastrophic illness/never had catastrophic 
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illness), time (pre-OSS/post-OSS) and facility-domicile proximity (proximity/non-
proximity). The OLS was applied. 
Robust standard error was used to adjust for time varying effect over an individual. The 
OLS confirmed the findings from univariate analysis, that is, the HICS had a positive 
effect on volume of use, compared to the uninsured by +0.05 admissions/person/year; 
but this effect was still smaller than the UCS (+0.15 admissions/person/year, compared 
to the uninsured).  
'Ever had catastrophic illness' was the largest effect modifier on volume of use (+0.40 
admissions/person/year). The older groups tended to have more admissions than the 
younger groups. Proximity to health facility increased the volume of services used with 
statistical significance. However, the overall admission volume seemed to decline after 
the advent of the OSS, see Table 25. 
Table 25 Multivariate analysis of IP utilisation volume by the OLS  
Variable (R2 = 0.087) Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)      
 HICS 0.050 0.006 <0.001 0.038 0.062
 UCS 0.154 0.005 <0.001 0.143 0.164
Age group (v <7 yr)   
 8-15 -0.083 0.010 <0.001 -0.102 -0.064
 16-30 -0.032 0.008 <0.001 -0.048 -0.016
 31-60 0.034 0.010 0.001 0.015 0.054
 >60 0.169 0.017 <0.001 0.136 0.202
Female (v male) -0.005 0.008 0.518 -0.021 0.011
Proximity (v non-proximity) 0.120 0.008 <0.001 0.105 0.135
Ever had catastrophic illness (v never) 0.402 0.014 <0.001 0.374 0.430
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) -0.033 0.007 <0.001 -0.047 -0.018
Provincial hospital (v district hospital) -0.003 0.011 0.816 -0.024 0.019
Constant 0.917 0.015 <0.001 0.888 0.945
 
The researcher checked a possibility of using alternative techniques, such as the RE 
model and the FE model. It was found that the RE model produced similar results to the 
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OLS. This is because the between entity error (sigma_u) approached zero as the length 
of time was short while the number of panels was proportionally large (too many N in a 
short time length), and the majority of patients were admitted only once. This situation 
attested that the conventional OLS, with robust standard error, sufficed. The FE model is 
not appropriate in this case since it cannot capture the effects of time-invariant 
covariates, for example, sex and domicile.  
With reference to Chapter 5, some interviewees complained that sick migrants 'overly' 
enjoyed services. That means it is imperative to assess whether the HICS really 
accounted for such a claim. Thus, an interaction term between beneficiary status and 
catastrophic illness was added to assess this claim.  
In addition, an interaction term between beneficiary status and OSS was put into the 
equation to examine if the recent registration measure really affected the service 
utilisation of migrants.  
After adding the interaction terms, the effect of 'ever had catastrophic illness' on volume 
of use was reduced from +0.40 to +0.06 admissions/person/year. This was because the 
interaction term between the HICS and catastrophic illness took part of the credit from 
the catastrophic illness variable. Being insured by the HICS and having history of 
catastrophic illness contributed to an additional effect of the number of visits by +0.23 
admissions/person/year, but this interaction effect was still only half of the size of the 
interaction between the UCS and catastrophic illness (+0.43 admissions/person/year). 
Increasing age and residing close to a facility were significant factors that appeared to 
boost the number of admissions. The OSS by itself significantly reduced the number of 
IP admissions in the uninsured group, despite a trivial effect size. This might be 
explained by a more stringent approach towards unregistered migrants by the junta. 
Note that the interaction term between the OSS and the HICS patients did not yield 
statistical significance, see Table 26. 
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Table 26 Multivariate analysis of IP utilisation volume by the OLS with interaction 
terms 
Variable (R2 = 0.094) Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Insurance (v uninsured)      
 HICS 0.014 0.005 0.010 0.003 0.025 
 UCS 0.088 0.005 <0.001 0.077 0.098 
Ever had catastrophic illness (v never) 0.057 0.012 <0.001 0.033 0.081 
Insurance##Catastrophic illness      
 HICS##Ever had catastrophic illness 0.225 0.031 <0.001 0.165 0.284 
 UCS##Ever had catastrophic illness 0.429 0.023 <0.001 0.385 0.473 
Age group (v <7 yr)      
 8-15 -0.081 0.010 <0.001 -0.100 -0.062 
 16-30 -0.039 0.008 <0.001 -0.054 -0.023 
 31-60 0.030 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.049 
 >60 0.151 0.017 <0.001 0.118 0.184 
Female (v male) -0.008 0.008 0.351 -0.024 0.008 
Proximity (v non-proximity) 0.120 0.008 <0.001 0.105 0.135 
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) -0.020 0.007 0.005 -0.034 -0.006 
Insurance##OSS      
 HICS##Post-OSS -0.000 0.012 0.994 -0.023 0.022 
 UCS##Post-OSS -0.019 0.013 0.141 -0.044 0.006 
Provincial hospital (v district hospital)  -0.004 0.011 0.732 -0.025 0.017 
Constant 0.974 0.014 <0.001 0.947 1.001 
Note: Likelihood ratio (LR) test displayed statistical significance (P-value <0.001), 
implying that an addition of interaction terms into the equation was valid. Also, the 
interaction terms increased the explanatory power of the equation (as R2 was enlarged to 
0.094).  
Other interaction terms, namely the interaction between insurance and age group and the 
insurance and facility level, were already checked to justify their inclusion in the 
equation. The findings revealed that the LR test did not show statistical significance 
after the interaction terms were added, implying that these additional interaction terms 
did not significantly improve the goodness of fit of the equation. As a result, the result 
tables with insurance##age-group and insurance##facility-level interaction terms are not 
displayed in the main text, but readers are still able to assess them in Appendix 13.      
One of the technical concerns over the OLS is a heteroskedasticity problem. Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test revealed that heteroskedasticity existed in the above OLS 
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with P-value <0.001. Therefore, to avoid heteroskedasticity, the Poisson regression was 
used instead. In essence, the Poisson regression better fits the given dataset since the 
outcome variable is a count number. The results are displayed in terms of incidence rate 
ratio (IRR).  
Table 27 shows that, based on the Poisson regression, the HICS had an additive effect 
on volume of use about +1.7% compared to being uninsured. This finding is very close 
to the OLS in Table 26, which suggested that the HICS tended to increase yearly 
admissions of an insured migrant by +1.4% (the figure, +1.4% was calculated by 
dividing the additive effect of the HICS of 0.014 yearly admissions by the constant term 
of 0.974). If the HICS effect was combined with history of catastrophic illness, the 
volume of use might increase by 19.3% as exhibited in the interaction term (but still 
lower than the interaction effect between the UCS and catastrophic illness), resulting in 
an overall rise in utilisation volume of 21.3% (19.3%*1.7%).  
The Chi-square goodness of fit test yielded P-value close to 1.000, implying that the 
Poisson regression fits reasonably well with the data. 
Table 27 Multivariate analysis of IP utilisation volume by the Poisson regression with 
interaction terms 
Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)  
 HICS 1.017 0.005 0.001 1.007 1.026
 UCS 1.087 0.005 <0.001 1.077 1.096
Ever had catastrophic illness (v never) 1.057 0.012 <0.001 1.034 1.080
Insurance##Catastrophic illness  
 HICS##Ever had catastrophic illness 1.193 0.028 <0.001 1.140 1.249
 UCS##Ever had catastrophic illness 1.336 0.021 <0.001 1.295 1.379
Age group (v <7 yr)  
 8-15 0.930 0.008 <0.001 0.914 0.945
 16-30 0.965 0.006 <0.001 0.952 0.977
  31-60 1.026 0.008 0.002 1.009 1.042
 >60 1.118 0.014 <0.001 1.092 1.145
Female (v male) 0.993 0.007 0.327 0.981 1.007
Proximity (v non-proximity) 1.106 0.007 <0.001 1.092 1.119
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Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) 0.982 0.007 0.006 0.969 0.995
Insurance##OSS  
 HICS##Post-OSS 1.001 0.011 0.961 0.980 1.022
 UCS##Post-OSS 0.988 0.011 0.268 0.968 1.009
Provincial hospital (v district hospital) 0.997 0.009 0.711 0.980 1.014
Note: Constant term was omitted because the result was shown in terms of IRR.  
Subgroup analysis—Addressing the endogeneity problem 
One of the important concerns in econometrics is whether an endogeneity effect persists. 
Without an appropriate awareness of endogenous variable(s), it was very likely that a 
biased estimate(s) would be produced.  
Technically, an endogenous variable is an independent variable correlated with the error 
term. A concrete example is when there is a causality loop between the independent and 
dependent variables (ie X causes Y and Y causes X). Thus, the IV was proposed to 
address this bias. The rationale of the IV was rather than regressing the outcome 
variable directly on the endogenous variable, the calculation is executed in two steps: 
first, regressing the endogenous variable on 'instrument(s)', and second, regressing the 
outcome variable on the predicted endogenous variable. This technique helped 
circumnavigate the endogeneity problem as it could be explained that X affected Y only 
through intermediate variable(s), namely, the instrument(s) (Cerulli, 2011). For this 
study, it was possible that, intuitively, by focusing on the HICS and the uninsured, 
insurance status could create an endogeneity problem. This was because even 
unregistered migrants were able to buy the insurance (though in practice, as stated in 
Chapter 6, there was confusion over this policy message amongst service providers and 
users). In such a situation, the insurance could be postulated as an endogenous variable 
since a patient with frequent visits was more likely to seek the insurance to 
accommodate his/her needs than those with fewer visits. A challenge in tackling the IV 
was seeking a 'good instrument', which satisfied the following conditions: (1) the 
instrument should be causally unrelated to the error term of the equation with outcome 
variable, but (2) the instrument should be correlated with the independent variable.  
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To tackle this problem, the researcher considered that employment status might serve as 
a good instrument because if a migrant was employed by a Thai employer, he/she 
should be issued with a work permit by the MOL, and thus would be eligible to buy the 
insurance card. The researcher therefore applied Probit-2SLS, one of the techniques in 
the IV family, using the employment variable as the instrument to tackle this point. It 
should be noted that in this step, UCS patients were excluded, since eligibility for UCS 
insurance is tied to Thai nationality, not employment status. The Probit-2SLS showed 
that the effects of the HICS and history of catastrophic illness on utilisation volume 
were more intense. The HICS increased utilisation volume by +0.13 
admissions/person/year (or about 13.5% from the baseline [constant term]), and a 
history of catastrophic illness possibly increased utilisation number by +17.9 
admissions/person/year. All other covariates produced quite similar results to the 
Poisson regression, except for the hospital level variable, where the coefficient became 
insignificant. The OSS variable produced a slightly negative effect on utilisation 
volume, indicating that FY 2015 saw a slight decrease in admissions per individual, see 
Table 28.     
Table 28 Subgroup analysis of IP utilisation volume by Probit-2SLS, comparing the 
HICS and the uninsured 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
HICS (v uninsured) 0.133 0.025 <0.001 0.084 0.182
Age group (v <7 yr)  
 8-15 0.001 0.012 0.917 -0.023 0.025
 16-30 -0.032 0.011 0.003 -0.053 -0.011
 31-60 0.006 0.011 0.606 -0.016 0.028
 >60 0.137 0.030 <0.001 0.078 0.197
Female (v male) -0.004 0.006 0.566 -0.016 0.009
Proximity (v non-proximity) 0.027 0.008 <0.001 0.012 0.042
Ever had catastrophic illness (v never) 0.179 0.014 <0.001 0.152 0.207
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) -0.026 0.007 <0.001 -0.039 -0.012
Provincial hospital (v district hospital) -0.015 0.008 0.050 -0.030 0.000
Constant 0.985 0.009 <0.001 0.967 1.003
Note:  The Hausman test for endogeneity produced F-statistics of 6.517 with P-value of 
0.011. 
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The researcher also tested the correlation of the instrument with the endogenous variable 
by regressing the insurance variable on the employment variable and other covariates 
via the Probit regression. The finding revealed a statistical significance with P-value 
<0.001. This finding warranted the assumption that the card had an endogeneity effect, 
and the employment variable was probably a strong instrument. Besides, the F-statistic 
for testing a null hypothesis of whether the instrument(s) is(are) weak showed the result 
of more than 10 with P-value of below 0.001; this supported a strong correlation 
between the instrument and the endogenous variable as suggested by Stock et al (2002). 
It is worth noting that an interaction term was not included, as it was not allowed in the 
Probit-2SLS in STATA XII software by standard ivtreatreg command. 
As displayed in the descriptive statistics, delivery-related diagnoses were the most 
common conditions in all beneficiary types, and it would be interesting to see if the 
multivariate results changed if delivery-related diagnoses were excluded. The researcher 
thus performed subgroup analysis that excluded delivery conditions, and found that the 
subsample results did not change much from the full sample analysis, see Appendix 13 
for more detail.  
In summary, the HICS had a significant additive effect on the sum of visits per year, by 
about 1.7% compared to the uninsured by the Poisson regression ceteris paribus. Yet 
this effect was still smaller than the effect of the UCS (+8.7%) on IP utilisation. The 
effect of the HICS became stronger after combining with the effect of a history of 
catastrophic illness (+19.3%), but it was still smaller than the combined effect in the 
UCS (+33.6%). After accounting for a potential bias from the endogeneity effect of the 
card, it appeared that the effect of the card per se was more intense (+0.13 yearly 
admissions per individual).  
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II. Outpatient utilisation 
Overview of the data    
The OP utilisation was analysed in a similar fashion to the IP utilisation. However, the 
data sources included not only Ranong provincial hospital and Kraburi district hospital, 
but also two health centres in two migrant populated subdistricts, one in each district 
(Health centre A and Health centre B). The data were drawn from a 4-fiscal-year period 
(FY 2012 to FY 2015), not 5 fiscal years like in IP analysis because of incompleteness 
in FY 2011 data. In total, there were 1,251,797 records in 4 fiscal years. About 78% and 
14% of patients were insured with the UCS and the HICS respectively. Approximately 
8% of patients were uninsured. The number of visits by the HICS patients and the 
uninsured migrants seemed to be stable across years in all facilities, while the UCS 
patients' OP visits grew constantly, especially at the health centre level, see Figure 31. 
Figure 31 OP utilisation volume by the top three most common insurance schemes 
across years 
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It should be noted that OP records with certain principal diagnoses, namely, Z532 (no 
attendance upon appointment, or procedure not carried out for unspecified reasons), 
Z027 (issuing medical certificate), and Z00 (general medical exam), were excluded to 
avoid measurement bias as these are conditions where a patient did not physically 
present at a facility.  
The age distribution of OP cases in all facilities appeared to be more uniform than for IP 
cases. This might be because, normally, there is no child delivery in an OP visit. Yet it 
was obvious that the peak frequencies of visits were in two age groups: very early 
childhood and late adulthood. The concentration of visits by children aged below 1 
might be due to the fact that the routine OP service normally included essential 
vaccination (and as expounded in Chapter 6, the PPHO also launched a policy of free 
vaccination for all patients regardless of the citizenship status), see Figure 32.   
Figure 32 Percentage of OP utilisation volume by age 
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Overall utilisation rate 
The OP utilisation rate of insured migrants was markedly lower than for UCS patients. 
The difference was most apparent in the latest year in Ranong hospital where the UCS 
utilisation rate was about six fold larger than that of insured migrants.  
For Kraburi hospital, OP utilisation of insured migrants was approximately half that of 
UCS patients between FY 2012 and FY 2013. Yet the utilisation gap became smaller in 
the following years, and the utilisation of migrants was even slightly larger than the 
UCS in FY 2014. This might be due to a relatively open HICS policy during that period 
(after the 2013 Cabinet Resolution was launched).  
Of note is that the overall utilisation rate of migrants at Kraburi hospital was always 
higher than at Ranong hospital throughout the study years, see Figure 33. 
Figure 33 OP utilisation rate between the HICS and the UCS beneficiaries by years 
 
Note: The analysis cannot delve into the utilisation rate at health centre level because of 
a lack of information about the accumulated number of registered migrants at subdistrict 
level.  
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Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Personal characteristics of the patients across insurance schemes 
Of the 1,251,797 records, 172,463 visits (~14%) were the OP visits by HICS patients. 
Mean age of the uninsured was lowest amongst all beneficiary types. The majority of 
patients had residence in the same district as the facility. Females outnumbered males in 
all beneficiary types, particularly the HICS and the UCS, even after excluding obstetric 
conditions. The uninsured were more mobile than others, as evidenced by a smaller ratio 
of patients showing domicile-facility proximity. Moreover, over 86% of the HICS 
patients were employed. 
The ratio of visits by HICS patients to all insurance types was largest at the provincial 
hospital (~16%), followed by district hospital (~11%) and health centres (~7%), see 
Table 29. 
Table 29 Comparing sum of OP visits by personal attributes and insurance schemes 
Variable 
 
Uninsured 
N = 99,119 
HICS 
N = 172,463 
UCS 
N = 908,215 
Test 
(P-value) 
Age—mean (SD) 28.1 (17.9) 37.1 (17.4) 45.1 (23.9) ANOVA (<0.001) 
Age group—n (%) 
 < 7 y 
 8-15 y 
 16-30 y 
 31-60 y 
 > 60 y 
 
17,560 (17.7) 
4,867 (4.9) 
35,155 (35.5) 
36,865 (37.2) 
4,668 (4.7) 
 
8,640 (5.0) 
2,967 (1.7) 
54,459 (31.6) 
89,975 (52.2) 
16,421 (9.5) 
 
99,480 (10.1) 
62,978 (6.4) 
116,252 (11.9) 
405,526 (41.4) 
295,974 (30.2) 
Chi-square 
(<0.001) 
Female—n (%) 51,882 (52.4) 104,343 (60.5) 561,184 (57.6) Chi-square (<0.001) 
Female (non-obstetric)—n 
(%)   48,596 (50.7) 97,281 (58.8) 557,065 (57.3) 
Chi-square 
(<0.001) 
Proximity to a facility—n (%)  57,020 (61.5) 132,567 (80.6) 791,155 (82.8) Chi-square (<0.001) 
Employed—n (%) 74,703 (75.4) 148,075 (85.9) 657,158 (67.0) Chi-square (<0.001) 
Facility level—n (row %)  
 Health centres 
 District hospital 
 Provincial hospital 
 
5,465 (5.1) 
40,856 (9.9) 
52,798 (7.2) 
 
7,913 (7.4) 
45,693 (11.1) 
118,857 (16.2) 
 
93,973 (87.5) 
324,362 (78.9) 
561,880 (76.6) 
Chi-square 
(<0.001) 
Note: Missing data were excluded from the analysis. 
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Disease status 
The disease patterns in each beneficiary type were quite alike. Z group was the most 
common diagnosis in all beneficiaries, particularly in the uninsured. Note that Z group 
refers to any diagnosis with ICD10 starting with 'Z', which comprises a large number of 
minor illnesses and disease prevention activities. Examples of conditions in Z group are 
wound dressing, medical counselling, vaccination, family planning and appointments for 
laboratory tests.  
Hypertension was the second most frequent diagnosis amongst migrant insurance card 
holders and UCS beneficiaries. The proportional difference between Z group and other 
diseases was conspicuous in the migrant card holders and the uninsured, while such a 
difference was smaller in UCS patients, see Table 30.xvii 
Table 30 Top five most common principal diagnoses by insurance schemes 
Insurance Diagnosis by ICD10 Admissions—n 
(%)
Uninsured 1. Z group 58,901 (59.4)
2. O479: False labour, unspecified  1,712 (1.7)
3. I10: Primary hypertension  1,170 (1.2)
4. R509: Fever, unspecified 1,117 (1.1)
5. K30: Dyspepsia 1,060 (1.1)
HICS 1. Z group 56,412 (32.7)
2. I10: Primary hypertension  9,032 (5.2)
3. K30: Dyspepsia 4,746 (2.8)
4. E119: Non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (DM)  4,610 (2.7)
5. O479: False labour, unspecified  3,634 (2.1)
UCS 1. Z group 267,653 (27.2)
2. I10: Primary hypertension  85,672 (8.7)
3. E119: Non-insulin dependent DM 37,307 (3.8)
4. E785: Hyperlipidaemia  23,668 (2.4)
5. K30: Dyspepsia 17,124 (1.8)
                                                 
xvii Note that it is not possible to use DRG or adjRW as a proxy for disease severity for OP since these 
indicators are applied for IP only 
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Difference of utilisation volume between insurance schemes and between pre-OSS 
and post-OSS 
In a broad view, the number of services enjoyed by the UCS was about 1.5 to 2 times 
greater than the HICS and the uninsured respectively (4.8 v 3.1 v 1.8 visits/person/year 
respectively).  
This difference had statistical significance by both ANOVA test and Kruskal-Wallis test 
with P-value of less than 0.001 for both tests,  see Table 31. 
Table 31 Comparing mean and median numbers of OP visits by insurance schemes in 
all years 
Insurance Mean (SD) Median 
(IQR) 
Min Max ANOV
A 
P-value 
Kruskal-
Wallis  
P-value
Uninsured 1.8 (1.9) 1 (1) 1 92
<0.001 <0.001HICS 3.1 (4.2) 2 (3) 1 176UCS 4.8 (8.5) 2 (4) 1 364
Total 4.2 (7.6) 2 (3) 1 364
Note: Having checked the raw data, the researcher found that the record with the total 
visit number of 364 was a UCS patient visiting the facility for daily physical 
rehabilitation. 
Of note is that the standard deviation of OP visit numbers was much greater than its 
mean. Such a pattern is known as over-dispersion, suggesting that the data are heavily 
skewed (and this data characteristic has important implications in selecting a proper 
regression technique for the multivariate analysis in the next step).  
The difference of OP visits between pre- and post-OSS within each patient group was 
quite small, despite having statistical significance by most tests. For instance, the mean 
difference between pre- and post-OSS utilisation in the uninsured and the HICS insurees 
was only 0.1 visits/person/year.  
A potential explanation for the presentation of statistical significance by the tests below 
might be because the dataset contained a huge number of records, see Table 32. 
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Table 32 Comparing mean and median numbers of OP visits in each insurance scheme 
between pre-OSS and post-OSS 
Insurance Mean (SD) Median (IQR) P-valuePre-OSS Post-OSS Pre-OSS Post-OSS Student's t Rank-sum
Uninsured 1.8 (1.8) 1.9 (2.1) 1 (1) 1 (1) <0.001 <0.001
HICS 3.1 (4.3) 3.0 (3.9) 2 (3) 2 (2) 0.005 0.306
UCS 4.8 (8.1) 4.8 (9.5) 3 (4) 2 (4) 0.262 <0.001
Total 4.2 (7.3) 4.3 (8.6) 2 (3) 2 (3) <0.001 0.001
 
Multivariate analysis 
The multivariate analysis for OP utilisation was exercised in the same way as IP 
admission analysis. All variables were arranged in the same fashion, except for three 
aspects. Firstly, the variable, 'ever had catastrophic illness' was replaced by the variable, 
'ever had ACSC'. ACSC refers to 'ambulatory care sensitive conditions', comprising a 
list of various OP diseases that need continuing care (such as chronic obstructive 
pulmonary diseases, and ischemic heart diseases)xviii. This variable was used because, in 
the OP recording system, there is no information on DRG or adjRW.  
Secondly, an extra variable, called, 'Z group', was added to the equation. The reason for 
adding this variable is derived from the observation that the Z group was the main cause 
of visits in all beneficiaries. It normally covers a wide range of minor diseases and 
health promoting activities, including vaccination and physical rehabilitation. Adding a 
Z group variable in the analysis also helped mitigate a risk of bias from counting non-
illness related visits.  
                                                 
xviii ACSC consists of the following ICD10 diagnoses: I20,  I24, J45, J46, J100, J110, J12, J13, J14, J15, 
J16, J18, J20, J21, J22, J41, J42, J43, J44, J45, J46, J47, E86, K522, K528, K529, A69, K02, K03, K04, 
K05, K06, K08, K098, K099, K12, K13, E10, E11, E12, E13, E14, H66, H67, J00, J01, J02, J03, J06, J31, 
I00, I01, I02, I10, I11, A33, A34, A35, A36, A37, A50, A53, A80, A95, B05, B06, B16, B18, B26, B50, 
B51, B52, B53, B54, B77, G00, I00, I01, I02, M01, N10, N11, N12, N136, and N39.  
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Thirdly, the hospital level variable was changed from binary variable (district 
hospital/provincial hospital) to factor variable (health centre, district hospital, and 
provincial hospital) since the OP analysis also included data from health centres. 
To make the presentation more concise, only the final techniques are presented. In 
summary, the calculation methods are not detailed from the very beginning like in the IP 
analysis. Table 33 demonstrates that the HICS seemed to increase OP use by 11.1% 
compared to the uninsured, and being insured with the UCS tended to increase visits 1.4 
fold (+35.2%) compared to the uninsured.  
Having a history of Z group conditions and ACSC diseases was likely to increase the 
number of services by about 42.0% and 66.7% respectively. The interaction terms 
between HICS and Z group, and HICS and ACSC also had statistically significant 
positive effects on volume of use. Provincial hospitals tended to attract more visits than 
health centres by 51%. FY 2015 (post-OSS period) saw a significant increase in OP 
utilisation in the uninsured by around 16%, but for the HICS, this effect was almost 
cancelled out, as reflected by the IRR of below 1 in the HICS##Post-OSS interaction 
term.  
A likely explanation for a declining trend in OP visit frequencies among HICS 
beneficiaries was that registration during the OSS period was more stringent than pre-
OSS era; that is, only a (seemingly) healthy migrant was eligible to be insured, leading 
to a smaller volume of visits.   
Table 33 Multivariate analysis of OP utilisation volume by the Poisson regression with 
interaction terms 
Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)      
 HICS 1.111 0.021 <0.001 1.071 1.152
 UCS 1.352 0.018 <0.001 1.318 1.387
Ever had ACSC (v never) 1.667 0.038 <0.001 1.595 1.742
Insurance##ACSC  
 HICS##Ever had ACSC 1.100 0.037 0.005 1.029 1.175
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Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
 UCS##Ever had ACSC 1.268 0.031 <0.001 1.208 1.330
Ever had Z group (v never) 1.420 0.020 <0.001 1.381 1.460
Insurance##Z group  
 HICS##Ever had Z group 1.880 0.049 <0.001 1.786 1.979
 UCS##Ever had Z group 1.606 0.027 <0.001 1.555 1.659
Age group (v <7 yr)  
 8-15 0.950 0.009 <0.001 0.933 0.968
 16-30 1.042 0.010 <0.001 1.023 1.062
 31-60 1.555 0.017 <0.001 1.523 1.589
 >60 2.253 0.030 <0.001 2.194 2.313
Female (v male) 1.006 0.010 0.555 0.986 1.026
Proximity (v non-proximity) 1.235 0.016 <0.001 1.205 1.267
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) 1.160 0.022 <0.001 1.118 1.204
Insurance##OSS  
 HICS##Post-OSS 0.862 0.021 <0.001 0.822 0.903
 UCS##Post-OSS 0.847 0.017 <0.001 0.814 0.881
Facility level (v health centres)  
 District hospital 1.600 0.020 <0.001 1.562 1.639
 Provincial hospital 1.511 0.018 <0.001 1.476 1.547
 
It should be noted that the goodness of fit test saw a statistical significance (P <0.001), 
implying that the Poisson regression might not fit well with the data. A potential 
explanation for this account was that the variance of the outcome variable was much 
larger than its means. This situation was regarded as over-dispersed count data (unlike 
the IP data where variance of outcome variable was close to or just slightly larger than 
mean). Thus, the Negative binomial regression was proposed instead. 
Table 34 displays results of the Negative binomial regression. Overall, the results from 
the Negative binomial regression were very close to the Poisson regression. The effects 
of HICS and the UCS alone showed about a +9.9% and +33.6% increase in service use 
as compared to the uninsured. The interaction between HICS and Z group yielded a 
large positive effect of +90.8%. Though the interaction between HICS and ACSC 
yielded significant positive effects, they were still smaller than the UCS##ACSC 
interaction (+11.8% v +28.5%).  
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Table 34 Multivariate analysis of OP utilisation volume by the Negative binomial 
regression with interaction terms 
Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)  
 HICS 1.099 0.016 <0.001 1.068 1.130
 UCS 1.336 0.014 <0.001 1.309 1.364
Ever had ACSC (v never) 1.569 0.031 <0.001 1.510 1.630
Insurance##ACSC  
 HICS##Ever had ACSC 1.118 0.031 <0.001 1.060 1.179
 UCS##Ever had ACSC 1.285 0.027 <0.001 1.234 1.339
Ever had Z group (v never) 1.389 0.018 <0.001 1.355 1.423
Insurance##Z group  
 HICS##Ever had Z group 1.908 0.039 <0.001 1.832 1.987
 UCS##Ever had Z group 1.606 0.024 <0.001 1.560 1.653
Age group (v <7 yr)  
 8-15 0.953 0.008 <0.001 0.936 0.969
 16-30 1.017 0.009 0.043 1.001 1.034
 31-60 1.471 0.013 <0.001 1.445 1.497
 >60 2.164 0.026 <0.001 2.114 2.216
Female (v male) 1.011 0.007 0.140 0.996 1.026
Proximity (v non-proximity) 1.200 0.012 <0.001 1.177 1.223
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) 1.165 0.021 <0.001 1.126 1.206
Insurance##OSS  
 HICS##Post-OSS 0.864 0.019 <0.001 0.828 0.902
 UCS##Post-OSS 0.841 0.016 <0.001 0.811 0.872
Facility level (v health centres)  
 District hospital 1.528 0.015 <0.001 1.498 1.558
 Provincial hospital 1.455 0.014 <0.001 1.428 1.483
Alpha 0.438 0.005 - 0.428 0.448
Note: From a technical angle, the Negative binomial regression always produced 'alpha' 
as a parameter for assessing whether the dataset fits well with the Poisson regression. 
However, to make the presentation more concise, the researcher did not show alpha in 
all Negative binomial regression tables. In this case, alpha was equal to 0.438 with 
statistical significance (95% CI of alpha = [0.428, 0.448]). Should alpha be different 
from zero, it is likely that over dispersion exists in the dataset and the Negative binomial 
regression might be more appropriate than the Poisson regression.  
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Subgroup analysis—Addressing the endogeneity problem 
The Probit-2SLS showed that possession of a migrant insurance card had an additive 
effect on volume of use by about 1.7 visits/person/year, comparable to +93.5% many 
more visits than the uninsured (mean OP visits amongst the uninsured was 1.8 
visits/person/year).  
Increasing age, having a history of Z group and ACSC, proximity to the health facilities, 
and above-health-centre facility level were important factors that were positively 
correlated with visit frequencies.  
This finding appeared to show the same pattern found in the IP subgroup analysis, 
where the HICS effect was enlarged after taking into account the endogeneity problem, 
see Table 35. 
Table 35 Subgroup analysis of OP utilisation volume by Probit-2SLS, comparing 
between the HICS and the uninsured 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
HICS (v uninsured) 1.690 0.137 <0.001 1.421 1.959
Age group (v <7 yr)  
 8-15 0.195 0.046 <0.001 0.105 0.285
  16-30 -0.455 0.054 <0.001 -0.562 -0.349
  31-60 0.001 0.059 0.987 -0.115 0.117
 >60 2.097 0.129 <0.001 1.845 2.349
Female (v male) -0.034 0.028 0.214 -0.088 0.020
Proximity (v non-proximity) 0.318 0.054 <0.001 0.213 0.423
Ever had Z group (v never) 2.047 0.049 <0.001 1.950 2.144
Ever had ACSC (v never) 1.646 0.052 <0.001 1.544 1.747
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) 0.038 0.046 0.405 -0.051 0.127
Facility level (v health centres)  
 District hospital 0.353 0.071 <0.001 0.215 0.492
 Provincial hospital 0.360 0.047 <0.001 0.267 0.453
Constant -0.111 0.080 0.166 -0.268 0.046
Note: The Hausman test yielded the P-value of 0.005, implying that the endogenous 
problem persisted in the data, and this warranted the use of the IV. 
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To sum up, the migrant insurance card was likely to increase the number of OP visits by 
about 9.9% (compared to the uninsured, according to the Negative binomial regression). 
After taking into account the endogeneity effect of the card, it appeared that the card 
tended to enlarge the volume of OP visits by 1.7 visits/person/year, almost double the 
volume of use by the uninsured. The interaction terms between the HICS and disease 
status also had a large additive effect on OP visits, but this influence was still much 
smaller than the effect of the UCS and disease interaction terms. 
III. Inpatient out-of-pocket payment 
Overview of the data 
Before analysing OOP, the dataset was converted back to its original format (per visit 
records). Due to the incompleteness of Ranong hospital's OOP data, only the IP OOP of 
Kraburi hospital was analysed. The length of the dataset was 5 fiscal years (FY 2011 to 
FY 2015).  
Descriptive statistics revealed that the OOP data were heavily right skewed. Mean OOP 
of uninsured patients was the highest amongst the three beneficiary types, contributing 
2,461 Baht (US$ 75) per visit. The median OOP of the migrant insurance card holder 
was 30 Baht (US$ 1). This is understandable since most health facilities in Ranong 
province charged migrant patients a 30-Baht fee for each visit. Over half of UCS 
beneficiaries did not pay for the services used, as evidenced by the OOP of the UCS 
having 0-Baht median, see Table 36. 
Table 36 Summary of descriptive statistics of IP OOP per admission by insurance 
schemes 
Beneficiary N—visits Mean in Baht (SD) Median in Baht 
(IQR) 
Min-Max
Uninsured 1,723 2,460.5 (1,556.3) 23,88 (1,968) 0-17,100
HICS 2,122 34.2 (101.8) 30 (0) 0-3,230
UCS 10,973 195.9 (558.1) 0 (30) 0-9,600
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There was a trivial decrease in mean OOP per visit (about 180 Baht decrease) in the 
uninsured in the five-year period. The OOP pattern in the UCS and the HICS 
beneficiaries remained constant over time, see Figure 34. 
Figure 34 Mean IP OOP per admission by insurance schemes across years 
 
Consistent with the variable management in the utilisation analysis, in this section, the 
main dependent variable was OOP per visit in Baht unit. The main predictor variable 
was insurance status (HICS/uninsured). Other covariates were sex (male/female), age 
group (0-7 yr, 8-15 yr, 16-30 yr, 31-60 yr, and > 60 yr), time (post-2013/pre-2013), 
catastrophic disease (having catastrophic illness on that visit, not having), and domicile 
of beneficiary (proximity, non-proximity).  
Nonetheless, there were a few important points that should be taken into account, and 
some of these points were slightly different from the IP utilisation analysis in the 
previous section. Firstly, the time variable in this analysis meant a cut-off point at FY 
2013. As a consequence, the OSS variable was superseded by a new variable called 
post-2013 (coded 1 if a visit was in FY 2014 and 2015 and 0 if before FY 2014). The 
rationale for this change was based on the information in Chapter 5 that a major change 
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in the HICS benefit package occurred in 2013. Hence, the post-2013 variable was likely 
to give a more meaningful explanation than the OSS variable since, intuitively, the OSS 
did not render a change in the benefit package of the scheme.         
Secondly, the analysis from this point onwards is limited to insured migrants and 
uninsured migrant patients. The rationale for dropping the UCS group was described in 
the methods subsection above. That is, in principle, the UCS covers universal treatments 
without co-payment for all Thai nationals. Though in the dataset, there were records 
showing that some UCS patients made payment at the point of care, such payments were 
in essence an extra charge for non-treatment services, such as private rooms. 
Univariate analysis 
The Student's t test revealed that, for each visit, an insured migrant paid approximately 
2,426 Baht (US$ 74) less than an uninsured migrant (with statistical significance). 
Females paid slightly less than males. Having catastrophic illness denoted a higher 
charge incurred by a user compared to other illnesses. Proximity to the facility was 
another significant factor that reduced the charge for each visit. After 2013, OOP fell by 
around 281 Baht (US$ 9) (955 Baht from 1,236 Baht).  
All of these differences had statistical significance from both Student's t test and 
ANOVA test. Since the expenditure data are heavily skewed (as evidenced by a large 
standard deviation compared to the mean), the P-values from non-parametric tests, 
namely, Wilcoxon rank-sum test and Kruskal-Wallis test are presented in parallel, see 
Table 37. 
Table 37 Comparing IP OOP by personal attributes and insurance schemes 
Variable Mean OOP SD of OOP P-value  
(Student's t or 
ANOVA) 
P value  
(Wilcoxon rank-sum 
or Kruskal-Wallis) 
Insurance  
 Uninsured 
 HICS 
 
2,460.5 
34.2 
 
1,556.3 
101.8 
<0.001 <0.001 
Sex 
 Male 
 
1,299.7 
 
1,770.4 <0.001 <0.001 
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Variable Mean OOP SD of OOP P-value  
(Student's t or 
ANOVA) 
P value  
(Wilcoxon rank-sum 
or Kruskal-Wallis) 
 Female 1,049.8 1,510.9 
Illness 
 Non-catastrophic 
 Catastrophic 
 
1,101.8 
1,415.2 
 
1,545.2 
2,112.6 
0.001 0.133 
Domicile 
 Non-proximity 
 Proximity  
 
1,689.2 
1,316.6 
 
1,742.1 
1,638.4 
0.023 0.013 
Time 
 Pre-2013 
 Post-2013 
 
1,235.5 
954.8 
 
1,642.7 
1,509.6 
<0.001 <0.001 
Age group (years) 
 0-7 
 8-15 
 16-30 
 31-60 
 >60 
 
1,803.5 (62.3) 
2,194.5 (130.0) 
963.2 (35.0) 
905.2 (46.7) 
1,547 (258.8) 
 
1,559.6 
1,325.4 
1,522.6 
1,592.7 
2,053.8 
<0.001 <0.001 
 
Multivariate analysis 
In this step, the TPM with robust standard error was applied. It should be noted that 
since 30-Baht was a symbolic charge applied to all services, not a true charge for 
services used, the expected OOP here (dependent variable) was any amount paid beyond 
30 Baht. 
The TPM is composed of 2 parts: (1) probability of payment (beyond 30 Baht), analysed 
by Logit regression, and (2) amount paid for any visit where the payment exceeded 30 
Baht, analysed by GLM with log link. Results from both are combined to determine the 
final estimate.  
The results of the TPM are shown in Table 38. The HICS reduced both (1) likelihood of 
payment and (2) amount of payment once payment occurred. This is evidenced by a 
negative coefficient in both parts. The -7.6 coefficient implied that the odds of card 
holders of making payment were about 0.0005 times (an exponent of -7.6) as large as 
the odds for the uninsured. The -3.0 coefficient in the second part implied that, once 
payment occurred, the card holder paid about 5% of the payment made by the uninsured 
(5% came from an exponent of -3.0).  
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After combing both parts, the HICS significantly reduced OOP by around 2,471 Baht 
(US$ 75) per IP visit. In addition, OOP tended to decline by approximately 136 Baht 
after the year 2013.  
Other key variables that significantly contributed to an increase in OOP were history of 
catastrophic illness and advanced age. Note that the interaction terms disappeared after 
combining both parts as the mixture of two parts is based on the marginal effect. In the 
marginal effect analysis, the interaction term effect is already absorbed by the main 
variables used to construct the interaction term. 
Table 38 Multivariate analysis of IP OOP by the TPM  
 Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Part 1  
Insurance (v uninsured) -7.649 0.399 <0.001 -8.431 -6.866 
Catastrophic illness (v not having) -1.076 0.378 0.004 -1.817 -0.334 
Insurance##Catastrophic illness 1.496 0.835 0.073 -0.140 3.133 
Post-2013 (v pre-2013) -0.792 0.292 0.007 -1.364 -0.221 
Insurance##Post-2013 0.539 0.505 0.286 -0.451 1.530 
Female (v male) 0.782 0.344 0.023 0.109 1.456 
Age group (v <7 yr)      
 8-15 -0.539 0.643 0.402 -1.798 0.721 
 16-30 -0.850 0.368 0.021 -1.572 -0.128 
 31-60 -1.105 0.427 0.010 -1.941 -0.268 
 >60 -2.612 0.542 <0.001 -3.675 -1.549 
Proximity (v non-proximity)  -0.672 0.557 0.228 -1.765 0.420 
Constant 4.736 0.640 <0.001 3.481 5.990 
Part 2 
Insurance (v uninsured) -3.047 0.545 <0.001 -4.115 -1.980 
Catastrophic illness (v not having) 0.345 0.070 <0.001 0.209 0.482 
Insurance##Catastrophic illness -1.241 0.548 0.024 -2.315 -0.167 
Post-2013 (v pre-2013) -0.075 0.036 0.039 -0.146 -0.004 
Insurance##Post-2013 0.880 0.932 0.345 -0.947 2.707 
Female (v male) 0.016 0.043 0.711 -0.069 0.101 
Age group (v <7 yr)      
 8-15 0.121 0.062 0.050 0.000 0.242 
 16-30 0.336 0.044 <0.001 0.249 0.422 
 31-60 0.223 0.054 <0.001 0.117 0.329 
 >60 0.275 0.189 0.145 -0.095 0.644 
Proximity (v non-proximity)  -0.016 0.082 0.845 -0.177 0.145 
Constant 7.632 0.092 <0.001 7.452 7.813 
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 Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Both parts  
Insurance (v uninsured) -2470.710 45.185 <0.001 -2559.271 -2382.150 
Catastrophic illness (v not having) 425.963 126.616 0.001 177.800 674.126 
Post-2013 (v pre-2013) -136.234 48.277 0.005 -230.855 -41.613 
Female (v male) 60.860 58.909 0.302 -54.600 176.320 
Age group (v <7 yr)      
 8-15 124.222 77.126 0.107 -26.941 275.385 
 16-30 400.856 57.477 <0.001 288.203 513.508 
 31-60 224.493 70.437 0.001 86.439 362.546 
 >60 94.868 244.645 0.698 -384.628 574.364 
Proximity (v non-proximity)  -55.321 110.728 0.617 -272.344 161.702 
 
IV. Outpatient out-of-pocket payment 
Overview of the data 
The analysis of OP OOP was conducted in the same way as IP OOP. The dataset 
contains individual OP records from 2 subdistrict health centres, Kraburi hospital and 
Ranong hospital, starting from FY 2012 (FY 2011 data were dropped due to 
incompleteness). 
Uninsured patients had mean OP OOP of 420 Baht (US$ 13) with a median of 100 Baht 
(US$ 3). The median OOP of a UCS patient was zero whereas the median OOP of a 
HICS patient was 22 Baht (US$ 0.7), which is quite close to the 30-Baht fee incurred for 
each visit. This observation corresponded with the interviews in Chapter 6, which 
suggested that most healthcare providers perceived that the 30-Baht fee policy was 
repealed only in the UCS, but not in the HICS, see Table 39. 
Table 39 Summary of descriptive statistics of OP OOP per visit by insurance schemes 
Beneficiary N—visits Mean in Baht (SD) Median in Baht 
(IQR) 
Min-Max
Uninsured 59,648 420.2 (805.9) 100 (383) 0-24,130
HICS 96,695 22.2 (147.4) 30 (0) 0-16,000
UCS 962,240 18.6 (110.1) 0 (30) 0-5,619 
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While mean OOP of the HICS and the UCS patients remained stable, mean OOP of the 
uninsured continually declined. A possible explanation for this phenomenon was the 
introduction of an internal policy in Ranong province in 2011 that allowed uninsured 
patients to enjoy certain OP services without charge while the PPHO would subsidise 
this expenditure based on the fee schedule; see Figure 35. 
Figure 35 Mean OP OOP per visit by insurance schemes across years 
 
Univariate analysis 
From this point onward the analysis focuses on insurance card holders and uninsured 
migrants. Note that some independent variables were minimally changed from the IP 
OOP analysis. Since OP records do not have DRG coding, it is difficult to define the 
'catastrophic illness' variable in each OP visit, so the 'ACSC' variable was used instead. 
Another variable added in the analysis was 'Z group' (like in the analysis for OP 
utilisation). To simplify this change, a new indicator variable, called, 'principal 
diagnosis' was proposed. The variable was coded 1 for non-specific OP diagnosis, 2 for 
Z group diagnosis, and 3 for ACSC diagnosis. Also, the hospital variable was changed 
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from binary variable (0 for district hospital and 1 for provincial hospital) to indicator 
variable (coded 1 for health centre, 2 for district hospital, and 3 for provincial hospital). 
Table 40 shows that the uninsured seemed to have much higher OOP than insured 
migrants, by around 398 Baht (US$ 12) (420 Baht compared to 22 Baht). After 2013, 
OOP tended to decline by half. Z group diagnosis, having a visit at district hospital, and 
non-proximity to health facility appeared to be correlated with increasing OOP; but 
these points needed further investigation in the multivariate analysis.  
Table 40 Comparing OP OOP by personal attributes and insurance schemes 
Variable Mean OOP SD of OOP P-value  
(Student's t or 
ANOVA) 
P value  
(Wilcoxon rank-
sum or Kruskal-
Wallis) 
Insurance  
 Uninsured 
 HICS 
 
420.2 
22.2 
 
805.9 
147.4 
<0.001 <0.001 
Sex 
 Male 
 Female 
 
222.4 
135.9 
 
593.8 
502.7 
<0.001 <0.001 
Illness 
 Non-specific 
 Z group 
 ACSC 
 
144.4 
256.1 
93.7 
 
520.3 
620.0 
427.5 
<0.001 <0.001 
Facility level 
 Health centres 
 District hospital 
 Provincial hospital 
 
64.4 
677.6 
69.8 
 
130.2 
1,069.6 
251.9 
<0.001 <0.001 
Domicile 
 Non-proximity 
 Proximity  
 
671.0 
69.9 
 
1,055.2 
270.1 
<0.001 <0.001 
Time 
 Pre-2013 
 Post-2013 
 
222.0 
106.9 
 
633.4 
383.7 
<0.001 <0.001 
Age group (years) 
 0-7 
 8-15 
 16-30 
 31-60 
 >60 
 
158.5 
220.5 
220.0 
152.9 
108.8 
 
435.2 
473.5 
615.8 
537.7 
471.1 
<0.001 <0.001 
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Multivariate analysis 
Taking into account all covariates by the TPM, it appeared that insurance variable was 
the most important factor that significantly reduced OOP by about 293 Baht (US$ 9). 
Other covariates, despite having statistical significance due to a large data size, had a 
relatively trivial impact on OOP. For example, a visit with Z group was likely to have an 
approximately 18 Baht (US$ 0.5) lower OOP than a visit with other diagnoses. This 
proves that the internal policy of the PPHO that allowed all patients (both legal and 
illegal migrants) to enjoy free health promoting services (which were part of the Z 
group) at public health facilities was in effect in reality. A visit to a district hospital 
seemed to incur higher OOP than other facilities. A likely explanation for this 
observation might be that the residents in Kraburi district had better economic status 
than in Muang district, implying a higher ability to pay for patients at Kraburi hospital, 
see Table 41. 
Table 41 Multivariate analysis of OP OOP by the TPM  
 Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Part 1 
Insurance (v uninsured) -5.037 0.061 <0.001 -5.157 -4.917 
Disease level (v non-specific diseases)      
 Z group -0.823 0.036 <0.001 -0.894 -0.752 
 ACSC 0.652 0.051 <0.001 0.552 0.753 
Insurance##Disease level      
 HICS##Z group 0.863 0.087 <0.001 0.691 1.034 
 HICS##ACSC -0.012 0.115 0.916 -0.239 0.214 
Female (v male) -0.405 0.037 <0.001 -0.478 -0.333 
Post-2013 (v pre-2013) -0.497 0.043 <0.001 -0.581 -0.414 
HICS##Post-2013 1.141 0.085 <0.001 0.974 1.308 
Age group (v <7 yr)      
 8-15 0.921 0.074 <0.001 0.775 1.067 
 16-30 0.442 0.048 <0.001 0.348 0.537 
  31-60 0.682 0.054 <0.001 0.575 0.788 
 >60 0.484 0.099 <0.001 0.289 0.679 
Proximity (v non-proximity)  -0.602 0.055 <0.001 -0.710 -0.493 
Facility-level (v health centres)      
 District hospital -0.344 0.113 0.002 -0.566 -0.122 
 Provincial hospital -2.048 0.121 <0.001 -2.286 -1.811 
Constant 2.681 0.108 <0.001 2.469 2.893 
251 
 
 Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Part 2 
Insurance (v uninsured) -0.677 0.186 <0.001 -1.041 -0.313 
Disease level (v non-specific diseases)      
 Z group 0.029 0.025 0.241 -0.020 0.078 
 ACSC -0.292 0.039 <0.001 -0.370 -0.215 
Insurance##Disease level      
 HICS##Z group 0.423 0.116 <0.001 0.196 0.650 
 HICS##ACSC 0.573 0.137 <0.001 0.304 0.842 
Female (v male) -0.091 0.025 <0.001 -0.140 -0.042 
Post-2013 (v pre-2013) -0.192 0.031 <0.001 -0.253 -0.131 
HICS##Post-2013 0.174 0.130 0.180 -0.080 0.428 
Age group (v <7 yr)      
 8-15 0.179 0.046 <0.001 0.088 0.270 
 16-30 0.576 0.032 <0.001 0.512 0.639 
 31-60 0.627 0.035 <0.001 0.558 0.696 
 >60 0.804 0.090 <0.001 0.627 0.981 
Proximity (v non-proximity)  -0.450 0.049 <0.001 -0.546 -0.354 
Facility-level (v health centres)      
 District hospital 1.667 0.050 <0.001 1.570 1.764 
 Provincial hospital 0.841 0.058 <0.001 0.727 0.955 
Constant 4.995 0.050 <0.001 4.897 5.094 
Both parts  
Insurance (v uninsured) -293.489 6.026 <0.001 -305.300 -281.677 
Disease level (v non-specific diseases)      
 Z group -18.274 4.168 <0.001 -26.444 -10.105 
 ACSC -22.301 5.838 <0.001 -33.743 -10.859 
Female (v male) -30.104 4.191 <0.001 -38.317 -21.891 
Post-2013 (v pre-2013) -37.670 4.330 <0.001 -46.156 -29.184 
Age group (v <7 yr)      
 8-15 42.301 5.818 <0.001 30.897 53.704 
 16-30 86.353 3.994 <0.001 78.525 94.181 
 31-60 105.692 5.352 <0.001 95.202 116.182 
 >60 132.951 19.697 <0.001 94.345 171.557 
Proximity (v non-proximity)  -95.033 8.555 <0.001 -111.801 -78.265 
Facility-level (v health centres)      
 District hospital 236.955 9.064 <0.001 219.191 254.720 
 Provincial hospital 14.938 4.110 <0.001 6.883 22.992 
 
In summary, the HICS helped reduce IP OOP and OP OOP by 2,471 Baht (US$ 75) and 
293 Baht (US$ 9) respectively, and OOP appeared to decrease over time, particularly 
after the change in the HICS benefit package in 2013. 
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7.4 Discussion 
This chapter has shed light on the outcome of the HICS in terms of utilisation and OOP 
of the service users at public facilities in Ranong province. The results from earlier 
chapters also helped explain the quantitative findings in this chapter, such as why the 
median payment of HICS patients at point of care was about 30 Baht, or certain disease 
variables did not have much impact on OOP even in the uninsured (because of the 
internal policy of the PPHO that removed user fees for certain services). Overall, there 
were two important findings from the above analysis, as follows.   
I. Low utilisation rate of insured migrants compared to Thais 
The first key finding was the utilisation rates of the HICS and the uninsured were much 
lower than for the UCS, particularly for OP care and for the services provided at the 
provincial hospital. There are some possible explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, 
IP diseases are normally more severe than OP diseases and migrant patients tended to 
present only when they were severely ill. This discovery was consistent with an earlier 
domestic study by Srithamrongsawat et al (2009), suggesting that the HICS utilisation 
rate was about threefold smaller than that of the UCS in OP services but this difference 
was only 1.5-to-2 times smaller in IP services. Some international literature also 
supports this observation (de Graaff and Francke, 2009, Shanmugasundaram and 
O'Connor, 2009). In one respect, this reflects that the utilisation rate of migrant patients 
has not been much improved in the last decade, despite a large number of migrant 
policies launched by previous governments.  
Secondly, the difference in utilisation rates between UCS and HICS patients was more 
pronounced in Muang district, while in Kraburi district this difference was less obvious. 
This might be because migrants in Kraburi district tended to have better support from 
peers and employers than those in Muang district to help them access health services 
(and this was confirmed by Chapter 6). Besides, Kraburi migrants appeared to have 
more favourable economic status relative to Muang migrants. This implies a better 
ability to pay for services as well as other expenses, including travelling cost.  
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Another likely explanation for the higher utilisation rate in Kraburi migrants is that most 
migrants in Kraburi district were agricultural workers whereas most migrants in Muang 
district were fishery workers (see more detail in the background section of this chapter 
and the life story of some migrant interviewees in Appendix 11). Most fishery workers 
spent most of their time offshore, rendering difficulty in accessing services.  
However, these were just some impressions from the fieldwork and it was difficult to 
assess the validity of these explanations in depth since the study lacked data of migrants 
who did not show up at health facilities. 
Lastly, the lower utilisation rate of migrants might be due to the 'healthy migrant effect', 
which suggests that migrants are likely to have better health status than their native 
counterparts (Thomson et al., 2013, Fennelly, 2007, Hesketh et al., 2008). However, the 
researcher argues that this assumption might not be a strong explanation in this setting 
because both insured and uninsured migrants still used services less than UCS insured 
people, despite controlling for age and disease status.              
II. Disease status—The strongest determinant of frequency of 
visits 
The second key finding was that disease status played an important role in determining 
the number of visits and this factor significantly interacted with the insurance variable. 
Initially, this point was not the researcher's main research question, but after the findings 
came out, the researcher found that there were some points worth discussing, as follows.   
Firstly, though the finding which suggested that patients with severe diseases tended to 
have more visits that those with milder diseases was intuitive, there appeared an 
interesting point. That is, disease effect was even larger than insurance status per se. 
This discovery more or less contradicted the perception of healthcare providers that 
insured migrants were exploiting the system. If the insurance really makes migrants 
make unnecessary use of services, a large coefficient of the insurance variable should 
appear. This is because the coefficient of the insurance variable reflects the effect of the 
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insurance per se on utilisation volume in the absence of severe illness and because the 
effect of severe illness is already captured by the catastrophic illness variable. Secondly, 
the interaction terms between disease status and insurance status contributed to a 
positive impact on service frequencies, and such an impact was larger than the insurance 
effect alone. This tacitly suggested that the effect of the card became more pronounced 
amongst the sick persons. Thirdly, interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between disease status and the UCS, and the UCS coefficient alone, were markedly 
greater than the coefficients appearing in the HICS. This denotes that if there are 
patients taking advantage of the health system, this account appears not only in migrants 
but also in the Thai UCS beneficiaries, and even to a greater degree in the latter.  
Thus the concerns expressed by interviewees in Chapter 6 (that migrants were overly 
taking advantage of the Thai healthcare system) might be due to a biased perception that 
migrants were the major cause of increasing burdens on a facility. However, the above 
arguments are just suggestive evidence. Unless data on non-users are acquired, it is 
difficult to assess this point more thoroughly. 
The positive coefficient of the HICS variable suggested that the HICS at least met its 
objective in boosting the number of visits from a vulnerable population (albeit to a small 
extent). Besides, from a public health perspective, the HICS did not aim to generate 
profit from the beneficiaries (as with voluntary insurance) but it appeared that some 
interviewees had applied the voluntary insurance concept into the HICS (such as an 
internal policy of some facilities that prohibited unhealthy migrants from buying the 
insurance). 
From a methodological point of view, the advantages of this study over earlier research 
migrant health in Thailand are as follows. Firstly, this research used facility-based 
individual data, which enabled the researcher to access the information of uninsured 
patients. Secondly, facility-based data had a large number of records. In the econometric 
sense, a large data size means a more consistent estimate is likely to be produced. 
Lastly, this study incorporated individual-level covariates into the analysis, which 
helped reduce the risk of information biases substantially.  
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Nonetheless, it still encountered some limitations. The primary concern is the lack of 
generalisability of the findings. This is because the data were retrieved from facilities, 
not from households. As a result, information on those who had never attended the 
facilities was not obtained. Secondly, the researcher could not track information on the 
same individual across facilities because of the problem of access to the 13-digit ID. 
Understandably, hospital staff refused to share the 13-digit ID of all individuals with the 
researcher for fear of violating patient confidentiality. The researcher addressed this 
problem by using hospital number instead of the 13-digit ID, and adding the domicile 
variable to address the effect of residential location. Thirdly, there is an issue of data 
cleanliness. The researcher noticed several errors in data recording, which is 
understandable since the facility need not submit HICS and uninsured utilisation records 
to the central authorities for reimbursement. All of these concerns are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 8. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The main benefits of the HICS policy can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the HICS 
tended to boost utilisation of health services for its insurees. Secondly, it helped 
alleviate the financial burden on insurees at point of care. HICS beneficiaries were likely 
to have 1.7% more visits than the uninsured for IP treatment, and 9.9% more visits for 
OP treatment, after adjusting for the effect of potential confounders. Payment defrayed 
by the insured migrants at point of care was about 2,471 Baht (US$ 75) and 293 Baht 
(US$ 9) less than that incurred by the uninsured for each IP and OP visit respectively. 
Broadly, the OP and IP utilisation rates of both insured and uninsured migrants were 
still lower than for UCS insurees, particularly for services provided at the provincial 
hospital. Disease status was a strong influence that positively determined the volume of 
visits. The interaction between catastrophic illness history and insurance status also had 
positive influence on utilisation number, and this effect was even larger than the 
insurance effect alone. This phenomenon suggests that the effect of the HICS is more 
apparent in severely-ill patients. 
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Section	4:	Discussion	and	conclusion		
The following section is the final part of this thesis, consisting of two chapters: Chapter 
8 and Chapter 9. The first three objectives were addressed in Chapter 5 (to explore the 
evolution of migrant health policies in Thailand), 6 (to investigate the responses of all 
relevant stakeholders towards the current migrant insurance policy), and 7 (to analyse 
the outcome of the current migrant insurance policy in terms of utilisation and out-of-
pocket payment) respectively. Before coming up with the last objective (Chapter 9), the 
key findings from the previous chapters (Chapter 5-7) are discussed to extract higher 
constructs/concepts (Chapter 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257 
 
Chapter 8: Discussion of the thesis' findings and 
methods 
This chapter is divided into five main topics: (1) summary of the findings and link with 
research framework, (2) discussion of the overarching themes, (3) enhancement of 
theoretical framework for understanding the enrolment of migrants in public health 
insurance and the insurance effects on use of services, (4) methodological discussion, 
and (5) conclusion. The key findings/themes appeared in earlier chapters, and were 
analysed together by thematic analysis. As suggested by Graneheim and Lundman 
(2004), thematic analysis is a method for extracting the crosscutting contents/themes or 
higher constructs from the original findings.  
8.1 Summary of the findings and link with research 
framework 
The key findings of all objectives were mapped to the earlier research framework 
presented in Chapter 4, see Figure 36. In Chapter 5 (objective 1), it appeared that the 
HICS was formulated amidst the dynamics and the interaction between three key 
political angles, namely, national security, economic necessity, and public health 
concerns. In Chapter 6 (objective 2), it was found that local implementers and service 
users adapted their routines towards the HICS policy in various ways, and often re-
interpreted the policy in a way that maximised their benefit and most fitted with the 
local context. All these challenges were coupled with an unclear policy message, 
ineffective intersectoral cooperation, and the involvement of private intermediaries in 
the registration process for migrants. In Chapter 7 (objective 3), analysis of the facility-
based data revealed that the overall utilisation rate of migrants was still less than the 
Thai UCS beneficiaries; and the HICS had a small but statistically significant positive 
impact on utilisation volume, though it significantly helped reduce OOP for insured 
migrants, relative to the uninsured.  
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Figure 36 Mapping the research findings with the research framework  
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In the earlier part of the thesis, the researcher drew important themes/concepts from the 
fieldwork and presented them in the discussion part of each chapter. In Chapter 5, there 
emerged two critical themes: (1) Instability of Thailand's migrant policies, and (2) De 
facto powerlessness of the health sector.  
In Chapter 6, three important themes, namely, (1) Adaptive behaviour of all sectors, (2) 
Gaps and dissonance in policy objectives, and (3) Economic implications of being legal, 
were identified; and in Chapter 7, there were two key messages: (1) Lower utilisation 
rate of insured migrants relative to Thai UCS beneficiaries, and (2) Disease status, not 
insurance status, as the most influential factor determining the volume of visits. 
To this end, thematic analysis was applied. The crosscutting themes appearing in the 
results chapters then served as condensed meaning units/contents. Similar codes across 
results chapters were grouped together to construct the overarching concepts/themes 
which encompassed all results chapters (in other words, the analysis built on those in all 
the results chapters). Parts of the results from the literature review chapter and additional 
references which were related to these themes were discussed as well. 
As depicted in Figure 37, four overarching concepts/themes were identified, namely, (1) 
'Incoherence of migrant policies—from agenda setting to implementation', (2) 'The 
MOPH—huge responsibility but inadequate capacity', (3) 'Vicious cycle of registration 
process', and (4) 'Migrants are exploiting the Thai healthcare system—Fact or fiction?'. 
It is worth noting that these themes were not mutually exclusive, as in fact, they all 
interrelated. A detailed description of each theme and its linkage between each other is 
presented in the following subsections.  
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Figure 37 Overarching themes synthesised from all chapters 
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8.2 Discussion of the overarching themes 
I. Incoherence of migrant policies—From agenda setting to 
implementation (overarching theme 1) 
It was clear that the implementation of migrant policies in Thailand has faced many 
operational difficulties. The root cause of the problem stemmed firstly from unclear 
policy messages and poor coordination between ministries, and secondly from the 
different authorities’ ground concepts and policy directions towards non-Thai 
populations, which were sensitive to the political atmosphere at a particular time.  
Though this thesis focused on policy implementation, some of the results were related to 
the upstream process of the policy. The discussion in this topic thus expanded to the 
beginning steps of the policy process, namely, policy formulation and agenda setting, 
and it appeared that the chaotic management happened at all stages in policy process.  
Agenda setting 
A very basic problem in agenda setting is a confusion in 'wording', used to define who is 
Thai and who is not. As explained in Chapter 5, the word, 'alien' (tang dao in Thai) was 
formally used in the laws to refer to a 'non-Thai national' (Thai Immigration Bureau, 
2004). By this definition, an 'alien' could be either a national of any country but 
Thailand, or a person who had not been registered as a national of any country. Yet, in 
reality, the legal terms were always confused with the lay language. In lay Thai, 'tang 
dao' usually meant a group of migrant workers and dependants from LMICs, while 
people from developed countries were often called 'tang chad', or 'foreigners' in English. 
Interestingly, many authorities, including the MOPH, did not show much effort in 
unpacking this confusion. Similarly, a number of official documents seemed not to be 
heedful of the words used.  
Moreover, when communicating with the local facilities, the MOPH almost always 
employed the word, 'migrant' in English, in lieu of 'tang dao' in Thai. One of the most 
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confusing examples occurred in 2014, where the MOPH issued a letter to PPHOs in the 
northeastern region of Thailand, instructing the PPHOs not to sell the health card to 
'Caucasian migrants' who visited a facility with the aim of buying the card. The term, 
'farang' (which is a lay Thai term, meaning 'Caucasian migrants'), was used in the 
MOPH's official letter. The text appearing in the letter contradicted the earlier 
announcement of the MOPH in 2013, which informed the wider public that now the 
insurance card was available to all 'tang dao' populations (or aliens or all non-Thais). To 
further confuse this issue, the English title of the card used the term 'foreigner' (Bureau 
of Health Administration, 2015, Bureau of Policy and Strategy, 2012, Health Insurance 
Group, 2013).  
One might argue that the problem above was just an inconsistency of language. 
However, some academics contended that it was the beginning of many problems. One 
of the interviewees (PM06) encouraged all authorities to utilise the term 'alien' in their 
routine practice. She highlighted that though the term 'alien' might sound unfriendly, it 
better reflected the nationality status problem of a person. Rattanamaee (2009) flagged 
that many words used to define the citizenship status of a person did not always reflect 
the 'truth' of the person's background. For example, there were a number of people who 
were believed to have Thai nationality but for some reason failed to be recognised by 
the officials as Thai nationals, whom Rattanamaee (2009) called 'artificial aliens'.               
This point reflected an ongoing debate in the international literature as well. Koutonin 
(2015) highlighted that there were still discriminatory words used to refer to an 
immigrant. He exemplified that the word, 'immigrant', was often set aside for 'inferior' 
races such as Asian and African immigrants, whereas the word 'expatriate' was often 
reserved for Caucasian people.  
This problem became more complex if focusing on a person crossing a border without a 
valid travel document. The IOM (2011) suggested that the term, 'irregular migrant', 
should be used to refer to a person crossing the border without permission, and 
highlighted that the term, 'illegal migrant', should be reserved for cases of smuggled 
migrants and trafficked persons. Vargas (2012) pointed out that the term 'illegal migrant' 
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was dehumanising and legally inaccurate, since living in a destination country without 
proper documents was a civil offense, not a criminal (illegal) act. Recent literature, 
especially from the US and Central America, often uses the term 'undocumented 
migrants’ instead, as presented in many articles in Chapter 2, such as Goldabe and 
Okuyemi (2012), Heyman et al (2009), Walter et al (2002). 
Returning to the Thai setting, it seemed that there had not been a consensus amongst 
authorities on 'whom we are talking to'. Each authority had its own focus and an 
integration of work between authorities was lacking. The lack of coordination 
engendered a number of problems, starting from the very basic question of how many 
non-Thai populations were residing in the country. This question was always a touchy 
issue in the Thai politics. The logics and means for collecting population data were 
diverse across authorities, and this in turn hindered the progress of further research on 
migrant policies and effective policy planning.  
The MOI's function mostly concerned migrants and people with citizenship problems 
who have (either permanent or temporary) residence in the country through the issuance 
of the residence permit (so-called, Tor Ror) and the 13-digit ID. The MOL limited its 
role to work permit issuance. The only prerequisites for applying for a work permit were 
a legitimate residence permit, name and address of the employer, and medical certificate 
proving of the absence of certain communicable diseases. 
Interestingly, having health insurance was not a precondition for obtaining a work 
permit, but having a work permit was one of the important conditions in buying the 
insurance card (though in practice, one might argue that the system of purchasing the 
insurance card was open to everybody regardless of work permit status, this was subject 
to the decision of individual hospitals’ administrative staff).  
Another problem in the agenda setting in migrant policies was the expected role of the 
MOPH. It raises the question of in which way the MOPH should function to better 
protect health and well-being of all populations in Thailand, beyond acting just as the 
insurance card seller. 
264 
 
It is arguable that there is nothing wrong with the MOPH as insurance-seller, since the 
most vital role of the MOPH is just providing services to a patient. However, the 
researcher argues that if the MOPH aims to cover 'all populations on the Thai soil', as 
appeared in its strategy (Bureau of Policy and Strategy, 2012), such a goal cannot be 
reached while the MOPH overlooks the inability of the current information system to 
track records of its potential beneficiaries. The information system for migrants had 
some points that were of more important concern than similar issues for Thai nationals, 
as detailed below.  
For Thai citizens, a person was by law insured by the UCS from birth, unless he/she was 
covered by one of the other two public insurance schemes (ie the SSS and the CSMBS). 
This implied that being insured by the UCS is independent from employment status. The 
NHSO could know whom the NHSO must cover by tracking the 13-digit ID of a person 
from the MOI data. Furthermore, the important aspect of the 13-digit ID for a Thai 
national was that it served as a time-independent unique identifier of a person. This 
practice meant that the UCS knew who its target beneficiaries were at all times.   
Unlike the NHSO, the MOPH had no information unit that linked the MOPH patient 
data with the MOI data. This was because, after the NHSO was established, the 
expected role of the MOPH was as the 'regulator' not the 'purchaser' of the healthcare 
system, and the MOPH did not prepare itself well enough for the insurance management 
task. This point was also associated with the inadequate capacity of the MOPH as 
expounded in overarching theme 2. 
In addition, even if the MOPH had all the 13-digit individual data from the MOI, it 
might not be certain that the MOPH would know who was or was not its insuree, for 
four key reasons.  
Firstly, the 13-digit code did not specify the nationality of a person; an official might 
only know from the 13-digit ID that a person is not a Thai national. To know the 
nationality of a person, an official must check the legitimate residence permit paper.  
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Secondly, the 13-digit ID for cross-border migrants was not necessarily constant over 
time. The 13-digit ID starting with '00' only meant that an illegal immigrant had already 
registered with the MOI and was awaiting the NV process. Upon the completion of the 
NV, the registered person would acquire a temporary passport, which applied a different 
coding system. Moreover, the passport ID was subject to change once the document 
expires and the new one is issued.  
Thirdly, if the MOPH used another approach by linking with the MOL data (given 
perfect cooperation), it might be possible to target all migrants with a work permit 
(which might meet the policy intention of the current government) but dependants of 
migrants, including those of working age, might be left behind. 
Lastly, assuming that the MOPH was able to identify, and to know the profile of, 'all' 
people in the country, it did not guarantee that all migrants would be insured as long as 
the HICS still exercised a premium-based system. This was because, to be insured, a 
migrant needed to show up at a health facility (or the designated location) and express 
his/her intention to buy the card to the hospital staff. 
So far, there had been no serious discussion of the above points, and, most of the time, 
the MOPH was criticised for a lack of accurate information on migrant populations. 
Though in practice the local providers, particularly at the health centre level, had very 
useful information about the whereabouts and profiles of all inhabitants in their 
responsible areas (the data were stored in the family folder format; the researcher also 
used this information to approach the interviewees with precarious legal status), 
unfortunately, such information was not routinely submitted to, and not used by, the 
MOPH for the planning of migrant policies.  
To sum up, starting from the policy agenda setting, it was still unclear who on Thai soil 
the Thai government aimed to cover. Each authority had its own agenda, which at times 
competed with each other (tension between state security, economic needs, and health 
protection). With the ambiguity in the policy objective, it was not surprising that a 
fuzziness in policy formulation and implementation always persisted.  
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Policy formulation 
Since migrant policies at the national level had never been made clear, many policies 
formulated thereafter seemed not to be successful in tackling deep-rooted migrant 
problems. Almost all migrant policies mentioned in this study (for instance, the '00' 
card, the health insurance card, the NV registration, and even the OSS policy) were 
interim measures to address problems of illegal migration, but it seemed that the 
government utilised these measures without adequately addressing the competing 
interests between authorities.  
The above point was evidenced by several rounds of registration periods in the last 
decade. The key problem lied in obsolete laws and regulations that could not keep pace 
with the change in human migration. For instance, so far it was not clear how the 
government should deal with illegal migrants who joined the NV process but finally 
failed to prove their nationality. In other words, those migrants were de facto stateless 
persons. Though the Thai government endorsed the National Strategy to Address Rights 
and Citizenship Problems of a Person in 2005, in practice the registration of stateless 
people was closed in 2009, and its focus was limited to those with permanent residence 
in Thailand (Ngamurulert et al., 2009). This gap implied that any new stateless persons 
appearing (after 2009) were excluded and therefore totally undocumented. Furthermore, 
the exact number of registered migrants who became undocumented after failing the NV 
was still in question (Napaumporn, 2012).   
Another instance of outdated laws which were still in effect was the Working of Alien 
Act that prohibited migrants from being engaged in certain jobs (negative occupation 
list), including manual labour. Dejsakulrit (2014) suggested that the negative occupation 
list should be renounced, as it did not match the opening of the ASEAN Community 
where the labour market was expected to be more open, and in practice, this regulation 
was poorly enforced. Previous governments attempted to resolve the low-skilled labour 
shortage by endorsing the bilateral MOU in order to recruit legal low-skilled workers 
from neighbouring countries and by introducing the MOL Decree to allow these 
migrants to engage in certain jobs, namely, manual labour and household maids. This 
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approach was in essence the MOL's tactic to get around the negative occupation list as 
specified in the Act. However, such an approach experienced some difficulties. For 
instance, recruitment through the MOU was extremely expensive and cumbersome due 
to red tape and the intervention of private intermediaries. Additionally, it created 
conflict between the MOU and the MOPH in terms of hiring migrant health workers. 
While many health facilities wished to hire migrant workers as health assistants (and 
most of these migrants were ex-illegal immigrants), the MOL argued that hiring 
migrants as health workers was invalid because the MOL regarded health work as 
highly skilled. This meant that to recruit migrant health workers in a legally correct 
manner (according to the MOL interpretation), a public facility (as an employer) was 
required to follow recruitment processes in the same way as a private company hiring 
high-skilled foreign workers. Interestingly, in the fieldwork, none of the facilities in 
Ranong province recruited migrant health workers via such channels.   
The challenges did not lie only in the policy content, but also in the policy formulation 
process. The history revealed that almost no migrant policies in Thailand were 
formulated through a 'rational model' where all migrant-related problems were 
discussed, and where all policy options were considered with ample evidence to support 
decision making (Walt, 1994). It was quite obvious the past and existing governments 
did not really aim to unpack the structural problems of the policies. Oftentimes, policies 
were quickly generated because of pressures from civil groups, and from international 
and domestic political conflicts. A very distinct instance was the instigation of the OSS 
policy as a response to the Tier 3 trafficking report and the exodus of Cambodian 
migrants right after the coup d'état.  
A change of migrant policies as a response to external factors was not uncommon in 
international politics. The European refugee crisis since 2014 was another interesting 
example. In 2015, amongst other EU nations, Germany accepted a large number of new 
asylum applicants (more than 476,000). Peston (2015) suggested that the generosity of 
Germany was not solely derived from its intrinsic intention to aid refugees who fled the 
religious conflict. It was also a response to Germany’s reverse-triangle demographics as 
the dependency ratio (percentage of those aged above 65 to those aged between 15 and 
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64) in Germany was projected to be 59% by 2060. Aside from economic reasons, 
Bershindsky (2015) reported that refugees and asylum seekers were accepted because 
Germany was keenly aware of its leadership role in the EU; thus international politics 
forced Germany to 'at least do something' to alleviate the refugee crisis. 
The policy formulating process seemed to be more sensitive to the nationalist views and 
economic demands more than to the health sector (either in a positive or negative way). 
The emergence of the OSS was one example of this, as the OSS was basically initiated 
by the security sector, not the health sector. In addition, the nationalist idea was 
prevalent not only in Thailand, but throughout Southeast Asia. During the recent 
Rohingya maritime movement in the Andaman Sea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia 
all denied Rohingya boats permission to land on their soil, creating a situation which the 
media called the 'human ping-pong' crisis (McKirdy and Mohsin, 2015).  
Sornbalang (2012) suggested that the nationalist mind-set in Thai society stemmed 
primarily from the longstanding social discourse (though media and school curriculum), 
claiming that migrants, particularly the Burmese, were the state’s security threat. 
Though there were a number of amendments to immigration and nationality laws, such 
amendments had not adequately changed the nationalist mind-set. This point was 
supported by Leichter (1979) suggesting that cultural values of the society almost 
always affected how public policy was formulated and implemented. 
Muntharbhorn (2013) pointed out that Section 7bis of the current Nationality Act should 
be amended to meet the international human rights standard, since this regulation clearly 
contradicted the principle of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Children, which 
Thailand was party to (see Section 7bis of the Nationality Act in Appendix 10). 
Currently, Section 7bis indicated that a child born in Thailand to undocumented/illegal 
immigrants, or immigrants who were not granted permanent residence in Thailand, 
would be regarded as an undocumented/illegal immigrant from birth. 
Robertson (2010) also observed that while the demand for migrant labour was soaring, 
and there were many new regulations from the MOL to facilitate the recruitment of 
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migrant workers, promotion of the rights of workers was still neglected. This was 
evidenced by the Section 88 of the Labour Relations Act (1975) that limited the rights to 
set up and belong to a trade union to those with Thai nationality. Saisoonthorn (2015) 
mentioned that, regardless of the politics behind the launch of 365-Baht card for a child, 
the 365-Baht card policy was, in practice, the first time that humanitarian motives took 
priority over nationalist and economic perspectives.        
Interestingly, whenever Thailand was blamed for its sluggishness in warding off 
trafficking, the Thai government always flagged the toppling down of trafficking 
syndicates and unscrupulous officialdom as a yardstick of its success.  It rarely pointed 
to revising obsolete laws/regulations and promoting the health and well-being of the at-
risk population, which included not only trafficked victims but also all 
undocumented/illegal migrants and dependants. In essence, as long as the humanitarian 
point of view was not given equal importance to national security and economic 
perspectives, it might not be justifiable for the government to say that the country had 
done its best in combating trafficking and humanitarian disasters (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2011). 
Policy implementation 
As elaborated in Chapter 6, there are a number of implementation gaps in the HICS 
policy. However, the term 'gaps' might not be appropriate here, as the policy objectives 
and goals were too vague to identify the gaps. The implementation challenges presented 
in this study could be explained by both top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
Using a top-down approach, Schofield (2001) concluded that the implementation failure 
of a policy originated from various factors, such as (1) unclear policy messages, (2) 
insufficient resources, (3) opposition within the policy community, and (4) unfavourable 
socioeconomic conditions. All of these points appeared in the fieldwork findings. For 
example, in the matter of unclear policy message, there was a problem with differences 
in interpretation of 'dependants', between the MOL and the MOPH. The MOL construed 
that migrants' dependants were children under the age of 15, who were not eligible to 
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acquire a work permit. In contrast, the MOPH imposed a cut-off age at 7. This tacitly 
created a gap for a migrant child aged between 8 and 15 since he/she was not eligible to 
apply for a work permit. Besides, suppose health staff were relaxed enough and allowed 
that migrant child to buy the insurance, his/her parent would need buy the card at the 
adult price.  
Regarding insufficiency of resources, there were concerns over budget constraints for 
hiring bilingual staff. As a result, the PPHO of Ranong province asked for support from 
local NGOs to help mobilise resources for hiring interpreters at the health centres. 
However, there was a question about the sustainability of this programme because the 
support from NGOs was fading away.   
The poor compliance of implementers was observed in contradictory practices of the 
PPHO and some of its affiliated health facilities. While the PPHO encouraged all 
facilities to sell the insurance card to as many migrants as possible, some health 
facilities contested the PPHO message by creating an extra rule, not to sell the card to 
unhealthy migrants.  
Concerning unfavourable economic conditions, it is obvious that while the junta 
launched a strong policy message that all migrants in Thailand needed to register with 
the government, not all migrants took part in the registration process. This is evidenced 
by the three from the ten migrant interviewees in Chapter 6 who neither joined the OSS 
registration nor bought the insurance card. From their perspective, the most common 
obstacle to participation in the OSS was the cost of registration, particularly for those 
without adequate support from peers and employers.  
From a different angle, studies from the bottom-up perspective shifted the attention to 
the contextual variables at the bottom. One of the most influential studies regarding the 
bottom-up analytical perspective was the Street-Level Bureaucracy theory (known as the 
SLB theory), by Lipsky (1980) (see Chapter 3 for more detail). Lipsky (1980) proposed 
that the street-level bureaucrats such as frontline social workers, teachers, and healthcare 
officers had some level of discretion which enabled them to reshape policy for their own 
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ends. This proposal is supported by some recent research, for example, the study by 
Walker and Gilson (2004), presenting the perceptions of primary care nurses towards 
the user-fee removal policy in South Africa. They reported that primary care nurses in 
South Africa were reluctant to grant free services to certain patient groups since they 
considered that many patients were abusing the free care system, and such perceptions 
were reinforced by the heavy workload and the unavailability of essential medicine at 
primary healthcare clinics. Lipsky (1980) also highlighted that there were some common 
routines/strategies that street-level bureaucrats often employed to maximise control over 
their work environment. These routines were at times contrary to the central policy. 
Common strategies identified in the SLB theory were (1) rationing services (worker 
bias), (2) controlling clients and reducing the consequence of uncertainty, (3) 
husbanding worker resources, and (4) managing the consequences of routine practice. 
These points were reinforced by the fieldwork findings, as presented in Table 42, which 
maps the actual findings against some elements of the SLB theory.  
Table 42 Matching the fieldwork findings with the proposal in the SLB theory  
Coping strategy Expositions in the theory Examples from the fieldwork
Rationing services 
(worker bias) 
Street-level bureaucrats often 
respond to general orientations 
towards clients' worthiness. For 
instance, policemen made decisions 
on the basis of whether or not the 
suspects displayed respect to the 
police.  
Healthcare providers perceived that 
only healthy migrant workers were 
eligible to buy the card even 
though the regulation of the MOPH 
still opened room to sell the card to 
non-worker migrants. 
Controlling clients 
and reducing the 
consequence of 
uncertainty 
Street-level bureaucrats usually 
require clients to appear for 
services, rather than had workers 
go to clients. This was not merely a 
matter of economic efficiency. 
Workers often faced physical and 
psychological threats when they 
left their silo. Interactions with 
clients were structured so that the 
officers could control their content, 
timing, and pace and this helped 
them avoid uncertainty in routines.    
The insurance policy always 
required migrants and employers to 
show up at the facilities rather than 
proactively selling the card. Some 
healthcare interviewees expressed 
that they were reluctant to sell the 
card to migrants who failed to join 
the OSS for fear that such practice 
might undermine their work 
security if there was an allegation 
that they were acting against the 
junta's direction.  
Husbanding worker 
resources 
Street-level bureaucrats often 
claimed that they needed to 
conserve their resources as they 
were subject to meet unpredictable 
The health provider interviewees 
claimed that barring sick migrants 
from buying the insurance card was 
a useful measure to 
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Coping strategy Expositions in the theory Examples from the fieldwork
surge in demands. Too-heavy 
workload and too-burdensome 
responsibilities were common 
arguments that officers used to 
justify their act of protecting the 
resources.   
protect/conserve the hospital's 
revenue. They also argued that this 
revenue was conserved to cover the 
arrears from providing care to 
uninsured migrants. Besides, the 
card revenue was unpredictable 
since there was a possibility that 
the registration policy might be 
changed in the future.      
Managing the 
consequence of 
routine practice 
Street-level bureaucrats tended to 
protect their routines by referring 
difficult cases to other people. This 
practice at times was done not 
because the problem cases defied 
workers' abilities, but because they 
interfered with the workers' 
routines.  
The health staff interviewees, 
working in the hospital where there 
was a regulation blocking sick 
migrants from buying the 
insurance, mentioned that they 
might advise the problem cases 
(sick migrants) to buy the card at 
other facilities where the card-
selling policy was more relaxed.  
 
Another striking instance of this theme is that the central authorities, the MOPH for 
instance, appeared to be insensitive to the adaptation of policies in the field. This might 
be because, most of the time, the central policy was designed as a one-size-fits-all 
measure. Without sufficient awareness of the differences of migrant population 
characteristics between provinces, it was not surprising that almost all previous migrant 
policies encountered many hurdles in implementation, in turn leading to more 
adaptations and deviation from initial policy goals.  
One might claim (as raised by one of the interviewees, PM01, in Chapter 5) that it was 
the intention of the MOPH to provide room for local providers to adapt the migrant 
insurance policy to fit the local context. This idea was supported by the fact that the 
HICS financing was designed differently from the UCS. The largest proportion of the 
card revenue was pooled at the individual hospital, while the UCS budget was mainly 
pooled at the NHSO, as the only pooling agency at the national level. However, it was 
arguable that the extent to which a local facility was permitted to adapt the policy was 
unclear. As presented in Chapter 6, some facilities regarded that barring seemingly sick 
migrants, whom doctors considered not fit for work (despite those migrants passing the 
health check for communicable diseases), from buying the card was acceptable, whereas 
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the officers at the central level opined that such adaptation in policy was against the 
MOPH intention.  
When conflicts between local practice and central policy took place, a lack of effective 
monitoring and evaluation from the MOPH meant the only concrete means available to 
local officers to solve the problems was to issue a consult letter to the MOPH on a case-
by-case basis. Though such practice was not totally wrong, it was not sensitive enough 
to tackle implementation problems in a timely manner. This raised an important concern 
over the sustainability of the policy, and one might expect more problems in the near 
future due to increased border permeability in the ASEAN Community and the resulting 
influx of diverse groups of migrants into Thailand. 
II. The MOPH—Huge responsibility with inadequate capacity 
(overarching theme 2) 
Thailand had extensive experience in expanding health insurance coverage in the last 
four decades. In the early 1970s, user fees were recognised as an important cause of 
household impoverishment. A policy waiving user fees, namely, the Low Income Card 
Scheme (LICS), was introduced in 1975, targeting poor households. In 1984 coverage 
was expanded to the informal sector through a community-based health insurance 
scheme, financed by voluntary household contributions. The schemes gradually evolved 
into the publicly subsidised voluntary health card scheme (VHCS) in 1994. This 
piecemeal extension reached over 70% of the population by 2001. In 2002 the 
government took an important step, unifying the LICS and the VHCS and broadening 
the coverage to the uninsured 30% of the population. The new scheme, known as the 
UCS, has been serving as the main public insurance scheme for Thai citizens since then. 
The important change at that period was not only the launch of the UCS, but also the 
reform of the entire health system. The UCS applied the purchaser-provider split 
concept where the NHSO served as the main governing body of the UCS. In contrast, 
the role of the MOPH shifted from 'provider' to 'regulator'. This financing reform was 
designed to promote better efficiency, sustainability, and accountability. Amongst other 
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things, the UCS had demonstrated success in promoting better health outcomes, 
narrowing inequity gaps, and preventing incidence of catastrophic expenditure and 
household impoverishment throughout its 15-year history (Tangcharoensathien et al., 
2015a).  
Interestingly, in the case of insurance for migrants, it appeared as though the MOPH was 
turning back the clock to before the UCS era. The main features of the migrant 
insurance are quite similar to the LICS and the VHCS.  
Firstly, it targeted the poor. Though the MOPH did not state this intention clearly in its 
announcement (and there had not been any system for means testing), this point was 
reflected by the interviews with policy makers in Chapter 5, expressing that the 
insurance card should not be sold to what they saw as better-off groups (such as 
European migrants in the Northeast of Thailand). Though this study did not have 
empirical evidence to prove whether or not the impression of policy makers on 
European foreigners (viewing them as the better-off group) was valid, there is some 
indicative literature suggesting that there exist some foreigners living rough in Thailand. 
Some were homeless and experiencing precarious immigration status (Finch and 
Merrill, 2013, Campbell, 2013).    
Secondly, its nature was not truly compulsory. Though, some literature, such as 
Srithamrongsawat et al (2009) and Tharathep et el (2013) defined the HICS as 
'compulsory', this thesis contended that the HICS was not totally compulsory. As a 
matter of fact, though registration for a residence permit for migrants was compulsory 
(in theory), buying insurance was not mandated for all migrants. One might claim that 
insurance became compulsory after the advent of the OSS, however, as described in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the OSS was just a place where the three relevant ministries 
(MOI, MOL, and MOPH) joined together to facilitate the registration process. So far, 
there had not been laws or regulations that indicated a penalty for an employer of a 
migrant if his/her migrant employee was uninsured. 
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The voluntary nature of the LICS and the VHCS entailed various implementation 
difficulties. Firstly, it was extremely difficult to define who was poor and who was not 
(Coronini-Cronberg et al., 2007). Secondly, in the Thai context, where the majority of 
the population (both Thais and non-Thais) were involved in the informal sector, it was 
not feasible to require contributions from all; and this was one of the key reasons, 
underlined by Prakongsai et al (2009), why the UCS applied general tax financing rather 
than payroll contributions. Finally, LICS insurees might (indirectly) be stigmatised, and 
this created significant barriers to care (Pannarunothai et al., 2000). These reasons were 
critical factors causing the Thai government to terminate the LICS and the VHCS in 
2002. 
One might argue that the HICS is at least a practical means of achieving UHC for 'all 
people' on Thai soil. This point should be pondered with caution. Some international 
literature argued against using voluntary insurance as a path towards UHC. Alkenbrack 
et al (2013) exemplified a case study in Lao PDR, where the community-based 
voluntary insurance scheme was launched to target poor households, then found that the 
insurance suffered from poor risk-pooling. After 12 years of operation, the scheme could 
cover only 2% of the 50% target population. At the global level, Pettigrew and Mathauer 
(2016) underscored that many countries paid inadequate attention to the potential risks 
of voluntary insurance as a route towards UHC. They explained that out of 74 countries 
included in the analysis of movement between voluntary health insurance expenditure 
(VHI%), OOP expenditure (OOP%), and general government health expenditure 
(GGHE%) during 1995-2012, seventeen countries saw a rise in VHI% plus an increase 
in OOP% and a decline in GGHE%. The study also concluded that voluntary insurance 
was not effective in filling gaps in publicly financed coverage.  
Aside from the problematic design of the HICS, the limited capacity of the MOPH made 
things more complicated. Health sector reform needed to ensure that the implementing 
organisations were well prepared. The term, 'capacity', in this regard, has both internal 
and external elements. The internal aspect comprises adequate number of skilled health 
staff, well-founded infrastructure, and good information systems. This includes 
strategies to incentivise health workers to perform their work properly, such as adequate 
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salaries, and a clear modus operandi. The external aspect refers to the broader 
environment that supports the function of the implementing units. This point 
encompasses political commitment and enabling laws/policies that help the organisation 
break through rigid bureaucracy (Mills et al., 2001).    
After 2002, the MOPH function was reformed. Most functions related to health 
insurance management were shifted to the NHSO, including budget control. In 2004 the 
HICS was formally launched. In principle, it should have been managed under the 
NHSO, but because of the narrow interpretation of the 2002 National Health Act by the 
Office of the Council of State, the power of the NHSO was restricted to Thai nationals. 
Hence, the MOPH took over responsibility for the HICS instead. Nevertheless, the 
MOPH did not prepare itself well for this task. It did not have a specific unit with 
adequate capacity to manage the insurance effectively. As a result, the HICS was 
assigned to the Health Insurance Group (HIG), a small unit under the Office of the 
Permanent Secretary.  
As elaborated in Chapter 5, the HIG director had no real discretionary power. All 
important changes in the HICS had to be approved by the Deputy Permanent Secretary, 
who was subject to change according to political instability. The HIG's investment in 
human resources and technology for migrant insurance faced many difficulties. Hiring 
additional staff could not be done easily since the quota of civil servant posts was 
limited. So far, the HIG had about ten staff members but their responsibility was huge as 
they needed to take care of over 1.5 million beneficiaries. The electronic claiming 
system of the HIG was outsourced to a private company due to the HIG's limited 
technical capacity. The delay in reimbursement often created conflicts between the HIG 
and local facilities, as reflected in the consultative meeting between the MOPH and the 
PPHOs in 2005, where many local facilities complained about the severe delays of 
HICS reimbursement (Bureau of Health Administration, 2015).  
Thus it might not be too harsh to criticise the HIG and the MOPH over the lack of 
efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness in managing the scheme. The latest 
annual report of the HICS was made in 2011, and no subsequent reports had been 
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launched to the public. Besides, there was no concrete system/channel that enabled the 
providers and the service users to voice their concerns to the MOPH in a timely manner. 
Vorakee (2003) underlined that the aforementioned problems appeared in almost all 
authorities in the Thai bureaucracy, not just the MOPH. Almost all previous 
governments raised the issue of bureaucratic reform as a national agenda. Nonetheless, 
serious reform had not been carried out because of two main reasons, namely, (1) a lack 
of political will and instability of Thai politics, and (2) a strong resistance to change of 
the bureaucracy itself as the reform implied the decline of bureaucratic power through 
delegation, democratisation, paradigm shift, and downsizing.    
This situation was reversed in the NHSO. The NHSO's design did not follow the 
bureaucratic paradigm. In contrast, it was regarded as 'New Public Management' (NPM) 
where private sector principles, rather than rigid hierarchical bureaucracy, were used in 
a state agency to promote efficiency and accountability (Evans et al., 2012). In fact, the 
thrust towards NPM was not something new in the MOPH bureaucracy, but before the 
establishment of the NHSO, the NPM approach was used by the MOPH facilities only 
in some micro-functions, such as contracting a private company to perform the 
Computed Tomographic (CT) scanning or allowing a certain degree of independence to 
hospitals in setting user fees within a range given by the central government (Bennett et 
al., 1998). However, fundamental change in the MOPH bureaucracy was still limited.      
With the NPM concept, the NHSO seemed to be more responsive to users' needs 
compared to the MOPH. By law, the Board of the NHSO consisted of stakeholders from 
various sectors, ranging from policy-level officers, providers, and patients 
representatives, making it less vulnerable to political intervention (at least in theory). 
Missions and indicators were clear at the outset and the authority's performance has 
been regularly assessed to maintain service standards and quality. NHSO financial and 
performance reports were open to the public every year. Annual surveys showed that the 
satisfaction of both providers and service users gradually increased over time (National 
Health Security Office, 2014).  
278 
 
Of course, no organisation is flawless and since an exploration of NHSO performance is 
beyond the scope of this study, the discussion here does not intend to state that had the 
NHSO managed the insurance for migrants, it might have outperformed the MOPH. The 
bottom line for this point is that, as long as the MOPH is bound with the obsolete 
bureaucracy and suffers from its limited capacity, it is very likely that the incoherence in 
migrant policies pointed out earlier will persist, and this will in turn create more 
difficulties for the MOPH.  
It is arguable that the MOPH is the only option for managing the migrant insurance 
scheme since the involvement of the NHSO is not legally possible. However, 
Saisoonthorn (2015) contended that the 2002 National Health Act was not set in stone. 
Though the Office of the Council of State judged that the NHSO's power was confined 
to Thai nationals, it was always possible to petition for a new verdict, given mutual 
agreement and strong political will from both the MOPH and the NHSO. This proposal 
had not been seriously pondered in the policy discourse and the conflict between the two 
parties became more entrenched in recent years, not only on the HICS management 
issue, but also regarding the UCS (Tnews, 2012).  
III. Vicious cycle of the registration process (overarching 
theme 3) 
As shown in the literature review, to tackle the problems of undocumented/illegal 
migrants, the first and foremost policy applied in many countries is registering a person 
to identify his/her country of origin and residence status. However, in practice, this 
process was not trouble-free. With more than a decade of its registration policy in 
Thailand, the actual figure of undocumented/illegal migrants was still unknown, and this 
in turn led to frequent re-openings of the registration periods. Obviously, a key 
contributing factor to the failures of registration was a lack of coordination between 
authorities as discussed earlier, but this was not the only reason. Drawing from the 
results of Chapter 5 and 6, and the literature review, other possible explanations for the 
registration failure are as follows. 
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Firstly, the registration policy started with an unrealistic assumption, expecting that 
migrants mostly entered the country to find jobs with Thai employers. This was not a 
wrong assumption but it was unrealistic. The story of migrant interviewees in Chapter 6 
suggests that migrants came into the country for various purposes; some seeking well-
paid jobs, some accompanying friends and relatives, and some just hoping for better life 
chances. In some households, there were migrants who had been living in Thailand for 
over a decade, and some of them had children (or even grandchildren) born in Thailand. 
This observation reflected the fact that some migrants had a strong link with, and even 
settled their life in, Thailand, and this link might be stronger than their connection with 
the country of origin.  
Secondly, since the majority of immigrants in Thailand are engaged in the informal 
sector and some are even self-employed, the precondition for buying the card that he/she 
must be employed by a Thai employer might create more adverse consequences than 
benefits. One of the critical problems was the intervention in the registration process of 
crooked brokers and counterfeit employers. Such a situation made registration costs soar 
and opened room for corrupt officials, which might indirectly force migrants to avoid 
the system.         
Thirdly, the registration policy was just a starting point for migrants who were in the 
‘nationality status vacuum’, since the NV process always takes time. As of March 2016, 
of the 1.5 million migrants registered with the OSS between 2014 and 2015, about 
600,000 had not completed the NV process, and there was no explicit measure from the 
government that aimed to indemnify the time and financial loss incurred by these 
migrants and their employers (Prachatai, 2016). As a matter of fact, the registration 
process could not be done solely by a single country, but needed extensive cooperation 
between states. In Myanmar, amongst other things, conflicts between ethnic groups and 
the central government and a lack of transportation to hard-to-reach areas meant that the 
Myanmar civil registry was far from complete (Daget and Fau, 2011). This situation 
implied that there were a number of migrants who did not have their name in either the 
Thai civil registry or the Myanmar civil registry.  
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Though the Thai government attempted to break the vicious cycle by encouraging 
employers to hire migrant employees only through the bilateral MOU, this recruitment 
channel has not been successful in reducing the influx of illegal migrants. As reported 
by the ILO (2015), problems of red tape and corruption in legal recruitment appeared 
not only in Thailand but also in Myanmar.        
Fourthly, the researcher considers that registration of undocumented/illegal migrants is a 
catch-22 situation. Most of the time the registration process was performed by state 
security authorities, such as police department and the MOI officials, and a number of 
migrants therefore avoided participating in the process. A similar situation was found in 
Germany, where undocumented/illegal migrants were reluctant to apply for the medical 
card in the welfare office because they were afraid of their profile being reported to the 
immigration office, which could lead to deportation (Gray and van Ginneken, 2012).  
Interestingly, some countries, the UK for instance, broke this vicious cycle (at least in 
principle) by separating the registration for health benefit from registration for the sake 
of citizenship status. This meant that rather than tying the health registration process to 
hard-power officials (such as police and/or immigration office), the UK government 
allowed undocumented/illegal migrants to register with a GP under the NHS (Gray and 
van Ginneken, 2012). The rules were simple. GPs had discretion to register whomever 
they deem appropriate, excepting some reasonable grounds (such as the patient was not 
living in the GPs’ catchment area). They could not refuse to register a patient on the 
basis of health status, race, gender, sexual orientation, or social class. Yet, in practice, 
there existed some variations between GPs. Due to poor guidance from Primary Care 
Trusts, many GPs demanded proof of immigration status from a patient prior to the 
registration (Migrants' rights network, 2011).      
Fifthly, from the migrant perspective, it was not clear what benefit they would gain from 
registration. Evidence from Chapter 6 showed that some migrants and employers, 
despite acknowledging the registration policy, neither joined the registration process nor 
bought the insurance card. In their view, forcing everybody to buy the insurance was 
unfair treatment to a healthy person, since he/she was less likely to enjoy health 
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services. One of the interviewees (MM3) raised an important point that their migrant 
peers who had already passed the NV and were working in the formal sector refused to 
join the SSS even though they were supposed to, since the payroll contribution of the 
SSS was troublesome. Besides, the SSS fringe benefits (such as paying some money 
upon return to the home country or pension allowance) did not match their needs.   
Lastly, from the health systems perspective, it was not clear if the MOPH wished to 
have its health facilities register all populations (including migrants, stateless people, 
undocumented persons, etc) in the facilities' catchment area (like a GP Practice in the 
UK), or register only those who had already participated in the OSS. Referring to the 
earlier discussion point, this confusion might derive from the equivocal policy message. 
Nonetheless, there might not be a significant difference between both choices 
(registering all people or registering only migrant workers) since the financial burden 
was still borne by migrants any way (as at the time of writing, there was no explicit 
law/regulation specifying who, between migrant and employer, had to take care of the 
cost of registration). In practice, an employer often paid for the insurance and other 
essential documents (ie work permit and residence permit) for his/her migrant 
employees but later deducted this expense from their employees' salary. This practice 
definitely created a financial burden on a migrant employee, and reinforced the adverse 
selection problem (see migrants' case stories in Chapter 6). 
The situation of the HICS and the MOPH was in contrast to the 'Education for All' 
policy of the MOE. As expounded in Chapter 5, the MOE had a policy to register all 
non-Thai children in the G-series system, begun in 2005. The G-series system was 
totally independent from security policies, and the MOE schools were able to request 
budget from the government according to the number of registered children. In 
principle, no cost was incurred by children or their parents for education. Dowding 
(2015) reported that, despite several challenges, the MOE's G-series policy was 
successful in guaranteeing rights to education for all children. The number of migrant 
children enjoying basic education programme of MOE schools increased continuously 
since the introduction of the policy (Dowding, 2015).  
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IV. Migrants are exploiting the Thai healthcare system—Fact 
or fiction? (overarching theme 4) 
'Taking Thai hospitals back to Thai people' was the headline in the news, recently 
released in Thailand (Thai Tribune, 2016). The news claimed that Thai public hospitals 
were being occupied by migrant patients, leading to huge negative impacts on the 
system, such as longer waiting time and an enormous financial burden on the facilities. 
The interview findings in Chapter 6 also supported this account. About one third of the 
health worker interviewees expressed their concern over the financial burden of the 
facilities from providing care to migrant patients. 
The idea that migrants exploited the health systems of receiving countries was prevalent 
not just in Thailand, but also in many developed countries, and it has been more 
pronounced during the refugee crisis in Europe in recent years. The new NHS regulation 
in 2015 stipulated that migrants outside the European Economic Area (EEA) were liable 
to be charged at 150% of the NHS national tariff for any care received unless they were 
covered by personal health insurance (Department of Health, 2015b). The regulation 
was part of the efforts to recoup a £500 million estimated cost shouldered by the NHS. 
Such example more or less indicated a general negative public perception of migrants.  
However, it is important to separate people's perceptions from evidence. Results from 
Chapter 7 clearly suggested that (both crude and adjusted) utilisation rates of insured 
migrant patients were relatively lower than of UCS insurees, particularly at the 
provincial-level facility and in OP visits.  
Even after adjusting for all potential confounders, the positive effect of the HICS on 
utilisation was still smaller than the influence of the UCS. It might be justified to state 
that the insurance made migrants enjoy health services more frequently than the 
uninsured, but it might be unfair to blame migrants alone for the exploitation of the 
system, since in reality the utilisation rate of Thai UCS patients was far greater than that 
of migrant patients. This discovery alluded to the fact that migrants did not always 
create adverse consequences for the health system, as commonly perceived.  
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Supporting evidence was found in the US. Stimpson et al (2010) suggested that, based 
on an examination of health care spending between 1999 and 2006 for immigrant 
noncitizens (which already included some undocumented/illegal immigrants). the cost of 
providing care to these immigrants was lower than that of providing care to the US 
natives, In addition, Stimpson et al (2010) argued that these immigrants did not 
contribute disproportionately to high health care costs in public programmes such as 
Medicaid, but they were found to be more likely than the US natives to have a health 
care visit classified as uncompensated care. 
In addition, the quantitative analysis revealed that disease status was the most important 
influence determining the amount of services used by both Thai and migrant patients. 
Patients with severe diseases were more likely to show up at the facilities than mildly-
sick ones. This discovery was not surprising, and in countries where the public sector 
played a dominant role in functioning the health system, having vulnerable populations 
benefit from health services might be perceived as a favourable policy outcome rather 
than a worry.  
Besides, a striking finding came out from the analysis, that is, the interaction between 
disease severity and migrant insurance was still smaller than the interaction effect in the 
UCS. This implied that even focusing on the severely-ill patients, UCS patients still had 
higher utilisation rates than insured migrants, let alone the uninsured. This finding might 
alarm policy makers and the wider public, concerned that there were migrants with 
severe diseases being left behind (for instance, the two uninsured interviewees in 
Chapter 6 who were severely ill, one with HIV/AIDS and the other with COPD). The 
policy that barred migrants who failed the health check from joining the insurance 
scheme might create more public health threats, especially since the diseases specified 
in the negative list (Tier 3) in the HICS regulation were mostly related to public health 
concerns, such as active tuberculosis, filariasis, and psychotic diseases. So far, there had 
not been a clear measure to tackle this matter. As reported in Chapter 5, the government 
was now using the Global Fund budget to provide treatment for uninsured migrants, but 
only for certain diseases, namely HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, and with limited quota of 
eligible beneficiaries. This raised a concern over the sustainability of the programme, as 
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the Global Fund support would be terminated by late 2016 and it was very likely that 
Thailand was not eligible to apply for the new round of funding since the priority was 
granted to the LMICs (Patcharanarumol et al., 2013). Interestingly,  some developed 
countries, such as Germany and France, have established special public insurance funds 
for treating patients with communicable diseases for the sake of public health security 
(see Chapter 2) (Gray and van Ginneken, 2012).           
In terms of financing, the HICS was a lucrative source of funds for some hospitals. 
Evidence from the financial sheet of a hospital (shown in Chapter 6) revealed that after 
deducting the cost of unpaid debts from treating uninsured patients, the hospital still 
earned about 12 million Baht (US$ 370,000) surplus from selling the card. This finding 
was supported by Srithamrongsawat et al (2009), which assessed the cost recovery of 
service provision for migrant workers in 47 hospitals in Thailand. The study found that, 
after deducting the expense of treating insured migrants and the exemption for the 
uninsured, hospitals that still gained a surplus from selling the insurance card were those 
with more than 10,000 registered migrant workers and those located in urban areas, 
while those with less than 10,000 registered beneficiaries and those in rural areas were 
at risk of running a deficit. This issue is related to the earlier discussion point that the 
wider public at times misperceived that migrants were exploiting the Thai health care 
system. However, the reality was that a hospital could earn revenue from insured 
migrants through the card premium, and even in the case of uninsured migrants, the 
patients still paid out-of-pocket for the services (according to ability to pay). Thus a 
presumption that migrants were always free-riders might not be totally justified.    
In summary, the above evidence countered the common perception that migrants were 
excessively exploiting public services. Hanefeld (2013) argued that the new NHS 150% 
charge on overseas patients by with an aim to recoup costs was made with partial or no 
evidence. In fact, the UK was a net exporter of medical travellers. Inbound medical 
tourists treated as private patients within NHS facilities were particularly a lucrative 
source of income for the NHS. The 50% surcharge might disincentivise patients needing 
care rather provide additional remuneration for the NHS. Gritt et al (2012) underscored 
that restricting migrants from health services on grounds that aimed to protect health 
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system finance could lead to more expensive treatment as migrant patients might return 
to the facilities at a more advanced stage of disease. They also asserted that the belief 
that free provision of care was a strong motive for undocumented migration was based 
on weak evidence. Gushulak and MacPherson (2011) highlighted that there were various 
factors that induced people to migrate, such as natural disaster, economic concerns, and 
political persecution but health matters were not amongst the important motives. 
Besides, the journey to more affluent countries was often long, risky and very 
expensive; conditions that were not suitable for ill people. This notion was supported by 
the interview findings in Chapter 6 where the motives to migrate to Thailand of all 
migrant interviewees were mainly related to economic prospects and family reasons 
rather than health concerns.     
8.3 Enhancement of theoretical framework for 
understanding the enrolment of migrants in public 
health insurance and the insurance effects on use of 
services 
While subsection 8.2 elaborated on the content of each overarching theme, this section 
seeks to shed light on how these themes were linked together. To this end, the researcher 
has sought to enhance a theoretical framework which reflects key messages from this 
study. It is hoped that this enhanced theoretical framework may be of use for future 
research on migrant health. The framework extends and links together some traditional 
theories, such as the SLB theory by Lipsky (1980) and the theory about factors affecting 
the policy process by Leichter (1979), see Figure 38 at the end of this subsection.  
The main idea of the framework is, though the terms 'enrolment' in the insurance and 
'use' of services are intuitively an aspect of service users (migrants), it is imperative to 
consider aspects of other stakeholders, such as how local providers and employers adapt 
themselves to the policy (or in the other way round how the stakeholders adapt the 
policy to match their routines). This is because the adaptation of the policy by relevant 
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stakeholders may not necessarily align with the policy original intentions, and this may 
affect the possibility of obtaining the insurance and the use of services amongst (both 
insured and uninsured) migrants. Thus, the framework briefly divides the role and 
function of stakeholders involved in the insurance scheme in three groups: (1) policy 
makers, (2) local implementers, and (3) service users, with details as follows.   
Policy makers 
Regarding the policy maker group, the framework suggests that the insurance for 
migrants is just one part of the whole sphere of migrant policies. This implies that it 
goes beyond health issue as it is deeply engaged with several government authorities, 
especially the economic and national security sectors. Thus the openness of the policy at 
a particular time depends on two main factors: (1) power play between authorities, and 
(2) external pressures surrounding the policy formulation process.  
The national security and the economic sectors usually have the greatest influence in 
policy decision making relating to migrants over the health sector. This is reflected in 
the diagram by big arrows pointing towards the health sector in contrast to smaller 
arrows pointing back to the national security and economic sectors. In other words, it 
appears that state security and economic concerns are always framed as 'high politics' 
whereas the health sector seems to be 'low politics' (Youde, 2016).  
The interaction between authorities is dynamic and much affected by external 
pressures/influences. These pressures can be either domestic or international (and in 
practice, in the globalisation era, it can be difficult to distinguish between 'domestic' and 
'international' as reflected by the dashed line connecting the two ovals). Some influences 
may (at least indirectly) make the insurance policy more 'open' (as reflected by a plus 
sign) while some may make it 'stricter' (as reflected by a minus sign). Examples of these 
pressures, which were detailed earlier in Chapter 5, are the threat of communism in 
Southeast Asia during the 1970s-1980s (minus: it led to a denial of the jus soli principle 
in the previous nationality law), the 2014 military coup (minus: it engendered a new 
regulation that allowed only migrant workers with Thai employers to buy insurance), the 
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complaint by border hospitals over the financial catastrophe caused by providing care 
for the stateless population (plus: it led to the introduction of public insurance for 
stateless people in 2010), and the downgrading of Thailand to the Tier 2 Watchlist in the 
TIP Report in 2013 (plus: it indirectly caused the government to introduce the card 
policy for a migrant child).   
Local implementers 
Local implementers (healthcare staff, security officers, work permit officers, etc) receive 
messages from central authorities. To insure undocumented/illegal migrants, local 
implementers need to start with identifying whether or not an undocumented/illegal 
migrant is eligible to be insured according to the host country's laws. This function is 
quite similar in most countries (see the literature review in Chapter 2). However, there 
may be some subtle differences between nations, for instance, in Italy an 
undocumented/illegal migrant is required to register with the municipality of residence 
to obtain a temporary residence permit, while in Thailand an applicant needs to have 
both a temporary residence permit and a work permit first, then to pass the health check 
before being eligible to buy the insurance. Local implementers will classify migrants 
into 'eligible' and 'non-eligible'. The eligible migrants can take up the insurance, while 
the non-eligible cannot. This idea is reflected by a plus sign alongside the bold arrow for 
the eligible and minus sign for the non-eligible. 
However, in practice, policy makers cannot guarantee perfect compliance from the 
ground-level officers. Unclear policy messages, poor regulation and monitoring from the 
central authorities, and perceptions that the policy is unfit to the local context, are 
common causes that lead local officers to 'adapt' or 'bend' the policy from its primary 
intentions. The adaption can be 'positive' and/or 'negative'. The diagram demonstrates 
some adaptive behaviours of local implementers in the dashed arrows. Negative 
adaption may make the eligible become non-eligible (such as creating an internal rule 
prohibiting seemingly sick migrants from buying the insurance), while positive adaption 
may cause the non-eligible to be eligible for the insurance (such as campaigning for the 
insurance with migrants in Myanmar). Note that some adaptations do not have a direct 
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impact on taking the insurance in the first place but may jump to another step, that is, 
the use of services (for example, the within-province fee schedule policy to incentivise 
local health staff to provide some services free of charge to all migrants regardless of 
their citizenship status).      
Service users 
Service users include migrants and employers of migrants. Evidence from Chapter 7 
confirmed that insured migrants tended to utilise services more often than the uninsured 
(despite to a lower degree compared to native citizens). This is depicted in the diagram 
by a plus sign next to the bold arrow pointing from eligible migrants to use of service. 
Nonetheless, one should be aware that the citizenship status of an immigrant is very 
fluid. Registered migrants can change their status to 'undocumented/illegal' for various 
reasons, such as failing to pass nationality verification or refusing to renew their 
passport once expired. By contrast, an undocumented/illegal migrant may change their 
status to 'documented/legal' by several means, for instance, resorting to a broker to act as 
though he/she is an employer of these migrants in order to fulfil the registration criteria. 
This point can be regarded as an adaption of policy by service users as well.  
Apart from insurance status, there are several other factors that influence migrants' use 
of services. The researcher classified these factors into two groups: (1) individual 
attributes, and (2) social determinants. Chapter 7 suggested factors that tended to 
increase number of visits at health facilities, such as history of catastrophic illness and 
proximity between domicile and registered hospitals. In contrast, some attributes may 
serve as hindrance to service use, for example, financial constraints in a household, or 
involvement with occupations that spend most of the time offshore. For social 
determinants, the literature review in Chapter 2 and the qualitative findings in Chapter 6 
clearly indicated that language/cultural barriers and unfamiliarity with the health care 
system in a host country tended to limit migrants' use of services. However, some 
determinants can be considered enabling factors, such as support from employers and 
migrant peers, and an involvement of NGOs to fill the service gap.  
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Figure 38 Conceptual framework concerning the enrolment in the insurance and use of services amongst undocumented/illegal 
migrants 
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8.4 Methodological discussion 
I. Strengths of the methods 
Multi-methods design  
This thesis employed a multi-methods design, which can be regarded as a key 
methodological strength. In social science research, the multi-methods approach has 
been increasingly applied in recent literature exploring social phenomena. It is a useful 
tool for exploring the complex webs of factors that affect utilisation of health services. 
Teddie and Tashakkori (2003) stated that a multi-methods approach was superior to a 
single-method approach in three ways: (1) it enables answers to some research questions 
which cannot be answered by a single-method approach, (2) it enables researchers to 
provide better and stronger inference, and (3) it allows researchers to explore a great 
diversity of divergent views. With these advantages, the multi-methods approach fits 
well with this study's objectives, as the implementation of the HICS involves the health 
dimensions well as national security and economic angles.  
In addition, the multi-methods approach enabled the researcher to answer both 
confirmatory and explanatory questions, and to explain the relationship between the 
studied variables. In this regard, quantitative and qualitative investigations were done in 
parallel to help validate the outcome of each study objective and to offset the 
methodological weaknesses of each research method.  
Qualitative approach 
In terms of qualitative methods, one of the methodological strengths of this thesis is the 
application of various data collection techniques, namely document review, systematic 
review, in-depth interview and informal discussion. The researcher adjusted the 
interview guides to match the roles and responsibilities of respondents, while preserving 
the main content of the interview guides.  
291 
 
Since migrant policies in Thailand are greatly dynamic, and at the time of data 
collection there was a huge change in policy as the junta overthrew the elected 
government, the researcher performed interviews more than once. The follow up 
interviews also benefited the researcher in several ways. Firstly, they enabled the 
researcher to assess any change in respondent perceptions. Secondly, the researcher 
could use the follow up interview as part of the data triangulation process by validating 
subsequent interview findings with the earlier ones. Thirdly, the more the interviews 
were carried out, the more the informants became familiar with the research team. An 
example was the interview with the migrant couple with HIV/AIDS in Chapter 6. While 
in the first interview the researcher found that the male interviewee was covered by the 
HICS, the subsequent interviews found that he was no longer insured by the HICS 
because the new hospital regulation barred unhealthy applicants from the insurance. 
This finding prompted the researcher to explore the coping mechanisms of this 
household, and then to discover that the local NGO had stepped in to alleviate the 
household's health expenditure.  
Quantitative approach 
Concerning quantitative methods, this thesis investigated the impact of the HICS on 
service users in comparison with the uninsured and with Thai UCS patients. In this 
sense, the insured migrants were considered treatment group and the uninsured migrants 
and the UCS patients were control. Having a comparison group is a prerequisite of a 
natural experiment study (Craig et al., 2012). Design elements that can strengthen causal 
inference include using pre/post measures to control for secular changes, such as 
interrupted time series design, or taking account of potential confounding and selection 
biases are also important (Meyer, 1995). Though the randomised controlled trial (RCT) 
is widely accepted as the least biased design for medical and public health research, 
oftentimes it is difficult to employ RCT in the real world (Khandker et al., 2010). 
Besides, in the context of a nationwide government policy like the HICS, it might be 
politically and ethically infeasible to evaluate the policy via an RCT study.  
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Another methodological strength is the use of individual-patient records over time.  
These records were collected at local health facilities, and this thesis might be one of the 
first studies in Thailand to analyse utilisation data deep into the health centre level.  
Though some articles have explored migrant health issues in Thailand, such as 
Srithamrongsawat et al (2009) and Hasuwannakit (2012b), the analyses were limited to 
provincial-hospital level, and did not account for possible bias from individual attributes 
and time-varying covariates. To address the knowledge gaps in earlier research, this 
study thus included key potential confounders at the individual level (such as domicile, 
occupation, and hospital-level variables) plus time variable in the analysis. 
Had the datasets been retrieved from other sources but the local facilities, information 
on the utilisation of the uninsured and some individual-level covariates might have not 
been obtained, since the MOPH and the NHSO normally dropped these variables from 
data submitted from local facilities. This was because these variables were not relevant 
to the reimbursement process. Also, the use of facility-based data made the researcher 
benefit from having a larger volume of data since, statistically speaking, the larger the 
sample size, the smaller the standard error. 
II. Weaknesses and limitations 
Despite a rigorous research methodology, this thesis still encountered some limitations 
and weaknesses. Though huge efforts were made to address the study 
limitations/weaknesses, it was difficult to address them completely. Therefore 
interpretation and application of the research findings in real-life settings should be 
made with caution. The following points are key limitations of which readers should be 
aware. 
Overall findings 
A prime concern was whether and to what extent the findings could be generalised to 
other settings or to other groups of non-Thai populations. In terms of spatial scope, this 
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study was regarded as case study research, where Ranong province was used as an 
example in investigating how migrant health policies actually functioned in the field. 
With only one province, it was difficult to claim that the province was a representative 
of other areas in Thailand. Besides, Ranong province has its very unique context. The 
province had a large diversity of populations (eg Thais, Burmese migrants, and 
displaced Thais) involved in agricultural and fishery businesses. Also, transportation to 
Myanmar was quite convenient due to a long border and numerous informal crossing 
points. This feature was in marked contrast to other provinces in Thailand. For example, 
in more urbanised areas like Bangkok and its vicinity, the most common migrant jobs 
included manual labour, construction workers, and employees in medium-to-large scale 
industries. In the southern region, the majority of migrants were Chinese and Muslim 
vendors from Malaysia. In the northern region, the majority of non-Thai populations 
were ethnic minorities and stateless people, and these populations were mixed up with 
refugees and migrant workers from Lao PDR and Myanmar.  
In terms of population scope, this study attempted to investigate the operation of the 
HICS policy. As the policy literally targeted migrant workers and their dependants, it 
implied that the thesis boundary was confined to migrant workers and dependants. This 
was what the researcher initially expected. Yet, the more research was conducted, the 
more the researcher realised that the boundaries defining populations were not clear. 
According to the fieldwork findings, in some migrant households, there were migrants 
who had been living in Thailand for years, and some were even born in Thailand. This 
meant they had de facto already integrated themselves into Thai society like Thai 
nationals. Thus it might not be exactly correct to state that the findings presented here 
were only about migrant workers and dependants. The limitation in differentiating the 
population of interest was an important element that a reader should be aware of. 
However, despite being a study limitation, this issue might also be regarded as a strong 
point of this study because it reflected the complexity of migrant issues in Thailand, and 
helped a reader to understand the real social phenomena. 
Nonetheless, these issues did not mean that the study completely lacked an ability to 
generalise the finding. Lewis and Ritchie (2003) suggested that generalisation of 
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research findings could be categorised into three levels: (1) theoretical generalisation, 
(2) inferential generalisation, and (3) representational generalisation. Theoretical 
generalisation aims to draw out theoretical propositions and principles that could be 
applied to a more general population. Inferential generalisation is an ability to generalise 
the research discovery to settings or contexts outside the study area. Representational 
generalisation aims to answer if, and to what extent, the results still hold true in the 
parent population from which sample is drawn.  
For theoretical generalisation, though this study did not intend to develop a new theory 
from the ground in the first place, it had shed light on and extended the perspectives of 
some existing theories to some extent. For instance, it had broadened the value of Street-
level Bureaucracy theory by viewing that the theory could be applied to all stakeholders 
participating in the entire policy process, not only local implementers. The researcher 
also proposed a conceptual framework regarding the uptake of the insurance and use of 
services in migrants (see Chapter 8), which might be regarded as new knowledge in 
health policy and system research arena, and one may use this as an analytical 
framework for future research on migrant health. All of these matters reflect theoretical 
generalisation to some degree. 
Also, this study had inferential generalisation. For example, in terms of how the 
functioning of the HICS was much influenced by the local context, it might be justified 
to infer that the challenges in policy implementation might occur in nearby provinces 
where the geography and population profiles are similar to Ranong province, for 
instance, Prachuab-Kirikan, Chumporn, and Surat-Thani provinces.  
Regarding representational generalisation, since the quantitative analysis explored the 
impact of insurance through facility-based data, and individual records were not 
randomly drawn from all migrants in the province, the quantitative findings could be 
generalised to migrants who have ever presented at a facility, but not all migrants in the 
field.  
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Objective 1: Interviews with policy makers and document review 
As migrant policies in Thailand are vastly dynamic and the timeline for fieldwork was 
quite limited (between mid-2014 to mid-2016), the study could not capture all the latest 
changes in migrant policies. For example, recently, the Thai government attempted to 
expand the insurance coverage to Vietnamese migrants in order to facilitate free labour 
movement amongst the ASEAN Community (Prachatai, 2015).  However, this came 
about after the researcher had returned from fieldwork, so it was difficult to explore this 
point in depth. In addition, though the researcher attempted to obtain information from 
all key policy perspectives (eg state security, economic planning and public health 
protection), the focus of this study was primarily within health. In addition, there were 
some societal angles which might have not been explored in this study (or might be 
touched upon, but just superficially). Such angles included ethnicity, religion, Thai—
Burmese history and culture, linguistics, and the role of the media. To further explore 
these issues, different research approaches are needed (such as ethnographic study, 
political science approach, and media research).        
Objective 2: Interviews with local implementers and service users 
A critical limitation was that the information obtained was a reflection of the 
respondents' views, not their exact behaviours. Though the respondents informed the 
researchers about the adaptation in policies, it was difficult to track if the respondents 
really behaved in the ways they reported to the researcher. Due to time limitations, the 
researcher did not embed himself in the facilities to fully observe how the respondents 
actually performed their daily work. However, the researcher triangulated the interview 
findings by several means, such as asking for documents that could prove the interview 
findings or interviewing service users to check if the adaptation in policies was really 
carried out as reported by the providers (for instance, the researcher re-visited the 
HIV/AIDS migrant interviewee to check if he was allowed to buy the card after the 
providers stated that the new hospital's guideline prohibiting sick migrants from buying 
the card was launched, and also asked the providers to show the meeting minutes 
concerning the facility's internal policy).      
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Approaching migrant informants, particularly the unregistered ones, could not be done 
in a formal manner due to the precarious legal status of the interviewees. To tackle this 
difficulty and to mitigate the risk of selection bias, the researcher applied several tactics, 
such as browsing through the household profile of migrants in the health centres' 
catchment area, and asking for support from NGOs, when visiting migrants' households. 
However, the bias might still exist. This was because the interviewed migrants at least 
could be identified by the NGOs, thus they might not represent the 'most' vulnerable 
groups that could not seek support from any source.        
Another key limitation was that the interviewees knew the status of the researcher as a 
professional. With outsider status, it was possible that the respondents tried to respond 
in the way that met the researcher's expectations. The researcher tackled this point by 
managing the interview in informal manner, such as carrying out the interview in places 
where the interviewees were familiar (eg at migrant households, or at nearby health 
centres), and exercising several rounds of interviews (where the first round of interviews 
began with informal chatting to build up rapport, then gradually probing into deeper 
detail in the following rounds), and using verbal consent rather than written consent 
where necessary. All of these practices were performed with the aim of building trust 
between the researcher and the interviewees, and to have the interviewees disclose their 
perspectives as honestly as possible.     
In addition, language difference was of critical concern. Although a professional 
interpreter was recommended as the gold standard for most research involved with 
multi-national respondents (van Nes et al., 2010), in this setting, the researcher asked 
migrant health workers at the local health centres to serve as field translators instead. A 
key reason for employing non-professional translators was to avoid any feeling of 
discomfort on the part of the interviewees. Bischoff and Hudelson (2010) also suggested 
that even though a professional interpreter was helpful in overcoming language 
difficulties, he/she might not have a clear understanding of migrants' behaviours and 
beliefs. Hence, the size of the researcher's team was kept as small as possible.  
Moreover, in real practice, migrant peers and family members occasionally joined the 
interview and at times assumed the interpreting role. The researcher was aware that such 
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a situation was a double-edged sword since it might breach the confidentiality of the 
respondents, but on the other hand, it made migrants more comfortable taking part in the 
interview. Accordingly, before embarking on the interview, the researcher always asked 
the interviewee if he/she was comfortable with a setting where he/she was surrounded 
by peers and family members.  
The researcher tackled a risk of information bias from employing non-professional 
interpreters by (1) listening to the tape record and checking it with the transcripts, and 
(2) sending part of the tape record and the transcripts to a professional interpreter to 
validate the transcript accuracy and to correct any erroneous translations.  Although 
Thai-to-English translation was less problematic than Burmese-to-Thai translation, it did 
not imply that the translation is absolutely correct, as English is not the researcher's first 
language. Therefore, the original quotes in Thai are presented in Appendix 9 to enable 
(Thai-speaking) readers to assess the translation accuracy.        
Objective 3: Quantitative analysis of the impact of the insurance 
As mentioned earlier, the dataset used in objective 3 was retrieved from local health 
facilities. The data were individual IP and OP records routinely collected by local health 
staff in the given period. Though the use of facility-based data has several advantages, 
as mentioned earlier sections, it still has some drawbacks. One of the key disadvantages 
was the cleanliness of the data. As the size of the obtained data was over a million 
records and as it was a real-world dataset where the researcher could not control for 
quality, despite exhaustive data cleaning, it was possible that the coding error still 
persisted. An obvious instance was the records of some Burmese patients that were 
miscoded as UCS beneficiaries. These problematic records were excluded from the 
analysis; and fortunately the size of such records was not large (less than 6% of the 
entire dataset).  
Careless coding usually occurred in migrant patients. A potential explanation for this 
phenomenon was the difference in the reimbursement process between insurance 
schemes. For the UCS patients, a hospital could be reimbursed the IP treatment based on 
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DRG directly from the NHSO. Hence the UCS records were quite complete and of good 
quality. For migrant patients, the insurance budget was mainly pooled at individual 
hospital for both OP and IP treatment. This system might lead to less careful coding of 
the HICS beneficiaries since the facility had no requirement to submit migrant 
utilisation data to the MOPH, let alone data for uninsured patients.  
Another critical limitation was a lack of unique identifier for migrant patients across 
facilities. The hospital ID used as the unique identifier in this study could not be tracked 
across facilities because each facility had its own ID system. Though it was possible to 
track records across facilities through the 13-digit ID, there were some important 
concerns over this approach. In the first instance, acquiring the 13-digit ID for each 
record might breach confidentiality of an individual, and as a consequence the PPHO 
staff decided not to share the 13-digit ID with the researcher.  
Secondly, suppose the 13-digit information was acquired, it might not be a good unique 
identifier for migrant patients. With reference to the background knowledge from the 
field, while the 13-digit ID for a Thai patient was fixed, a migrant's 13-digit ID could 
change over time. As discussed in Chapter 5, issuing a 13-digit ID for registered 
migrants was only an interim process while the NV process was in progress. Once the 
NV process was completed, a migrant would be issued with a temporary passport, and 
then the passport number was literally the unique identifier of that person instead of the 
13-digit ID. Should an NV migrant overstay in the country beyond the expiry date 
specified in his/her passport, and if he/she re-entered the registration process again, that 
person would be re-issued with a new 13-digit ID. This was not an uncommon situation 
in the migrant population. As reflected in Chapter 6, all the migrant interviewees had 
spent about ten years in Thailand, despite that fact that the maximum duration of 
legitimate stay in Thailand upon completing the NV is four years. In reality, looking 
merely at the hospital records, it was difficult to determine if an individual had already 
passed the NV. Therefore this problem inevitably affected the analysis accuracy. It was 
also an indication of the failure of the government authorities to successfully manage 
migrants' biometric data.   
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Thirdly, it was likely that using the hospital number as the unique identifier might cause 
an underestimation of the utilisation rate per individual in the quantitative analysis. This 
was because the analysis could not link the records of an individual across facilities. 
However, the result might not be severely biased because the main purpose of objective 
3 was to 'compare' the effect of different insurance types on the outcome variables, 
rather than estimating the absolute effect of the insurance. Suppose the estimate was 
downwardly biased, when comparing the estimate across individuals, such bias was 
likely to be differenced out because the bias took place not only in migrant patients, but 
also in Thai UCS beneficiaries. However, this assumption might be true only if there 
was no significant difference in the unobserved characteristics across beneficiaries. For 
Ranong province, this assumption was likely to be justified because of an internal policy 
that repealed the gate-keeping mechanism for both migrants and Thai UCS 
beneficiaries. Besides, to address this problem more thoroughly, the researcher added 
the domicile variable in the analysis. Therefore part of the effect of the change in facility 
choice of a patient was captured by the proximity between his/her domicile and the 
registered health facility. 
Reflexivity 
As part of this thesis employed a qualitative approach, it is imperative to acknowledge 
the personal accounts of the researcher in terms of role, social status, and prior 
knowledge that might affect the rigour of the analysis. This element is known as 
'reflexivity'. In qualitative tradition, subjective impressions and personal values are an 
inevitable part of the research process. Thus reflexivity is a way that researchers 
critically analyse themselves about their subjective views on the research findings, 
without abandoning all claims to producing scientific accounts of the world (Green and 
Thorogood, 2014).  
Reflexivity has played important role since the beginning of the research. For this study, 
at the proposal development phase, the researcher crafted the research questions based 
on an assumption in Western healthcare that service users wish, and ought to be, 
informed about the policies that affect their health needs, and policy makers expect 
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perfect compliance from the users. This is because of the researcher has an educational 
background in Western medicine and is familiar with the concept of facility-based care. 
The researcher thus more or less expected that the insurance would benefit its 
beneficiaries only if it could boost number of visits at health facilities.   
During the data collection phase, though the researcher always informed the respondents 
that the interview was in essence part of his doctoral degree, and the interviewees were 
always assured that their shared opinions would not affect their work benefits and well-
being in any way, it was difficult to conceal the professional and civil servant status of 
the researcher when contacting and asking for permission from the authorities for 
entering the fieldwork.  
Such a circumstance inevitably shaped the way that the informants interacted with the 
researcher. For instance, local health staff might avoid showing negative opinions 
towards migrant patients (maintaining a benevolent image) for fear that the researcher 
might report this to senior level officers in the MOPH or to the wider public.  
With respect to personal accounts, the researcher was aware of the effect of his prior 
knowledge and work experience on the interpretation of research findings. The 
researcher worked as a clinician in a border hospital in the northern region of Thailand 
for years, and he has been immensely involved with several research projects relating to 
promoting the health and well-being of non-Thai populations. As a result, his accounts 
are influenced by humanitarian and egalitarian beliefs rather than nationalist 
perspectives.  
To avoid misinterpretation of the findings, the researcher submitted the preliminary 
results of the research (in Thai) to the interviewees to ask for feedback on accuracy. This 
practice also enabled the researcher to ask for permission from the interviewees before 
distributing the research findings to the wider public.    
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8.5 Conclusion 
This thesis concluded that the existing migrant health insurance policy in Thailand 
encountered several challenges at all stages of the policy process. In the upstream 
process (agenda setting and policy formulation), there were political tensions between 
authorities. The policy content was poorly designed and does not capture all the 
important aspects of the migration process. Besides, there was a lack of participation 
from all stakeholders in the policy formulation phase. In the downstream process (policy 
implementation), the HICS was implemented in a haphazard fashion. Local 
implementers adapted the policy in various ways; some seemed to be positive in 
facilitating the healthcare access of migrants while others were less so. The situation 
was made more complex by a lack of capacity in the MOPH in monitoring and 
regulating the policy, and constraints in the Thai bureaucracy. Prior experience revealed 
that Thai governments have failed to address migrant health issues systematically. One 
of the very basic and incessant challenges was a failure in the registration policy, as 
evidenced by the fact that there existed a fair number of migrants opting out from the 
registration system. These challenges were coupled with a misperception amongst the 
wider public that migrants are unfairly taking advantage of the Thai healthcare system. 
However, this research found that migrants utilised services to a lesser extent than did 
the Thai UCS insurees. Though the HICS beneficiaries had higher visit frequencies than 
the uninsured migrants, the use rate of insured migrants were still lower than the UCS 
patients. Disease status was a strong influence in determining the number of visits, and 
its effect was even larger than the insurance effect alone. This suggested that the social 
discourse that insuring undocumented/illegal migrants might overload the Thai 
healthcare system might not be justified. Moreover, in Thailand there were a number of 
migrants who were neither insured, nor able to return to their home country, and a 
policy to protect health of this population has not been in place. This issue not only 
posed a critical challenge to the government since the current migrant policies have not 
yet met international humanitarian standards, but also indicated a public health threat to 
all populations in the country if uninsured migrants are left untreated.  
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Chapter 9: Contribution to knowledge, policy 
implications and research priorities 
This chapter commences with the summary of research findings (subsection 1) and the 
contribution of knowledge to the field of health policy and systems research (subsection 
2), and is completed by policy implications (subsection 3) and the recommendations for 
research priorities (subsection 4).   
9.1 Conclusions of the study 
Migrant health has received much attention in both domestic and international politics in 
recent years. From the economic perspective, migrants are key contributors to a host 
country. From the public health perspective, protecting the health of migrants implies a 
protection of health and welfare of the receiving countries' populations as a whole. 
Accordingly, the issue of migrant health and well-being becomes one of the important 
agendas in many high-level policy dialogues. However, the wider public's perception of 
migrants is not always positive. With a migration surge, today there exists a concern 
over if and to what extent migrants are taking advantage of a host country's welfare 
system, as well as more serious concerns over trafficking issues.  
As presented in Chapter 2, much of the literature reveals that migrant health is greatly 
dynamic and interacts with many factors, not just individual health needs but also 
differences in healthcare systems, diverse social perceptions, and host countries’ legal 
restrictions on migrant rights. Some literature suggested that, in general, migrants tended 
to have better health than the host population, leading to a lower utilisation rate in 
migrants than the host country’s citizens. This phenomenon is known as the 'healthy 
migrant effect'. However, there is also evidence suggesting that the low utilisation rate 
amongst migrants was not mainly due to favourable health status but instead stemmed 
from the fact that migrants, particularly the undocumented/illegal ones, often faced a 
number of difficulties in accessing health services, including communication barriers, 
cultural differences, and precarious legal status.  
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The systematic review in Chapter 2 elaborated this point by suggesting that the 
challenges in providing care for migrants can be sorted into three layers, (1) interaction 
with migrant patients (such as language barriers and differences in 
perceptions/knowledge of healthcare systems), (2) constraints in a healthcare workplace 
(such as lack of human resources and interpreting services), and (3) contradiction 
between laws that restrict right to health of illegal/undocumented migrants and 
professional ethics/standards. Literature also suggested that the extent to which migrants 
enjoyed health services in public facilities varied according to the political direction and 
each country's health system context. Moreover, the provision of care in reality does not 
always conform to what is written in law, as there is always a substantial room for legal 
interpretation and the adaptation of policies by local providers to fit their own daily 
problems. The situation where local officials implemented a policy in a way that 
deviates from the initial policy goals is what Lipsky (1980) defined as 'Street-level 
Bureaucracy' (SLB) theory, a commonly used concept in much health system research, 
including this thesis.  
Chapter 2 served as a basis for the identification of gaps of knowledge in Chapter 3. The 
challenges in providing care for migrants identified from international evidence, 
appeared in the Thai context as well. Moreover, the migrant health situation in Thailand 
seemed to be more complex for certain reasons as follows. Firstly, the vast majority of 
migrants in Thailand are illegal/undocumented immigrants from neighbouring countries 
(CLM nations). Secondly, the country always needs a large number of migrant workers 
as they are mostly involved with risky jobs that Thai workers tend to ignore. Lastly, the 
health sector is not the only player in migrant health policy; the security and economic 
authorities are also closely involved in this issue.  
Of about 1.5 million migrant workers (including only those with a work permit) in 
Thailand, over one million entered the country without a valid passport or travel 
document. Notably, this figure does not include migrants and their dependants who 
failed to register themselves with the government. The previous and current 
governments attempted to address migrant health problems through various measures, 
including requiring all illegal/undocumented migrants to be registered with the 
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government within a given period, and instigating a health insurance scheme specifically 
for these migrants, namely, the HICS. 
Though the HICS has been implemented for years, a systemic evaluation of the scheme 
is still lacking. This thesis therefore aimed to tackle this knowledge gap by exploring 
responses of various stakeholders to the HICS and by investigating the outcomes of the 
HICS in terms of utilisation volume and out-of-pocket payment (OOP) of the HICS 
insurees. To this end, a multi-methods approach was exercised.  
The thesis consisted of four objectives. The first objective was to explore how the HICS 
and surrounding migrant policies were formulated (Chapter 5). Data were collected 
through document review and interviews with policy makers. The results showed that 
the evolution of migrant policies in Thailand was in essence a power play between state 
authorities. The HICS is just part of the complexity of migrant policies, where the 
MOPH seems to have less dominant power than other government authorities. The 
sphere of migrant policies in Thailand is dynamic and subject to change according to 
various unpredictable determinants, ranging from domestic variables like a change in 
government and pressures from media and civil society, and international factors, such 
as a tense relationship between Thailand and its neighbouring countries, and allegations 
of human trafficking in Thailand. Theoretically, the HICS should function in line with 
migrant policies of other authorities, especially the policy on issuance of a work permit 
(by the MOL) and the nationality verification policy (of the MOI). Yet, in the real 
world, there are a number of operational constraints due to bureaucratic inefficiency, 
poor law enforcement, and lack of coordination between ministries. In 2014 the junta 
instigated a new measure, namely, the One Stop Service, or the OSS, with the aim of 
filling the gaps between ministerial policies and of responding to the massive outflow of 
migrants after the coup. Though the OSS seemed to be successful in registering a large 
number of illegal/undocumented migrants, it is difficult to claim that all deep-rooted 
problems in migrant policies have been solved. 
Chapter 6 sought to address study objective 2, that is, to elaborate the perceptions of 
healthcare staff, street-level bureaucrats, and migrant service users towards the HICS 
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policy in reality. Some local implementers adapted the policy in various ways to address 
challenges in the work routines, despite the fact that such adaptive practices might make 
the policy deviate from its initial intention. Some adaptations were 'positive' for 
migrants (such as the withdrawal of user fees for all patients, regardless of nationality 
status, for certain services with externality benefits) while some tended to be 'negative' 
(such as prohibiting unhealthy migrants from acquiring the insurance card with the aim 
of protecting a hospital's financial gain).  
In addition, adaptations in policy happened at all levels, from policy makers at the 
MOPH, to executive staff at the PPHO, and to frontline health staff at local facilities, 
and took place not only in the MOPH, but also in other ministries (such as the creation 
of a 'zoning' policy by the MOI). Unclear policy messages and a lack of feedback 
mechanisms intensified the implementation complexity. 
Though the government attempted to 'sweep and clean' undocumented/illegal migrants 
in Thailand, there still existed some undocumented/illegal migrants (the exact figure was 
unknown), who failed to join the OSS. The registration cost was a critical concern for 
migrant workers and their employers. Support from employers was an important factor 
that determined the participation in the registration process and the acquisition of all 
essential documents, such as work permit and insurance card. Reliance on brokers to 
help pass through the registration rigmarole was common practice amongst both migrant 
workers and Thai employers. NGOs also played an important role in providing support 
to migrants who slipped off the registration track, and in helping facilities to fill service 
gaps (such as mobilising resources to employ migrant health workers at health centres, 
in order to avoid difficulties in hiring illegal/undocumented migrants via normal 
bureaucratic channels). 
With the above challenges, this does not mean that the HICS policy has no merits. The 
important benefits of the HICS on its beneficiaries, as examined in the third study 
objective (Chapter 7) are as follows. Firstly, the HICS helped increase access to care of 
its insurees. Secondly, it did reduce OOP at point of care. Catastrophic illness was the 
main factor that contributed to higher utilisation volume, and this effect was stronger 
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than the insurance effect alone. Besides, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
disease status and the HICS was quite large, but was still smaller than the UCS##disease 
interaction term's coefficient.  
In conclusion, the difficulties surrounding migrant healthcare policies in Thailand can be 
explained by four overarching themes (Chapter 8). Firstly, there are conflicts and 
disharmony in migrant policies at all levels of the policy process, starting from the 
unclear directions/objectives at the agenda setting stage, to the implementation phase, 
where the street-level bureaucrats adapted the policies in diverse ways.  
Secondly, despite having enormous responsibility, it seems that the MOPH, the sole 
governing body of the HICS, does not have adequate capacity for managing the 
insurance with efficiency, transparency and accountability. The key problem is that the 
MOPH is locked into an obsolete bureaucracy that prevents the authority from keeping 
pace with the dynamics of surrounding policies.   
Thirdly, though a registration policy is a sensible attempt to resolve 
nationality/citizenship problems of the illegal immigrants, it created a catch-22 situation.  
That is, the use of hard-power authorities (such as police and the MOI officers) to 
enforce the registration indirectly made some undocumented/illegal migrants (in 
unknown numbers) evade registration. Also, the Thai government seemed to ignore the 
fact that the registration policy was just a temporary measure to help solve citizenship 
problems of those in limbo. There was a lack of supporting measures to clear up all 
potential problems throughout the migration process. Many important questions have 
been left unaddressed, for instance, so far it has been unclear how to deal with registered 
migrants who were denied nationality of any country in the world (in other words, these 
migrants became stateless persons), or how to encourage Thai employers to recruit 
migrants through a fully legalised channel (like the MOU policy) rather than awaiting 
another round of registration.  
Fourthly, this study found that the HICS was an income generator for some facilities. 
Though the HICS created additional burden to a facility due to its positive effect on 
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utilisation volume for its beneficiaries, the overall utilisation rate of the HICS 
beneficiaries was still smaller than that of Thai UCS patients. Thus, the policy and social 
discourse claiming that insuring undocumented/illegal migrants overloaded the Thai 
healthcare system might not be justified. Besides, the most important factor that 
determined the number of visits was not insurance status, but it was in essence the 
disease condition, and the disease effect on utilisation volume was more apparent in 
Thai UCS patients than insured migrants. Such a discovery suggested that there might 
be migrants with catastrophic illness who were neither insured, nor able to return to their 
home country (and the result from qualitative chapters confirmed this observation). 
Unless policies to protect the health of this population are put in place, poor access to 
care for the uninsured will continue being a serious public health problem, not only to 
migrant communities but also to Thai society in general. 
9.2 Contribution to knowledge  
Prior to the description of policy recommendations, it is imperative to consider how this 
thesis contributed additional knowledge to the issue of migrant healthcare and to the 
area of health policy and systems research as a whole. Firstly, as presented in Chapter 2 
and 3, most literature has explored migrant healthcare issues through a health lens, but 
very little literature has delved into the interaction between healthcare policy and 
surrounding political environments. This study contributed to filling this gap by 
encompassing economic and state security perspectives in the investigation. 
Secondly, while most literature suggested there was/were always gap(s) between policy 
objectives and policy implementation, in this case little was known about how local 
implementers adapted their practice towards the policy, and why such adaptive 
behaviour took place. This thesis scrutinised this point quite thoroughly.  
Thirdly, the study reinforced the value of existing theory, such as that of Street-Level 
Bureaucracy. The thesis also expanded the theory in some ways, for instance, by 
suggesting that adaptive behaviour towards the policy could happen anywhere in the 
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policy process, not just among frontline staff. Even service users, in this case, also found 
a way to 'survive' through the frequent changes in policies.   
Fourthly, though in the last decade there has been considerable growth in the quantity of 
health policy and systems literature, most studies are performed in developed countries. 
Ghaffar et al (2016) underscored that health policy analysis in LMICs was still in an 
early phase of development. Also, this study, despite being limited to Thailand, might be 
beneficial to health systems researchers in other settings. This is because Thailand has a 
relatively advanced healthcare system like that of many developed countries, but the 
majority of its population is engaged in the informal sector, as in many developing 
nations.  
Lastly, narrowing down to a Thai context, this study is one of the very first studies that 
explored the outcomes of the HICS after more than a decade of implementation.  
From a methodological point of view, this thesis is an example for health policy and 
systems researchers of how to utilise several research methods to answer research 
questions in real-world settings. A variety of data collection techniques and analysis 
tools were used. The multi-methods approach enabled the researcher to address each 
method's limitations/weaknesses, and helped strengthen the scientific soundness of the 
findings. 
9.3 Policy recommendations for improving healthcare 
access of migrants in Thailand 
This section presents key policy recommendations that may help improve the 
management of migrant health policies in Thailand. The recommendations are divided 
into two strands: macro-policy and micro-policy. The macro-policy recommendations 
focus mainly on long term political commitments and actions which require mutual 
agreements between government sectors, while the micro-policy recommendations are 
more sector-specific. Note that all recommendations provided here are just a starting 
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point. To adopt these recommendations in reality, much more work needs to be done, 
and there should be further studies on feasibility, efficiency and equity of these 
measures. 
I. Macro-policy recommendations 
1. Commitment of the government to provide health security for everybody in 
Thailand 
The government should send a strong political message that all residents in Thailand, 
regardless of immigration and citizenship status, must have health security. In fact, this 
recommendation is not something new to the government. In the global politics, 
Thailand is a party to many international laws/conventions that ratify the 'rights to 
health' of a person, regardless of his/her citizenship status, such as the 1948 UDHR, the 
1966 ICCPR, and the 1966 ICESCR. 
In the national politics, many public authorities have already recognised this; for 
instance, the NHSO strategy for 2012-206 stated that, 'All people in Thailand are 
assured under the Universal Health Coverage', and the MOPH Border Health Plan 
(2012-2016) also emphasised the word 'all people' in one of its strategies (National 
Health Security Office, 2014, Bureau of Policy and Strategy, 2012).  
Yet in practice this concept is recognised only within the health sector, with little 
emphasis from non-health authorities and even the overarching government. The 
government should be aware that currently, the UHC is not just a matter of health, but it 
is now a global agenda. The UNGA Resolution (2012) acknowledged that the UHC is a 
key instrument to enhancing health, social cohesion and sustainable human and 
economic development.  
Recently, the UNGA also approved the Post-2015 SDGs, where UHC is set as an 
important development goal (Goal 3.8). So far, the HICS is regarded as a concrete 
attempt to cover 'everybody' in Thailand as part of the way to achieving UHC (at least, 
in theory). However, unclear political messages as to whether the HICS is for 
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'everybody' or 'only registered migrant workers', has led to substantial room for 
interpretation and finally resulted in confusion in policy implementation.  
Of course, saying that everyone on Thai soil is to be insured does not mean that all 
problems will be cleared up: there are still many challenges to work on. At least, it 
might indicate a strong political commitment to UHC. Hidden problems regarding 
migrant health would be recognised and discussed more openly.  
From the political angle, this message would indirectly help the Thai government refute 
allegations of breaching human rights according to international laws.  
From a health economics perspective, this thesis shows that having health insurance per 
se is not a factor that creates much additional burden (in terms of number of visits) on 
the Thai healthcare system. Leaving migrants uninsured might result in patients visiting 
a facility at a more advanced stage of disease, and such a situation might consume more 
healthcare resources than insuring everybody and promoting access to treatment at the 
first opportunity. 
2. Formulation of clear legal grounds for the health sector to support its 
role/responsibility  
To implement the above recommendation, there should be strong legal grounds for 
responsible authorities. One might learn from the success of the pathway towards the 
UHC in Thailand. The main three public insurance schemes, namely, the CSMBS, the 
SSS, and the UCS, are founded on a strong legal basis. The 2002 National Health Act 
ratified the foundation of the UCS in the same way as the 1980 Royal Decree for the 
CSMBS and the 1990 Social Security Act for the SSS. In contrast, the HICS is 
established through a 'ministerial announcement', which is a weak legal instrument and 
subject to change according to shifts in politics. 
An additional challenge is that, although the OSS is like a new overarching policy that 
incorporates work of the MOI, the MOL, and the MOPH, there has not been 
fundamental change in the power and the responsibility of each authority.  
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In addition, the OSS itself was founded in special circumstances. Its legal status was 
physically under the Order of the junta (unlike an Act or Cabinet Resolution). This 
situation leads to a concern over what will happen in the coming election when the 
military government relinquishes its power and OSS functions are replaced by routine 
bureaucracy.  
Therefore this thesis suggests that the political commitment to UHC will materialise if 
and only if there is a strong legal foundation (not just a statement appearing in the 
strategy/vision of an organisation) that affirms the rights to health for 'all' people.  This 
will help raise the importance of the health authorities, placing them on a par with the 
national security and economic authorities in terms of policy making.  
3. Ensuring proper treatment for migrants who fail to pass the health check 
With reference to earlier recommendations, one concrete measure to support the 
enrolment of all migrants to UHC is delinking the acquisition of insurance from the 
disease screening outcome. So far, a migrant, who wishes to buy the insurance, will be 
eligible to be insured only if he/she passes the health check first, and above all if a 
doctor considers he/she is fit enough for work and is not affected by any disease(s) 
specified in the negative list (such as active tuberculosis, filariasis, elephantitis, and drug 
dependence). This regulation is illogical in protecting public health benefits for the 
whole population for the following reasons.  
Firstly, current regulations requires a migrant with disease(s) indicated in the negative 
list to be deported without any supporting measures to ensure that he/she will receive 
proper treatment either in Thailand or in the country to which he/she is deported. The 
findings from Chapter 5 and 6 clearly suggest that, with a long Burmese-Thai border 
and numerous natural crossing points, it is almost impossible to completely block illegal 
immigration. Therefore, a better way to protect public health benefits is not deporting 
those with infected cases but treating them. The government should stipulate that the 
deportation must not take place unless proper treatment is ensured. In fact, previous 
governments indirectly admitted that the deportation of sick migrants is poorly enforced. 
That is why there always existed a number of uninsured migrants infected with public 
312 
 
health threat diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and TB, and governments tackled this problem 
by asking for funding from international donors. Such an approach however creates 
concerns over its sustainability. 
Secondly, one might argue that the health check is designed to ensure the financial 
sustainability of the scheme by allowing only the 'healthy' to be insured. Yet, in reality, 
judging who is or is not 'fit enough' for work appears to be quite arbitrary, and therefore 
does not function as a way to ‘protect’ the health financing system. In addition, health 
screening should be done under certain prerequisites: (1) the burden of illness is high, 
(2) the screening and confirmatory tests are accurate, (3) early treatment (or prevention) 
must be more effective than late treatment, (4) the test(s) and the treatment(s) must be 
safe, and (5) the cost of the screening strategy must be commensurate with the potential 
benefit (Dans et al., 2011). However, the current health check for the HICS was not 
based on the above grounds. The screening of negative-list diseases for immigrants was 
established with reference to the Decree of the Office of the Council of State (1992), 
which was designed to block infected immigrants at point of entry into the country, 
rather than to check if a migrant (who had already crossed the border) is eligible to be 
insured. 
Thirdly, the HICS is state-run insurance, not voluntary insurance, and applying 
voluntary insurance concepts to public insurance might contradict the initial policy 
intention to protect vulnerable groups. Thailand may learn from some developed 
countries, such as Germany and the UK, where the public sector plays a dominant role 
in managing insurance for undocumented/illegal migrants, also a health check result is 
not a prerequisite for obtaining the insurance (Grit et al., 2012). This is because the 
social motivation of the insurance is more critical than the financial benefit. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the health check for immigrants should be 
completely abandoned. It is sensible to require the health screening as a condition for 
acquiring a work permit as this will mitigate a risk of having communicable diseases 
spread to migrants' (and also Thais') communities, but to prohibit sick migrants from 
being insured is not sensible at all. Migrants can benefit from the health check by 
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becoming more aware of their own personal health conditions and by being empowered 
to take preventative or curative actions. Therefore, health screening should be used in a 
way that helps migrants integrate into receiving communities and assists healthcare 
providers to take prompt action in caring for migrants, not to exclude persons with 
certain health conditions from being insured. The MOPH should work more closely with 
the MOI and the MOL to help migrants who do not pass the health check obtain 
insurance, or at least have proper treatment before being deported. 
4. Establishment of an efficient, transparent, and low cost system for insuring all 
migrants 
As discussed in Chapter 8, no matter how harshly the registration policy was enforced 
there still existed a large number of illegal/undocumented migrants outside the system. 
A major cause of this phenomenon was the cost of registration (perceived by migrants as 
too expensive). The OSS was a sensible attempt to facilitate the registration process, 
however, there was still a long way to go. The cost of registration should be made clear 
at the outset and the government should establish a system where migrants and 
employers can report the officials in charge if the intervention by private intermediaries 
pushes the cost of registration beyond the specified limit. Today is where a window of 
opportunity opens since the junta has absolute administrative power and hence a prompt 
decision can be made.  
Besides, this recommendation might be part of the government's measures to tackle 
human trafficking, which is a priority issue in international politics. Another measure to 
recruit more migrants to the registration process is to improve collaboration between 
local healthcare providers and local MOI officers in surveying all migrant households in 
the catchment areas of health facilities. Undocumented/illegal migrants are more 
accessible to local healthcare officers than MOI staff or police. This recommendation 
does not create much additional burden on local health staff since they need to survey all 
residents in the facility's catchment area as part of their routine work to make patients' 
family folders. However, due to poor regulation from the MOPH, family folder 
information is hardly updated, and most healthcare providers do not make best use of it. 
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Note that, to make the survey constructive and really reach the vulnerable group as 
intended, the government should make it clear that information from the survey will be 
used for tackling heath and citizenship problems of migrants rather than for penalty or 
deportation (which is actually beyond the role and responsibility of the MOPH). With a 
transparent, effective, and low cost registration process, it might be possible to terminate 
this vicious cycle, and at the same time, to undermine the counterfeit brokers and 
trafficking syndicate.  
5. Ensuring adequate and sustainable infrastructure management of the HICS   
It is clear that the HICS' governing body (the MOPH) encounters a number of 
constraints in managing the HICS due to its bureaucratic structure and limited capacity. 
To make the stewardship of the HICS more effective, the government should re-
consider the very basic question, that is, if there are other authorities aside from the 
MOPH that are able to administer the HICS. Though this thesis did not aim to compare 
in depth the capacity and feasibility to manage the HICS between organisations, there 
exist some options that are worth discussing as follows. 
 Alternative 1: The NHSO as the HICS' governing body—There are a 
number of advantages to this option. Firstly, the NHSO has established strong 
institutional capacity in terms of funding, technology, and skilled human resources. The 
UCS beneficiary data are linked with the MOI data via the 13-digit ID. This means that 
once the registration for residence permit takes place (registration for residence permit 
and issuance of 13-digit occur simultaneously), a migrant will be automatically insured. 
This approach also helps reduce registration red tape as a migrant can pay the 
registration fee and the insurance premium at the same time. This is in contrast to 
current practice, where the purchase of the insurance card and the payment of the MOI 
registration fee are managed separately.  
Secondly, regarding health financing, the NHSO has a larger pooling size, resulting in a 
larger risk sharing and a stronger negotiating power in purchasing high-cost drugs or 
medical items. Also, with larger risk sharing, managing the HICS as recommended will 
help reduce instances where hospitals refuse to sell the insurance card to unhealthy 
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migrants. This is because the financial risk will be shared at the country level rather by 
individual hospitals.  
Thirdly, managing migrant insurance under the NHSO will open opportunities to apply 
a tax-based financing system to the HICS. This approach is similar to some developed 
countries, such as the UK and Italy, where undocumented/illegal migrants, once 
registered, will be insured by the main public insurance scheme like native citizens, and 
this will help tackle the operational problems of the HICS re its de facto voluntary 
nature (for example, some migrants avoiding buying the insurance due to economic 
concerns). This option suggests that using a tax-based system instead of premium-based 
financing might be more appropriate in the Thai context. This alternative does not 
necessarily mean that undocumented/illegal migrants should be able to enjoy equal 
benefits to Thai nationals. However, there should be more studies to establish an 
appropriate benefit package. There are several international experiences to learn from 
(see Chapter 2). For example, in France the benefit package for undocumented/illegal 
migrants is related to length of stay in the country. Another example is the UK, where 
undocumented/migrants are liable to pay out-of-pocket for some advanced treatments, 
but this can be waived in the case of public health threat conditions, such as TB and 
certain infectious diseases.    
Lastly, this approach is also in line with the government attempts to harmonise various 
public insurance schemes in terms of financing management and benefit packages. 
However, there are some challenges, one of which is a demand for strong political 
commitment to overcome political tensions between the MOPH and the NHSO. Besides, 
there must be a strong political push to help the NHSO get through the legal deadlock 
which originated from the verdict of the Office of the Council of State. Another 
challenge is this option may require extra tax financing and a sound system that ensures 
an effective tax collection from migrants. However, one may argue that the extra tax 
financing may not be necessary since migrants have already contributed to the system 
via indirect tax similar to most Thai citizens.   
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 Alternative 2: The MOPH as the HICS' governing body—This option is the 
status quo management. The advantages of this option are: firstly, the MOPH has been 
regulating the migrant insurance scheme for over a decade, thus the authority has 
extensive experience in migrant insurance management, and secondly, the MOPH faces 
less legal constraint compared to the NHSO since the MOPH was already vouchsafed 
power to manage the HICS from the Cabinet Resolution (however, one may argue that 
the Cabinet is able to grant this HICS governing power to the NHSO as well if there is a 
strong political will).  
Yet, there are some downsides. Firstly, the MOPH has far less institutional capacity than 
the NHSO in managing the HICS. To overcome this challenge, an extensive 
bureaucratic reform is required, not just for the MOPH but for all public authorities in 
Thailand (and it is doubtful that whether the reform would really happen and to what 
extent it would be successful).  
Secondly, the financial management of the HICS is the responsibility of each individual 
facility. Even though the MOPH might change the HICS financial management by 
pooling the card revenue at the central level, the HICS' risk pooling is still far smaller 
than the UCS (~1.5 million HICS beneficiaries versus 47 million UCS beneficiaries).  
Thirdly, this approach might be against the government direction that attempts to unify 
or harmonise different public insurance schemes in Thailand.  
Fourthly, this option means that the MOPH will act as both purchaser and provider, and 
this contradicts the purchaser-provider split concept, which is widely accepted as means 
for ensuring accountability and efficiency of the health system. 
 Alternative 3: The SSO as the governing body—The SSO is now managing 
the SSS, which is the social insurance for (both Thai and non-Thai) legal workers. There 
are some advantages to this option. Firstly, the SSS has a larger pooling size 
(approximately ~10 million); though not as large as the UCS, it is still far bigger than 
the HICS.  
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Secondly, this alternative is still consistent with the government's direction to harmonise 
the three different public insurance schemes.  
Thirdly, the contracted facilities of the SSS encompass both public and private 
hospitals/clinics and the insurees can register themselves with any facilities near their 
workplace, which will accommodate the mobile behaviour of migrants as well.  
Fourthly, the SSS has quite a well-founded capacity that can help manage migrant 
insurance more effectively. 
The challenges of this approach are as follows. Firstly, the SSS still covers workers in 
the formal sector only. Though, literally, the Social Security Act requires all employers 
with at least 'one employee' to be insured, the SSO has records of only the formal 
entrepreneurs. Thus, unless the system to track records of the informal workers is in 
place, it is very likely a number of migrant workers will be left out.  
Secondly, the SSS does not cover dependants of its insurees. Should the SSS take over 
the role/responsibility of the MOPH in insuring all migrant workers and their 
dependants, this might create a conflict amongst the Thai workers because, at present, 
the Thai workers' dependants are not covered by the SSS.  
Thirdly, the SSS does not cover health promotion and prevention activities for its 
beneficiaries as these functions are entrusted to the UCS. Hence, should the SSS manage 
the insurance for migrants, this will lead to a difficult situation. That is, if the SSS used a 
similar approach to the Thai beneficiaries, health promotion activities for migrant 
insurees would not be in the benefit package, and the UCS would need to set aside part 
of its budget for health promotion activities for migrants (and this approach might create 
another problem given the existing legal interpretation re the NHSO’s responsibility). In 
contrast, if the SSS extended its benefit package to include health promotion activities 
for migrant insurees, would this be seen as unfair treatment for Thai SSS insurees? This 
question is another instance of challenges that demand further work.  
Lastly, the monthly contribution of the SSS is much higher than the existing premium of 
the HICS. The monthly contribution of the SSS, which an employer and an employee 
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must defray, is set at 5% of the employee's salary. Now the minimum daily wage of a 
worker in Thailand is set at 300 Baht (US$ 9) by law. Suppose migrants receive the 
minimum daily wage, a rough calculation suggests that a migrant would need to make 
an annual contribution to the SSS of around 5,000 Baht (US$ 152). This figure is much 
higher than the current card premium, and even at the current card price, some migrants 
still refuse to buy the insurance card, so let alone make the SSS contribution. 
II. Micro-policy recommendations 
1. Launching clear message from the MOPH to include all migrants 
The MOPH should send a clear message on whether the current insurance policy is still 
open to 'all' migrants or just to 'migrant workers'. This confusion often leads to 
haphazard policy implementation. Results from Chapter 6 showed that the majority of 
migrants in Thailand were involved in the informal sector and some were even self-
employed. These migrants did work and contribute to the Thai economy but were not 
recognised as 'workers'.  
In addition, the OSS policy stipulated that 'migrant workers' and 'dependants' were 
eligible to buy the insurance once registered; 365 Baht for a child aged less than 7 and 
1,600 Baht for an adult. This message indirectly indicated that a 'dependant' referred to a 
child aged below 7 and an adult worker had to pay 1,600 Baht for the insurance. As 
mentioned by the interview in Chapter 6, with the existing regulation, a child aged 
between 8 and 15 was likely to fall into this policy gap, that is, he/she was neither able 
to acquire the work permit nor eligible to buy the 365-Baht insurance (since his/her age 
was above 7).  
Given a blurred line between 'workers' and 'non-workers' and between 'workers' and 
'dependants', this thesis argues that the policy should aim to include 'all' migrants rather 
than just 'migrant workers', and set the cut-off point for 'dependants' at the age of 15 (or 
even 18 if this follows the international standards, for instance, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child) to make the health insurance policy more consistent with other child 
protection measures. 
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2. Integrating information systems 
The MOPH should consider integrating the information of the HICS with the SSS. This 
will enable the government to track records of migrants, who have already passed the 
nationality verification and are being employed in the formal sector, since, by law, their 
entitlements should be switched to the SSS. In addition, the MOPH should work closely 
with the MOI and the MOL to track records of migrants who failed to be verified of 
their nationality since these migrants will become 'stateless' persons. Though the 
government has already endorsed the national strategy to tackle citizenship problems of 
stateless people since 2005, the strategy mainly focused on ethnic minorities or 
highlanders who failed to register for their citizenship since birth while ignoring the fact 
that migrants could be stateless as well. Therefore, a seamless information linkage 
between authorities is indispensable. 
3. Approving the employment of migrant health workers to work for health 
facilities 
The MOPH should come to an agreement with the MOL in order to address restrictions 
to hiring low-skilled migrants to work as health personnel. Migrant health workers and 
volunteers (MHWs/MHVs) play an important role in reaching hard-to-reach populations 
and assisting health professionals to provide services and promote health education for 
migrant communities. The MHWs/MHVs can help bridge cultural and linguistic gaps 
between migrant patients and Thai health professionals. The limitations in employing 
these migrants stem from the legacy of the 1978 Working of Alien Act, and in reality, 
this Act is poorly enforced. Currently, health facilities use various tactics to hire 
migrants as health personnel, such as seeking support from NGOs or specifying in the 
work permit that a migrant is hired as household maid or manual labour, but in practice 
he/she is employed as a health worker or as an interpreter at health centres. Although 
such an approach is not wrong, there exists a concern over its sustainability.  
This recommendation does not mean that migrant workers can perform all clinical tasks 
as normal health workers. If this issue is raised and discussed more extensively, it will 
be possible to specify which tasks migrants are allowed to perform. Also, this 
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recommendation might be beneficial to the MOPH in regulating and supervising the 
quality of service provided by MHWs/MHVs in a more systematic manner, rather than 
letting the MHWs/MHVs employment system function under the radar as at present.    
4. Reorienting the process of recruiting migrants via the MOU channel 
This recommendation is a 'quick-win' measure that may complement the earlier macro-
policy recommendations. Since now there exists an MOU channel for legally recruiting 
migrant workers, the MOL should revise this channel to make it less costly and more 
convenient. Currently, there are no additional health insurance or other fringe benefits 
for a migrant recruited through the MOU, relative to entering the country illegally and 
seeking work via other means (including the black market). This recommendation would 
indirectly help reduce interference in the recruitment system by crooked brokers and to 
some extent help prevent trafficking problems.  
5. Establishing an effective communication channel  
A feedback channel that healthcare providers and service users can use to voice their 
concerns to the MOPH should be established as a matter of urgency. The MOPH should 
learn from the NHSO's 24-hour helpline, which has been in place since the inception of 
the UCS. A patient can check his/her insurance status and eligible benefits through the 
helpline and can make a complaint to the NHSO if he/she faces seemingly poor quality 
or unfair treatment. It does not mean that the system is flawless, but it is an important 
factor contributing to an increase in service satisfaction in both UCS providers and 
service users over the past decade (National Health Security Office, 2014). In contrast, 
after more than a decade of the HICS, information on patient and provider satisfaction is 
unavailable, and this point is one of many reasons that intensify the confusion in the 
HICS implementation. In practice, the MOPH could entrust this function to the NHSO 
by using the same helpline number for both the HICS and the UCS. This would also 
serve as another step towards harmonisation/unification between schemes as per the 
government's direction.  
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In addition, this recommendation is likely to reduce confusion in policy implementation 
and to assist the MOPH to monitor and regulate health facilities under its control. It does 
not mean that local implementers should not have any flexibility in exercising or 
adapting central authority policies, because results from fieldwork show that some 
adaptive behaviours are positive to both migrants and healthcare providers. The bottom 
line is that, without effective communication, the MOPH will not be able to know if and 
to what extent the adaptive behaviours of local implementers are acceptable and really 
benefit the health of the populations in the society as a whole.    
9.4 Recommendations for research priorities 
1. Expanding research to cover all non-Thai populations 
One of the most important limitations of this thesis is that a number of non-Thai 
populations remain unexplored. The focus of this thesis was on the implementation of 
the HICS, which is mainly related to migrant workers and dependants from CLM 
nations. In reality, Thailand has a vast range of non-Thai residents, from the better-off 
groups, such as tourists and high-skilled foreign workers, to the vulnerable ones, for 
instance, refugees, urban detainees, the Rohingya, and stateless persons. Each group has 
its own idiosyncrasies, and overlapping features. Besides, even within a particular 
group, there may be differences in baseline characteristics, economic status, and health-
seeking patterns. For instance, some western foreigners may suffer from poor economic 
status while, at the other end of the spectrum, some CLM illegal/undocumented 
migrants may have good quality of life. Thus, further research, which delves into the 
unique characteristics and health problems of each migrant group, and then contrasts  
the research findings across groups, might be useful to the design and arrangement of a 
health service system for all types of migrants in Thailand. 
2. Conducting a household survey on non-Thai populations 
A survey on migrants' access to care at household level could help answer the research 
questions of this thesis more thoroughly. Though this study analysed more than a 
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million records, the analysis is still limited to those who presented at health facilities. 
This knowledge gap cannot be addressed unless a household survey is carried out.  
3. Research on equity  
Further studies on the equity aspect of the insurance will help illuminate whether and to 
what extent the HICS really addresses the health problems of the poor. Equity in 
healthcare use and fairness in public health subsidies are important concerns in current 
policy making. Migrants are perceived as vulnerable compared to Thai citizens, but even 
amongst the vulnerable, there are disparities in socio-economic status between groups. 
As shown in Chapter 6, some migrant interviewees lived in deprived communities and 
suffered financial hardship, while some had a well-established house with favourable 
income.  
Though this study had an impression that better-off migrants benefited more from the 
HICS than the poor, it still lacks quantitative evidence to confirm this. Since the facility-
based records used in Chapter 7 lacked socio-economic variables, such as income, 
savings, assets and living conditions (and this is understandable as these variables are of 
little use in service provision), many inequity indicators (such as Gini index, Benefit 
Incidence index, and Kakwani index) cannot be analysed. Also, the equity analysis 
should be applied in all types of non-Thai populations. For example, it might be also 
interesting to explore the validity of the assumption (mentioned by one of the 
interviewees in Chapter 5) that western foreigners should not be eligible for the HICS as 
they are better-off. Is there any inequity in healthcare access between poor migrants and 
poor westerners? If so, how large is the gap?         
4. Research on the use of biometric data for improving the information systems 
on migrants 
In terms of health information data, further studies on the use of biometric data, and 
improvements to MOPH facility data recording systems, might be useful. One of the key 
limitations in Chapter 7 is the inability to find a good unique identifier for a migrant 
patient, and without this, accurate analysis of patients' utilisation patterns cannot be 
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achieved. In addition, a lack of accurate utilisation data will affect policy making in the 
long run. As immigration and citizenship status is fluid, a good unique identifier should 
attach to a real person, not a number. This is why a biometric information system comes 
into play. However, the application of biometric data still has caveats since it might 
breach individual privacy, and there should be measures to ensure that the data will not 
be used for discriminating against patients or for any uses that are against human rights. 
All potential benefits and caveats of the use of biometric data should be explored. 
5. Research on alternative financing mechanisms 
This point is linked with the above recommendations, which suggest that the 
government should aim at providing health protection for everybody on Thai soil. 
However, this does not mean that everybody can enjoy all health benefits free of charge. 
Different financing systems may be proper for different migrant groups. Future research 
questions on health financing should encompass all financing aspects, not just who 
should defray the cost of the insurance card, and the value of the premium. Other 
relevant questions that should be further investigated include whether the existing card 
price reflects the true cost of services, or to what extent the current payment mechanism 
is financially equitable.  
Examples of possible financing alternatives are a tax-based system (like the UCS), 
payroll contributions (like the SSS), micro-credit mechanisms (like Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh), and donor-driven innovative financing mechanisms (like the Global Fund 
for TB, AIDS, and Malaria). None of the mechanisms are flawless, and of course, there 
can be nuanced differences in the insurance arrangements for migrants and Thai 
citizens. Further studies that explore benefits and downsides, and feasibility of other 
financing alternatives, will be definitely helpful for future policy decision.  
An example of a future research question is whether integrating the HICS into the UCS 
but adjusting the HICS benefit package according to a beneficiary's length of stay in the 
country (like in France) is an effective means for providing financial protection for all 
undocumented/illegal migrants in Thailand.   
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6. Research on social phenomena regarding the social perceptions towards 
migrants  
Local officers’ policy responses and adaptations are determined by various factors. 
Though this thesis has identified some factors that explain this phenomenon, such as 
policy volatility, outdated bureaucracy and legal limitations, there are still other causes 
that were left untouched (or just superficially explored), for instance, media role, social 
stigma, and the influence of education. To investigate these elements, alternative study 
designs and methods are needed. Ethnographic research, media studies and historical 
studies are all approaches worth exploring. 
7. Costing studies 
There should be studies on the real 'cost' of treating migrants as this will help inform the 
price set for the insurance card if the scheme revenue is still based on the card premium. 
This study explored payment by migrant patients, but that is a 'charge' indicated by each 
facility, not a true 'cost'. A unit cost study is needed and demands a different study 
design. The current premium is derived from a political decision rather than economic 
grounds. Besides, the unit cost study alone cannot answer a question about how much a 
migrant should pay for the card, unless a household survey is conducted in parallel. This 
is because information on non-users must be taken into account. Similar costing studies 
may be performed for other groups of migrants as well, such as seasonal workers, 
overseas visitors, and cross-border commuters.      
8. Research on the feasibility of establishing cross-border insurance 
There should be studies on the feasibility of establishing cross-border insurance in the 
ASEAN context. Now is an opportune period for starting this initiative since the 
ASEAN Community is formally open, and its country members are calling for better 
health protection for 'all' people in the Community. ASEAN countries may learn from 
the experiences in an already established Community like the EU. This point is also in 
line with the aim of achieving UHC in all countries in ASEAN. It does not mean that the 
insurance arrangement/design must be similar in all ASEAN countries. Future research 
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may start with some micro-functions at the borders, such as how to ensure a seamless 
and effective cross-country referral system between hospitals, then gradually broaden 
the study scope to cover all aspects of the insurance arrangements. However, this is not 
an easy path as the ASEAN Community is like a microcosm of the world with a great 
variation in terms of social, economic and political contexts.  Yet Thailand is in a good 
position to be at the forefront of studies in this area, since the country has extensive 
experience of managing migrant health insurance and has already achieved UHC for its 
domestic population for more than a decade. 
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Appendix 1: Data extraction table of the literature review on health-
seeking barriers of migrants 
Table 43 Main findings of the 28 selected articles for the literature review on health-seeking barriers of migrants 
Author(s), year Setting and participants Study objectives or research 
questions 
Main findings
1. Aranda-Naranjo 
et al (2000) 
South Texas, the US/ 13 HIV-
positive migrant seasonal farm 
workers (MSFWs) 
(1) How did HIV-positive MSFWs 
live with this disease?, (2) How did 
they seek healthcare?, and (3) What 
factors facilitated or hindered their 
care seeking behaviour?   
The disruptive migrating behaviour had 
increased the likelihood of HIV 
exposure. Men migrating alone 
increased their risk of HIV infection 
because of unsafe sexual practices 
regardless of their marital status. 
Access to HIV information was quite 
difficult due to language barrier and 
difference in cultural beliefs as sex and 
AIDS issues were not openly discussed 
in Hispanic culture.
2. Arcury et al 
(2006) 
North Carolina, the US/ 30 
Latino farmworkers 
To investigate the self-management 
practices of  skin diseases amongst 
Latino migrants and seasonal 
farmworkers in North Carolina   
Self-care actions of hygiene, home 
remedies and use of over-the-counter 
medicine were common practices of 
farmworkers in coping with skin 
diseases. While most migrants 
recognised the benefits of medical care, 
they were also mindful of barriers to its 
use. These barriers included difficulties 
in transportation and getting time off to 
health facility, and language difference.
3. Aslam et al 
(2009) 
Sydney, Australia/ 5 Indian 
migrant women 
To explore socio-cultural influences 
on decision makings and beliefs of 
migrant mothers with regards to co-
Health providers often advised migrant 
women to take the baby to sleep in 
his/her own cot. Yet, the participants 
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Author(s), year Setting and participants Study objectives or research 
questions 
Main findings
sleeping as a risk factor for sudden 
infant death syndrome (SIDS) 
usually resisted the advice of health 
practitioners. This resistance was tied 
with their cultural value since co-
sleeping was regarded as means to 
facilitating child security, increasing 
breastfeeding, and strengthening family 
bonding and connectedness.
4. Aung et al 
(2010) 
London, the UK/ 11 Burmese 
migrants in London   
To evaluate (1) the knowledge of 
Burmese migrants on health services 
in Greater London, (2) the level of 
access to and utilisation of General 
Practice (GP) services, and (3) 
hindrances faced during registration 
with GPs and when consulting GPs, 
and also socio-demographic 
disparities in access to care. 
Unsecure immigration status, shorter 
duration of stay and having lower age 
were key barriers to healthcare access 
amongst Burmese migrants. Many 
migrants did not recognise the 
importance of being registered to GPs 
since in Burma, patients were not 
required to be registered with primary 
care doctor. Some migrants coped with 
difficulty in access to care by self-
medication, and bringing medicine 
when they left Burma since, unlike in 
UK, most of this medicine did not need 
official prescription.  
5. Biswas et al 
(2011) 
Copenhagen, Denmark/ 10 
undocumented South Asian 
migrants 
To analyse experiences of 
undocumented migrants regarding 
the access to care and the use of 
alternative health-seeking strategies 
in Denmark 
The barriers to care of migrants 
included limited medical rights, 
uncertainty in healthcare professionals’ 
attitudes, fear of being reported to the 
police, language incompetency, lack of 
knowledge about the Danish healthcare 
system, and lack of knowledge about 
networks of health professionals. 
Numerous coping strategies were 
applied, including self-medication, 
contacting doctors in countries of origin 
and borrowing health insurance cards 
from Danish peers.
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Author(s), year Setting and participants Study objectives or research 
questions 
Main findings
6. Blignault et al 
(2008) 
Sydney, Australia/ 9 China-born 
patients  
To investigate factors that relate to 
the low utilisation rate of mental care 
services in Chinese immigrants in 
Australia 
The participants identified several 
factors that limited access to mental 
healthcare and undermined the quality 
of care acquired. These factors included 
mental health literacy, communication 
difficulties, stigma, confidentiality 
concerns, and other service constraints 
(eg the unavailability of professional 
interpreters and long waiting time).
7. Bollini et al 
(2007) 
Turkish and Portuguese 
communities in Switzerland/ 40 
women with pregnancy 
experience in Switzerland (9 
Swiss, 14 Turkish, and 17 
Portuguese women)  
To examine the issues of pregnancy 
and delivery in migrant women and 
in their interaction with the 
healthcare system in Switzerland 
Migrant women in Switzerland were 
confronted with many stressful 
situations (such as precarious living 
conditions, heavy work during 
pregnancy, communication barriers, 
and feelings of racism and 
discrimination). In contrast, Swiss 
women tended to complain over the 
complexity of the health insurance 
system, lack of information about their 
rights, economic barriers, and excessive 
medicalisation.
8. Castaneda 
(2013) 
Germany (specific study site, not 
specified)/ street-based male sex 
workers (SMSWs) from 
Romania and Bulgaria (The total 
number of all respondents, 
including physicians, health 
department staff and migrants, 
was 46, but the exact number of 
migrant interviewees was not 
reported in the article.) 
To analyse the health issues 
encountered by SMSWs in Germany 
in light of the response to economic 
opportunities (freedom of movement 
across European countries) and 
constraints (measures limiting access 
to labour market) 
Most migrant SMSWs were not 
registered as legitimate residents since 
they could not afford to rent an 
accommodation in their own. 
Therefore, they could not obtain a 
business license required for the 
registration. Most migrant SMSWs 
were in lower age group. Thus, they 
were ignorant about possible threats to 
their health and were more willing to 
take risks. Lack of job prospects, 
language barriers and insecure housing 
pushed them to work in risky settings.  
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Author(s), year Setting and participants Study objectives or research 
questions 
Main findings
9. Heyman et al 
(2009) 
Texas, the US/ 84 undocumented 
or illegal migrants (mostly 
Mexican migrants) 
To explore barriers to seeking care in 
unauthorised migrants living in 
Texas, and to identify resilient factors 
of learning and gaining confidence 
about available services    
A number of barriers to accessing care 
amongst unauthorised migrants were 
identified. Direct barriers included the 
unavailability of healthcare 
programmes to the unauthorised, 
especially for children. Indirect barriers 
were fear of deportation and obstacles 
to movement (both to and from 
Mexico) by the immigration law. At the 
same time, some migrants were 
successful in overcoming these 
constraints through interpersonal 
networks and through referrals by 
trusted philanthropic institutions.
10. Hoang et al 
(2009) 
Tasmania, Australia/ 10 Asian 
migrant women 
Two main research questions: (1) 
How did migrants perceive on 
maternity care after having moved to 
Australia?, and (2) What were 
barriers hampering the access to 
maternity care in Asian migrants? 
Some Asian women still retained 
traditional views and behaviours 
regarding child delivery. These 
behaviours (such as having diet in 
confinement, social restriction and 
keeping warm after birth) at times 
contradicted the practices of the 
Western medicine. Limited English 
language proficiency and cultural 
difference also served as barriers to 
expressing their need or enquiring 
healthcare providers about the services 
received. 
11. Huffman et al 
(2012) 
Sothern Kazakhstan/ 10 in-depth 
interviews with tuberculosis 
(TB) Uzbek patients and 12 
focus group discussions   
To explore mechanism that impeded 
migrants access to TB treatment 
Three structural contexts (employment, 
legal and healthcare contexts) caused 
migrants vulnerable to exploitative 
work conditions and created a series of 
healthcare barriers. These barriers 
included lack of registration, poor work 
conditions, police harassment and 
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Author(s), year Setting and participants Study objectives or research 
questions 
Main findings
brutality, etc. These conditions 
increased risk of TB exposure and 
reactivation of disease due to care-
seeking delays and weakened 
immunity. Seasonal migration caused 
treatment interruption, which led to a 
risk of drug resistance.     
12. Lue Kessing 
et al (2013) 
Copenhagen, Denmark/ 29 
migrant women from various 
countries, eg India, Somali, 
Turkey and Pakistan 
To contextualise screening behaviour 
through the exploration of  
transnational ties of migrants and 
their influence on involvement with 
mammography screening in Denmark
Although most migrant women had 
knowledge about breast cancer and 
mammography screening, participation 
in screening programme was not their 
priority. All participants encountered 
emotional and financial stresses. These 
struggles in everyday life left little 
room for concerns about breast cancer 
screening.
13. Martin (2009) Salt Lake City, the US/ 15 
Iranian migrants 
To explore whether the way mental 
health was conceptualised by Iranian 
immigrants had influence on their 
mental health-related practices 
The Iranian migrants often faced 
cultural differences in mental health 
conceptualisation when seeking mental 
healthcare. Distrust in the effectiveness 
of the Western medication made many 
Iranian patients reluctant to take part in 
treatment. The notion that only 'crazy' 
people seek mental health service was 
commonly held by the Iranian 
migrants, and so this belief served as a 
hindrance to seeking mental health 
services. 
14. Mukherjea et 
al (2012) 
Chicago and San Francisco, the 
US/ 88 migrants from South 
Asian countries 
(1) To understand the extent of 
culturally-specific tobacco products 
used by South Asian migrant 
communities, (2) to examine 
knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs 
regarding tobacco use, and (3) to 
A large number of culturally-specific 
products were commonly used in the 
community. Respondents had diverse 
views about health outcomes of tobacco 
use. While mainstream cigarettes were 
deemed harmful, many culturally-
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questions 
Main findings
explore the contextual dimensions of 
identity and culture pertinent to 
tobacco use behaviour 
specific tobacco products were 
considered to have beneficial 
properties, including antiseptic, and 
local anaesthetic properties. Moreover, 
South Asian tobacco items were used to 
preserve their traditions and cultural 
values, and to maintain their ethnic 
identity. 
15. Munyewende 
et al (2011) 
Johannesburg, South Africa/ 15 
Zimbabwean women 
To explore perceptions of 
Zimbabwean migrants on HIV/AIDS 
and the access to HIV/AIDS health 
services in South Africa 
Overall, the participants found that it 
was easier to access health services in 
South Africa compared to their country 
of origin. They, however, cited several 
constraints to health services in South 
Africa, including financial barriers, 
confusion about eligibility for 
treatment, and unfriendly attitudes of 
health facility staff. Furthermore, 
despite knowing the risk of HIV and 
the availability of free condoms and 
HIV-testing centres, some respondents 
still resorted to transactional sex and 
were involved with multiple sex 
partners in order to obtain extra stipend.
16. Navaza et al 
(2012) 
Madrid, Spain/ 13 sub-Saharan 
African migrants (SSAMs) 
To investigate the reasons why 
SSAMs residing in Spain were 
unwilling to undertake HIV blood 
test 
The participants had different views on 
blood test from the Western medicine. 
Some participants believed that blood 
taken from them for HIV test could be 
given to other people, and having small 
amount of blood loss might lead to 
weakness. This situation was 
intertwined with the concern over 
cultural differences and linguistic 
barriers. Some participants were 
undocumented, and so, they were afraid 
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of being exposed to police if they 
showed up at hospital, or if they were 
diagnosed with HIV.
17. Ochieng 
(2013) 
North England, the UK/ 90 
African migrants 
To explore the experiences of newly 
arrived (less than 5 years) Black 
African migrant families in accessing 
health promotion services in the UK 
Poor communication with health 
workers was key underlying problem in 
seeking antenatal information and 
support for participants, particularly, 
who had limited English proficiency. 
Some participants ever experienced 
health practitioners used volunteer 
translator in the clinical practice, but 
such practice did not happen regularly. 
18. O'Mahony and 
Donnelly (2013) 
Canada (specific province not 
specified)/ 30 immigrant women, 
including refugee from various 
countries (such as Mexico, and 
South America nations)  
(1) To explore how contextual factors 
influenced the ways in which 
immigrant and refugee women 
sought help to manage postpartum 
depression (PPD), (2) to gain better 
understanding on the immigrant and 
refugee women’s health-seeking 
behaviour and decision making with 
regards to postpartum care, and (3) to 
determine supportive and appropriate 
strategies for PPD prevention/ 
treatment
Structural barriers and gender roles 
hindered women’s ability to access 
necessary mental healthcare services. 
Gender hierarchy was dominant in their 
family context. Domestic violence was 
regarded as normal and this was also 
one of the key contributing factors to 
PPD. Insecure immigrant status 
coupled with emotional and economic 
dependence made immigrant women 
disadvantaged in protecting themselves 
against PPD.
19. Palmer and 
Ward (2007) 
Several boroughs in England, the 
UK/ 21 refugees and asylum 
seekers from diverse countries 
(such as, Somalia, Russia, and 
Iran)  
To explore the experiences of forced 
migrants in participating in 
healthcare services in UK 
Uncertainty legal status and poor 
housing condition brought negative 
impact on mental health of refugees 
and asylum seekers. These factors were 
coupled with traumatic experience from 
their home countries. Long waiting 
time and unfamiliarity with the UK 
health system made this situation more 
complex. Moreover the concept of 
depression and stress in their cultural 
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value differed from mainstream 
biomedical sense. Individuals seeking 
mental care were normally regarded as 
'mad' or 'insane'.  
20. Pirrone et al 
(2013) 
Melbourne, Australia/ 30 African 
migrant women, who were 
Muslims and wore the Hijab.  
(1) To explore perceptions, 
experiences and understandings of 
vitamin D deficiency (VDD) amongst 
African migrant women, (2) to 
identify the most useful sources of 
information regarding VDD in this 
population, and (3) to identify 
enabling factors and barriers to 
addressing VDD  
Despite having quite a good 
understanding on VDD, several barriers 
to addressing VDD were identified. For 
instance, the change of housing type 
from a private house with backyard to 
high-rise buildings without balcony 
made it more difficult for them to 
obtain sufficient sun exposure in a 
culturally appropriate way (secluded 
from a male view). Some participants 
reported developing VDD due to poor 
compliance. A key explanation of the 
poor compliance was heavy domestic 
chore burden, which was tightly linked 
to their cultural role. This huge burden 
had made their health come second 
place after the needs of family.   
21. Riggs et al 
(2014) 
Melbourne, Australia/ 115 
migrant women from Iraq, 
Lebanon and Pakistan 
To explore the experiences of dental 
service from the perspective of 
migrant mothers residing in 
Melbourne, Australia 
Despite recognising the importance of 
seeking dental care, the first dental 
contact for both immigrant women and 
their children was typically for 
emergency care. Accessibility, cost and 
waiting lists were significant barriers to 
attendance. There was general 
confusion about which services were 
free and which required payment. 
Communication barrier was also a 
challenge. Interpreters at times did not 
have knowledge about the dental care 
system.  
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22. Simich et al 
(2007) 
Toronto, Canada/ 11 irregular 
migrants from Central America 
countries 
To explore experiences of living 
without regular immigration status 
and implications for health security 
in irregular migrants (including 
refugee claimants and visitors with 
overstay visa) in Toronto   
Study participants expressed that they 
perceived discrimination due to lack of 
legitimate immigrant status and felt the 
injustice of being hard working, but 
lacking rights to the same health 
services as the native citizens. Most 
irregular migrants remained excluded 
from public health services by the 
limited capacity of community health 
centres. Access to essential services 
was hampered by illogical bureaucratic 
rules. 
23. Terry et al 
(2011) 
Tasmania, Australia/ 36 Asian 
migrants 
To examine the lived experience of 
healthcare-seeking behaviour of 
Asian migrants in Tasmania, and to 
identify strategies, which enabled 
migrants to utilise the health system 
better. 
Although many participants felt 
positive towards the health system in 
Tasmania, there were anxieties from 
the lack of choice and the inability to 
access culturally appropriate care in 
timely manner, particularly, amongst 
small and remote communities. These 
communities also faced limited 
development of culture-specific 
specialist services, lack of translated 
health information, and inadequacy of 
culturally competent workers. 
24. Van Cleemput 
(2007) 
England, the UK/ 59 Gypsies 
and Travellers from Scotland, 
Ireland and Wales 
To illuminate findings of the survey 
on the health status of Gypsies and 
Travellers by exploring their 
experiences of ill health and health 
beliefs 
Ill health was considered a normal 
inevitable consequence of adverse 
social experiences, and it was stoically 
and fatalistically accepted. Travelling 
lifestyle had positive and negative 
effects on their health status. On the 
positive side, travelling meant moving 
away from potential troubles of the 
'hostile world'. On the downside, 
travelling was associated with 
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diminished choice of safe stopping 
place, shortage of clean water and basic 
amenities, and difficulties in accessing 
basic education and healthcare services.
25. van der Veen 
et al (2009) 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands/ 54 
Turkish migrants  
To investigate social, cultural and 
behavioural determinants of migrants 
in relation to hepatitis B screening 
In the view of Turkish migrants, 
hepatitis B was closely linked with 
inappropriate sexual activity, which 
was considered a taboo in Islamic 
culture. Nevertheless, this religious 
belief could be a motivating factor 
encouraging migrants to undertake 
screening since Muslims were taught to 
be obliged to care for their personal 
health in order to be 'pure' enough to 
return to the Allah, and to protect 
Muslim communities as a whole. 
Distrust towards the Dutch healthcare 
system and the feeling that Dutch 
physicians were less willing to 
prescribe medication for them (relative 
to Turkish doctors) also served as 
barriers to participating in the 
screening.   
26. Walter et al 
(2002) 
San Francisco, the US/ 38 
Mexican and Central American 
day labourers  
To identify the social context which 
affected risk for occupational injury 
amongst undocumented day 
labourers, and to characterise the 
ways in which this social context 
influenced their experience of 
disability   
The prevalence of work injury was high 
in these migrants. The injuries caused 
not only detrimental impact on physical 
health, but also stressful feeling. 
Occupational injuries meant failure to 
fulfil masculine responsibility. Despite 
a high incidence of work injuries, the 
participants were reluctant to utilise 
health services due to precarious legal 
status as well as communication 
barriers.   
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27. Weiler and 
Crist (2009) 
Arizona, the US/ 10 Mexican 
migrants 
(1) What were the socio-cultural 
influences that steered self-
management practices amongst 
Latino migrant adults with type 2 
diabetes?, (2) How did the social 
context influence the way in which 
these migrants manage their diabetes 
condition?, and (3) How did 
perceptions and experiences of 
migrant status and socioeconomic 
determinants influence the way 
Latino migrants coped with type 2 
diabetes? 
The biggest challenge was family 
gathering culture in Mexican 
community. These events revolved 
around the plenty of food and 
celebration. Declining food offers were 
considered disrespectful and socially 
unacceptable. Social stigma also played 
important role in diabetes management 
as having diabetes significantly resulted 
in embarrassment and shame in 
Mexican culture. On the other hand, 
tight kinship network between family 
members according to the Mexican 
tradition had positive influence on 
participants in many ways, such as 
providing encouragement, and serving 
as motivator in disease management.  
28. Weine et al 
(2013) 
Moscow, Russia/ 33 female sex 
workers from various countries 
(such as Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
Moldova) 
To identify knowledge concerning 
HIV risks in female sex workers in 
Moscow, and to discuss risks, 
resources  and challenges in HIV 
preventive measures 
Some migrants were pulled into sex 
working in order to earn enough 
income. Many female migrant sex 
workers were intimidated and ever 
experienced violence by male clients. 
Despite having basic knowledge on 
HIV, some migrant sex workers denied 
to use condom in order to earn more 
money as per their clients' requests. 
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Appendix 2: Quality assessment of the selected 
articles for the systematic review 
Table 44 Quality assessment of the 37 selected articles for the systematic review  
Selected articles (author(s), year) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10
1. Abbot and Riga (2007) Y Y Y N Y Y ? Y ? Y 
2. Akhavan (2012) Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y ? Y 
3. Boerleider et al (2014) Y Y Y Y Y ? Y Y Y Y 
4. Briones-Vozmediano et al 
(2014) Y Y ? Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
5. Byrskog et al (2015) Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y ? ? 
6. Cross and Bloomer (2010) Y Y N ? Y N Y Y ? N 
7. Dauvrin et al (2012) Y Y ? ? Y N Y Y Y Y 
8. Donnelly and McKellin (2007) Y Y N ? ? N ? N Y ? 
9. Eklof et al (2015) Y Y N ? Y N Y ? Y Y 
10. Englund and Rydstrom (2012) Y Y ? ? Y N Y Y Y Y 
11. Farley et al (2014) Y Y ? ? Y N ? Y N ? 
12. Foley (2005) Y Y Y ? Y N Y ? Y N 
13. Fowler et al (2005) Y Y Y Y Y N Y ? ? Y 
14. Goldabe and Okuyemi (2012) Y Y ? N ? N ? Y ? Y 
15. Hakonsen et al (2014) Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y 
16. Health Protection Agency  
(2010) Y Y ? ? ? N Y ? Y ? 
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Selected articles (author(s), year) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10
17. Hoye and Severinsson (2008) Y Y Y ? Y N Y Y ? Y 
18. Hultsjo and Hjelm (2005) Y Y Y ? Y N Y ? Y Y 
19. Kurth et al (2010) Y Y Y Y Y N ? ? Y ? 
20. Lindsay et al (2012) Y Y Y Y Y N Y ? Y Y 
21. Lyberg et al (2012) Y Y Y ? Y N Y Y Y Y 
22. Manirankunda et al (2012) Y Y Y Y Y N ? Y Y Y 
23. Munro et al (2013) Y Y Y ? ? N ? ? Y ? 
24. Nicholas et al (2014) Y Y Y Y Y N ? Y Y Y 
25. O'mahony and Donnelly 
(2007) Y Y ? ? Y N Y Y Y Y 
26. Otero-Garcia et al (2013) Y Y ? ? ? N Y Y Y ? 
27. Pergert et al (2008) Y Y ? ? Y Y Y ? Y Y 
28. Rosenberg et al (2006) Y Y Y Y Y ? Y Y ? Y 
29. Samarasinghe et al (2010) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y ? 
30. Sandu et al (2013) Y Y ? Y Y Y Y ? Y Y 
31. Straßmayr et al (2012) Y Y Y N Y N ? Y Y Y 
32. Suurmond et al (2013) Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y ? 
33. Terraza-Nu´n˜ez et al (2011) Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y 
34. van den Ameele et al (2013) Y Y Y Y Y N ? Y Y Y 
35. Vangen et al (2004) Y Y ? Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
36. Wachtler et al (2006) Y Y N ? ? ? ? ? Y N 
37. Worth et al (2009) Y Y ? Y Y N Y ? Y Y 
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Note: The above table was adapted from the CASP checklist (2013). The assessment 
questions are as follows: 
 Q1—Was there a clear statement of the research aim? 
 Q2—Was a qualitative methodology appropriate? 
 Q3—Was the research design proper to address the research aim? 
 Q4—Was the recruitment strategy appropriate to the research aim? 
 Q5—Was the data collected in a way that addressed the research issue? 
 Q6—Was the relationship between researcher and participants sufficiently 
considered? 
 Q7—Was the ethical issue taken into consideration?   
 Q8—Was the data analysis sufficiently rigorous? 
 Q9—Does the research have a clear statement of the findings? 
 Q10—Does the report sufficiently express the research value? 
 Y—Yes (clearly described) 
 N—No (Not described) 
 ? —Cannot tell (described but with limited detail) 
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Appendix 3: Data extraction tables of the systematic review on 
challenges of providing care for migrants through providers' 
perspectives 
Table 45 Characteristics of the 37 selected articles for the systematic review on challenges to providing care for migrants 
through providers' lens 
Selected articles 
(author(s), year) Study site Migrants' profiles Type of services Healthcare providers Data collection techniques 
1. Abbot and Riga 
(2007) 
The UK Bangladeshi 
immigrants 
Primary care   General practitioners 
(GPs), school nurses, 
etc
Focus group 
discussions (FGDs) 
2. Akhavan (2012) Sweden Immigrants and 
asylum seekers 
(mostly from Eastern 
Europe)
Primary care Midwives Semi-structured 
interviews 
3. Boerleider et al 
(2014) 
Netherlands Non-western 
immigrants (mostly 
from Turkey, 
Morocco, etc)
Postnatal care Maternity care 
assistants 
In-depth interviews 
(IDIs)  
4. Briones-
Vozmediano et al 
(2014) 
Spain Battered immigrant 
women (nationality not 
clearly specified)
Care for battered 
immigrant women 
Social workers, 
psychologists,  and 
mediators 
IDIs and FGDs
5. Byrskog et al 
(2015) 
Sweden Somali-born women Antenatal care Midwives IDIs
6. Cross and Bloomer 
(2010) 
Australia Migrant communities 
(nationality not 
specified)
Mental health care Mental health 
clinicians 
FGDs
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Selected articles 
(author(s), year) Study site Migrants' profiles Type of services Healthcare providers Data collection techniques 
7. Dauvrin et al 
(2012) 
16 countries 
in   the 
EUGATE 
project* 
Irregular migrants 
(nationality not 
specified) 
Mental health 
services,  Accident & 
Emergency (A&E) 
words and primary 
care  
Clinicians and health 
managers 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
8. Donnelly and 
McKellin (2007) 
Canada Vietnamese 
immigrants
Breast cancer 
screening
Community 
physicians and nurses
IDIs
9. Eklof et al (2015) Finland Migrants and asylum 
seekers (countries not 
specified)
Primary care Community nurses IDIs
10. Englund and 
Rydstrom (2012) 
Sweden Non-western 
immigrant parents of 
children with asthma
Care for asthma 
patients 
Nurses and 
physicians in asthma 
clinic
IDIs
11. Farley et al 
(2014) 
Australia Refugees (nationality 
not specified) 
Primary care General practitioners 
(GPs), nurses and 
administrative staff
Semi-structured 
interviews and FGDs 
12. Foley (2005) USA HIV-positive African 
immigrants
HIV care Medical practitioners 
and social workers
IDIs, informal 
interviews, and FGDs
13. Fowler et al 
(2005) 
Canada Kosovar refugees General health 
services
Family physicians, 
nurses, dentists, etc
IDIs
14. Goldabe and 
Okuyemi (2012) 
Costa Rica Undocumented 
Nicaraguan migrants 
Antenatal care, 
infectious diseases, 
and occupational 
injuries
Nurses, physicians, 
and social workers 
IDIs
15. Hakonsen et al 
(2014) 
Norway Non-western 
immigrants
Community care Community 
pharmacists
FGDs
16. Health Protection 
Agency  (2010) 
The UK Refugees, asylum 
seekers, and irregular 
migrants (nationality 
not specified)   
Various settings (eg 
Primary Care Trust—
PCT ) 
Health workers, type 
unspecified 
Phone interview
17. Hoye and 
Severinsson (2008) 
Norway Non-western 
immigrants
Critical illness care  Intensive care unit 
nurses
FGDs
18. Hultsjo and Sweden Refugees and asylum Emergency care, Nurses and assistant FGDs
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Selected articles 
(author(s), year) Study site Migrants' profiles Type of services Healthcare providers Data collection techniques 
Hjelm (2005) seekers (nationality not 
specified)
ambulatory care and 
intensive care 
nurses
19. Kurth et al 
(2010) 
Switzerland Asylum seeking 
women (nationality not 
specified)
Delivery and 
maternity care 
Physicians, nurses, 
psychologists and 
interpreters
Semi-structured 
interviews 
20. Lindsay et al 
(2012) 
Canada Immigrant families 
(nationality not 
specified)
Rehabilitation Physiotherapists and 
social workers 
IDIs and FGDs
21. Lyberg et al 
(2012) 
Norway Female migrants with 
diverse ethnicities
Maternity care Midwives and public 
health nurse
FGDs
22. Manirankunda et 
al (2012) 
Belgium Sub-Saharan African 
migrants (SAMs) 
HIV clinics Nurses, midwives, 
and obstetricians
IDIs
23. Munro et al 
(2013) 
Canada Uninsured pregnant 
women with 
precarious immigration 
status (nationality not 
specified)
Antenatal care and 
delivery 
Family physicians Semi-structured 
interviews 
24. Nicholas et al 
(2014) 
Canada Immigrant families, 
mostly from Asia and 
the Pacific region 
Neonatal intensive 
care units 
Neonatologists, nurse 
practitioners, social 
workers, 
administrative staff, 
etc
FGDs
25. O'mahony and 
Donnelly (2007) 
Canada Immigrant women 
(nationality not 
specified)
Mental health care Social workers, 
physicians and nurses 
IDIs
26. Otero-Garcia et 
al (2013) 
Spain Immigrant women 
(nationality not 
specified)
Sexual and 
reproductive health 
services 
Midwives in primary 
care 
IDIs
27. Pergert et al 
(2008) 
Sweden Immigrant patients in 
paediatric oncology 
units (nationality not 
specified)
Care for children with 
cancer 
Nurses and nurse 
aides  
FGDs and IDIs
28. Rosenberg et al Canada Immigrant patients, Primary care Family physicians Non participant 
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Selected articles 
(author(s), year) Study site Migrants' profiles Type of services Healthcare providers Data collection techniques 
(2006) mostly from Asia and 
Africa
observations and 
interviews
29. Samarasinghe et 
al (2010) 
Sweden Involuntary migrants 
(nationality not 
specified)
Nurse-led primary 
care clinics 
Primary healthcare 
nurses (PCHNs) 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
30. Sandu et al 
(2013) 
16 countries 
in   the 
EUGATE 
project*
First-generation 
immigrants (diverse 
nationalities) 
Mental health care Psychiatrists, mental 
health nurses, social 
workers, etc 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
31. Straßmayr et al 
(2012) 
14 European 
countries# 
Irregular migrants 
(nationality not 
specified)
Mental health care Mental health care 
experts 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
32. Suurmond et al 
(2013) 
Netherlands Asylum seekers 
(nationality not 
specified)
Primary care (first 
contact care) 
Physicians and nurse 
practitioners 
Group interviews
33. Terraza-Nu´n˜ez 
et al (2011) 
Spain Immigrant 
populations, mostly 
from Morocco, 
Romania, and Latin 
America countries
Primary and 
secondary care 
Health managers and 
health professionals 
in primary and 
secondary care 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
34. van den Ameele 
et al (2013) 
Morocco Sub-Saharan African 
migrants 
Sexual violence 
prevention 
General practitioners,  
community workers, 
and obstetricians
Semi-structured 
interviews  
35. Vangen et al 
(2004) 
Norway Immigrant pregnant 
women from Somalia 
Antenatal and 
delivery care 
Gynaecologists, 
nurses and midwives
IDIs
36. Wachtler et al 
(2006) 
Sweden Immigrant population, 
countries of origin not 
specified
Primary care GPs Semi-structured 
interviews 
37. Worth et al 
(2009) 
The UK Asian Sikh and 
Muslim migrant 
communities 
Hospitals, hospices, 
home care for  life 
limiting illness  
GPs, specialist 
nurses, social 
workers, and hospital 
manager
IDIs
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Table 46 Key messages of the 37 selected articles for the systematic review on challenges to providing care for migrants 
through providers' lens 
Selected articles 
(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
1. Abbot and Riga 
(2007) 
To explore the views of 
primary care staff about 
delivering services to 
the local Bangladeshi 
community 
Language and religious 
difference served as key 
difficulties in service 
provision.  
Not clearly described Peer pressure from 
families and communities 
played important role in 
inhibiting or promoting 
health services, especially 
in families with a large 
number of members
2. Akhavan (2012) To explore the views of 
midwives on the factors 
that contribute to 
healthcare inequality 
amongst immigrants 
Midwives conceived that 
healthcare inequality 
amongst in migrants was 
due to miscommunication, 
shortage of meeting time, 
language barriers, and lack 
of trust from patients.
Due to capacity/resources 
constraint in the workplace 
where these midwives 
were working, the time 
allotted for a consultative 
meeting with migrants was 
limited. 
Patriarchal culture could 
create misunderstanding 
between midwives and 
migrant patients. 
3. Boerleider et al 
(2014) 
(1) How do Dutch 
Maternal Care 
Assistants (MCAs) feel 
about providing care to 
non-western clients?; 
and (2) Do Dutch 
MCAs adjust their care 
to non-western clients 
and if so in what ways? 
MCAs often found that 
migrant clients had limited 
knowledge in maternity 
care. Language difference 
served as a barrier in 
health education. Some 
MCAs mentioned that 
caring for non-Dutch 
mothers was intensive and 
frustrating.
Telephone professional 
interpreters were requested 
to assist MCAs in 
communicating with non-
western mothers. 
However, this service was 
not always available.  
Family involvement 
played a pivotal role in 
maternity care. MCAs 
needed to put more effort 
in understanding cultural 
values of their clients, 
particularly, in patriarchal 
culture.  
4. Briones-
Vozmediano et al 
(2014) 
To explore the 
experience of service 
providers in  Spain 
concerning their daily 
Some providers felt 
frustrated with the 
decision of immigrant 
women, particularly those 
The abandonment of the 
help seeking process of a 
victim was due to the 
ineffectiveness of 
The respondents found 
that many immigrant 
women, especially those in 
Arab families, failed to 
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Selected articles 
(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
practice with battered 
migrant  women  
in low socioeconomic 
status, who abandoned the 
health seeking process due 
to ignorance of the system.   
healthcare resources 
management.  
escape the violence cycle 
due to a submission to 
patriarchal belief.   
5. Byrskog et al 
(2015) 
To explore ways 
antenatal care midwives 
in Sweden work with 
Somali born women and 
the questions of 
exposure to violence 
Almost all midwife 
informants raised concerns 
about violence exposure in 
Somali born women. 
Communication barrier 
was an important factor 
that hampered care access.
Not clearly described Some midwives lacked 
background information 
vis-à-vis cultural/religious 
conceptions of health, 
family life, value systems, 
and violence experience of 
Somali women. 
6. Cross and Bloomer 
(2010) 
(1) To explore how 
mental health clinicians 
modify communication 
practice to address 
cultural differences and 
promote client self-
disclosure; and (2)  To 
identify experiences 
that clinicians used 
when interacting with 
people from culturally 
diverse groups 
The study participants 
recognised language as 
one of the communication 
difficulties. Besides, 
gender role in migrant 
community was another 
issue that made patients 
adapted their approach. In 
cases of sexual assault, 
abuse and childhood 
trauma, female clinicians 
were preferred.
Not clearly described Healthcare providers 
found that there were 
diverse cultural beliefs in 
migrant communities. For 
instance, some migrants 
still understood that 
mental illness was a 
punishment from god or 
superstition. 
7. Dauvrin et al 
(2012) 
To investigate the 
experiences of health 
professionals in 
providing care to 
irregular migrants in 
three types of healthcare 
service (maternity care, 
accident & emergency 
care, and primary care) 
across 16 European 
Health workers in accident 
and emergency (A&E) 
departments reported less 
of a difference between 
the care for migrant 
patients and for native 
patients in a regular 
situation than did health 
staff in primary care and 
mental health services. 
Professionals in primary 
care and mental health 
services felt more 
difficulties in performing 
further diagnostic and/or 
therapeutic interventions 
due to the workplace 
restriction. Some 
clinicians solved this 
nuisance by prescribing 
Even in countries with full 
rights of healthcare access 
for irregular migrants, 
there were still problems 
when referral was needed. 
Delay of treatment 
occurred frequently as 
providers and patients 
needed to wait until legal 
issue of the patients was 
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Selected articles 
(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
countries* Concern over language 
differences was more 
apparent in mental health 
services than in A&E 
departments. 
medicines for their own 
names if a patient could 
not afford the medicine 
expense.   
resolved. Notifying police 
was a rare practice, even 
in countries where 
healthcare providers were 
obliged to do so. 
8. Donnelly and 
McKellin (2007) 
To understand views of 
healthcare providers in 
catering breast and 
cervical cancer 
screening services for 
Vietnamese women in 
Candata  
The majority of healthcare 
provider informants were 
aware that Vietnamese 
women were hesitant and 
embarrassed about breast 
and cervical examination 
due to cultural difference. 
Healthcare providers 
adpated their routine 
pracitces to facilitate the 
service use of Vietnamese 
women by providing 
flexible hours of operation 
for the healthcare clinic, 
physicians reminding 
women of their check-ups, 
and having more 
accessible educational 
materials for women. 
The Canadian government 
paid little attention on the 
promotion of cancer 
screening and specifically 
for the Vietnamese 
migrants. In some 
provinces, services for 
immigrants faced 
considerable funding 
cutbacks. 
9. Eklof et al (2015) To describe nurses 
perceptions when using 
interpreters in primary 
healthcare nursing with 
migrant patients 
Nurses were aware of the 
importance of interpreters 
in tackling the differences 
in language when 
interacting with migrant 
clients. However, some 
nurses considered 
interpreters acting like 
cultural brokers rather than 
professional interpreters. 
The ordering and 
availability of interpreters 
seemed to be challenging 
and time-consuming. With 
references to some nurses’ 
experience, access to the 
interpreter service by 
phone was difficult and 
increased workload, 
specifically in urgent 
situations.
In Finland, there were 
several regulations 
regarding the use of 
interpreters. The 
interpreting costs were 
paid by the government if 
the patient was an asylum 
seeker; if not, the costs 
would be paid by a 
municipality, which often 
had strict guidelines.
10. Englund and 
Rydstrom (2012) 
To gain a broader 
insight of the challenges 
healthcare professionals 
faced in their 
encounters with non-
Health professionals 
viewed that language 
differences and 
unfamiliarity with the 
Western medicine of 
Not clearly described A strong belief in some 
families that trusted male 
physicians far over female 
nurses created stressful 
feeling and sense of 
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Selected articles 
(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
western immigrant 
parents of children with 
asthma
immigrant families created 
conflicts between 
providers and patients.  
powerlessness in female 
nurses.   
11. Farley et al 
(2014) 
To explore enabling 
factors and barriers 
healthcare staff 
experienced in 
providing care to 
refugees 
Participants perceived 
communication difficulties 
as one of the most 
important barriers for 
managing care for 
refugees.  
 
Interpreter services were a 
crucial enabler of refugee 
healthcare but were also 
time consuming. The 
services were oftentimes 
unavailable and unreliable 
for the quality. 
Not clearly described
12. Foley (2005) To examine views of 
medical practitioners 
and social workers that 
provided clinical care to 
African immigrants 
living with HIV/AIDS 
The provider informants 
expressed a keen 
awareness of the broad 
cultural gulf that secluded 
them from their African 
patients. Communicating 
with immigrants with little 
formal education and 
limited English or French 
fluency was their greatest 
frustration. 
Nurses and social workers 
adapted the routine service 
guideline of a facility to 
match belief and culture of 
African HIV patients. 
These strategies included 
giving African patients 
their medications in 
unlabelled bottles, delivery 
of medications to locations 
other than their patients’ 
homes, and helping 
women negotiate condom 
use with male partners 
without disclosing their 
HIV status.
To be insured at the city 
health centres, patients 
must provide proof of 
residence in the city of 
Philadelphia. Yet, African 
women often had no 
documentation in their 
own name since they lived 
with male partners. Some 
nurses, and social workers 
assisted uninsured migrant 
patients through several 
strategies, such as seeking 
funding from special 
government programmes. 
13. Fowler et al 
(2005) 
To investigate the main 
challenges and 
successes for providing 
care for Kosovar 
immigrants 
Not clearly described Many health professional 
respondents expressed 
concern over the inability 
to access information of 
refugees in a timely 
manner since the 
information system of a 
The Canadian regulation 
allowed Kosovars to 
received medical care 
through the Interim 
Federal Health (IFH) 
programme. However, 
some benefits were not 
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Selected articles 
(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
Canadian health facility 
was not integrated with 
that in the country of 
origin of the refugees.  
covered free of charge 
(home health care, eye 
glasses for refractive error, 
etc).  
14. Goldabe and 
Okuyemi (2012) 
To explore attitudes of 
providers in Costa Rica 
about deservingness to 
care of Nicaraguan 
undocumented migrants 
Not clearly described Not clearly described By law, undocumented 
migrants were prohibited 
from public health 
services, except for, 
emergency care, health 
care for children <18 
years, and prenatal care. 
Providers opined that 
undocumented migrants 
should not deserve 
treatment for occupational 
injuries as the benefits 
from the treatment did not 
go to the whole nation.    
15. Hakonsen et al 
(2014) 
To determine the 
cultural barriers 
encountered by 
Norwegian community 
pharmacists in 
providing service to 
non-western immigrant 
patients and to outline 
how these barriers were 
being addressed
The pharmacist 
participants found that 
language difference made 
the service provision for 
non-western immigrants 
challenging, and they were 
uncomfortable with 
situations where family 
members or friends acted 
as interpreters. 
Not clearly described Not clearly described
16. Health Protection 
Agency  (2010) 
To analyse the use of 
services in various types 
of migrants in the UK 
and to explore the needs 
of professionals 
Respondents expressed 
concerns about language 
barriers, which impeded 
the provision of effective 
services, in particular, 
Not clearly described Respondents described the 
confusion in the NHS' 
regulation. The UK health 
workers sought support 
from civil networks to 
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(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
working with migrant 
patients   
mental health care. manage some services (eg 
housing aid) which were 
not regularly available to 
certain migrant groups.
17. Hoye and 
Severinsson (2008) 
To explore the 
perception of intensive 
care unit (ICU) nurses 
with regards to their 
encounters with 
families of culturally 
diverse patients  
The ICU nurses became 
insecure when facing 
cultural differences.  
The multicultural families 
consisted of larger number 
of family members, 
relative to Norwegian 
families. ICU rooms were 
at times crowded by many 
visitors, and such a 
situation might hamper 
nursing care.
ICU nurses felt that, due to 
patriarchal views held by 
immigrant families, 
female nurses often 
received lack of respect 
from the ethnic groups.    
18. Hultsjo and 
Hjelm (2005) 
To identify if healthcare 
staff in somatic and 
psychiatric emergency 
care experienced any 
problems in the services 
for migrants
All respondents expressed 
serious concerns over 
language barrier and 
difficulty to address the 
traumatic experiences of 
migrants. 
Difficulties in finding an 
interpreter, especially at 
night, and minority 
language, and shortage of 
healthcare staff were the 
main setback in all wards.
Not clearly described 
19. Kurth et al 
(2010) 
To examine perceptions 
of health professionals 
in caring for asylum 
seeking women in the 
Women’s Clinic of the 
University Hospital in 
the city of Basel, 
Switzerland  
Language barriers were 
identified as a major 
struggle for a provision of 
care for asylum seekers.  
Not clearly described The Swiss government 
attempted to reduce health 
expenditure by limiting 
the asylum seekers’ choice 
of where to seek care and 
assigning them to primary 
healthcare providers’ 
networks. Physicians were 
forced to make difficult 
decisions in controlling 
the expenditure from 
treating migrants. 
20. Lindsay et al 
(2012) 
To better understand the 
experiences of 
Language difficulties and 
unfamiliarity with 
Even though professional 
interpreters were available, 
Not clearly described 
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Selected articles 
(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
healthcare providers 
working with immigrant 
families which had 
children with physical 
disability
Canadian health system of 
a patient were important 
barriers in caring migrant 
families in the providers' 
views  
the use of professional 
interpreters was limited 
since it always added time 
on the clients' 
appointment.
21. Lyberg et al 
(2012) 
To illuminate public 
health nurses' and  
midwives' perceptions 
in caring prenatal and 
postnatal migrant 
patients in Norway 
Linguistic and cultural 
barriers shaped the way 
providers delivered 
services. Some providers 
considered videotape 
education was more useful 
than face-to-face 
communication.  
Respondents complained 
over the quality and 
availability of interpreting 
service in their workplace. 
Male interpreters did not 
understand vocabularies 
used in maternal care, and 
this could create distrust 
between providers and 
patients.  
Not clearly described
22. Manirankunda et 
al (2012) 
To identify physicians’ 
HIV testing practices 
and barriers to 
managing provider-
initiated HIV testing 
and counselling (PITC) 
for Sub-Saharan 
African migrants 
(SAM) in Belgium 
Some health professionals 
were ignorant of the high 
prevalence of HIV in 
SAM communities. Lack 
of expertise in discussing 
sexuality and lack of time 
also served as key barriers 
in implementing PITC.    
Not clearly described Racism issue and shaky 
legal status of immigrants 
affected the decision of 
doctors in undertaking 
PITC. Some doctors felt 
that carrying out HIV test 
for undocumented 
migrants who might be 
deported at any time was 
unethical since they could 
not assure proper follow-
up. Some providers fear 
being accused of racism 
when suggesting an HIV 
test in SAMs.
23. Munro et al 
(2013) 
To explore the 
perceptions of family 
physicians who 
Poverty and lack of 
understanding in the 
Canadian's insurance 
Logistically, physicians 
had difficulty accessing 
prenatal resources for their 
In Canada, refugees and 
refugee claimants were 
insured with the Interim 
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(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
provided services to 
uninsured pregnant 
women with precarious 
immigration status 
system played a major role 
in inhibiting access to care 
of immigrants. 
Nevertheless, care of 
uninsured women was 
generally thought to be a 
professional obligation, 
regardless of the woman’s 
ability to pay.  
uninsured migrant 
patients. For example, 
social services were 
available only to officially 
recognised immigrants or 
refugees. Some physicians 
altered standard of care to 
avoid cost incurred by 
uninsured immigrants, and 
to avoid referrals to 
specialists 
Federal Health 
Programme. Quebec 
province imposed a 3-
month delay on the 
acquisition of health 
insurance for newly 
arrived immigrants. Due to 
administrative delays, 
some individuals with a 
right to public insurance 
found themselves without 
coverage.  
24. Nicholas et al 
(2014) 
To examine cross-
cultural care from the 
healthcare providers' 
perspective within two 
tertiary level Neonatal 
Intensive Care Units 
(NICUs) 
Language difference was 
common barrier to care. 
NICU healthcare staff felt 
that communication 
barrier was more 
pronounced in intensive 
wards due to frequent 
shifting nature of a 
patient's condition.
Limited availability of 
complementary and/or 
alternative treatments was 
thought to limit capacity 
for cross-cultural care. The 
lack of translators in the 
wards was also an 
important challenge. 
Birthing rites and rituals 
were identified as 
culturally nuanced, yet 
often poorly understood 
and at times, disrespected 
and subjected to pejorative 
judgment.  
25. O'mahony and 
Donnelly (2007) 
To examine concerns of  
healthcare provider in 
managing mental health 
care for immigrant 
women 
The participants often 
mentioned that 
misunderstandings of 
western biomedicine and 
unfamiliarity with mental 
healthcare service in 
migrant women badly 
affected how these women 
sought help.  
Not clearly described All healthcare providers 
viewed the cultural and 
social stigma as a key 
barrier to accessing mental 
health services for 
immigrant women. Some 
respondents expressed that 
in many cultures there 
were significant negative 
feelings towards mental 
illness and the taking of 
medication.
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(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
26. Otero-Garcia et 
al (2013) 
To explore the 
perceptions of 
midwives providing 
maternal care for 
immigrant women 
Midwives explained that 
language and cultural 
differences, and gender 
inequity, were significant 
barriers to care. 
Not clearly described Not clearly described 
27. Pergert et al 
(2008) 
To gain knowledge 
about how healthcare 
staff resolved obstacles 
when caring for 
immigrant families in 
paediatric oncology 
care units. 
Nurses in paediatric 
oncology unit expressed 
their concern over 
linguistic difference. Many 
strategies, including 
nonverbal communication 
using 'signs' and 'printed 
information', were used to 
bridge this obstacle.  
The organisation adapted 
its routine care policy by 
allocating extra time for 
immigrant patients, and 
attempting to recruit more 
staff with diverse ethnic 
backgrounds.    
Not clearly described 
28. Rosenberg et al 
(2006) 
To explore challenges 
for family physicians 
and migrant patients 
with respect to 
intercultural 
communication (ICC). 
Some physicians reported 
that when language barrier 
arose, they were more 
likely to bypass 
psychosocial aspects of the 
health problem since it 
was more time consuming 
than general somatic care. 
Not clearly described Physicians had different 
beliefs about the 
expression of distress and 
illness experience from the 
patients' views. In some 
cases, physicians viewed 
patient’s behaviours as 
normal for a person of the 
given culture (such as 
tears and rotten words), 
while the same behaviour 
was considered 
psychological trouble in 
another culture. 
29. Samarasinghe et 
al (2010) 
To describe health 
promoting activities in 
involuntary migrant 
families in cultural 
transition through the 
Some PCHNs approached 
patients by focusing only 
on somatic health of 
individuals as they deemed 
expanding more than 
Not clearly described Some PHCNs empowered 
immigrant family 
members to be able to 
integrate into Swedish 
society by seeking support 
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(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
views of Swedish 
primary healthcare 
nurses (PHCNs)
physical health required 
much more time, and was 
sometimes costly. 
from non-health workers, 
such as social workers and 
preschool teachers.  
30. Sandu et al 
(2013) 
To investigate health 
providers' experiences 
in managing care for 
immigrants in 16 
European countries* 
Interviewees noted a 
general concern about 
mistrust and unfamiliarity 
with the healthcare system 
of a host country in 
migrant patients 
Not clearly described Divergence in belief 
systems was a key barrier 
undermining the quality of 
mental care. It was 
difficult for practitioners 
to distinguish a culturally 
normal response of an 
immigrant patient from 
what was an indication of 
mental pathology.
31. Straßmayr et al 
(2012) 
Objective 1—to  
identify barriers to 
mental health care in 
irregular migrants; 
Objective 2—to  
identify how health 
professionals tackle 
these problems in the 
real practice 
Language difference was 
the key barrier to care in 
the providers' views.  
Shortage of resources and 
limited capacities in 
mental health services 
were reported. Problems 
included long waiting lists, 
which restricted the 
availability of 
psychological treatment. 
Physicians usually 
employed informal 
networks and non-
government organisations 
to cover the unfilled gaps. 
Experts from the countries 
that provided no legal 
access to mental health 
care for irregular migrants 
beyond emergency care 
described a lack of legal 
entitlement as the main 
barrier. Some providers 
lacked the general 
knowledge about the 
entitlements to health care 
for migrants.  
32. Suurmond et al 
(2013) 
To explore insight of 
healthcare providers 
about how to address 
health problems of 
newly arrived asylum 
seekers. 
The respondents felt that 
asylum seekers had little 
knowledge about the way 
their body functions. It 
was questionable to screen 
mental health problems 
when there was no 
Not clearly described Not clearly described
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Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
guarantee for follow-up. 
Not all respondents were 
strict to the screening 
guideline. 
33. Terraza-Nu´n˜ez 
et al (2011) 
To analyse health 
personnel perceptions 
about the provision of 
care to immigrant 
population 
Providing health care to 
immigrants created 
feelings of distress, 
overload and exhaustion in 
health professionals, 
especially in primary care 
setting. Communication 
barrier was one of the 
main problems. 
Informants ascribed the 
inadequacy of resources to 
an absence of suitable 
planning on the side of the 
health authority 
(Department of Health), as 
well as to its lethargy in 
mobilising resources in the 
health system (human 
resources, regulations and 
clinical instruments) to the 
sudden increase in the 
immigrant population.
Not clearly described
34. van den Ameele 
et al (2013) 
To  identify the current 
role and position of the 
healthcare sector in 
Morocco towards the 
prevention of sexual 
violence against sub-
Saharan migrants 
Some respondents 
acknowledged the need for 
prevention of sexual 
violence against migrants, 
but differences in 
language, and cultures, 
occasionally, encumbered 
healthcare workers to 
identify victim cases and 
exploring traumatic 
experiences of migrants. 
Limitations of the 
Moroccan public health 
sector re the response to 
sexual violence included 
inadequate staffing, and 
resources. Several 
informants indicated that 
migrants preferred relying 
on NGOs over the public 
health system when 
seeking care. 
The providers viewed that 
reporting the presence of 
illegal migrants to police 
would increase risk of 
being deported, and such 
practice contradicted the 
professional norm.   
35. Vangen et al 
(2004) 
To explore how 
perinatal care practice 
influenced labour 
outcomes in 
circumcised women.
Health professionals were 
uncertain about delivery 
procedures for infibulated 
women and caesarean 
sections were at times 
The communication 
between outpatient clinics 
and hospitals regarding the 
management of 
infibulation was quite 
Not clearly described
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(author(s), year) 
Objective(s) or research 
question(s) 
Patient factor Workplace factor Societal factor
done in lieu of 
defibulation. Neglect of 
circumcision might lead to 
unnecessary caesarean 
sections or even adverse 
birth outcomes. 
poor. The antenatal clinics 
had stopped referring 
women to the hospital for 
antenatal defibulation 
since their requests had 
been refused. 
36. Wachtler et al 
(2006) 
To examine how 
general practitioners 
(GPs) in Sweden  
managed clinical 
consultations when 
facing immigrant 
patients 
GPs conducted 
consultations with 
immigrants in the same 
way that they performed in 
normal patients. Yet, the 
consultations with migrant 
patients did  not always 
lead to positive clinical 
outcome and this created a 
feeling of failure in GPs. 
Not clearly described Not clearly described
37. Worth et al 
(2009) 
To examine the 
experiences of South 
Asian Sikh and Muslim 
patients (and their 
families) in Scotland 
with life limiting illness 
and to identify how to 
tackle these problems 
Most healthcare 
professionals expressed 
intentions to provide 
equitable care for migrants 
and normal citizens, but 
their aim was hampered by 
language difficulties and 
lack of understanding of 
Muslim tradition.  
Healthcare services faced 
difficulty in managing 
basic needs under Muslim 
culture, such as, the Halal 
diet, and need for specific 
hygiene practices, such as  
Wudu (ritual ablution 
preceding daily prayers), 
which were not prepared 
in clinical routine. 
Not clearly described
Note: * Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
 # Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
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Appendix 4: Question guides for the interviews 
with local implementers 
The following question guides were used in the real interview. Phrases in hard brackets 
are suggested prompts/memos for the researcher. Note that the questions listed below 
were not asked in sequential order as, in reality, the researcher adapted the questions to 
match the respondents' dialogue. 
Table 47 Example of question guides for the interviews with local implementers  
Domain Examples of questions [prompts/memos for reminding the interviewer] 
General 
information of the 
interviewees and 
their workplaces  
 Please tell me about your job [How long have you been in this job?, 
What about your past experience in this job?] 
 Please tell me about your organisation [Role and responsibility of 
your organisation in association with the card policy?] 
History and 
background of 
migrant situation 
 Please tell me about your daily job with regards to migrants [Do you 
have many migrants coming to your facility each day?, Can you please 
estimate how many migrants visit your facility per day?] 
 What are problems that you experience in dealing with migrant 
patients? [What about the legal status problem? Is there any problem 
about the language barrier?, What about the cost of treatment of illegal 
uninsured migrants?, How did you do when migrants could not pay for 
the treatment?—Link this information with the interview with migrants] 
 In your opinion, before and after the HICS policy, are there any 
changes of the use of service by migrant population? Please tell me more 
about your perceptions on this issue? [Is there any change in the disease 
pattern or the common age group of migrant patients?, and what are the 
changes?] 
 In your opinion, why do these changes in migrant service utilisation 
happen? [Check this information with the interview with migrants]
Perception on the 
policy and 
association with 
daily work 
 Please tell me how you know about the HICS policy [From which 
routes/channels (official document from the ministry, attending 
workshop, being informed by peers, etc)?] 
 Has the policy made any impact on your daily work [No change? or 
significant change?, What about any additional burdens?] 
 Have you ever experienced any constraints in your work with 
regards to this policy? Please explain more about that situation and how 
you cope with it. [Any innovations that your organisation set up to 
address such problem?—Link this answer to the theory of 'street-level 
bureaucracy': any discrepancy between 'de jure' policy design and 'de 
facto' policy implementation] 
 Please tell me about how you cope with the situation when migrants 
without the card (uninsured migrants) come to your facility to utilise 
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Domain Examples of questions [prompts/memos for reminding the interviewer] 
services [Who paid for them? How did you help them obtain the card?—
Then link this answer with the interview with migrants] 
 What do you think about the policy guideline from the ministry 
[Does it work? If so, or if not, why do you think accordingly?] 
Participation with 
other 
organisations 
 Please tell me how the Ministry of Public Health communicates 
with your facility regarding the HICS policy [Any documents sent to and 
from the ministry regularly?, Any workshops or consultative meetings 
held by the ministry?, How did you feedback your concerns to the 
ministry?] 
 Who else that you have to work with in running this policy? 
[Ministry of Labour? Ministry of Interior?, NGOs?] 
 What is your experience in working with them [Supportive or 
inhibitive? Any challenges?, Can you please give an example or explain 
more about why you think accordingly?]
Overall 
perceptions and 
opinions with 
regards to  the 
policy 
 To what extent the HICS policy design fit your local context? 
[Please tell me why you think accordingly.] 
 In your view, what are benefits and downsides of this policy? 
 Please tell me your suggestions how the policy should be improved 
in order to better fit your local context [Any suggested improvement for 
better services for migrant populations as a whole?] 
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Appendix 5: Question guides for the interviews 
with migrants 
The following question guides were used for the interviews with migrants. Similar to the 
interview guides in strand 1, the questions listed below were just a starting point for the 
dialogue. In practice, the researcher let the interview flow naturally while gradually 
shaping the dialogue to meet the topics of interest.  
Table 48 Example of question guides for the interviews with migrants and employers 
Domain Examples of questions [prompts/memos for reminding the interviewer] 
General 
information of the 
interviewees and 
their household 
members 
 Please tell me about yourself [Please describe more about your 
occupation, How long have you been here in Thailand?] 
 Please tell me about your family [How many family members are there 
in your family? What are their occupations?] 
 How do you support your family? [Please tell me about the estimated 
monthly income of your family and  the estimated monthly expense] 
 How did you come to be working here in Ranong? [Please describe 
more about how you came into the country, Who helped you settle 
down in Thailand] 
Health beliefs and 
healthcare seeking 
behaviours 
 Please tell me about your health [Note that the index cases are 
selected—link this answer to the disease information from the family 
folders but the interviewer must bear in mind the issue of 
confidentiality.] 
 Tell me about your most recent visit to a health facility? [What is your 
registered facility?, What treatment did you receive?, Why did you 
choose to visit that facility?, Have you ever had problems in seeking 
care when travelling away?—Note that some migrants are mobile, 
particularly, in Muang district where a number of migrants spent most 
of the time in the fishing boats.] 
 Please tell me about your experience in receiving services at that 
facility [What about the outcome of the treatment?, Do you feel that 
health practitioners really paid attention to your needs?, Do you feel 
that you are welcome at public facility?, Did they talk to you nicely?, 
etc] 
 Is there anything done at public facility that made you comfortable in 
utilising services? [Use of translators, Providing leaflet in non-Thai 
language, etc]  
 Have you ever visited healthcare providers outside public facilities? 
[Private clinics?, Traditional healers?, NGOs?, etc—Then link this to 
the question below; why migrants chose not to visit the public 
facilities] 
 Please tell me why you decided to visit them  
396 
 
Domain Examples of questions [prompts/memos for reminding the interviewer] 
 Is there a time that you (or your family) were sick and really needed 
treatment, but you did not seek care from anybody? [Could you please 
tell me what happened at that time?, Why did you fail to meet 
healthcare providers?, How did you cope with that problem?, etc] 
Perception on the 
policy  
 Have you ever heard about the health insurance card for migrants? And 
by what means?  
 Please describe the process of obtaining the card [How much did you 
pay for the card? How long have you got it?—Link to the question 
about cost] 
 Have you ever used the card when you needed treatment?  
 What was your experience on care/services when you used the card? 
[Did you feel that a doctor treat you differently compared to those 
without card and Thai beneficiaries?, What about your treatment 
expenses (compared to if without the card)?, Is there any specific 
interest in obtaining the card in your view?, etc]  
External support 
and influences  
 Did anyone help you obtain the card [Who helped you?, How they 
helped you?, etc] 
 When you needed help in your health problems, who did you turn to?, 
and how they helped you? [Please tell me about your past experience 
on this issue—Link to the previous question about health seeking 
behaviour] 
 Have you ever heard your neighbours or friends talking about the 
card?, What did they say?, Do you agree with what they said?, Please 
tell me your opinions on this matter [Link to previous questions about 
perception on the card] 
Overall perceptions 
and opinions with 
regards to the 
policy 
 In your opinion, are there any differences in your well-being between 
before and after having the card?  
 In your opinion, what are advantages of the card? And what are 
drawbacks and also limitations of the card? [Please tell me reasons why 
you think accordingly] 
 If you were able to change anything about the card to make it better fit 
your need, what would you suggest? [Please give reasons why you 
think accordingly]     
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Appendix 6: Detailed information of variables 
used in the quantitative analysis 
The following table describes all variables used in the quantitative analysis in objective 
3. It should be noted that the analysis also added the interaction terms between 
confounding factors and the insurance variable.         
Table 49 Example of variables used in quantitative analysis 
Variable Justification Expected outcome 
IP utilisation volume 
(visits/person/year) 
Dependent 
variable 
IP utilisation rate has increased over time in all 
patients. Migrants with the card are likely to have less 
IP use than the UCS counterparts as most migrants 
are in working age group. Amongst all beneficiaries, 
migrants without the card possibly enjoy least 
services due to huge financial burden.  
OP utilisation volume 
(visits/person/year) 
Dependent 
variable 
OP utilisation rate has increased over time in all 
patients. Amongst all beneficiaries, migrants without 
the card possibly enjoy service least frequently.  
OOP 
(Baht/person/visit, both 
OP and IP)  
Dependent 
variable 
The uninsured migrants are likely to suffer from 
higher OOP payment than their counterparts.    
Insurance type (HICS, 
UCS, and no 
insurance) 
Independent 
variable 
The HICS benefits migrant patients by increasing 
utilisation and lessening OOP payment.    
Sex (male and female) Confounding 
factor
No significant difference in utilisation volume and 
disease severity between sexes. 
Occupation (formal 
and informal sector) 
Confounding 
factor 
Patients in formal employment are supposed to have 
higher possibility in obtaining the card, but there 
should be no significant difference in the number of 
services used.
Age (years) and age 
groups 
Confounding 
factor
The older age groups tend to utilise more services 
than the younger.
Domicile (proximity to 
the facility and non-
proximity) 
Confounding 
factor 
Patients residing the area close to the health facility 
(proximity) are likely to utilise more services than 
those living far from the facility (non-proximity). 
Proximity is determined by if the home address of a 
patient is located in the same district of the address of 
the health facility.   
Principal diagnosis  Confounding 
factor 
Patients with critical/catastrophic illnesses are likely 
to utilise more services than those without. To 
identify 'catastrophic illness', the researcher used the 
cut-off point of the fifth digit of the Diagnostic 
Related Groups code.  
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Variable Justification Expected outcome 
Time variable  Confounding 
factor 
The utilisation volume before the change in the HICS 
policy in 2014 was larger than after 2014 since in 
practice most healthcare providers interpreted that the 
OSS measure allowed only healthy migrants to be 
insured (details in Chapter 6).  
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Appendix 7: Mathematical details of key 
econometric techniques for the quantitative 
analysis  
In econometric study, there are two most common models for the panel data analysis: 
(1) Random-effects model and (2) Fixed-effect model. 
Random-effects (RE) model 
Let's say Yit is the dependent variable, Xit is set of independent variables and β is 
corresponding coefficients. Consider data with N observations and T time periods; 
 it = β it + μ + (μi + εit) for t = 1, 2, 3,..., T and i = 1, 2, 3,..., N 
where μ is the mean of random intercepts, and the errors, μi (between entity error) and εit 
(idiosyncratic error), are considered the composite error term with variances σ2μ and σ2ε 
respectively. The transformation for random effects estimation is it *= it - i and xit* = 
, where  = 1 – [σε/(Tσ2μ + σ2ε)1/2]. 
Though the RE model seemed to fit well with the dataset of this thesis, it was found that 
the RE model produced similar results to the OLS due to a very small between entity 
error (sigma_u).    
Fixed-effect (FE) model 
Consider data with N observations and T time periods; 
 it = β it + αi + εit , for t = 1, 2, 3,..., T and i = 1, 2, 3,..., N  Equation (1) 
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While αi is the unknown intercept for each entity/individual, Yit is the dependent 
variable, Xit is set of independent variables, β is corresponding coefficients and εit is the 
error term. β for the 'card' variable reflects the policy impact on the outcomes of interest 
(after adjusting all covariates). By averaging the observations on the ith individual over 
T time. The equation is appeared to be: 
  i = β i + αi +  i        Equation (2) 
Subtracting equation (2) from (1), the equation is displayed as: 
 it - i = β  + (εit-  i ) 
Regressing it *= it - i on xit* =  will produce a fixed effect estimator. 
Though the FE model appeared to be a good alternative for the analysis in Chapter 7, it 
had serious downside, that is, the FE model was incapable of estimating the effect of 
time invariant variables, such as sex or insurance status. Therefore, results from the FE 
model were not shown in this thesis. 
Treatment-effect model 
There are several tests under the family of Treatment-effect model, such as 2-Staged-
Least-Square (2SLS) and Probit-2SLS. These tests are variants of the Instrumental 
variable (IV), and normally have very similar structure as they originated from the same 
logics. The assumption of these techniques are as follows. Consider data with N 
observations and T time periods; 
 Yit = βXit + αi + μit for t = 1, 2, 3,..., T and i = 1, 2, 3,..., N 
While αi is the unknown intercept for each entity/individual, Yit is the dependent 
variable, Xit is set of independent variables, β is corresponding coefficients and μit is the 
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error term. β for the 'card' variable reflects policy impact on the outcomes of interest 
(after adjusting all covariates). The structure of the equation is composed of two stages 
(Khandker et al., 2010): 
 First stage:  Tit = ɣZit + ΦXit + μit 
 Second stage:  Yi = δQi +  ɳi, + vit, where t = 1, 2, 3,…, T and i = 1, 2, 3,..., k 
Note that 
 Q refers to a vector of covariates, including exogenous variables (X) and 
'predicted' treatment variable (T^). 
 T is (troublesome) treatment variable, in this case, the 'card'. 
 μ and v are idiosyncratic errors. 
 ɳ is unobserved fixed effect. 
 Z is instrument(s). 
The treatment variable is regressed on instrument(s) Z in the first stage; T^ (predicted T) 
is then applied (by embedded in Q) in the second stage. A key concern is that Z should 
be strongly correlated with the treatment variable, but independent from the error terms. 
Two part model 
The following equation is the final estimation of the Two part model. 
 E(y|x) = Pr(yi>0|xij) x exp(βjxij) 
For part 1 (Logit regression), the dependent binary variable y, is estimated in the form of 
log odds ratio (p/(1-p)). The probability of an event lies between 0 and 1: 
 ln(y) = ln((p/(1-p)) = Z = β1 + β2xi 
 p = ez/(1+ez), where p is a probability of an interested event. 
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For part 2 (Generalised linear model [GLM] with a gamma family and log link 
transformation), the GLM consits of  
 a random component for response variable y, of which the distribution is a 
member of exponential family (in this case, gamma family); 
 a linear predictor that is a linear function of regressors, 
o ɳi = α + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + … + βkxik; 
 a smooth and inverse link function, g-1, which transforms the expectation of the 
response variable, μ = E(yi) to the linear predictor, 
o g(μi) = ɳi = α + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + … + βkxik; and in the analysis of health 
expenditure, a log transformation is applied as a link function.  
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Appendix 8: Participant information sheet and 
consent form 
English version 
Department of Global Health and Development, 
Faculty of Public Health and Policy,  
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
15-17 Tavistock Place 
London WC1H 9SH  
 
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7927 2700 
UK Mobile: + 44 (0) 77632 17934 
Thailand Mobile: + 66 (0) 81544 6966 
Email: Rapeepong.Suphanchai@lshtm.ac.uk, rapeepong@ihpp.thaigov.net 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
"Health Insurance Card for Foreigners" policy for cross-border migrants in 
Thailand: Responses in policy implementation & outcome evaluation 
I would like to invite you to be interviewed as part of a research study that aims to 
explore how the health insurance card for migrants affect healthcare providers and 
cross-border migrants in Thailand. This sheet provides general information about the 
research and how you would be involved, explains the confidentiality and data storage 
arrangements, and gives details of how the research has been funded and reviewed. 
Please read the following information and if there is anything that is not clear, or if you 
wish to have further information, please contact the researcher as per detail below. 
The research is undertaken as part of my doctoral degree at the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), which is supervised by Prof Anne Mills. 
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This study is funded by the Health Insurance Systems Research Office and the 
International Health Policy Programme, the Ministry of Public Health, Thailand.  
The study objectives are: (1) to explore policy aims and objectives through views of 
policy makers in Thailand, (2) to explore the response of local healthcare providers to 
the HICF policy, and how the policy affects migrant health-seeking behaviour, (3) to 
assess the influence of the policy on service utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditure of 
insured migrants, and (4) to provide recommendations on the Thai migrant healthcare 
policy.  
The key methods are: (1) reviewing relevant evidence and interviewing with policy 
makers, (2) interviewing both Thai healthcare providers at the ground level and also 
migrants about how they respond to the current health insurance policy for migrants, and 
(3) analysing facility-based data on the volume of use and out-of-pocket expenditure of 
migrants.  
I would like to interview you because your interest in and experience of this policy in 
Thailand might be beneficial to the improvement of healthcare services policy for 
migrants in Thailand, and I sincerely hope that you are able to participate in this study. 
The interview will last approximately 60-90 minutes, and will be held at a location and 
in language as per your preference. 
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form. Having signed the 
consent form you will remain free to withdraw from the study at any time, without 
having to give a reason for this. You will be ensured that your participation in the 
research will not affect your rights and benefits of any kinds, such as, healthcare access 
and/or career advancement.  
Confidentiality 
With your permission, the interview will be digitally recorded and transcribed. You may 
request a copy of your transcript to be sent to you, and you can correct any part of the 
transcript that you believe to be in error. Direct quotes will only be used in the research 
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reports with your consent, and all quotes will be anonymised in the way that the 
interviewees cannot be identified. Only the research team, consisting of the researcher, 
the research assistants, the student's supervisor and a transcriber, will be able to access 
to the audio files. 
Dissemination of results 
 Preliminary finding of the research will be reported back to the participants in 1-2 study 
seminars, probably by September 2015. This will be an opportunity to feedback on 
emerging results, and validate the information collected. The final study results will be 
disseminated only for academic purpose and will be presented in several forms, such as, 
journal, research report and thesis.   
Data storage 
Audio files and anonymised transcripts will be securely stored by the researcher until 
the completion of his study, probably by December 2016. The LSHTM research 
governance requirements stipulate that files are then securely stored with the LSHTM 
records management service for a further 10 years. During this time, only the researcher 
can access – or give permission to access – the stored files. No permission will be 
granted to access the audio files. After 10 years, the files will be disposed. 
With your permission, the researcher will archive your anonymised transcript with 
LSHTM’s data repository, under the option “request access”, for 10 years from the point 
of deposit, after which time they will be destroyed. Requests for access will be sent to 
the researcher. Information about LSHTM repository can be found at: 
http://blogs.lshtm.ac.uk/rdmss/files/2014/04/Data-Collection-Structure-Mar2014.pdf. 
Ethical Review 
The study has been approved by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
Ethics Committee and by the Institute for Development of Human Research Protection 
in Thailand.   
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Further Information and Complaints 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please contact me via email at 
Rapeepong.Suphanchaimat@lshtm.ac.uk or rapeepong@ihpp.thaigov.net, or call my 
Thai mobile number, +66 (0) 81544 6966 and I will do my best to answer your 
questions. If you are concerned about your rights as a research participant, think you 
have not been treated fairly or wish to make a complaint, you can contact the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Ethics Committees at ethics@lshtm.ac.uk or 
call +44 (0) 207 927 2221.   
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Rapeepong Suphanchaimat 
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Informed consent form 
By signing below, you are agreeing that: (1) you have read and understood the 
Participant Information Sheet, (2) questions about your participation in this study have 
been answered satisfactorily, (3) you are aware of the potential risks (if any), and (4) 
you are taking part in this research study voluntarily (without coercion).  
     
 
_______________________________    
Participant’s signature       
(Participant's name) 
 
 
______________________________ ______________________________
   
Principal investigator's signature    Witness' signature 
(Principal investigator's name)    (Witness' name) 
 
Date __/__/__ 
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Thai version 
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Burmese version  
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Appendix 9: Original and translated interview 
quotes 
Interview with policy makers (Chapter 5) 
1. "The bottom line of migrant health problems in Thailand is many people, 
particularly Thai NGOs are overly afraid of using the term, 'aliens', and try to replace it 
with more beautiful words like, 'foreigners' or 'migrants'. This made us forget the non-
nationals who cannot identify their country of origin. It is like hiding a problem; using a 
hand to cover the sun. Can we hide it?" [PM06] 
"ปัญหาของคนต่างดา้วในไทยคือ  หลายๆคนโดยเฉพาะเอน็จีโอไม่กลา้ใชค้าํวา่ต่างดา้ว เลยไปใชค้าํวา่
ขา้มชาติบา้งหรือไมแกร้นบา้ง  มนัเลยทาํใหเ้ราลืมคนท่ีไร้สญัชาติไป  เหมือนกบัเราพยายามปิดบงั
ปัญหา ถามหน่อยวา่เอามือมาบงัพระอาทิตยม์นัจะบงัไดไ้หมล่ะ" [PM06] 
2. "When you talk about migrant policy in Thailand, that's wrong. Because, there has 
never been a migrant policy in this country…Policy makers in this country never saw 
farther than the end of their noses, and never thought of addressing structural 
problems." [PM02] 
"คุณถามผมวา่ไมแกร้นโพลีซีในไทยเป็นยงัไง นัน่ผดิแลว้ เพราะประเทศน้ีมนัไม่เคยมีไมแกร้นโพลีซี 
...นกัการเมืองในประเทศน้ีไม่เคยมองอะไรเกินกวา่ปลายจมูกของตนเอง ไม่เคยคิดแกปั้ญหาเชิง
โครงสร้าง" [PM02]  
3. "I was involved in the drafting of the 2005 Strategy. At that time, the spearhead of 
the Strategy was Mr XXX, who then held a high position in the Ministry of Education in 
few months after the 2005 Strategy was introduced." [PM06] 
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"พี่เคยร่วมในการร่างยทุธศาสตร์ปี 48 ตอนนั้นคุณ XXX เป็นหวัหอก แลว้ต่อมากไ็ปมีตาํแหน่งใน
กระทรวงฯ" [PM06] 
4. "The 2012 Strategy belongs to the right-wing hawk. Unlike the 2005 Strategy, which 
ensures human rights of a person, the 2012 Strategy rarely touches this (humanitarian) 
issue. In the XXX international meeting, the Strategy was shamefully criticised." 
[PM06]   
"ยทุธศาสตร์ปี 55 มนัเป็นของพวกสายเหยีย่ว ไม่เหมือนยทุธศาสตร์ปี 48 ซ่ึงมีการรับรองเร่ืองสิทธิ
มนุษยชน ยทุธศาสตร์ปี 55 ไม่แตะเร่ืองน้ีเลย ในการประชุม XXX นานาชาติ ยทุธศาสตร์น้ีถูกวิจารณ์
จนขายหนา้มาก" [PM06] 
5.  "I just knew that there was a quota (for migrant recruitment), but I had no idea how 
it (the MOL) allocated this quota. If I request 5 housemaids, I am not sure whether it 
(the MOL) will check this request." [PM02] 
"ผมเพ่ิงรู้วา่มนัมีโควตา้แลว้จดัโควตา้ใหผ้มยงัไงไม่รู้ ถา้ผมบอกวา่ตอ้งการคนใช ้ 5 คน เขาจะดู ยงัไง
ผมไม่รู้" [PM02] 
6.  "There was an idea that once a work permit was obtained, and to avoid duplicate 
payment of premiums, the SSO should register this person (regardless of the 
completeness of the NV). But in practice, during the first two weeks, it (the DOE) needs 
to check information on that migrant, including his/her criminal background and so on. 
So that migrant is not fully eligible for the SSS. Accordingly, that migrant cannot be 
insured by the SSS during that time. This is a constraint in practice." [PM05]  
"กมี็แนวคิดวา่ถา้คุณไดเ้วิร์คเพอร์มิตถูกตอ้งและป้องกนัการจ่ายซํ้าซอ้น เพราะฉะนั้น ประกนัสงัคม
ควรรีจิสเตอร์เขาเลย (โดยไม่ตอ้งรอพิสูจน์สญัชาติแลว้เสร็จ) แต่ในทางปฏิบติั การอนุญาตทาํงาน
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ในช่วงสองอาทิตยแ์รกอยา่งไรเขา (กรมการจดัหางาน) กต็อ้งไปตรวจสอบขอ้มูล ทั้งประวติั
อาชญากรรมนู่นน่ี จึงไม่ไดอ้นุญาติอยา่งเตม็ท่ี กเ็ลยกลายเป็นวา่ อยา่งน้ีกย็งัลงทะเบียนคุณเขา้สู่ระบบ
ประกนัสงัคมไม่ได ้ในช่วงนั้นเลยเป็นปัญหาในทางปฏิบติั" [PM05] 
7. "Even within the MOL, both parties (the SSO and the DOE) rarely talk to each 
other. Those responsible in insuring migrants work in the SSO. Those finding jobs for 
migrants work in the DOE. Those responsible for issuing work permit just do their job. 
They do not care if migrants will be insured for their health. It is not my business! 
Because it is not written in the law (that migrants with work permit must be insured)." 
[PM03] 
"กระทรวงแรงงานสองฝ่ายกไ็ม่ค่อยคุยกนั คนทาํประกนักอ็ยูป่ระกนัสงัคม คนจดัหางานกอ็ยูก่รมการ
จดัหางาน คนออกเวิร์คเพอร์มิตมีหนา้ท่ีออกเวิร์คเพอร์มิต คุณจะประกนัไม่ประกนัไม่ใช่เร่ืองของฉนั 
กฎหมายไม่ไดเ้ขียนไวน่ี้นา" [PM03] 
8. "(Interviewer: What factors that you consider a bottleneck for operating the migrant 
insurance at this moment?) We must make the insurance system supported by a legal 
instrument. Without legal grounds supporting the system, it is not possible to set up an 
authority to work on this issue in the long run." [PM04] 
"(ผูส้มัภาษณ์: อะไรเป็นปัญหาคอขวดของการทาํงานในเร่ืองประกนัคนต่างดา้วในปัจจุบนัครับ) ...
ตอ้งใหฐ้านะทางกฎหมายกบัตวัระบบมนั การท่ีไม่มีกฎหมายกบัระบบประกนัของต่างดา้ว ทาํใหไ้ม่มี
การตามมาดว้ยการตั้งองคก์รเพ่ือทาํงานในระยะยาว" [PM04] 
9. "There are only 10 staff members in the office. Two of them have just resigned. 
Seriously, I wish to resign too…The big-picture policy (on migrants) is always shaky. 
This consumes much of our time since we need to change our works according to a new 
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policy. If the new policy was developed based on what we have done, this would lead to 
a progress. But nowadays it is always volatile. " [ADM_CO1]    
"เรามีเจา้หนา้ท่ีสิบคน สองคนกเ็พิ่งลาออกจริงๆพี่กก็าํลงัจะลาออกดว้ย นโยบายภาพใหญ่เปล่ียน
ตลอด มนัทาํใหเ้ราเสียเวลาไปกบัส่วนท่ีตอ้งมาคิดตามนโยบายใหม่ตลอด ถา้นโยบายมาจากพ้ืนฐาน
เดิมแลว้ไปขา้งหนา้ มนัจะเป็นการต่อยอดแต่มนัพลิกไปมาตลอดทุกวนัน้ี" [ADM_CO1] 
10. "They (the BHA) launched health examination regulations and other miscellaneous 
measures. But when local providers faced problems with the insurance, the BHA didn't 
solve the problems of local providers. So they (local providers) always speak to us (the 
HIG) instead." [ADM_CO1] 
"เขา (สาํนกับริหารการสาธารณสุข) ทาํหนา้ท่ีเร่ืองการตรวจสุขภาพออกประกาศและมาตรการต่างๆ 
แต่เวลาเกิดปัญหาเร่ืองการประกนัแลว้เขาไม่ไดต้อบหน่วยบริการ เร่ืองมนักเ็ลยมาอยูท่ี่เรา" 
[ADM_CO1] 
11. "We intended to have reverse financing design to the UCS. Since each province has 
its own specific context. So the money should be pooled only where needed but 
distributed as much as possible." [PM01] 
"เราตั้งใจใหม้นัรีเวิร์สจากยซีู เพราะแต่ละจงัหวดัมีบริบทไม่เหมือนกนั เราจึงพยายามพลูเงินเท่าท่ี
จาํเป็นแต่กระจายใหม้ากท่ีสุด"[PM01] 
12. "Some hospitals are bluffing by not sending (high-cost) money to us (the MOPH). 
They may think that they have already sold a large number of cards so they don’t' want 
to pool the high cost with us." [ADM_CO1] 
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"โรงพยาบาลท่ีลกัไก่ไม่ส่งกมี็ยงัมี คือเขาคาดวา่ขายไดเ้ยอะแลว้ โดยไม่ตอ้งส่งเงินค่าใชจ่้ายสูงให้
กระทรวง" [ADM_CO1] 
13. "I am the one that is not convinced that we should force migrants to have health 
screening. Even though, it sounds good… But I am an epidemiologist. I know that a 
yearly health check does not benefit you that much. But if you take all of them to the 
insurance, this is the best disease surveillance system. It is a win-win situation. Now it is 
like you need to know whether a migrant is having diseases and you ask him/her to pay 
you to get this answer. But if you insure all of them, it means that I promise to protect 
your health all year long. That migrant will benefit from the treatment and you will be 
able to know his/her health status." [PM03] 
"ผมเป็นคนหน่ึงท่ีไม่ค่อยเห็นดว้ยวา่ควรมีการตรวจโรคนะ...แมว้า่การตรวจโรคมนัจะฟังดูดี แต่ผม
เป็นนกัระบาด ผมรู้วา่การตรวจโรคปีละคร้ังมนัไม่ไดช่้วยอะไรมาก แต่ถา้คุณเอาเขาอยูใ่นระบบ ถา้
เขาเจบ็ป่วยเขาจะมาหาคุณ น่ีคือการเฝ้าระวงัโรคท่ีดีท่ีสุด วินวนิ ตอนน้ีคุณแค่อยากรู้วา่เขาเป็นโรค
อะไร คุณใหเ้ขามาเสียตงัคแ์ลว้คุณไดค้าํตอบ แต่ถา้ใหเ้ขาประกนักบัเรามนัเป็นการสญัญาวา่เราจะ
รักษาเขาตลอดทั้งปี เขากไ็ดป้ระโยชน์คุณกไ็ดป้ระโยชน์ท่ีรู้วา่เขาเป็นโรคอะไร" [PM03] 
14. "Children and women are potential victims of human trafficking. I am also a 
member of the White Ribbon (a campaign against violence on women and children) 
[The interviewee showed the White Ribbon badge to the researcher while 
interviewing]…That is why we made the 15-January-2013 insurance policy to enable us 
to insure all migrants in Thailand.…and the '365-Baht' card is the country's CSR. …And 
if we take care of them well, once they return home, they will definitely wish to come 
back to us." [PM01] 
"ผูห้ญิงและเดก็เป็นเหยือ่ของการคา้มนุษย ์ ผมเป็นสมาชิกกลุ่มริบบ้ินขาว (โครงการรณรงคต่์อตา้น
ความรุนแรงต่อผูห้ญิงและเดก็) [ผูถู้กสมัภาษณ์โชวเ์ขม็กลดัริบบ้ินขาวต่อนกัวจิยั]... เราจึงทาํนโยบาย
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ประกนัสุขภาพ 15 มกราคม 2556 เพื่อใหเ้ราสามารถประกนัคนต่างดา้วทุกคนได ้และบตัร365 บาท
ยงัเป็นซีเอสอาแบบหน่ึง นัน่คือถา้เราดูแลเขาดีเม่ือเขากลบับา้นเขากอ็ยากกลบัมาหาเราอีก" [PM01] 
15. "This (the 365-Baht card) shows how the government has brain but no wisdom. How 
can they say that this is a charitable gift?…If the problem is so huge, it should not be 
CSR…Concerning structural problems, if the problem is so big, it means we must do 
something (systematically). We should know how 'strict' we are going to be in dealing 
with these illegal migrant children." [PM02] 
"เร่ืองน้ี (บตัร365 บาท) โชวว์า่รัฐบาลมีสมองแต่ไม่มีก๋ึน มีอะไรมากบ็อกวา่ใหอ้นัน้ีเป็นการกศุล ถา้
หากวา่ปัญหามากกไ็ม่ควรเป็นซีเอสอา คือถา้เชิงระบบแลว้ปัญหามนัมากน้ี แปลวา่เรากจ็ะตอ้ง
ดาํเนินการอะไรบางอยา่งแลว้ วา่เราจะเห้ียมแค่ไหนกบัเดก็ๆ" [PM02] 
16. "The problem of this policy (the Cabinet Resolution on 15 January 2013) is 'who is 
the target population?'. When policy makers talk to the public, they said 'everybody'. 
Then, it created problem. Can a foreign husband of a Thai wife in Udonthani (one of the 
provinces in the Northeast) come to buy the card?...Healthy foreigners will not buy the 
card for sure. Those who bought the card are sick foreigners, who used to pay the 
hospital over 60,000-70,000 Baht a year. Now they just pay 2,200 Baht. Of course, they 
will be happy. So, we launched a letter telling the hospitals to stop selling the card (to 
western foreigners)." [PM03] 
"ปัญหานโยบายตอนนั้นคือวา่ ใครเป็นกลุ่มเป้าหมายบา้ง เวลาผูใ้หญ่ไปพดูกบ็อก'ทุกคน' คราวน้ีมนัก็
ยุง่น่ะสิ ผวัฝร่ังท่ีอยูอุ่ดรธานีซ้ือไดไ้หม ท่ีแขง็แรงดีกไ็ม่ซ้ือ กมี็แต่ผวัฝร่ังท่ีเคยมาเอายาท่ีโรงพยาบาลปี
ละหกเจด็หม่ืนมาซ้ือ คราวน้ีซ้ือแค่สองพนัสอง แฮปป้ีจะตาย ตอนหลงัเลยตอ้งออกหนงัสือหา้ม" 
[PM03] 
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17. "[Laughing] Oh!, they use the term, 'farang' (referring to Caucasian foreigners). 
The MOPH must answer whether these foreigners are aliens in legal terms." [PM06] 
"[หวัเราะ] โอ!้ เขาใชค้าํวา่'ฝร่ัง'เลยเหรองั้น กระทรวงสาธารณสุขกต็อ้งตอบคาํถามวา่ ฝร่ังคือคนต่าง
ดา้วในเชิงกฎหมายไหม" [PM06] 
18. "I am more than happy to see more than 100,000 Cambodian migrants fleeing out of 
the country. It makes the government realise that they (migrants) are not voiceless 
[Bang the table!]. I wish Thai people would petition the government too."  [PM02] 
"ผมแฮปป้ีมากตอนท่ีคนงานเขมรเดินออกนอกประเทศทั้งหมดกวา่แสนคน มนัทาํใหรั้ฐบาลเร่ิมคิดวา่ 
พวกน้ีเขากมี็สุม้มีเสียง [ทุบโตะ๊!] ผมอยากใหค้นไทยทัว่ไปโวยวายดว้ย" [PM02] 
19. "Initially, this (the OSS) was a measure to pull Cambodian migrant workers back to 
Thailand. And finally, there was a policy to cover all irregular migrants. But our data 
are of bad quality. I asked in the meeting how many Cambodian migrants who were in 
this exodus came back to us? Nobody can answer this. At that time, many constructions 
in Thailand, let's say roads, express ways, and so on, were badly affected." [PM03] 
"ตอนแรกกท็าํโครงการน้ีข้ึนมาเพื่อดึงพวกเขมรกลบับา้น และสุดทา้ยกมี็นโยบายท่ีเปิดใหค้นเถ่ือนมา
ทั้งหมด แต่ขอ้มูลของเราแยม่าก ผมถามในท่ีประชุมวา่ ช่วยตอบผมทีวา่เขมรท่ีไหลกลบัไป กลบัมาก่ี
คน ไม่มีใครตอบได ้ตอนนั้นพวกก่อสร้างถนนทางด่วนอะไรต่อมิอะไรกระทบเลยนะ" [PM03] 
20. "Speaking in lay language, once an illegal migrant passes the OSS door, he will 
become a legal migrant…The government used to say that they would be able to clear 
all illegal migrants within two months, which I told them that was impossible...See, then 
they extended…The MOL also negotiated with us to reduce the insurance price to 
reduce barriers. Then the negotiation began and the price was set to 1,600 Baht…But 
there exist problems, you can recall Burmese guys that were accused of killing a British 
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girl [During the interview period, there was news reporting that two British 
backpackers were murdered in Thailand by Burmese migrant], they still have not yet 
joined the OSS…Like dependants issue, to what extent we will cover? Only one wife? 
Parents of migrants? What is the cut-off age of dependants? These questions need lots 
of further negotiations. And I believe that even you ask the government, they cannot 
answer…" [PM03] 
"พดูง่ายๆวา่นายจา้งเอาลูกจา้งผดิกฎหมายมาเขา้โอเอสเอสออกมาถูกกฎหมายเลย ตอนแรกรัฐบาล
บอกวา่จะจดัการใหเ้สร็จในสองเดือนซ่ึงผมบอกเขาวา่มนัเป็นไปไม่ได ้ เห็นไหม สุดทา้ยกข็ยายเวลา 
ทางแรงงานมาเจรจาบอกขอลดราคาบตัรเพ่ือจูงใจ ...แต่กย็งัมีปัญหา คุณคงจาํได ้พม่าท่ีถูกกล่าวหาวา่
ฆ่าแหม่มนัน่กย็งัเถ่ือนนะ ยงัไม่ไดไ้ปทาํบตัรเลย ...หรือเร่ืองผูติ้ดตามน่ีจะรวมใครบา้ง เมียหน่ึงคน
ไหม พอ่แม่ไหม คาํถามเหล่าน้ีมนัตอ้งอาศยัการเจรจา และผมกเ็ช่ือวา่ถา้คุณถามรัฐบาล เคา้กต็อบ
ไม่ไดห้รอก" [PM03] 
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Interview with local officers, NGOs, employers and migrants (Chapter 6) 
1. "I think the health card gives right to a migrant patient equal to or even more than a 
Thai patient, especially in case of pregnancy. Thais can enjoy two pregnancies at most 
but the Burmese are allowed to have free deliveries with unlimited number…pregnant 
again and again…Now, in Ranong, there are more Burmese residents than Thais. In my 
opinion, we will face problems in the future, particularly problems with these Burmese 
children, who will be brought up in Thailand." [RN_HC2] 
"พี่วา่ตอนน้ีบตัรสุขภาพบริการเท่าเทียมกบัคนไทยหรือมากกวา่คนไทยดว้ยซํ้า โดยเฉพาะเร่ืองคนทอ้ง 
คนไทยใชไ้ดแ้ค่สองทอ้งพม่าใชไ้ดทุ้กทอ้ง ทอ้งๆๆๆ... ตอนน้ีพม่ามาระนองมากกวา่คนไทย ใน
ความคิดพี่นะ เราจะมีปัญหาในอนาคต โดยเฉพาะเร่ืองเดก็ในอนาคตท่ีจะโตมาในไทย" [RN_HC2] 
2. "Last year (2013), we got profit from the card…But we need to use this money to 
cover the uninsured as well. See!, We are generous. Last year (2013), we shouldered the 
unpaid debt by 2.5 million Baht, so, 11.9 million Baht left. But this is the money that we 
will use to care for all migrants throughout the whole coming year. Certainly, this 
(money) won't be adequate." [RN_RNH1]  
"ปีท่ี (2556) แลว้เราไดก้าํไรจากบตัร...แต่เราตอ้งเอาไปคฟัเวอร์คนไขก้ลุ่มท่ีไม่ไดท้าํบตัรดว้ย น่ีไงเรา
มีมีความเมตตากรุณา ปีท่ีแลว้ (2556) เราอนุเคราะห์ไป 2 ลา้น 5 แสนบาท เหลือ 11.9 ลา้น แต่น่ีคือเงิน
ท่ีเราตอ้งไปดูแลเขาในรอบหน่ึงปีซ่ึงไม่พออยูแ่ลว้" [RN_RNH1] 
3. "There are people who are hired to act as an employer and even attorney. There was 
a woman with stage-3 breast cancer came to the hospital to buy the card. She was over 
80. The employer said that she was his household maid. The attorney emphasised that if 
we didn't sell the card, he would sue us. The attorney might receive 5,000 Baht and the 
employer might receive 3,000 Baht from that migrant. Certainly, she cannot work at 
such an advanced age." [RN_RNH1] 
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"มีคนท่ีรับเป็นนายจา้งและรับเป็นทนายดว้ยคนไขเ้ป็นมะเร็งเตา้นมระยะท่ีสาม อายกุแ็ปดสิบกวา่ แลว้
บอกทาํงานลา้งถว้ยชามในบา้น ทนายบอกไม่รับผมฟ้องเลยนะ ทนายอาจจะไดส้กัหา้พนั นายจา้ง
อาจจะไดรั้บสกัสามพนั กท็าํงานไม่ไหวอยูแ่ลว้อายตุั้งแปดสิบกวา่" [RN_RNH1] 
4. "I think now there are more Burmese children than Thai children for the EPI 
(Extended programme on immunisation)…The PPHO gives us some money per head for 
the service (EPI) provided. But we need to submit this info (to the PPHO) on a monthly 
basis." [RN_HC2] 
"พี่วา่คนพม่ามาร่วมอีพีไอเยอะกวา่คนไทยอีก ...อยา่งอีพไีอ สสจ.เคา้กใ็หเ้ราเป็นรายหวั แต่วา่เราตอ้ง
ส่งขอ้มูลทุกเดือน" [RN_HC2] 
5. "If a patient from hospital X comes to us, he will not need to pay for the service. We 
will send the bill to the PPHO to be reimbursed for 700 Baht per case. But there is now 
a debate. Because sometimes the medicine cost is about 3,000 Baht but we earn only 
700 Baht. If the PPHO insists on applying this system, next time we will prescribe 
medicine at the cost of not more than 700 Baht." [RN_RNH1] 
"เช่นคนไขโ้รงพยาบาล X มาท่ีเรา กไ็ม่ตอ้งจ่ายเงิน เรากมี็บิลไปเรียกเกบ็ท่ีสสจ. 700 บาท แต่กาํลงั
เป็นประเดน็เพราะบางทีมาเอายา 3,000 บาท เราเกบ็ไดแ้ค่ 700 บาท ถา้ทางสสจ.ยงัยนืยนั 700 บาท เรา
จะจ่ายยาในราคาไม่เกิน 700 บาท" [RN_RNH1] 
6. "We employ 34 MHWs. Before 2012, all money (used for hiring the MHWs) was 
from NGOs. In 2012 the NGOs quit. So we needed to shoulder this cost. Frankly, we 
don't have enough money. But we still had some savings in our purse, about 10 million 
Baht. I may be able to extend this project (hiring MHWs) just for the next 2-3 years." 
[RN_PHO2] 
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"เราจา้งพสต.อยู ่34 คน ก่อนหนา้น้ีเอน็จีโอจ่ายหมด เม่ือปี 55 พอส้ิน 57 เคา้ออกละ เราตอ้งจ่ายเอง เรา
ไม่มีเงินหรอก แต่ของเก่าเรามีเงินสะสมอยูสิ่บกวา่ลา้น ผมคงช่วยไดร้ะยะหน่ึงนะคงประมาณ2-3 ปี" 
[RN_PHO2] 
7. "We (as an NGO) mobilised money from many sources, such as the Australian 
Embassy, AusAID, and recently from Global Fund; but now Global Fund is about to 
fade away….So we try to reduce our work size, from 9 provinces to 4 provinces." 
[RN_NGO1] 
"เรากข็อทุนจากหลานแหล่ง เช่น สถานทูตออสเตรเลีย ออสเอดส์ และหลงัๆมากจ็ากโกลบอลฟันด ์
แต่ตอนน้ีงบโกลบอลฟันดก์ค่็อยๆเฟดออก เรากล็ดขนาดพื้นท่ีลงจากทาํงาน 9 จงัหวดั กเ็หลือ 4 
จงัหวดั" [RN_NGO1] 
8. "The PPHO may not support the hiring of MHWs for this year. They (the PPHO) 
said they have no money. Our MHW earns only 5,000 Baht for her salary. That is low, 
compared to if they work in a factory." [RN_HC2] 
"สสจ.อาจไม่ให ้ (จา้งพสต.)ดว้ยซํ้าในปีน้ี เคา้บอกวา่ไม่มีเงิน นอ้งเคา้กไ็ดเ้งินแค่หา้พนับาทเอง นอ้ย
นะถา้เทียบกบัเคา้ทาํงานโรงงาน" [RN_HC2] 
9. "We tried to tell the hospital to sell the card to as many people as possible. Some 
hospitals said they wouldn’t sell the card to children because of a fear of running 
deficit. They said they wouldn’t sell the card to sick people. I told them we should not 
think like that. We must sell the card to them and ask them to persuade other migrants to 
buy the card. Finally, the province earned more than 70 million Baht (from selling the 
card). I even promoted this by making a huge cutout written in both Thai and Burmese. I 
even travelled to Kawthaung district to seek more clients. The reason for doing this was 
because the hospitals were very inert." [RN_PHO2] 
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"เราพยายามบอกโรงพยาบาลใหข้ายใหเ้ตม็ท่ี เคา้บอกเคา้ไม่ขายเดก็ เพราะวา่ขาดทุน ไม่ขายคนป่วย 
เราบอกวา่ไม่ได ้ เราตอ้งขาย และใหค้นป่วยไปกระตุน้ใหค้นอ่ืนมาซ้ือ แลว้ทั้งจงัหวดักไ็ดม้าเจด็สิบ
กวา่ลา้นบาท ผมกไ็ปโปรโมทโดยการทาํป้ายใหใ้หญ่ เขียนภาษาไทยและภาษาพม่า ผมขา้มไปท่ีเกาะ
สองเพื่อดึงลูกคา้ฝ่ังนูน้ เหตุผลคือโรงพยาบาลอยูน่ิ่งๆไง" [RN_PHO2] 
10. "There was a time when the PPHO went to Kawthaung district to campaign for the 
card but the hospital did not agree with such campaign. It happened before the advent 
of the One Stop Service. The bottom line is if we can make mass sales, this will be 
financially worthy. But it is not like that because we found the majority of the buyers are 
sick or pregnant migrants. We used to face a case with thyroid disease and renal 
disease. We asked his history and he could not answer naturally. Finally, he confessed 
that he was from Kawthaung district." [RN_RNH3]  
"เคยมีช่วงท่ีนโยบายของสสจ.บอกไปรณรงคข์ายบตัรท่ีเกาะสองแต่โรงพยาบาลไม่ไดรั้บรู้ดว้ย ตอน
นั้นก่อนช่วงวนัสตอ๊ปเซอร์วิส คือถา้เป็นกรุ๊ปใหญ่มนักคุ็ม้ แต่มนัไม่ใช่ ส่วนใหญ่คือคนป่วยและคน
ทอ้ง คราวก่อนกมี็เคสเป็นไทรอยดแ์ละโรคไต กล็องถาม เคา้กอ็ ํ้าอ้ึง กห็ลุดออกมาวา่มาจากเกาะสอง" 
[RN_RNH3] 
11. "I used to speak in the meeting (between the VHVs and the inspectors from health 
centres) as well but they (the inspectors) had never visited the community. I told them 
that we need the officials to come and check whether many small-sized grocery stores 
here sell medicine because I found that those drug sellers have never attended the 
training." [RN_HP1]          
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"พี่เคยไปพดูในท่ีประชุม (ระหวา่งอสม.กบัเจา้หนา้ท่ีโรงพยาบาลส่งเสริมสุขภาพตาํบล) แต่เขายงัไม่
เคยลงมาตรวจสอบในชุมชน เราจาํเป็นใหเ้จา้หนา้ท่ีลงสาํรวจหน่อย วา่ร้านคา้เลก็ๆเหล่าน้ีวา่เขาเอายา
มาจาํหน่ายรึเปล่า เพราะการอบรมเขากไ็ม่มี" [RN_HP1] 
12.  "I used to meet a chubby woman with heart failure. She said she was working as a 
maid. It seemed that she was still able to work (therefore this case was able to buy the 
card). From my experience, most of the buyers passed the health check. There were only 
2-3% not passing the health check. Let's say if we face a cancer patient, we will not let 
them pass the health check since cancer requires high-cost care" [RN_RNH3]   
"ดิฉนัเคยเจอคนอว้นเป็นโรคหวัใจ เคา้บอกวา่ทาํงานแม่บา้น กดู็วา่เคา้ยงัพอทาํงานได ้(ดงันั้นจึงใหซ้ื้อ
บตัรได)้ ท่ีตรวจมาส่วนใหญ่ผา่นการตรวจสุขภาพ มีสองถึงสามเปอร์เซ็นตท่ี์ไม่ผา่นการตรวจสุขภาพ 
อยา่งถา้เป็นมะเร็งเรากไ็ม่ใหผ้า่น อยา่งมะเร็งมนัค่อนขา้งค่าใชจ่้ายสูงเราเลยไม่ใหผ้า่น" [RN_RNH3] 
13. "All of these measures (such as forbidding unhealthy migrants from being insured) 
were initiated by us. These measures put us at risk of being sued. To insure a patient, 
the MOPH should give us the right to say yes or no…May I ask you something? When 
you buy a health insurance from a private company, does it accept every case? If you 
take a guy, who is going to die soon, to the company, will it accept?" [RN_RNH1] 
"นโยบายเหล่าน้ีเราทาํกนัเองนะ มีสิทธิถูกฟ้องไดท้ั้งนั้น ในการทาํประกนัสุขภาพ กระทรวงควรให้
อาํนาจพื้นท่ีตดัสินใจ วา่เคสน้ีรับเคสน้ีไม่รับ ...ผมถามวา่เวลาคุณทาํประกนัเอกชน เคา้รับทุกรายไหม 
เอาคนท่ีกาํลงัจะตายประกนัจะเอาไหม" [RN_RNH1] 
14. "Some hospitals said they won't sell card to pregnant and sick migrants. So who is 
smarter than whom? Do you think migrants are not smart? They all know. If you are 
fair enough, you should sell the card to pregnant (and sick) cases. Of course, it might 
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run a deficit. But these migrants will persuade more people to buy the card, this will 
make us earn more in the end." [RN_PHO2] 
"บางโรงพยาบาลบอกใครทอ้งไม่ขายคน ป่วยไม่ขายเลย ถามวา่ตกลงใครโง่ใครฉลาด แรงงานเขาไม่
ฉลาดหรื เขากรู้็ถา้ เราแฟร์เราตอ้งขายคนทอ้ง (และคนป่วย) ซ่ึงมนัขาดทุนอยูแ่ลว้ แต่เขาจะไปหาคน
อ่ืนมาซ้ือกบัเรา ซ่ึงเรากไ็ดม้ากข้ึนจริงๆ" [RN_PHO2] 
15. "We have used such text for several years. It means that only patients with such 
diseases (active TB, filariasis, and elephantitis, etc) can't buy the card. It is the problem 
of that hospital. If this case is voiced to us, we will be on patient side." [ADM_CO1] 
"เรากใ็ชข้อ้ความน้ีมาหลายปี มนัหมายถึงวา่คนไขท่ี้มีโรคอนัน้ี (วณัโรคระยะแพร่เช้ือ, ฟิลาเรียสิส, 
และเทา้ชา้ง เป็นตน้) ไม่ใหซ้ื้อบตัร มนัเป็นปัญหาของโรงพยาบาล ถา้เคสน้ีร้องมาท่ีเราเรากอ็ยูข่า้ง
คนไขอ้ยูแ่ลว้" [ADM_CO1] 
16. "To enjoy the right, the system should not allow an immediate effect. There should 
be a one-month lag time like private insurance company. We used to see a patient. He 
did not buy the card, then he got an accident, and had fracture of femur. He was 
admitted in the orthopaedic unit. He didn't have money. Then, our staff advised him to 
be discharged from the hospital first. Then, he bought the card. And he could buy it 
since at that time our staff were confused about the policy. One day later, he was 
admitted again (to enjoy the treatment free of charge)." [RN_RNH1] 
"การใชสิ้ทธิไม่ควรใชสิ้ทธิไดท้นัที จะตอ้งรอระยะเวลาหน่ึงเดือนเหมือนประกนัชีวิตเอกชน ...เราเคย
เจอคนไขแ้บบน้ี มีคนไขค้นหน่ึงไม่ไดซ้ื้อบตัรสุขภาพแลว้กถู็กรถชนขาหกัเขา้มาในตึกออร์โธปิดิกส์ 
ไม่มีเงินเคา้ใชสิ้ทธิไม่ไดแ้ลว้อาจจะมีเจา้หนา้ท่ีเราแนะนาํใหดิ้สชาร์จออกไปก่อนแลว้กไ็ปซ้ือบตัร
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สุขภาพ แลว้กซ้ื็อไดด้ว้ย เพราะตอนนั้นเจา้หนา้ท่ีเรากมึ็นๆอยู ่ แลว้อีกวนัหน่ึงกม็านอนโรงพยาบาล 
(เพื่อใชสิ้ทธิรักษาพยาบาลฟรี)" [RN_RNH1] 
17. "(Interviewer: So what will you do when facing unhealthy migrants who really wish 
to buy the card?)...I will tell them to buy it at another hospital. Since then they can use 
service anywhere in the province." [RN_RNH2]    
"(ผูส้มัภาษณ์: พี่ทาํอยา่งไรครับถา้เจอคนป่วยมายนืยนัวา่จะขอซ้ือบตัรจริงๆ) ...พี่กจ็ะบอกใหไ้ปซ้ือ
โรงพยาบาลอ่ืน จากนั้นเคา้กส็ามารถใชบ้ริการท่ีไหนกไ็ดใ้นจงัหวดัอยูแ่ลว้"[RN_RNH2] 
18. "During the One Stop Service, the MOPH said the target population was migrant 
workers. So we perceive that a buyer must have work permit (in order to be eligible to 
buy the 1,600-Baht card). And what about those without work permit? Yes, they are still 
eligible. But the card price is 2,200 Baht and he/she must be a displaced Thai." 
[RN_RNH2] 
"ช่วงวนัสตอ๊ปเซอร์วิส กระทรวงบอกตอ้งเป็นกลุ่มแรงงาน เรากเ็ลยมาคิดกนัวา่แปลวา่ตอ้งมี
ใบอนุญาตทาํงาน (จึงจะซ้ือบตัร 1,600 บาทได)้ ถา้ไม่มีใบอนุญาตทาํงานไดไ้หม กไ็ดแ้ ต่ขายในราคา 
2,200 บาท แต่นัน่สาํหรับไทยพลดัถ่ิน" [RN_RNH2] 
19. "The term, 'dependant', for the MOPH is different from the MOI. Now we are selling 
the card to only those below 7. For those between 8 and 15, we have not opened (the 
card selling policy) yet. Because the term, 'dependent', for the MOI uses the cut-off at 
15. (Interviewer: So far, is there any consensus for this difference?) No!, we have 
stopped selling the card (for children aged 8-15) at this moment" [RN_RNH3] 
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"นิยามเป็นคนละแบบกบัของมหาดไทยค่ะ ตอนน้ีเราขายเฉพาะตํ่ากวา่ 7 ปี แต่ช่วง 8-15 ปีเรายงัไม่เปิด
ขายบตัร เพราะคาํวา่ผูติ้ดตามในส่วนของมหาดไทยบอกวา่ตํ่ากวา่ 15 ปี (ผูส้มัภาษณ์: เลยยงัไม่รู้วา่จะ
ตกลงอยา่งไรหรือครับ) ใช่ค่ะ เลยยงัไม่ขายไปก่อน" [RN_RNH3] 
20. "(Interviewer: If I were Burmese, and I somehow did not join the One Stop Service, 
what would you do to me?) We dare not sell the card. Suppose we sell, there might be a 
question whether we are against the national policy. (Interviewer: Have you ever raised 
this issue to the MOPH?) I did. Dr XXX (policy maker in the MOPH) told me that 'Yes!, 
you may sell them the card but do this covertly.’ I then replied that 'Sir!, if you said so, 
no local facility will dare sell the card.' Because nobody will protect our action if that 
migrant is caught and charged by the police." [RN_PHO1] 
"(ผูส้มัภาษณ์: ถา้ผมเป็นพม่าและผมไม่สามารถเขา้ร่วมวนัสตอ๊ปเซอร์วิสพี่จะทาํอยา่งไรครับ) เราไม่
กลา้ขาย ถา้ขายป๊ับ ถามวา่เราผดิกบันโยบายของประเทศไหม (ผูส้มัภาษณ์: เคยถามไปในท่ีประชุมกบั
กระทรวงไหม) ผมเคยถามแลว้ท่าน XXX กบ็อกวา่ เน่ียลกัลอบขายได ้ ผมเลยบอกวา่ ท่านครับ ถา้
แบบน้ีหน่วยบริการกไ็ม่กลา้ขายแลว้ล่ะ ไม่มีใครมาเป็นประกนัใหเ้ราเลยเกิดพม่าคนน้ีถูกจบัถูกฟ้อง" 
[RN_PHO1] 
21. "There were some legal and administrative constraints re the reimbursement of 
extra stipend for staff or the problem about human shortage. Because when you 
summoned lots of staff in a short time to work in a special venue, you needed to ask for 
help from many authorities. The government might say that it is your duty. But it is 
difficult for us (the MOI), as the host (of the venue) to ask for support from others. 
Because if we cannot give them an extra stipend, they might ask why they have to 
participate in this event (the OSS). I wish to stay at my workplace so that I can save my 
travel cost." [RN_MOI1] 
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"มนัมีระเบียบกฎหมายบางเร่ืองท่ียุง่ในการบริหารจดัการ เช่น เร่ืองค่าตอบแทน เบ้ียเล้ียง หรือเร่ืองคน 
เพราะวา่เวลาเอาคนมารวมกนัในเวลาท่ีจาํกดัตอ้งระดมคนจากหน่วยงานต่างๆ รัฐกอ็อกจะบอกวา่ก็
คุณตอ้งทาํงานอยูแ่ลว้ แต่เราเป็นเจา้ภาพมนัพดูยาก (เพราะถา้ไม่มีเบ้ียเล้ียงให)้ เคา้กบ็อกวา่ งั้นทาํไม
ฉนัตอ้งมาฉนักอ็ยากอยูท่ี่เดิม ไม่ตอ้งเสียค่านํ้ามนัมา" [RN_MOI1] 
22. "(Interviewer: Could you please tell me about the coordination between you and 
non-MOPH authorities?) Frankly, we are voiceless. The two parties (the MOI and the 
MOL) will inform us after they had already talked to, and agreed with each after." 
[RN_RNH2] 
"(ผูส้มัภาษณ์: การประสานงานกบัหน่วยงานนอกกระทรวงสาธารณสุขเป็นอยา่งไรบา้งครับ) ออก
แนวเถียงไม่ไดค่้ะ พดูตรงๆ เคา้ประสานกนัสองฝ่ายเรียบร้อยค่อยบอกโรงพยาบาล" [RN_RNH2] 
23. "To be honest with you, I think we at times have difficulties when working with the 
MOPH. I may not understand the culture and the way of thought of the health sector. 
For example, the MOPH always told us to force everybody to buy the insurance. But if 
they could not afford the price, can we force them (to buy the card)? To my knowledge, 
it is just a ministerial announcement. The MOPH told us to speak in the same language 
(that all migrants are obliged to buy the card). That makes us feel uncomfortable (to say 
so)." [RN_MOI1] 
"ผมพดูตรงๆนะ ผมวา่ทาํงานกบัทางสาธารณสุขบางเร่ืองค่อนขา้งยาก ผมอาจไม่เขา้ใจวฒันธรรมและ
วิธีคิดของทางสาธารณสุข เช่น กระทรวงสาธารณสุขบอกวา่ ใหเ้กบ็ค่าประกนัสุขภาพทุกคน ถา้เกิด
เขาไม่จ่ายจะทาํอยา่งไร บงัคบัไดไ้หม เท่าท่ีผมทราบ มนัเป็นแค่ประกาศกระทรวงทางสาธารณสุข ก็
บอกวา่ใหทุ้กหน่วยพดูใหเ้หมือนกนัวา่ตอ้งเกบ็ๆ เรากล็าํบากใจ" [RN_MOI1] 
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24. "There are three main agencies at the central level that deal with migrant health, 
namely the BPS, the BHA, and the HIG. I used to be invited to attend the meetings about 
migrant health in the MOPH. In the morning, there was a meeting by the HIG, and then 
in the afternoon, there was a meeting by the BPS. And the meeting agendas (between 
authorities) were the same. So, who is insane? If you cannot talk amongst your teams at 
the central level, you should not invite the local level like us. We are frontline staff. The 
order must be clear, then we can act according to the order. If the order is blurred, 
that's pointless." [RN_PHO2] 
"ส่วนกลางมีสามหน่วยท่ีดูเร่ืองต่างดา้ว สนย., สบรส., และกลุ่มประกนั ผมเคยเขา้ประชุมในกระทรวง 
เชา้ของกลุ่มประกนั บ่ายของสนย. ประชุมเร่ืองเดียวกนั ตกลงใครเพี้ยน ถา้คุณยงัคุยกนัเองไม่ได ้ คุณ
ไม่ควรเชิญหน่วยบริการแบบเรา เพราะผมคือหน่วยปฏิบติั คาํสัง่ตอ้งชดัผมถึงทาํได ้ ถา้คาํสัง่ไม่ชดั 
คุณไม่มีความหมายเลยนะ" [RN_PHO2] 
25. "The work permit is issued by me as the registration officer. But, in case there are 
employers who refuse to pay monthly contribution for their employees, the SSO should 
be the plaintiff, not the DOE...I have power to check only whether you are working in 
the site according to what it is shown in your work permit." [RN_WP1] 
"ใบอนุญาตทาํงานออกโดยผมท่ีเป็นนายทะเบียน แต่ในกรณีท่ีมีนายจา้งท่ีมีลูกจา้งแลว้ไม่จ่ายเงิน
สมทบเขา้ประกนัสงัคม คนกล่าวโทษร้องทุกขคื์อประกนัสงัคม ไม่ใช่จดัหางาน ...ผมมีอาํนาจแค่ดูวา่
คุณทาํงานถูกตามประเภทงานตามท่ีระบุในใบอนุญาตทาํงานไหม" [RN_WP1] 
26. "In our area, we tried to block the influx of migrants. But we admit that we still face 
some limitations. In many work sectors, if we always caught illegal migrants, there 
might not be enough workers left. Then, we might have problems with the entrepreneurs. 
So we need to use other measures aside from law enforcement. For example, we tried to 
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create the zoning area that we will be somewhat strict in the inner city and will be more 
relaxed in the outer zone." [RN_MOI1] 
"ในพื้นท่ีเรากพ็ยายามสกดักั้นการเขา้มาของคนต่างดา้ว แต่กย็อมรับวา่มีขอ้จาํกดัพอสมควรในหลาย
จุด ถา้เราใชม้าตรการจบักมุตลอดเวลา แรงงานอาจไม่เหลือ เรากจ็ะมีปัญหากบัผูป้ระกอบการ เราก็
พยายามใชม้าตรการบางอยา่งนอกจากมาตรการทางกฎหมาย เช่น เรากจ็ดัโซนน่ิง กวดขนัในพ้ืนท่ี
ตอนใน พื้นท่ีตอนนอกเรากอ็นุโลมบา้ง" [RN_MOI1] 
27. "(Interviewer: Normally, how long is a migrant required to pause before coming 
back to Thailand again?) In fact, they came back immediately, just get their passport 
stamped and then re-enter the country. But, in theory, they should pause. I knew this 
from my own experience. I knew one of the immigrants who did this." [RN_NGO2] 
"(ผูส้มัภาษณ์: ปกติแลว้เคา้ตอ้งกลบัไปนานแค่ไหนจึงจะกลบัเคา้มาไดอี้กคะ จึงจะกลบัมาได)้ จริงๆ
แลว้ไม่ เคา้กเ็ดินทางไปสแตมป์ออกและสแตมป์เขา้ไดเ้ลย แต่โดยหลกัการแลว้มนัควรเวน้วรรค ผม
ประสบดว้ยตนเองไง มีแรงงานคนหน่ึงท่ีผมรู้ท่ีทาํแบบน้ี" [RN_NGO2] 
28. "During the OSS, there was a transition period where the visa of some legalised 
migrants was about to expire and they needed to journey back to their home country. As 
a result, they turned themselves into illegal migrants again in order to enter the OSS 
instead of legally extending their visa and passport ...Because it was cheaper, faster, 
and more convenient, then re-entered the NV again. Thus, the increase of the 
registration volume (during the OSS) might be false. I think the figure was too high." 
[RN_NGO2] 
"ผมวา่ช่วงวนัสตอ๊ปเซอร์วิสมนัมีช่วงเปล่ียนผา่นท่ีแรงงานท่ีถูกกฎหมายแลว้และวีซ่ากาํลงัจะหมดอาย ุ
และจาํเป็นตอ้งกลบัประเทศ เขาเลยเปล่ียนรูปแบบตนเอง โดยการเขา้วนัสตอ๊ปเซอร์วิสใหม่ ทั้งๆท่ี
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ควรต่อวีซ่าและหนงัสือเดินทาง ...กม็นัถูกกวา่ ไวกวา่ และสะดวกกวา่ แลว้กพ็สูิจน์สญัชาติใหม่อีก 
ยอดตวัเลขในการลงทะเบียนช่วงวนัสตอ๊ปเซอร์วิสท่ีสูงข้ึนมาอาจจะเป็นเทจ็กไ็ด ้ ผมวา่ตวัเลขมนัเยอะ
ไป" [RN_NGO2] 
29. "I always opposed the HICS. If that is for land migrants or those at the fish docks, I 
will be OK with it. But for seafarers, I totally disagree because they don't have a chance 
to use the insurance. They are always aboard. I lost over a million for the insurance. 
Some migrants stayed with me for just a couple of months, then they left their work. And 
who paid for their insurance? It is the employer! I didn't even have a chance to deduct 
their salary to recover my expense. The policy makers did not understand this setting. 
Do you think this policy is successfully implemented? I think it was just 30% 
successful." [RN_E3] 
"ประกนัสุขภาพผมคดัคา้นมาตลอด อยา่งแพปลาหรือคนทาํงานบนบกผมเห็นดว้ย แต่ลูกเรือประมง
ผมคดัคา้น เพราะทาํแลว้ไม่ไดใ้ช ้ เคา้อยูบ่นเรือตลอด ผมหมดไปเป็นลา้นแลว้ บางทีเคา้กอ็ยูเ่ดือนสอง
เดือนเคา้กห็นี แลว้ใครเป็นผูจ่้าย นายจา้งนะครับ ยงัไม่ทนัหกัเงินเดือนเลย คนท่ีอยูต่รงนั้นไม่รู้แลว้ก็
ออกนโยบาย พอออกนโยบายถามวา่ทาํไดท้ั้งหมดไหม ผมวา่แค่สามสิบเปอร์เซ็นตเ์ท่านั้นแหละ" 
[RN_E3] 
30. "Now there emerges a new job that helps complete the registration for migrants on 
behalf of the employers…It is more convenient but I had to pay more (laugh!). It 
charged me 500 Baht per head of migrant. But the registration takes numerous steps, 
and is very tiresome, and there are so many people. That's why I don't want to get 
involved. So I am OK with hiring them (brokers)." [RN_E2]  
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"ตอนน้ีมนัมีอาชีพใหม่นะคือรับทาํบตัรไง เรากส็ะดวกข้ึนแต่กจ่็ายตงัตม์ากข้ึน (หวัเราะ!) เคา้คิดเป็น
หวั หวัละหา้ร้อย แต่วา่การข้ึนทะเบียนแรงงานพม่ามีขั้นตอนมาก เหน่ือยมาก คนเยอะมาก ทาํใหเ้รา
ไม่อยากไปเลย จา้งๆไปเถอะ" [RN_E2] 
31. "The current migrants are those who expect that the rubber price may go up. But 
there are fewer new workers now. Some of our migrants even have their own rubber 
field on the other bank (of the river). It is like they use us as their learning field 
[laugh!]." [RN_E2]  
"ตอนน้ีพม่าปัจจุบนัคือพม่าเดิมท่ียอมทนอยูก่บัเราเผือ่วา่ยางจะราคาดีข้ึน พม่าใหม่น่าจะนอ้ยลง พม่า
ท่ีมาอยูก่บัเราอยา่งนอ้ยเคา้กมี็สวนฝ่ังนูน้ เคา้มาอยูก่บัเราระหวา่งท่ียงัไม่ตดัยาง กม็าอยูก่บัเราศึกษาดู
งาน (หวัเราะ!)" [RN_E2] 
32. "The advantage of the card is if we have surgery or if giving birth, we pay only 30 
Baht...But the policy changed very quickly. We went to tell the villagers (about the 
card), and then it changed again, and the villagers came to blame us (for giving wrong 
information)" [MM3] 
"ขอ้ดีของบตัรนะคะ คือถา้เราผา่ตดัหรือคลอดลูกเรากจ่็ายแค่ 30 บาท ...แต่นโยบายเปล่ียนบ่อย บางที
เราไปบอกชาวบา้น (เก่ียวกบับตัร) แลว้นโยบายเปล่ียนอีกแลว้เคา้กม็าวา่เรา (วา่ใหข้อ้มลผดิ)" [MM3] 
33. "The Social Security Office told that they will give us the money back when we reach 
60 years of age, and also when we die. Who will guarantee that we will receive that 
money? And they say they will give us 1,000 Baht when we leave for our home. But you 
must send notice (to the SSO) in advance…Who knows that their cousin will die by next 
month? Just 1,000 Baht!, I can collect it by myself." [MM3] 
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"ประกนัสงัคมบอกวา่เคา้จะใหเ้งินคืนตอนเราอาย ุ60 หรือตอนตาย ใครจะไปรับรองไดว้า่เราจะไดใ้ช้
เงินนั้น แลว้กบ็อกวา่จะใหเ้งินคืน 1000 บาทถา้เรากลบัพม่า แต่ตอ้งไปบอกเคา้ก่อน ...ใครจะรู้วา่ญาติ
เราจะตายเดือนหนา้ แค่ 1,000 บาท ฉนัเกบ็เองได"้ [MM3] 
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Appendix 10: Section 7bis of the Thai Nationality 
Act 1965 (B.E.2508) as amended by the Thai 
Nationality Act 2008 (B.E.2551) 
Section 7. The following persons can acquire Thai nationality by birth: 
1. A person born of a father or a mother of Thai nationality, whether within or 
outside the Thai Kingdom; 
2. A person born within the Thai Kingdom except the person under Section 
7bis paragraph one. 
…Section 7bis. A person born within the Thai Kingdom of alien parents does not 
acquire Thai nationality if at the time of his birth, his lawful father or his father who 
did not marry his mother, or his mother was: 
1.  the person having been given leniency for temporary residence in Kingdom as 
a special case; or 
2. the person having been permitted to stay temporarily in the Kingdom; or 
3. the person having entered and resided in the Thai Kingdom without permission 
under the law on immigration. 
In case the Minister deems it appropriate, he may consider and give an order for 
each particular case granting Thai nationality to any person under paragraph one, in 
conformity with the rules prescribed by the Cabinet. 
The person who is born within the Thai Kingdom and has not acquired Thai 
nationality under paragraph one shall be deemed to have entered and resided in the 
Thai Kingdom without permission under the law on immigration unless an order is 
given otherwise according to the law on that particular matter.  
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Appendix 11: Case studies of selected migrant 
interviewees 
Case 1 A 47-years-old female with DM and HT 
Monn was a 47-years-old Burmese woman. She illegally migrated to Thailand about 20 
years ago and has been living in Ranong province since then. At the time of migration, 
she was accompanied by her husband, her two sons born in Myanmar and her sister. The 
family migrated to Thailand with an aim to seek better job opportunities. Currently, her 
household income was 13,000 Baht (US$ 394) per month, while the expense was about 
10,000 Baht (US$ 333) per month. 
When Monn first arrived Thailand, she worked in a wood factory. Then she became ill 
with HT and DM. The illness got worse when she was engaged with the extensive 
labour work. She needed to visit Ranong hospital to receive medication every 3-4 
months. Monn preferred visiting the hospital to the health centre since she felt that there 
were many more doctors at the hospital, and the doctors often treated her nicely. 
However, she admitted that utilising services at the hospital was not convenient due to a 
long waiting queue and a lack of interpreters.  
She used to pay her medicine about 500 Baht (US$ 15) per visit; but in 2012 she bought 
the card and after that she could enjoy services free of charge. Monn mentioned that her 
illness was the main reason of buying the card, and she renewed the card every time it 
met the expiry date.  
The employer of her husband and her eldest son (working as construction labour) 
accepted to put her name in the list of employees (despite the fact, in practice, that she 
was not able to work heavily) because her husband and her son were quite skilful in 
their job, and the employer was care about the living of his employees. Her husband's 
employer also managed all paper works for her (passport, work permit, and health card) 
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with the overall expense of 5,000 Baht (US$ 152), but this was later deducted from her 
husband's monthly wages.  
Now there were four members in the household. Everybody in her household was 
insured, except for her youngest (11 years old) son, as she reckoned that the card price 
was too expensive. Monn expressed that, for her health benefit, if the card price went 
up, she still wished to buy the card. However, she opined that if she had not been ill, she 
would not have been interested in buying the card. The genogram of Monn's household 
is presented below. 
 
Case 2 A 58-years-old female with dyspepsia 
Za migrated to Thailand about ten years ago. Currently, she has been living with her 
husband, her daughter and three grandchildren. She peeled shrimps for a living, with an 
estimated daily income of 100-120 Baht (US$ 3-4). Every morning there was a pickup 
truck containing many buckets of shrimps, coming to her community.  
Her (and her neighbour's) duty was to peel the shrimps before the pickup truck came to 
recollect the buckets in the evening. Her wage depended on the amount of shrimps she 
peeled (approximately 12-15 Baht (US$ 0.4-0.5)/kg). Almost all villagers joined this 
work. However, she had no specific knowledge about who the employer was.  
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Her general health condition was fairly good. She occasionally suffered from dyspepsia 
(stomach pain) but has never been admitted in the hospital. She used to enjoy service 
both at the hospital and at a private clinic, with an average expense of 350-700 Baht 
(US$ 11-21) per visit.  
Za did not have any legal documents until July 2014 when the OSS was set up. She 
joined the registration process due to a fear of being arrested. She spent about 10,000 
Baht (US$ 303) to acquire all essential documents, which were processed by a broker.  
Now she had work permit and the health card, but she has not yet received the passport 
as the NV is still on the way. Name of the employer appearing on her work permit was 
the employer of her husband, working at the fish dock. The entire household expense 
was about 8,000 Baht (US$ 242), and the income was somewhat unpredictable.  
Her 22-year-old daughter also had problems with the work status as she just came to live 
with Za after being away to work in another province for a while, and her work permit 
was tied with the former employer. She was about to get a new job at the mobile phone 
shop but there was problem with the work permit. This was because to obtain a new 
work permit, she needed to inform the Department of Employment at the province 
where her existing work permit was issued and this required much paper work as well as 
consent from her ex-employer. However, she told that the mobile shop owner did not 
worry much about her work permit.  
As her work permit was issued at another province, she was not insured with the health 
facility in Ranong province. However, she was still healthy, thus the health card was not 
of her concern at the moment. Now she was living with her 2-years-old daughter (Za's 
niece), whose father is a Thai national. Therefore her child acquired Thai nationality 
since birth and this made her carefree with the health security of her baby.  
The genogram of Za's family presented below reflects the fact that, though the current 
government intended to have all migrants involved in the OSS and insured with the 
HICS, not all migrants took part in the registration. 
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Note: NA = not applicable or no information 
Case 3 A 53-years-old female with NCD 
Wei had been residing in Kraburi district for more than 23 years. She moved from 
Myanmar to Thailand with an intention to search for better job prospect. In her 
household, there were Wei, her husband and her youngest son. All of them were the 
rubber field workers. They had been working for the current employer for over 11 years. 
However, Wei travelled back to Myanmar occasionally as she still owned the rubber 
field on the other bank of the river, and her two elder sons were staying in Myanmar.   
The household monthly income was about 20,000 Baht (US$ 606). The land owner 
provided her family a house in the rubber field free of charge. The family spent only 
utility bill. The landlord also took care of the whole legalisation process, and later 
deducted the cost of registration from her income. Her wage depended on the amount of 
latex acquired (about 5 Baht [US$ 0.2] per raw rubber fluid). Wei's underlying diseases 
were DM and HT; however she was still fit enough for work. She received medicine 
regularly at the nearby health centre, and at times visited a private clinic due to a shorter 
waiting time. Wei mentioned that a mutual support from the employer was vital factor 
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that kept her staying in Thailand. The employer was very kind and he even bought the 
blood sugar self-monitoring machine for her.    
Her family genogram is as follows: 
 
Note: NA = not applicable or no information 
Case 4 A 41-years-old male with HIV/AIDS 
Tan illegally migrated to Ranong province around 15 years ago and started to work as 
an offshore fisherman. He then settled his life with the second wife in Muang district. In 
2010 he found a swelling mass in the neck and thereafter it was diagnosed of TB 
lymphadenitis. While being treated for TB, the hospital further investigated his 
immunity and discovered that he was infected with HIV/AIDS. In 2012 his health 
became worse and he was admitted in the hospital. At that time, the cost of treatment 
was over 5,000 Baht (US$ 152), and there must be regular expense of lifelong ART for 
about 1,800 Baht per month (US$ 55). Tan could not afford the treatment cost. He asked 
for a waiver from the hospital. The hospital still offered him medication and collected 
money from him according to the ability to pay. Now Tan's viral blood level was much 
better but his physical function was still impaired due to malnourishment and a lack of 
proper rehabilitation. He could not walk due to poor muscle mass in the lower 
extremities.  
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The situation seemed to be better between 2013 and mid 2014 as at that time the card 
policy was relatively open to all migrants. His wife's employer agreed to buy the card 
for him. Tan's wife also had HIV/AIDS but her health status remained in a good 
condition. She already acquired work permit and passport through the assistance of a 
broker. The only document that Tan possessed was the health card issued in February 
2014. Tan heard about the OSS, but he failed to join the event due to a very poor 
physical condition. In February 2015 his card expired and he turned to be uninsured 
again; and this worsened the financial difficulty of the household (though the hospital 
still continued the treatment even after his card expired, but he still needed to pay for the 
ART according to the ability to pay).  
Now there was the local NGO that offered help to him by partially subsidising 
transportation cost and laboratory expense as he was required to monitor his CD4 level 
and viral loading twice a year (a subsidy from NGO is about 1,400 Baht [US$ 43)/year]. 
Tan wished to be insured again but he admitted that his request might be in vain due to 
the strict regulation of the hospital that barred unhealthy migrants from being insured. 
The family did not have any plan for the future, whether to settle down here or to return 
to Myanmar, as Tan must continue the treatment here, and in the meantime the family's 
economic status was in trouble as the only income generator was Tan's wife. His wife 
earned only 5,000 Baht (US$ 152) per month, and this could hardly offset the 
household's monthly expense. Tan also had a son of  working age, born from his first 
wife, but they have not been in contact for years. The family genogram of Tan is 
displayed below. 
 
Note: NA = not applicable or no information 
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Appendix 12: Crude utilisation rate 
Table 50 Details of the calculation for IP and OP utilisation rates of the UCS and the HICS beneficiaries 
Service type Insurance Variables Facilities FY 
2011
FY 
2012
FY 
2013
FY 
2014
FY 
2015
Inpatient HICS 
Total registered 
beneficiaries (persons) 
Kraburi hospital (a) 6,393 10,443 8,171 7,343 11,917
Ranong hospital (b)  29,829 39,244 26,660 31,928 45,543
Utilisation volume 
(admissions) 
Kraburi hospital (c)  
 
285 
 
448 
 
511 
 
454 
 
484 
Ranong hospital (d)  
 
2,654 
 
3,495 
 
3,444 
 
4,044 
 
2,401 
Utilisation rate 
(admissions/person/year)
Kraburi hospital 
(c/a) 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04
Ranong hospital 
(d/b) 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.05
UCS 
Total registered 
beneficiaries (persons) 
Kraburi hospital (a) 
 
37,915 
 
38,393 
 
37,565 
 
61,549 
 
61,527 
Ranong hospital (b)  
 
59,898 
 
60,952 
 
62,155 
 
37,192 
 
36,972 
Utilisation volume 
(admissions) 
Kraburi hospital (c)  1,522 2,301 2,571 2,395 2,185
Ranong hospital (d)  7,467 8,334 8,336 7,653 7,411
Utilisation rate 
(admissions/person/year)
Kraburi hospital 
(c/a) 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04
Ranong hospital 
(d/b) 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.20
Outpatient HICS Total registered 
beneficiaries (persons) Kraburi hospital (a) 
 
6,393 
 
10,443 
 
8,171 
 
7,343 
 
11,917 
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Service type Insurance Variables Facilities FY 
2011
FY 
2012
FY 
2013
FY 
2014
FY 
2015
Ranong hospital (b)  
 
29,829 
 
39,244 
 
26,660 
 
31,928 
 
45,543 
Utilisation volume 
(visits) 
Kraburi hospital (c)  NA 9,768 9,935 12,442 13,556
Ranong hospital (d)  
 
NA 33,642 31,309 25,718 30,368
Utilisation rate 
(visits/person/year) 
Kraburi hospital 
(c/a) NA 0.94 1.22 1.69 1.14
Ranong hospital 
(d/b) NA 0.86 1.17 0.81 0.67
UCS 
Total registered 
beneficiaries (persons) 
Kraburi hospital (a) 
 
37,915 
 
38,393 
 
37,565 
 
61,549 
 
61,527 
Ranong hospital (b)  
 
59,898 
 
60,952 
 
62,155 
 
37,192 
 
36,972 
Utilisation volume 
(visits) 
Kraburi hospital (c)  NA 82,155 79,304 80,882 82,378
Ranong hospital (d)  
 
NA 135,039 144,969 135,174 148,619
Utilisation rate 
(visits/person/year) 
Kraburi hospital 
(c/a) NA 2.14 2.11 1.31 1.34
Ranong hospital 
(d/b) NA 2.22 2.33 3.63 4.02
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Note:  
1. The utilisation of the UCS beneficiaries might be underestimated since the visits 
by a Thai national who was willing to pay out of pocket were coded as 'insurance 
not shown' or 'uninsured' though the fact is he/she was already covered by the 
UCS.    
2. The calculation above was just a rough analysis of utilisation rate and it still 
suffered from a limitation that the researcher could not track the personal ID (13-
digits code), which was a unique identifier of a person because the health staff in 
the study hospitals felt uncomfortable to share the 13-digit ID of a patient for 
fear of breaching ethics. This limitation did more or less affect the calculation 
accuracy.  
3. The figures were cumulative numbers of registered beneficiaries at the start of 
given fiscal year. For example, the figure, '7,343', in the table above refers to the 
number of the migrant card holders at the beginning of FY 2014 in Kraburi 
hospital (which was a cumulative number of all registrations by the end of FY 
2013).  
4. The calculation did not include newborn admissions. 
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Appendix 13: Examples of the OLS on inpatient 
utilisation with various interaction terms 
The following table (Table 51) is an extension of Table 27 in Chapter 7 after adding the 
interaction term between the insurance variable and the facility level variable. The 
interaction between HICS and facility level did not yield statistical significance. Also, 
the LR test exhibited the P-value of 0.175. This implied that the interaction term did not 
lead to a significant increase in the goodness of fit of the equation (R2 = 0.094, equal to 
the restricted equation).   
Table 51 Multivariate analysis of IP utilisation volume by the OLS after adding 
interaction term between the insurance variable and the facility level variable 
Sum of visits (R2=0.094) Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)    
 HICS 0.012 0.012 0.344 -0.012 0.036
 UCS 0.114 0.013 <0.001 0.088 0.139
Ever had catastrophic illness (v never) 0.054 0.012 <0.001 0.030 0.078
Insurance##Catastrophic illness  
 HICS##Ever had catastrophic illness 0.226 0.030 <0.001 0.166 0.285
 UCS##Ever had catastrophic illness 0.433 0.023 <0.001 0.388 0.477
Provincial hospital (v district hospital) 0.021 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.037
Insurance##Facility level   
 HICS##Provincial hospital 0.000 0.013 0.977 -0.025 0.026
 UCS##Provincial hospital -0.033 0.015 0.034 -0.063 -0.002
Age group (v <7 yr)   
 8-15 -0.081 0.010 <0.001 -0.100 -0.062
 16-30 -0.039 0.008 <0.001 -0.054 -0.024
  31-60 0.029 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.049
 >60 0.150 0.017 <0.001 0.118 0.183
Female (v male) -0.007 0.008 0.372 -0.023 0.009
Proximity (v non-proximity) 0.120 0.008 <0.001 0.105 0.135
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) -0.020 0.007 0.005 -0.034 -0.006
Insurance##OSS   
 HICS##Post-OSS 0.002 0.011 0.854 -0.020 0.025
 UCS##Post-OSS -0.018 0.013 0.149 -0.044 0.007
Constant 0.954 0.012 <0.001 0.930 0.978
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One might be interested to examine if there was an interaction between the HICS and 
age group since the HICS had different card prices between a migrant adult and a 
migrant child. In this regard, the researcher added an interaction between the insurance 
variable and the age group variable. To avoid having too many unnecessary interaction 
terms and for better interpretation of the results, the age group variable was converted 
from 5 categories to 2 categories, namely, child (=< 7 years) v non-child (> 7 years). 
Table 52 and Table 53 present the OLS with and without insurance##child interaction 
respectively. It was clear that results from both models were very alike. The 
HICS##child interaction did not have statistical significance. However, the child 
variable itself revealed a statistically significant effect despite a minute negative effect 
size. This finding was consistent with the result before converting the age group 
variable, suggesting that patients with advanced age tended to have more admissions 
than the younger ones. P-value of the LR test was 0.903, reflecting that the interaction 
term did not lead to a significant increase to the goodness of fit of the equation.    
Table 52 Multivariate analysis of IP utilisation volume by the OLS after substituting 
age group variable with child variable 
Sum of visits (R2=0.087) Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)  
 HICS 0.011 0.005 0.040 0.001 0.021
 UCS 0.109 0.005 <0.001 0.099 0.119
Ever had catastrophic illness (v never) 0.081 0.012 <0.001 0.057 0.105
Insurance##Catastrophic illness  
 HICS##Ever had catastrophic illness 0.221 0.031 <0.001 0.161 0.282
 UCS##Ever had catastrophic illness 0.456 0.023 <0.001 0.411 0.501
Child (v non-child) -0.021 0.008 0.012 -0.037 -0.005
Female (v male) -0.015 0.008 0.059 -0.031 0.001
Proximity (v non-proximity) 0.118 0.008 <0.001 0.103 0.132
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) -0.016 0.007 0.020 -0.030 -0.003
Insurance##OSS  
 HICS##Post-OSS -0.005 0.012 0.696 -0.027 0.018
 UCS##Post-OSS -0.023 0.013 0.077 -0.048 0.002
Provincial hospital (v district hospital) -0.006 0.011 0.568 -0.028 0.015
Constant 0.980 0.013 0.000 0.954 1.006
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Table 53 Multivariate analysis of IP utilisation volume by the OLS after adding 
interaction term between the insurance variable and the child variable 
Sum of visits (R2=0.087) Coef. Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)      
 HICS 0.011 0.005 0.037 0.001 0.022
  UCS 0.109 0.006 <0.001 0.097 0.120
Ever had catastrophic illness (v never) 0.081 0.012 <0.001 0.056 0.105
Insurance##Catastrophic illness  
 HICS##Ever had catastrophic illness 0.222 0.031 <0.001 0.161 0.283
 UCS##Ever had catastrophic illness 0.456 0.023 <0.001 0.411 0.501
Child (v non-child) -0.022 0.006 0.001 -0.035 -0.009
Insurance##Child  
 HICS##Child -0.010 0.017 0.532 -0.043 0.022
 UCS##Child 0.003 0.012 0.826 -0.022 0.027
Female (v male) -0.015 0.008 0.058 -0.031 0.000
Proximity (v non-proximity) 0.117 0.008 <0.001 0.103 0.132
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) -0.016 0.007 0.020 -0.030 -0.003
Insurance##OSS  
  HICS##Post-OSS -0.004 0.011 0.716 -0.027 0.018
 UCS##Post-OSS -0.023 0.013 0.077 -0.048 0.002
Provincial hospital (v district hospital) -0.006 0.011 0.569 -0.028 0.015
Constant 0.980 0.013 <0.001 0.954 1.007
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Appendix 14: Subgroup analysis after excluding 
delivery-related conditions 
Inpatient utilisation 
As displayed in the descriptive statistics' findings, delivery-related diagnoses were the 
most common causes of admissions in all insurance types. The analysis in this step 
therefore excluded observations with delivery-related diagnoses to assess if and to what 
extent the multivariate analysis results deviated from the full sample. Of note is that the 
researcher defined a delivery-related condition as any diagnosis with ICD10 starting 
with 'O' (because the 'O' category in ICD10 refers to gynaecologic and obstetric 
diseases).   
Table 54 displays that the subgroup analysis results were somewhat similar to the full 
sample analysis results. Almost all independent variables in the subsample analysis still 
had the same IRR direction as in the full sample and none of the independent variables 
experienced a change in the statistical significance. This meant though delivery was the 
main purpose of admissions by all beneficiaries (particularly the non-Thai patients) in 
the crude analysis, it did not render more yearly admissions by an individual after all 
covariates were taken into account.      
Table 54 Multivariate analysis of IP utilisation volume by Poisson regression with 
interaction terms after excluding obstetric conditions 
Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)    
 HICS 1.029 0.007 <0.001 1.014 1.043
 UCS 1.091 0.006 <0.001 1.080 1.103
Ever had catastrophic illness (v never) 1.063 0.012 <0.001 1.039 1.086
Insurance##Catastrophic illness   
 HICS##Ever had catastrophic illness 1.210 0.032 <0.001 1.150 1.274
 UCS##Ever had catastrophic illness 1.338 0.022 <0.001 1.296 1.381
Age group (v <7 yr)     
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Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
 8-15 0.928 0.008 <0.001 0.913 0.944
 16-30 0.932 0.007 <0.001 0.919 0.945
  31-60 1.034 0.009 <0.001 1.016 1.053
 >60 1.117 0.014 <0.001 1.091 1.144
Female (v male) 0.988 0.008 0.140 0.973 1.004
Proximity (v non-proximity) 1.125 0.009 <0.001 1.108 1.143
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) 0.985 0.009 0.091 0.967 1.002
Insurance##OSS     
 HICS##Post-OSS 0.970 0.016 0.071 0.939 1.003
 UCS##Post-OSS 0.982 0.013 0.167 0.957 1.008
Provincial hospital (v district hospital) 0.999 0.011 0.960 0.979 1.021
 
Outpatient utilisation 
Subgroup analysis in this section was performed in the same way as the IP treatment. 
However, as 'delivery' was not normally treated as an outpatient care, a new variable, 
'ever had O group', was used instead. The variable was coded as 1 if a patient was ever 
involved with any condition with its ICD10 starting with 'O', which refers to obstetric 
and gynaecological conditions, in a given fiscal year, and 0 if otherwise. Table 55 below 
demonstrates that after excluding O group diagnoses, there was a slight difference 
between the full sample and the subsample results as seen in the HICS effect that 
marginally subsided in the subsample analysis (from +9.9% to +9.0%). 
Table 55 Multivariate analysis of OP utilisation volume by the Negative binomial 
regression with interaction terms after excluding obstetric conditions 
Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Insurance (v uninsured)  
 HICS 1.090 0.017 <0.001 1.058 1.123
 UCS 1.303 0.015 <0.001 1.275 1.333
Ever had ACSC (v never) 1.528 0.031 <0.001 1.468 1.590
Insurance##ACSC  
 HICS##Ever had ACSC 1.127 0.032 <0.001 1.067 1.192
 UCS##Ever had ACSC 1.317 0.029 <0.001 1.262 1.375
Ever had Z group (v never) 1.302 0.018 <0.001 1.267 1.337
Insurance##Z group  
454 
 
Variable IRR Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
 HICS##Ever had Z group 1.971 0.045 <0.001 1.884 2.062
 UCS##Ever had Z group 1.687 0.026 <0.001 1.636 1.740
Age group (v <7 yr)  
 8-15 0.950 0.008 <0.001 0.933 0.966
 16-30 0.985 0.009 0.089 0.969 1.002
 31-60 1.476 0.013 <0.001 1.450 1.502
 >60 2.165 0.026 <0.001 2.114 2.217
Female (v male) 1.002 0.008 0.792 0.987 1.017
Proximity (v non-proximity) 1.204 0.012 <0.001 1.180 1.227
Post-OSS (v pre-OSS) 1.184 0.022 <0.001 1.142 1.228
Insurance##OSS  
 HICS##Post-OSS 0.855 0.020 <0.001 0.817 0.895
 UCS##Post-OSS 0.830 0.016 <0.001 0.799 0.862
Facility level (v health centres)  
 District hospital 1.506 0.015 <0.001 1.476 1.536
 Provincial hospital 1.446 0.014 <0.001 1.419 1.474
 
